The Communist Party and war communism in Moscow, 1918-1921 by Sakwa, Richard
The Communist Party and War Communism in Moscow, 1918-1921
Richard Sakwa
Submitted for the Degree of PhD
Centre for Russian and East 
European Studies, 
Faculty of Commerce and 
Social Science, 
University of Birmingham, 
1984
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
SYNOPSIS
The thesis is divided into ten chapters and 3 parts. 
Following an introductory chapter on the literature on the main 
issues of the period, Part I opens with a chapter on the social 
and economic transformation of the city of Moscow during war 
communism, and its second chapter analyses the role of the trade 
unions and the pattern of labour relations in this period. 
Part II is concerned with the internal transformation of the 
party and the development of its relationship with society; and 
discusses recruitment, organisation, the nature of militarisation 
during the civil war, the party's ideological work, and its 
relationship to mass bodies. It ends with a study of the Moscow 
soviet and the development of bureaucracy. In Part III the 
debates at the end of war communism are considered in the light 
of the foregoing economic and political developments. The 
conclusion assesses the nature of war communism in Moscow.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
On 2 November 1917 the Moscow Bolsheviks and their allies on 
the Military Revolutionary Committee gained control of the city 
after 8 days of sporadic but often savage fighting against the 
defenders of the Provisional Government. The victors came to 
power with neither a detailed blueprint of the forms that their 
power would take nor of the speed or scale of the social and 
economic transformation that would accompany the general aim of 
establishing some form of socialism in Russia. Other than 
providing some broad economic guidelines, such as the abolition 
of commodity production and of wages, and in the political sphere 
calling for a stateless society, Marx and his followers had been 
loath to provide such a plan, and thus it was left to the 
Bolsheviks, the executors of the first successful socialist 
revolution, to work out in the most unpropitious circumstances 
the meaning of socialism in practice.
The question was not so much one of Marxist theory as of 
tactics. The period up to the beginning of the civil war in mid- 
1918 was marked by the consolidation of Bolshevik power, 
legitimised by their dominance in the Soviets, and saw the other 
parties circumscribed in their activities and possible sources of 
institutional opposition, such as the dumas, eliminated. At the 
same time the initial 'Red Guard attack against capital 1 
following October 1917, aimed at neutralising capitalist 
opposition, after the Brest-Litovsk peace of March 1918 gave way 
to the compromise of the state capitalist breathing space period. 
This stage ended with the beginning of general, if at this point
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formal, nationalisation of all large plant by the decree of 28 
June 1918.
Whereas after the Brest-Litovsk peace Lenin had envisaged a 
fairly long, if unspecified, period in which socialism (the 
state) and capitalism (industry) would coexist to allow the 
development of industry, the supply crisis and the onset of the 
civil war accelerated the elimination of capitalist economic 
relations and forced the introduction of a new system. What had 
begun as a series of measures in response to specific 
circumstances on the morrow of the revolution, though the 
circumstances themselves were provoked by the type of policies 
implemented by the Bolsheviks, was extended during the civil war 
to cover all of social, political and economic life in a system 
that later became known as war communism.
It was in this period that the majority of what are now the 
familiar elements of Soviet-type systems were introduced, 
including the first rudimentary exercises in planning. The 
reasons for their introduction and their manner of operation are 
therefore a crucial aspect of any attempt to understand the 
development of the Soviet system. The traditional view is that 
war communism was 'a compound of war emergency and socialist 
dogmatism'. The problem remains, however, to evaluate how far 
war communism was a coherent if forced application of traditional
socialist precepts, above all aimed at the elimination of
2 commodity production and alienating capitalist relations, or how
1. W.H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921, vol.2, 
London 1938, p.96.
2. The view held, for example, by Paul C Roberts, '"War Communism" 
A Re-examination', Slavic Review, June 1970, pp.238-261.
- 3 -
far it was, as Maurice Dobb and the standard Soviet 
interpretations since the 1930s put it, 'an improvisation in face 
of economic scarcity and military urgency in conditions of 
exhausting civil war 1 .
This study will seek to show that war communism was more than 
an economic system, whether introduced as a pragmatic response to 
circumstances or as a dogmatic exercise in socialist 
fundamentalism, but a complex system of economic and political 
relationships which together created a novel social formation. 
Changes in the economic system affected the organisation of 
labour, which in turn altered the working class's relationship 
with the state and the communist party. Ultimately the state and 
the party developed as a bodies beyond the control of social 
forces. The civil war and foreign intervention acted as the 
catalyst hastening the formation of this new system.
The socialist revolution had been victorious in a country 
where the leaders of the revolution perceived the absence of the 
economic foundations to support that victory. Hence the tension 
between the attempt to build socialism and the need, in their 
view, to create the preconditions for that attempt. It is this 
tension which is sometimes seen as a conflict between ideology 
and pragmatism. Serge Mallet writes that in the first phase of 
socialist industrialisation 'The bureaucracy was occupied with
3. Maurice Dobb, Soviet Economic Development Since 1917, London 
1948, p.122. The literatureontheideologicaland economic 
aspects of war communism has been reviewed by Roberts, op.cit., 
and by Sylvana Malle, The Economic Organisation of War 
Communism, 1918-1921, manuscript of bookto be published by CUP.
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4 the organisation of scarcity 1 . The scarcity for the regime
during the civil war was not confined to the economy but included 
human and cultural resources. The result in the economy was 
centralisation and the coercion of the working class and the 
peasantry, and in the party the concentration of authority in a 
small group at the apex of the party committee structure. We 
shall look at the literature on the economic and political 
aspects of war communism in turn.
1. The economic system of war communism
War communism was characterised by its concentration on the 
central task of winning the civil war. To this end production 
and distribution were bureaucratically centralised, military 
methods were applied in labour relations, and a punitive system 
of grain expropriation was imposed on the peasantry to feed the 
starving cities and the army. Commodity and money relations were 
pushed to the margins as economic life became 'naturalised 1 . It 
was, as Moshe Lewin put it, a 'harsh rationing system 1 , which 
could not provide adequate material incentives and hence relied 
on revolutionary enthusiasm backed up by coercion.
The common interpretation of events following the revolution 
has been summarised by Szamuely:
(a) Immediately after the October Revolution, i.e., in 
the spring of 1918, the Bolshevik Party intended to 
build socialism in conformity with the principles of 
NEP; (b) This was hindered, or rather interrupted, by
4. Serge Mallet, Bureaucracy and Technocracy in the Socialist 
Countries, Spokesman Books, London 1974, p.34.
5. Moshe Lewin, Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic 
Debates, Pluto Press, London 1975, p.77.
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the civil war and foreign military intervention; (c) 
Thus War Communism is nothing else but war economy 
resorted to under the pressure of random coincidence, as 
it were, of historical circumstances; (d) It was , 
abolished as soon as the civil war was terminated.
This view can be criticised from three aspects. Firstly, the 
extent to which aspects of war communism were already implemented 
in the period immediately following the revolution, and before 
the full devlopment of the civil war. Both Medvedev and Szamuely 
argue that looked at in ideological terms there was little to 
differentiate the 'breathing space' period (April-May 1918) from 
the war communism that followed. Medvedev points to specific 
policies that anticipated the later period, such as supply policy 
and state intervention in industry. Szamuely points out that 
Lenin's theoretical conception of the state capitalist period was 
in harmony with war communist ideology, but differed only in its
o
practical application. In other words, the breathing space 
period had little in common with NEP, and to its protagonists war 
communism was both an ideologically desirable state of affairs 
and increasingly a necessary practical solution to the mounting 
problems facing them.
The second line of criticism against the schema presented 
above is that participants in the great drama of war communism 
were convinced that it represented not only a move in the 
direction of communism, but that it was the direct 
implementation of communism. Lenin's vigorous defence of war
6. Laszlo Szamuely, First Models of the Socialist Systems: 
Principles and Theories, Budapest 1974, p.8.
7. Roy Medvedev, The October Revolution, Constable, London 1979, 
pp.117-31.
8. Szamuely, pp.46-62.
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communism at the time requires no comment. The most notable 
analysis of war communism during its brief existence was 
Bukharin's Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda (Economics of the 
Transitional Period), published in May 1920. The work 
essentially argued that in the transition to socialism not only 
the economic readiness of a country should be taken into account 
but also the human and political maturity of that country. In 
other words, the socialist state, not eschewing coercion against
the old order and in its own labour process, could create the
9 
conditions for the 'building of socialism 1 . Marx's economic
categories are rejected and in their place a political gnosis is 
employed in which the party itself creates the new social 
relations. The work therefore illustrates the 'economistic 
deviation of Marxism' wherein the social relations of production 
are subordinated to the development of the productive forces 
themselves. Arguing on the basis of the circumstances of the 
time Bukharin, and with him Trotsky, developed a strategy based 
on coercion which provided a model for the later development of 
industry. Put another way, war communism was not so much a 
response to exogenous circumstances as a specific programme for
the introduction of socialism in which, as Szamuely points out,
12 
every one of its traits had its own theoretical background.
9. Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution:
A Political Biography, 1888-1938, Vintage Books, New York 1975,
pp.90-5.
10. Malle, p.7.
11. Malle, p.5. This indeed was the classic Stalinist view, 
discussed by Charles Bettelheim, Class Struggles in the USSR: 
First Period, 1917-1923, Harvester Press, 1976, pp.20-9.
12. Szamuely, p.44.
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The third point against the above schema centres on the 
circumstances of the introduction of NEP. As Szamuely has 
hinted, if Lenin defined NEP as a 'retreat 1 , as a 'concession to 
the peasantry', and that it would 'last long but not forever', 
then what was the presumed economic model against which the 
'retreat 1 was measured if not war communism? In his pamphlet 
'The Tax in Kind 1 (21 April 1921) Lenin argued that war communism
had been forced by 'war and ruin 1 and had only been a 'temporary
14 
measure'. This came after widespread disturbances in the
country and months of bitter conflict in the party over democracy 
and the trade unions, and at the X party congress held a few 
weeks earlier Lenin had flayed the oppositions. Malle comments 
on his position thus:
Through this politically brilliant 'composition of 
opposites 1 , Lenin was able to strike simultaneously at 
the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and 
Kautskyists, and at the Workers' Opposition, against 
which most of his efforts were directed at the party 
congress. If war communism had been necessary, it could 
not be mistaken. Vice-versa, if mistakes had been made 
in the choice of policies, the effective policies were 
not necessary, but on the contrary, perverse. Lenin 
laid the foundations for both interpretations of war 
communism.
Lenin's interpretation of war communism at the VII Moscow 
guberniya party conference in October 1921 argued that it had 
been an attempt to achieve socialism by the quickest possible 
route forced by the 'logic of the struggle', and that it had 
failed, and this is crucial, because
13. Szamuely, p.8.
14. V.I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (PSS), 5th ed, 
vol.43, p.220.
15. Malle, p.15.
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The political situation in spring 1921 showed us that 
on a range of economic questions we had to retreat to a 
position of state capitalism, to shift from 'storming' 
to a position of 'siege'.
In other words, the aims of war communism had been correct but 
the methods employed to achieve them had to be adjusted when 
faced with the political, and not so much the economic, crisis of 
spring 1921.
In all important respects, then, the schema presented above 
is inaccurate. War communism had strong ideological 
underpinnings and in many ways represented, to contemporary and 
to later Bolsheviks, a viable pattern of development. 
Nevertheless, Lenin's contradictory evaluation of war communism 
has stimulated a debate that continues to the present day.
One of the first attempts to rehabilitate war communism from 
Lenin's critique was carried out by Kritsman. His defensive 
account of the period emphasised the positive programme aimed at 
eliminating commodity production on the basis of several 
overriding principles: class exclusivity, the labour principle 
enacted through the obligation to work, the collective principle 
expressed through collegiality, and the principle of rationality 
which was to sweep away the old fetishistic relations. While 
exalting war communism as an expression of the immanent 
tendencies of the proletarian revolution, which in the period 
1918-20 led to the formation of what he called the proletarian- 
natural economic structure, Kritsman had no illusions about the
16. Lenin PSS, vol.44, p.204.
17. L. Kritsman, Geroicheskii period velikoi russkoi 
revolyutsii: opyt analiza t.n. "voennogo kommunizma", M/L. 1926, 
pp.82-4.
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actual practice of the system. The transformation took place, he 
argued, on a basis unprepared by capitalist development and using 
unsuitable materials (petty-bourgeois and small capitalist forms) 
leading to the inevitable deformation of the proletarian-natural 
economy, such as its split into a legal and an illegal part and 
the growth of bureaucracy (Chs.VII and VIII). In sum, he argued,
It is easy to see the period 1918-20, war communism, 
not as the transition to socialism but as the 
organisation of the 'rear', not the organisation of 
socialism but as the organisation of the war, i.e., the 
simulation of the transition to socialism.
Kritsman has therefore been able to transcend the rather 
sterile debate over the supposed opposition between ideology and 
expediency in the development of war communism: it was both. The 
immanent tendencies of the October revolution were revealed by 
the civil war, which caused the deformation of the proletarian 
revolution beyond what was economically feasible (as Lenin had
recognised during the breathing space period) in order to destroy
19 the internal sources of strength of the counter-revolution.
The civil war only hastened the development of what was implicit 
in the very act of the Bolshevik seizure of power. His account 
therefore contains some of Lenin's contradictory evaluations of 
war communism, but stresses its necessity in the circumstances. 
While recent Soviet historical writing has avoided some of 
the more dogmatic assertions of Stalinist historiography on the 
random nature of war communism, there is still a tendency to 
regard it as an aberration coming between the proto-NEP of early 
1918 and the NEP itself, and forced by war alone. The guestion 
then arises that if this was indeed the case, then why was the
18. Kritsman, p.71. 19. loc.cit.
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opportunity afforded by the breathing space of the first months 
of 1920, after the victories over Koichak and Denikin, not used 
to relax war communist policies, but instead saw their 
intensification and the militarisation of labour? Gimpel'son 
argues that the military situation was still unclear, and that 
some of the more fantastic notions for the intensification of war
communism, such as the expropriation of the kulaks raised at the
20 IX party congress in March, were in fact rejected. This does
not answer the question of why no serious attempt was made to 
review the aptness of war communist policies, for example, in 
relation to the grain reguisitioning policies. 
On this point Szamuely is clear:
Thus, the war economy of the civil war years brought 
about a momentary correspondence between the earlier 
theoretical assumptions about socialist economy and the 
everyday requirements of practice, while the military 
victory over the enemies proved that the methods of 
economic organisation had been correct and purposeful - 
and it seemed that the theory also had stood the test. 
It is accordingly not surprising that after the 
conclusion of the civil war Lenin - together with the 
other leaders of the Bolshevik party - should have 
wished to utilise the methods and institutions found and 
tested during the war for the peaceful construction of 
socialism.
It was to take further economic collapse and worker and peasant 
insurgency, together with dangerous conflict within the party, 
before the need for NEP became 'self-evident 1 . Instead, war 
communism was intensified at home and attempts were made to link 
the Russian economy with the relatively advanced German economy
20. E.G. Gimpel'son, "Voennyi kommunizm": politika, praktika, 
ideologiya, M. 1973, pp.191-2.
21. Szamuely, p.65.
- 11 -
22 by waging a 'revolutionary war' to seize the Polish bridge. As
Chamberlin put it, the closing stages of war communism were 
marked by an increasing miasma of 'bureaucratic unreality' as
ever more grandiose ideas, such as the integrated economic plan,
23 
were mooted in ever more miserable circumstances. While the
key to the debate between ideology and pragmatism, as Sheila
Fitzpatrick points out, lies in differing conceptions of how
24 quickly the Bolsheviks could move towards communism, and
naturally clothed their understanding in suitable ideological 
garments, once the NEP 'retreat 1 had been decided these garbs had 
to be suitably laundered.
The key component of the economic system of war communism 
was glavkism, the strict centralisation of economic management on 
vertical lines, or as Sapronov put it, in pillars. Though the 
glavki began to be formed before war communism, and were weakened 
already by the end of 1920 though some survived as a system of 
management later, their identification with war communism is
correct because, as Gimpel'son put it, what is meant by glavkism
25 is the 'hypertrophy of centralised management 1 . For Gimpel'son
they were a function of the war and therefore he rejects
Kritsman's argument that they were, however imperfectly, a
2 6 
'breakthrough of the future into the present 1 , on the grounds
22. Norman Davies, 'The Missing Revolutionary War', 
Soviet Studies, XXVII, 2, April 1975, p.179.
23. Chamberlin, p.296.
24. Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, OUP 1982, p.71.
25. E.G. Gimpel'son, Velikii oktyabr' i stanovlenie sovetskoi 
sistemy upravleniya narodnym khozyaistvom, M. 1977, p.68.
26. Kritsman, p.75.
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that this betrays a lack of understanding of their specific
2 7 historical location.
Gimpel'son's view, however, neglects the broader political 
implications of glavkism in particular and the ideological input 
of war communism in general which Kritsman, for all his 
shortcomings, attempted to integrate into a general analysis of 
the period. In his 'Critique of the Gotha Programme 1 Marx had 
dismissed the idea that the succesful proletarian revolution 
could immediately embark on the creation of the 'people's state 1 , 
on the grounds that the bourgeois state had its roots in 
capitalist production which could not be abolished at a stroke. 
Instead, he argued,
...Between capitalist and communist society lies the 
period of the revolutionary transformation of the one 
into the other. Corresponding to this is also a 
political transformation period in which the state can 
be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the 
proletariat.
The bourgeois state was rooted in economic exploitation, and
hence, according to Lenin in 'State and Revolution 1 , the
i
bourgeois state is abolished after the revolution, but the
proletarian state would only wither away in proportion to the
29 disappearance of capitalism. During the breathing space period
the bourgeois state was destroyed and a new one created, but it 
was only during war communism that it set upon the task of 
eliminating capitalism in its entirety, and this it achieved by 
the massive consolidation of state power, epitomised in its
27. Gimpel'son (1977), p.69.
28. Quoted in 'State and Revolution 1 , Lenin PSS, vol.33, p.86.
29. Lenin, PSS, vol.33, p.91.
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economic aspect by the development of glavki. Just as the 
bourgeois state was rooted in economic reality, so the socialist 
state expanded as a measure of the increasingly ambitious 
economic tasks it set itself.
The civil war provoked the integration of the theory of the 
transitional period with the practice of of Bolshevik power in 
the system of war communism. Glavkism and one-man management, 
the centralised economy and the militarised labour process, all 
underlay the economic functions of the state in the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, but at the same time it had a profound effect 
on the political organisation of the state. By concentrating on 
the economic structure of war communism, and the associated 
debates over the relationship to the peasantry, wages policy, 
management, and over the very essence of the nature of the 
transitional period, the implications of the political system of 
war communism are often under-rated. War communism was a fusion 
of economic and poltical practice in which the role of the state 
was intensified, but within that state the party became supreme. 
The war and the elimination of capitalism required the 
development of a massive state apparatus, but it was the party 
that gave the state order and direction. The dictatorship of the 
proletariat became transformed into the dictatorship of the 
party.
2. The political system of war communism
A debate over the nature of the changes that took place in 
the party during the civil war has taken place in parallel to, 
and usually in isolation from, the debate over the nature of the 
economic policy of war communism. Many of the same issues have
- 14 -
been raised: the role of ideology and specifically the influence 
of Lenin's organisational precepts launched in his 1902 pamphlet 
'What is to be Done? 1 ; the weight to be attached to exogenous 
factors such as the civil war in determining the changes in this 
period; and the extent of the change between the party of 1917 
compared to that of 1921. The major difference colouring the 
various interpretations is that whereas in the economy a major 
break took place in early 1921, in the party not only were civil 
war party organisational methods not discarded, but were on the 
contrary intensified. A central question therefore is, why was a 
NEP introduced but the old political policy retained?
Robert Service has described the changes in the party 
between 1917 and 1922 as an 'internal metamorphosis'. 
Explanations for this metamorphosis have been sought in processes 
internal to the party: its organisational principles, its 
totalistic ideology, and the application of general sociological 
laws (especially those formulated by Robert Michels and Max 
Weber) of functional differentiation found in all large 
bureaucratic organisations in modern industrial societies. 
Others have stressed the 'external 1 factors such as the 
international situation (above all the lack of a succesful 
revolution in Western Europe), Russia's bureaucratic and 
authoritarian heritage in a peasant society, and the ambitious 
tasks the party set itself in a culturally and economically 
backward country. In this vein a recent article has argued that
30. Robert Service, The Bolshevik Party in Revolution 1917-1923: 
A Study in Organisational Change, Macmillan 1979, p.3.
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...The nature of the revolution and the civil war, not 
Leninist theory and pre-revolutionary experiences, were 
decisive forces in the creation of the party machine by 
1921.
Such an approach raises a series of questions on why, out of 
various responses, particular policies were adopted at specific 
times and not others. Ideology, if not always Leninist theory, 
as we shall see, constantly impinged on the choices made at 
various points of the civil war. This line also fails to 
establish a relationship between the economic revolution and the 
political consolidation.
In his interpretation of the period E.H. Carr has looked at 
economic changes in isolation from changes within the party. For 
him war communism was 'the product of a special emergency, and
lacked a suffi ciently solid social and economic basis to ensure
32 its full survival... 1 This was indeed the case, but the whole
problem was that by early 1921 its political basis had been 
undermined. As for the political changes, his stress lies on the 
application of Michels's 'iron law of oligarchy' to the party, 
exacerbated by circumstances, but not 'peculiarly Russian or 
peculiarly Bolshevik 1 .
A very different interpretation is proposed by Abdurakhman 
Avtorkhanov, who has written a political history of the Bolshevik
31. Jonathan R. Adelman, 'The Development of the Soviet Party 
Apparat in the Civil war: Center, Localities and Nationality 
Areas', Russian History/Histoire Russe, 9, pt 1, 1982, p.87. The 
main positions on these questions have been summarised by 
Service, pp.4-7.
32. E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution: 1917-1923, vol.2, 
Pelican 1966, p.270.
33. E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution: 1917-1923, vol.1, 
Pelican 1966, p.192.
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party. In his view the party established its dictatorship over 
the working class and society soon after the October revolution. 
This dictatorship was not of the party as a whole, though, but of 
its Central Committee (TsK), then the Politburo and the 
Secretariat, but above all the group around Lenin and finally of 
Stalin himself. In short, he describes the technology of power 
and the development of the central party apparatus. His work, 
based largely on the materials of the party congresses during the 
civil war, does not have have much to say on the social and 
economic conditions that made possible the development of this
power, nor does he analyse the conditions within the party that
34 facilitated the rise to power of this group.
Both Daniels and Schapiro have written works that look at 
the civil war developments in the party from the point of view of 
the oppositions. Daniels admits that late 1920 was the high 
point of 'Communist liberalism 1 in the party, and that the reform 
movement achieved significant strength and some gains in its 
attempts to overcome some of the worst aspects of centralisation 
imposed during the war. With Avtorkhanov, he argues that the 
party leadership and Lenin himself had specific objectives of 
their own - 'to maintain a firm hold of the party machinery 1 . 
A similar view is taken by Schapiro, and he recognised the 
importance of war communism, as distinct from the civil war, as 
the key to the victory of the party machine:
34. A. Avtorkhanov, Proiskhozhdenie partokratii, vol.1, 
TsK i Lenin, Posev, Frankfurt 1973.
35. R.V. Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist 
Opposition in Soviet Russia, London I960, pp.117-8.
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Though 'war communism 1 failed as a system of organising 
national economy, it helped lay the foundations for the 
dictatorship of the communist bureaucracy which^gas 
designed to replace the old machinery of state.
Several recent studies have confirmed that in 1917 the 
Bolshevik party was not the monolithic, disciplined, party of 
later myth, even though it must be stressed that the Bolshevik 
party was still incomparably better organised than its rivals. 
All the factors mentioned above certainly played their part in 
realising the myth by the early 1920s, but the bases of the 
contrast should be examined.
Neil Harding points out that after October 1917 the notion
of democratic centralism, hitherto restricted to the party, was
3 8 
extended to the rest of society. This left the role of the
party unclear since once it had organised the revolution its
functions were now in theory to be carried out by the proletariat
39 
as a whole. In the first six months after the revolution the
party faded into the background as the enormous project of the 
destruction of the bourgeois state and its replacement by soviet 
forms went ahead. The bourgeois state was smashed and in its 
place a massive new state was established, and at first it was 
not the state but the party itself that was in danger of
36. Leonard Schapiro, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: 
Political Opposition in the Soviet State 1917-2T]London 1955 , 
p.217.
37. This has been shown by Service, ch.2, for the country as a 
whole; Alexander Rabinowich, The Bolsheviks Come to Power: 
The Revolution of 1917 in PetFograd, New York 1976 , for 
Petrograd; and B'Ann Bowman, The Mo"scow Bolsheviks, February - 
November 1917, PhD dissertation, Indiana, 1973, for Moscow. ~~
38. Neil Harding, Lenin's Political Thought, vol.2, Theory and 
Practice in the Socialist Revolution, Macmillan 1981, p.175.
39. ibid., p.177.
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withering away. The party poured its members into the new state 
structures, the party leaders became the leaders of the new 
state, but up to mid-1918 there remained the unresolved problem 
of its role in the new state system. Preobrazhenskii allegedly
even went so far as to suggest that the party could be disbanded
40 
since it duplicated the structure of the proletarian state.
By March-April 1918, with the revolution still confined to 
one country, Lenin's thoughts increasingly stressed the 
dictatorship of the proletariat concept over commune forms. This 
expressed itself, as Harding writes, in the debates over 
'workers' control and one-man management...between the trade
unions and the Supreme Economic Council...between the Council of
41 People's Commissars and the Soviets'. The self-activity of the
workers and peasants was gradually replaced by centralised power 
and authoritarian command structures with the masses relegated to 
the role of 'checkers'. Social and political circumstances thus 
led Lenin towards envisaging the dictatorship of the proletariat 
as a transitional phase suitable to the alignment of class and 
international forces until commune forms could come into their 
own. Central to the new analysis was the enhanced administrative 
role of the party as the only force cohesive enough in the 
transitional period to ensure the execution of the socialist 
programme. By mid-1918 the working class as a whole had proved
itself incapable, Lenin argued, of managing the country on its
42 
own. The relationship of the party to the new state, however,
remained undefined.
40. Bettelheim, p.302. No source is given for this claim
41. Harding, p.187. 42. ibid., p.196.
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The extent to which commune forms were introduced after 
October 1917 is debatable, but the main point is valid. The 
beginning of the civil war coincided with a reappraisal of the 
role of the communist party in the Soviet state. As part of this 
process the internal organisation of the party was improved and 
its leading role in the state confirmed. Under the impetus of 
the transition to war communism the 'withering away of the party 1 
was halted, and in parallel with the economic revolution a new 
model party was forged which drew its ideological inspiration 
partly from pre-revolutionary ideas developed by Lenin and 
briefly neglected in the first flush of revolution, and partly 
from the organisational reguirements of war communism itself.
The party in 1917, emerging from the underground into a 
multi-party competititive environment and with different 
objectives than those of a ruling party, could not but have 
organised and behaved differently than later. When faced with
dominance over state power, however, an underlying unity is
43 
revealed between the earlier and later stages. The responses
include: no organisational unity or alliances with other parties 
or groups without Bolshevik supremacy; Bolshevik fractions owing 
primary allegiance to the party and not to the organisation in 
which they worked (soviets, trade unions, Komsomol, etc.,); the 
principle of individual party member allegiance and subordination
43. Just as there were in the responses in the economic sphere 
even before the war stimulated the creation of the full-blown war 
communist economy. As Malle puts it: 'There were certain 
constraints, like the centralisation of economic decisions, 
collective commodity exchange, the incapacity to make use of 
financial means of control, which preceded the major involvement 
in war and prepared some further economic developments', Malle, 
p.22.
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to the party above all else; hierarchical command structures 
designated by the term democratic centralism. At the same time 
in society, just as commodity relations were extirpated during
war communism, so were 'islands of separatism 1 eliminated and the
44 one-party state established.
Over these general principles there was a consensus amongst 
the majority in the party for the greater part of the war. But 
the way in which these principles were applied within the party 
aroused increasing opposition, and by 1920 the consensus broke 
down and various groups emerged with alternative organisational 
precepts. Democratic centralism was extended to the rest of 
society and at the same time it began to be interpreted 
increasingly restrictiveiy within the party. Broadly speaking, the 
oppositions sought to establish institutional safeguards to allow 
each unit in the soviet state the exercise of its nominal 
prerogatives. The issues centred over the extent to which 
commune forms could be restored by allowing greater scope for the 
working class organised in trade unions or the Soviets, for the 
rank and file party member in the party organisations, and in 
general the extent to which the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
in the sense of centralised party and state control, could be 
relaxed. The failure of the challenge in 1920-early 1921 marked 
the consolidation of war communist forms of party organisation 
which in essence remain to this day as the basis of Soviet-type 
systems.
44. Cf., Carl J. Friedrich, 'Evolving Theory and Practice 1 in 
Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views, London 1969, p.107.
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This study will focus on the city of Moscow during the civil 
war and will aim to show how the processes described above 
developed in practice. The city can be seen as a microcosm of 
the changes that took place in the country at large, but because 
of its overwhelming importance as the seat of Bolshevik power it 
was also a crucible in which crucial processes for the rest of 
the country were developed. Here were concentrated the major 
industrial resources of Soviet power, the largest concentration 
of workers, and the biggest communist party organisation. The 
work will look at the development of the centralised Soviet state 
in its local context. Among the guestions considered are the 
degree to which the war or the attempt to eliminate commodity 
relations enhanced the powers of the centralised state; the 
nature of the internal metamorphosis of the Moscow party; the 
definition of its relationship to society; and the failure of the 
reform movements in 1920-1. The basic questions posed are the 
nature of war communism, how it worked in practice, and the role 
of the party in the new system. The three parts broadly 
correspond to the social and economic changes and their results; 
the changes in the party and its role in society; and finally the 
political and ideological debates at the end of the period.
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PART I 
Society and Economy During the Civil War
After three years of war the Russian revolutions swept away 
first the autocracy, and then the bourgeois democratic 
Provisional Government, and it was to be three more years before 
peace was to return. At the price of heavy territorial and 
material losses Russia withdrew from the first world war in March 
1918 through the peace of Brest-Litovsk. For a brief period a 
semblance of peace returned to the unhappy country, but by May 
1918 war returned in its most terrible visage: civil war. The 
swiftness of the Bolshevik victory in October 1917 was now belied 
by two and a half years of vicious fighting in which the delayed 
resistance to the October revolution took the form of anti- 
Bolshevik armies in the field.
Following the revolt of the Czechoslovak legion in May 1918 
anti-Bolshevik governments were established in Siberia and on the 
Volga, foreign forces escalated their activities in Murmansk, 
Arkhangel, Odessa, and Vladivostok; Denikin and his Volunteer 
army extended their territories in the south; while Kolchak in 
the East forged a powerful anti-Soviet army. A brief lull in the 
fighting in autumn 1918 gave way to the life and death struggles 
of 1919. Gradually the advantage turned in favour of the 
Bolsheviks as Yudenich's advance on Petrograd in summer 1919 was 
turned, Denikin's attack on Moscow reversed in November, and 
Kolchak's forces in Siberia dispersed in early 1920. With the 
defeat of Wrangel in the South in November 1920 and the signature 
of the Peace of Riga with Poland in that month the war was
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largely over. The country lay ruined and exhausted. It was 
against this background that the centralised Russian Soviet state 
was reconstructed as a powerful instrument of military and 
internal coercion. The period coincided with massive social, 
economic and political changes that together created the system 
of war communism. The coincidence of war and the development of 
war communism would suggest that the one flowed logically from 
the other. In practice, the actual development of policies and 
their introduction had a greater autonomy than necessity forced 
by the exigencies of war.
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CHAPTER 2 
Population and Economy of Moscow
During the civil war Moscow's social and economic structure 
changed with unprecedented rapidity. The general circumstances 
of the time and Bolshevik policies together accelerated the 
collapse of the city's traditional economy and radically altered 
social relationships. The size and structure of the population 
and working class changed, and at the same time a centralised and 
bureaucratically administered economy emerged and with it an 
alter ego, the illegal economy.
1. Urbanisation and deurbanisation
Moscow's population had grown rapidly after the 1861 peasant 
emancipation, nearly tripling in size from 394,000 in 1862 to 
1,039,000 in 1897. ^  Between 1900 and 1910 the growth rate of the 
population at 3.5% per annum was the fastest of any city in the 
world, and in the next five years it accelerated to a massive 
5.5% every year. By 1912 Moscow was the egual sixth largest city 
in the world (with St Petersburg) with a population of 1,617,700, 
which by early 1917 had peaked at 2,017,173 (Appendix I). 2
Moscow's growth was a classic case of urbanisation resulting
1. Statisticheskii spravochnik g. Moskvy i Moskovskoi gubernii 
1927g., M. 1928, p.24.
2. Krasnaya Moskva: sbornik state! (KM) , M. 1920, cols.52-3. 
Moscow's importance as an urban centre can be seen from the fact 
that while in 1913 the city represented only 1.17% of the Russian 
empire's total population of 137.2 mln, it nevertheless contained 
6.5% of the country's urban population of 24.7 mln, Izmeneniya 
sotsial'noi struktury sovetskogo obshchestva: oktyabr' 1917-1920, 
M. 1976, p.248.
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from inmigration stimulated by industrialisation. Urban 
development was encouraged by state-aided capitalist industrial 
expansion over half a century. By 1912 out of 165,184 industrial 
workers in the city 149,529 (90.5%) were inmigrants, i.e., had 
been born outside the city. The massive expansion of the city 
generated powerful social conflicts, which when combined with 
Russia's unsuccessful participation in the first world war led on 
to the revolutions of 1917. At the same time the ability of the
municipal authorities to respond to the new circumstances was
4 
undermined by the Tsarist government. During the civil war
capitalist social conflict gave way to a profound social crisis 
in which the whole population shared. The problem became one of 
survival in the competition for a share of the meagre resources 
available. New patterns of privilege and authority became 
established which in turn stimulated a new terrain of political 
consciousness.
By 1920 Moscow's population had fallen below the 1897 level, 
with a 40.1% loss during the civil war alone. At the height of 
the war and the assault against commodity relations in 1919/20 
nearly a quarter of Moscow's population left in a single year 
(Appendix 1). The decrease was not distributed evenly
3. KM, col.170.
4. On urbanisation and municipal government, see Michael F. 
Hamm, 'The Breakdown of Urban Modernisation: A Prelude to the 
Revolutions of 1917', in The City in Russian History, Kentucky 
1976, pp.182-195; and James H. Bater, 'Some Dimensions of 
Urbanisation and the Response of Municipal Government: Moscow and 
St Petersburg 1 , Russian History/Histoire Russe, 5, pt.1, 1978, 
pp.46-63 .
5. Between 21 April 1918 and 28 August 1920 the population 
decreased by 689,000, and by 1920 the population had decreased by
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over the city, however, with the fall greatest in the working 
class suburbs, where it had fallen by up to a half, while in the 
middle class and bureaucratic centre there was little change. 
In an interview with H.G. Wells in late 1920 Lenin was even 
prepared to consider that the decline of the cities under 
communism would be allowed to continue. The city had grown as a 
function of the development of capitalism, and the period of the 
destruction of capitalism was marked by the decline of the city. 
But the deurbanisation of the revolutionary period marked not 
only the collapse of the capitalist economy in particular but of 
the industrial economy in general. The villages took back the 
population that they had so recently given to the towns, and the 
urban-based Bolshevik party was faced with the erosion of its 
physical and ideological heartlands.
Some of the demographic effects of the wars are shown in 
Table I, overleaf. From the table it can be seen that the 
marriage rate fell at the beginning of the first war, but from 
1917 began to rise steeply. The number of marriages had fallen 
from 10,000 in 1914 to 7500 each in 1915 and 1916, then risen to 
9900 in 1917. In just the first half of 1919 alone there were 
nearly as many civil marriages (9359) as in all of 1917, which
49.1% since the February 1917 peak, Statisticheskii ezhegodnik g 
Moskvy i Moskovskoi gubernii, issue 2, 1914-1925, M. 1927, p.9.
6. KT, 21 August, 22 October 1920. In Moscow guberniya the 
popuTation had increased as the population of the city dispersed 
to the countryside, and in some uezds the population rose by 
nearly 20%, KT, 22 October 1920.
7. H.G. Wells, Russia in the Shadows, London 1920, p.134; 
Sunday Express, 28 November 1920.
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Table 1
Natural movement of Moscow city population,1913-1921
(per 1000 population)
Marriages Divorces Births Deaths Natural Deaths per 100
change up to 1 yr old
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
Source :
6 .0
5.5
4.1
3.9
5.4
7.5
17.4
19.1
16.9
Stat .
2
3
3
5
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31.
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0
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6
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4
4
7
.12-1
24
23
24
23
23
29
45
36
25
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.2
.0
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.9
.4
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7
7
2
-0
-4
-15
-28
-14
5
.5
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.9
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.1
.1
.0
.9
.1
28
27
30
34
35
32
33
23
24
.5
.9
.3
.2
.5
.2
.0
.0
.8
when the population fall is taken into account represented a 250%
gincrease. The change in the balance of the population in favour 
of women, the easier conditions of divorce, the introduction of 
simple civil marriage, delayed marriages from the first war, and
perhaps the search for family security in a time of cataclysmic
9 
change, all led to this extraordinary marriage boom. At the
same time, the civil war saw the divorce rate double (Table 1). 
Together with the rise in the marriage rate the the civil war saw 
a rise in the birth rate after the steady decline during the 
first war. The number of births fell from 54,000 in 1914 to 
25,000 in 1918, and it remained at this level despite the 
declining population, leading to an increased birth rate. The 
demobilisation of 1918 and the high marriage rate played their 
part in this boom, but another factor was the campaign waged on
8. Vechernie izvestiya Moskovskogo soveta (VIMS), 3 September 
1919.
9. In Petrograd the marriage rate reached the amazing level of 
27.7 per thousand in 1920, O naselenii Moskvy. M. 1980, p.29.
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health grounds from late 1918 against the enormous number of 
illegal abortions carried out by Moscow doctors. Abortion 
itself was only legalised in November 1920.
One of the major factors driving the population from the 
city was the shortage of food. The recommended daily calorie 
intake for industrial workers was set at 3600, but at no time 
during the civil war was this achieved. The daily consumption 
of bread by the average Muscovite fell from 648 gms in 1913 to 
537 in 1916 and 422 in August 1919; meat consumption between 1913 
and August 1919 fell dramatically from 615 to 59 gms a day; fish 
from 410 to 164 gms; fat intake halved between 1916 and 1919 from 
31 to 15 gms; and potato consumption in 1919 was 348 gms a day. 
The workers' diet was reportedly worse than that of the soviet 
employee, and both these worse than that of a middle class 
person. In August 1919, for example, a worker consumed 373 gms 
of potatoes a day and 328 gms of bread, while the respective 
figures for the middle class were 389 and 480 gms. A worker 
received 37% of his bread by ration, and the bourgeois 29%,
reflecting the greater dependence of the bourgeoise on the
12 
market. The periods of the worst food shortages in early to
mid-1919 and early 1921 corresponded to periods of maximum worker
10. Vechernyaya krasnaya gazeta, 28 September 1918.
11. The consumption of the average worker in Moscow in terms of 
the total energy value of diet measured in calories consumed per 
person per day, with an indication of the quality of the diet 
shown by the amount of animal protein consumed, ranged from 2066 
calories (29.2 gms of animal protein) in March 1919; 2554 (9.1) 
in July; 2791 (4.6) in December; 3430 (13.8) in May 1920; 2744 
(7.5) in October; and 2411 (12.9) in April 1921, Steve 
Wheatcroft, University of Birmingham SIPS, 20, 1981, pp.13-14.
12. VIMS, 3 September 1919.
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disturbances.
The lack of food encouraged large numbers to leave the city, 
and at the same time hunger weakened the resistance of those who 
remained against disease and cold. The death rate began to rise 
in 1918 and reached the catastrophic level of 45.4 per thousand
in 1919, and took a particularly heavy toll of infants and old
14 people. By the end of 1919 a worker took 19.2 days off work a
year because of illness, compared to about 11 in 1917. From 
late 1918 the city was struck by a typhus epidemic, and later by 
attacks of cholera. The renewed typhus epidemic at the end of 
1919 had a particularly high mortality rate. The average of 
128 deaths a day in the city in 1918 rose to 170 in 1919,and in 
1920 fell to 121, though given the fall in the population this 
does not represent a significant fall.
Despite the decreased population the housing shortage in the 
city remained acute. Between 1918 and 1920 the number of living
units (flats) fell from 231,485 to 189,811, a fall of 18% and a
18 
return to the 1910 level. Many buildings were gutted to
provide firewood, and the use of crude stoves and open grates 
provoked a massive number of fires, which in the winter of
13. In 1919 in Petrograd the death rate reached 77.1 per 
thousand, O Naselenii Moskvy, p.29.
14. KM, col.74. 15. KM, col.186.
16. In October 1918 there were 357 cases of typhus in the city, 
in November 1009, in December 2482, and this epidemic peaked in 
March 1919 with 11,974 cases (500 of which were not Muscovites), 
VIMS, 3, 31 May, 11 November 1919.
17. KT, 25 October 1921.
18. Over the same period the number of empty flats increased 
from 5698 to 16,217: they had been rendered uninhabitable by the 
lack of maintenance and the search for fuel, KT, 22 October 1920
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1919-20 alone destroyed 850 buildings. 19 In addition, the 
burgeoning bureaucratic apparatus devoured living space as 
buildings were converted into offices, a particularly severe 
problem since the government move from Petrograd in March 1918. 
Therefore, despite the fall in population there was an acute
housing crisis by 1921, exacerbated by the flood of people coming
20 to the city to seek refuge from famine.
During the civil war Moscow's age structure did not change 
significantly (Appendix 3), though the trend continued to redress 
the imbalance caused by the pre-war inmigration of people of
working age. Before the revolution Moscow had had a much more
t 
homogenously Russian population than Petrograd, but during the
wars the city became more cosmopolitan as the proportion of 
national minorities increased, especially of Jews, and more 
Russians than others took part in the exodus to the countryside. 
By 1920 Russians comprised 84.8% of the population compared to 
95.2% in 1921 (Appendix 2).
The pattern of urbanisation as a function of
industrialisation is revealed in the preponderance of men over 
women in the population structure as the men came to work in the 
new factories. Hence the disproportion was most marked in the 
working age groups and levelled out in the under 10 and over 50 
groups. The non-working class areas of the city had a more
19. KT, 18 March 1921.
20. In April 1920 3000 people officially arrived; in May 4600; 
and in June 7850, all asking for accomodation, (KT, 4 August 
1920). On housing and other aspects of the social crisis see 
William John Chase, Moscow and its Working Class, 1918-1928: 
A Social Analysis, PhD Dissertation, Boston 1979, pp.39-47 and 
passim.
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balanced structure since there were fewer newcomers from the 
countryside. The tendency for the sex ratios to equalise, as the 
families of workers came to join the men and women were drawn 
into industry, was hastened by war and revolution. Men were 
called into the armies while the refugees from the western 
provinces were predominantly women, and the deurbanisation of the 
civil war hit the male population hardest. Between 1912 and 1920 
the male population of the city decreased by 380,000 and the 
female by 211,000, and so from mid-1917 women became the majority 
of the population at just over half (Appendix 4).
In sum, the civil war saw a massive decline in Moscow's 
population as it fell to only nineteenth largest in the world by 
1920. Two-fifths of its citizens left in little over two years, 
and those who remained suffered from hunger, disease and cold. 
For the first time since the beginning of industrialisation women 
became a majority of the population.
2. Social structure and the working class
Russian cities, and Moscow in particular, had a far higher 
percentage than other European cities of independent population 
(i.e., those earning an income or wage) because of the pattern of 
urban inmigration. The tendency was for the two parts to 
equalise, and this was not halted by the first world war despite 
the increased role of women in production and the decrease in the 
proportion of the child population (Appendices 3, 4), because of
21. In 1897 there were 755 women for every 1000 men; in 1912 
843; in February 1917 983, in October 1917 1016; and'in August 
1920 1063, Stat. spravochnik, p.24; M.Ya. Vydro, Naselenie 
Moskvy, M. 1976, pp.18, 21. '
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the influx of refugees with their families and the closure of the 
factories in 1917-18. The situation changed radically during the 
civil war as the population of the city fell and the remainder 
were pressed into employment. By 1920 the proportion of the 
independent population had risen substantially, nearly reaching 
pre-war levels:
Table 2 
Independent population of Moscow city, 1912-1920
Total Independent Dependent % independent 
population
1912 1,616,415 1,052,263 565,152 65
1918 1,716,022 935,098 780,924 54.5
1920 1,027,000 651,118 375,882 63.4
Sources: Vydro, p.39; KM, col.167. The figure of 935,098 
includes 89,003 unemployed: if this number is subtracted the 
percentage of independent people in 1918 falls to 49.3.
Between 1918 and 1920 the city lost 283,980, or 30.4%, of its 
independent population, but 405,042, or 51.9%, of its dependent 
population, which indicates that the majority of those who left 
were not employed, above all unemployed women and children. 
Moscow's employment structure returned to an earlier stage of 
industrial development both because of the departure of 
dependents, and also because those who remained were drafted into 
labour. At the same time the occupational structure itself 
changed.
The greatest change in Moscow's social structure was the 
fall in the number of bosses (68%) and in the number of service 
workers, including domestic servants (63.6%). The number of 
employees of various types fell by a mere 13.5%, much less than
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the rate of population fall, and therefore as a proportion of the 
population rose from 15% in 1918 to 21% in 1920, and as a 
proportion of the independent population rose from 21.6% to 
34.3%. The number of manual workers over this period fell by a 
third, but as a proportion of the total population increased from 
17.8% to 20%. However, because of the increased weight of the 
employee category manual workers fell slightly as a proportion of 
the independent population from 32.7% to 31.5% (Appendix 5).
The fall in the numbers of the industrial working class was 
only slightly higher (43.8%) than the fall in the city's total 
population and hence there was little change in its relative 
weight.
Table 3
Moscow's industrial working class, 1913-1921 
Moscow city Moscow guberniya Total
1913
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
Source :
148
205
155
115
87
84
Stat.
,212
,919
,026
,962
,091
,408
ezhegodnik ,
235,632
242,824
241,829
159,971
110,605
115,421
p. 171.
383,844
448, 743
398,855
275 ,933
197,696
199,829
As a proportion of the total population the group fell from 10.2% 
in 1912, 9.1% in 1918 (11.7% of adult population over 15), to 
8.5% (11% of those over 15); and as a proportion of the 
independent population increased between 1912 and 1918 from 15.7%
to 16.6%, and then fell sharply to 13.4% in 1920, reflecting the
22 general industrial decline. The only major beneficiary of
22. Figures derived by comparing Table 3 with Appendix 1, and 
KM, col.167.
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changes in the occupational structure during the civil war, 
therefore, were the employees. The expansion was stimulated by 
the transfer of the capital and the growth of bureaucratic 
regulation, and by 1920 every third adult Muscovite was employed
in some institution or other. Over half of the new posts were
2 3 
occupied by former Moscow factory workers and hence represented
a significant drain on the enterprises as their most committed, 
if not most able, workers left for the offices (Chapter 8).
While the relative decline of the industrial working class 
is not all that large, its internal composition changed much more 
radically. Already between 1914 and 1917 the number of 'cadre 1
workers had fallen by 40% on account of departures for the
24 front. Between 1914 and 1918 there was a high degree of
fluidity in the labour force in Moscow with an annual average
turnover of 100% as workers moved away from factories, between
25 factories, and from one industry to another. Moscow had been
much less successful than Petrograd in preserving its workers
9 fi from the draft. The military mobilisations of the first war
fell above all on the 18-40 male age group (Table 4 following),
and by April 1918 61,370 (63%) of the city's industrial workers
2 7 had been mobilised. By September 1917, for example, only about
23. KM, col.688.
24. Statistika truda, 6-7, 1918, p.2.
25. Ya. Piletskii, Rabochii klass i khozyaistvo Rossii v 1914- 
1919 godakh, Kiev 1919, p.25.
26. Diane Koenker, Moscow Workers in 1917, PhD dissertation, 
Michigan 1976, p.116.
27. Calculated from Table 4 and these figures. At the moment of
the April 1918 census not less than 60% had been mobilised from
those between 18-19, 70% of the 20-24 group, 56% of the 25-29
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Table 4
Sex and age profile of Moscow city industrial workers
on 21 April 1918
Age
Under 14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
Over 60
TOTAL
Source :
Men
1037
15114
10308
12077
12389
12634
11745
9328
5996
3917
2824
97369
Dva goda
Women
453
12414
12911
10112
6875
6070
3984
2815
1814
1002
691
59141
diktatury
Total
1490
27528
23219
22189
19264
18704
15729
12143
7810
4919
3513
156510
proletariata ,
Men for every
100 women
229
122
80
120
180
208
295
332
331
392
408
164
1917-1919,
VSNKh, M. 1919, p.19.
20% of the skilled metalworkers were left in the city because of
2 8 the war. To a large extent only those unsuitable for military
service were left and this had a debilitating effect on 
productivity. The declassing of Moscow's proletariat had 
therefore begun during the first war. While some workers 
returned with the demobilisation of early 1918 the economic 
crisis of the breathing space period once again reduced their 
numbers. In Butyrskii raion, for instance, the number of workers 
plummetted from 20,000 in October 1917 to 5000 by April 1918. 29
group, 36% of the 30-34 group, 32% of the 35-39 group, and there 
was an 8% deficit from the 40-44 group because of earlier 
mobilisations, Dva goda diktatury proletariata 1917-1919, VSNKh, 
M. 1919, p.19.
28. Sotsial-demokrat, 12 September 1917
29. P, 6 April 1918.
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During the civil war the declassing of Moscow's industrial 
proletariat intensified. Mel'nichanskii, the leader of the 
Moscow trade unions for the greater part of the civil war, later 
described the process. Workers on supply detachments or on other 
missions preferred to stay in the countryside where food was more 
readily available. Concurrently, many workers were drawn into the 
illegal economy and speculation, the production of lighters and 
other goods for exchange, all of which had a further debilitating 
effect on industry and class consciousness. In other words, 
declassing refers not only to changes in the size or internal 
composition of the working class, but also to changes in its 
relationship to the industrial economy. It could be argued that 
the Moscow workers re-established their links not only with the 
countryside but also with the peasant economy.
The supply, military and other demands on manpower fell 
above all on Moscow's industrial proletariat. In 1918 a fifth of 
all the workers sent on supply detachments came from the city, in 
1919 two-fifths, and by 1920 nearly three-quarters. 1 Both 
Zinoviev in Petrograd and Rykov, chairman of VSNKh, expressed
concern over the drain that the detachments constituted for the
32 
working class. A much greater source of loss, however, were
the military mobilisations. A VTsIK decree of 29 May 1918
30. IV Moskovskaya gubernskaya konferentsiya profsoyuzov, 14-15 
Sentyabr' 1921g., M. 1921, p.13.
31. In 1918 Moscow (city and guberniya) sent out 3703 out of the 
national total of 16,564; in 1919 11,236 out of 28,103; and in 
1920 8562 out of 11,632, KT, 21 September 1920; KM, col.686; 
Bor'ba klassov, 7-8, 1934, p.184.
32. Medvedev, October Revolution, p.155.
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signalled the transition to universal military conscription, 
and about 8000 Moscow city workers left in the first major draft
of 21-24 June 1918. The intensity of the drafts steadily
34 increased, with 9 mobilisations alone in August-September 1918.
By the end of 1918 100,000 Moscow city workers had joined the 
army; between January-May 1919 55,000; and between January- 
October 1920 49,000. Over the whole course of the war the city 
sent just under 315,000 people to the front, some of whom 
returned and not all of whom were workers.
The haemorrhage of workers continued the changes in the 
internal composition of the working class begun by the first war. 
The departed workers were replaced, insofar as recruitment took 
place, by women, the urban petty-bourgeoisie, and peasants. 
While in 1914 only 21.6% of Moscow's workers were women some 
industries were dominated by them, such as textiles where there 
were only 32 men to every 100 women. The first war saw the 
growth of the female labour force in Moscow to reach 37.6% in 
1917, and by that time the proportion of men in the textile 
industry had fallen to 19%. The proportion of women fell
33. Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti, vol.2, M. 1959, pp.334-5.
34. Lenin i Moskovskie bol'sheviki, M. 1977, pp.331-2.
35. Ocherki istorii Moskovskoi organizatsii KPSS, 
1883-1965, M. 1966, pp.332, 334, 339.
36. KM, col.648.
37. Piletskii, p.23. In the traditionally male-dominated 
printing and metal industries the percentage of men between 1914 
and 1917 had fallen from 92.6 to 79.2, and 91.7 to 79.7, 
respectively (Pechatnik, 3-4, 1 April 1919, p.12). In the Guzhon 
metal plant, for instance, between 1913 and November 1917 women 
increased from 5% to 15% of the workforce, TsGAOR, 7952/3/209/26
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3 8 
slightly to 35.6% in 1918 as male workers returned from the
army, but it rose sharply to reach 42.7 in 1920. Therefore the 
wars had seen the proportion of women in Moscow's population 
increase by 5.5%, but a far more dramatic change had taken place 
in industry where their proportion had increased by 15.1%. By
1920 52.5% of all women were employed compared to just over a
39 quarter in 1914. The introduction of compulsory labour duty
absorbed the urban lower middle class into the factories. They 
ranged from clerks to those in professions rendered 
anachronistic by the revolution such as lawyers, small 
financiers, and so on. The induction of these declasse people 
inevitably altered the atmosphere in the factories. The peasants 
came mainly from the uezda surrounding Moscow. About 90% of the 
Bromlei metal plant's workforce, for instance, were peasants by 
1920, and in the Guzhon metal plant they constituted about 90% of 
the workforce.
The proportion of office workers in the city's independent 
population, as we have seen, increased, and in the factories a 
similar process took place. A survey of Moscow's 13,811 food 
workers in September 1918 found that 18% of them were office
staff, and in some plants there were 19 office workers to 21
41 
workers. Out of 143,309 employed in industry in May 1918
16,657 (11.6%) were office workers, and their proportion increased 
to 18,973 (15.3%) out of 124,183 in June 1919, and in June 1920
38. Piletskii, p.23. 39. Vydro, p.39.
40. N.M. Aleshchenko, Moskovskii sovet v 1917-1941gg., M. 1976, 
p.222.
41. Izvestiya Moskovskogo soyuza rabochikh i sluzhashchikh po 
vyrabotke pishchevikh produktov, 2, 25 November 1918, p.3.
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they comprised 15,474 (15.1%) out of 102,837. 42 Therefore the 
great increase in office workers in factories took place at the 
end of 1918 and early 1919, and thereafter remained a stable 
proportion of the workforce. The bureaucratism of the period 
clearly pervaded the factories as much as the city in general. 
Changes in the size and composition of the workforce, the 
growth of bureaucracy and the illegal economy, weakened the 
factories as the site of revolutionary activity. A resolution of 
a general meeting of the Guzhon plant as early as 1 August 1918, 
for example, compared the plant with 1905 and 1917 when it had 
been at the forefront of the revolutionary movement, but
Then in the plant only workers worked, and now it is 
completely different. The best comrades have either 
died...or gone to the front...We must turn the comrades 
away fgom the speculationist temper that is seizing 
them.
A report on a general meeting in the same plant a year later
stated that the meeting resembled less a workers' meeting than a
45 gathering of 'traders from the Sukharevka'. By 1920 the
42. KM, col.184. According to another source the number of 
worker^ to one employee in the city fell as follows: 1913 - 14.6; 
1917 - 11.5; 1918 - 10.3; 1919 - 8.2; 1920 - 7; 1921 (July) - 
6.2, V.Ya. Yarotskii, 'Trud v SSSR', Entsiklopedicheskii slovar 1 , 
7e pererabotan. izd., (Granat), vol.41, pt.2, p.267.
43. By the end of October 1919 in the 154 enterprises of 
Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raion there were 2918 employees to 16,433 
workers (17.7%). Since early July 1919 the number of workers had 
fallen by 3403 (17.1%), but the number of employees had increased 
by 1549 (88.4%) since early 1919. In the 32 metal plants (the 
largest single group) there was the greatest proportion of 
employees (6861 workers to 1585 employees, 22.8%) while the 
proportion was lowest in the 12 textile mills (1823 to 158, 
8.7%), and the 28 tailor shops (2748 to 177, 6.4%), VIMS, 5 July, 
3 November 1919.
44. TsGAOR, 7952/3/212/217.
45. P, 27 July 1919.
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authorities in Moscow increasingly drew attention to the large 
numbers of workers who, as it were, for social or political 
reasons had evaded all the measures aimed at integrating them 
into the Soviet state system. The literacy campaign of 1920 was 
designed to serve both political and educational purposes. It
revealed a desperate picture of ignorance with over a guarter of
46 
a million people in the city illiterate in March 1920, and in
a working class raion such as Basmannyi over a third of the 
working population was either completely or partially 
illiterate.
More will be said in later chapters about the working 
class's relationship to the party and state. Here we have seen 
how the industrial working class had decreased in size by over 
two-fifths but remained a stable proportion of the population, 
how office workers emerged as the single largest group in the 
population, and the declassing of the proletariat as old workers 
left and other social groups took their place. No industry was 
immune to these changes. Workers left for the countryside or the 
fronts, and in the factories the revolutionary enthusiasm of 1917 
had given way to the struggle for survival.
46. Stenograficheskie otchety Moskovskogo soveta (Stenotchety 
MS) , 2, 1920, p.26. Vydro, p.47, states that literacy among men 
in the city had increased from 74.2% in 1902, 81.1% in 1912, to 
84.3% in 1920; and among women in those years from 47.6%, 56.6%, 
to 67.9%.
47. KT, 15 April 1920.
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3. The war communist economy
a. Industry
The civil war saw not only the collapse of the urban economy 
but also of the industrial economy. Moscow was the greatest 
centre of Russian industry with 11.7% of all the enterprises and
11% of all the workers in the republic at the time of the
48 industrial census of 31 August 1918. Of the guberniya's 2978
49 
census enterprises two-thirds (1190) were in the city but only
two-fifths of the workers, which indicates the smaller scale of 
factories in the town.
The first world war had seen the increasing concentration of 
the Moscow working class as metal, engineering, and chemical 
plants expanded, but still the striking feature of Moscow 
industry was the absence of such giant works as the Trubochnyi 
and Putilov plants in Petrograd. Neither was there an 
overwhelming concentration of workers in a single industry as the 
metal workers in Petrograd, where they comprised two-thirds of 
the factory workers and 30% of the country's metalworkers. 
By 1918 average concentration in Moscow city over the 1006
48. Trudy TsU, vol.26, issues 1-2, M.1926, pp.VIII, XXI, 16.
49. KM, col.167.
50. Average concentration in the guberniya was 608 workers per 
enterprise (KM, col.169). Industrialists preferred to locate 
their enterprises beyond the control of the police, sanitary and 
other regulations of the city.
51. Whereas in Petrograd in 1917 82.1% of the working class were 
employed in enterprises of over 500 workers (Izmeneniya sots, 
struktury, p.131) with an average of 740 workers per enterprise, 
in Moscow concentration averaged at 209 over 960 enterprises (KM, 
col.169). There has been a major debate over the relative weigKt 
of Moscow's textile and metal industries in 1917 centring on the 
greater 'petty-bourgeois' nature of Moscow's workers. Koenker 
(1976) discusses the question pp.23,24, 33-4, 54 n30.
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52 
enterprises for which figures are available had fallen to 154.
Moscow's industry was therefore less of an example of combined 
and uneven development than Petrograd, an indication of the 
greater role of native investment. While Moscow had an abundance 
of small enterprises (942 with less than 500 workers) they 
employed less than half of the total proletariat. In 1918 over 
half (52.1%) of Moscow's industrial proletariat (80,831) were 
still employed in the 64 enterprises (6.4% of the total) of over 
500 workers (cf. Appendix 6). Thus the traditional picture of 
the Moscow working class as a heavily fragmented group the bulk 
of which ostensibly were textile mill hands should be seen in 
perspective. It would be true to say, however, that 'The few
large plants in Moscow were islands in a sea of small and medium
, 54 
enterprises' .
Table 5 overleaf summarises the changes during the civil 
war. While the number of census enterprises fell by only a 
tenth, the fall in the number of industrial workers was over two- 
fifths, with the greatest decline among textile workers, followed 
by the chemical and food industries. By 1920 average 
concentration had fallen to 82 workers per plant. By then the 
metal industry had become the premier Moscow industry in terms 
both of enterprises and numbers employed in them, but not in 
terms of value of gross production where the textile industry had 
the slight edge (Appendix 9).
52. KM, col.169. 53. KM, cols.169-70.
54. M. Gorky, History of the Civil War in the USSR, vol.2, 
London 1947, p.68.
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Table 5
Moscow industry in 1918 and 1920
31 August 1918 
Enterprises Employed
1 June 1920
Metal
Textiles
Clothing
Food
Printing
Chemical
Others
No. %
239 20.1
182 15.3
157 13.2
130 10.9
145 12.2
119 10.0
218 18.3
No.
23,285 15.1
40,372 26.0
15,514 10.0
16,944 10.9
12,987 7.8
14,922 9.6
31,908 20.6
Enterprises
% fall
No. % cf. 
1918
222 20.9 7.1
177 16.6 2.8
137 12.9 12.7
111 10.4 14.6
123 11.6 15.2
114 10. 7 4.2
179 16.9 17.9
Employed
% fall
No. % cf. 
1918
20,241 23.2 13.1
14,178 16.2 64.9
14,042 16.1 9.5
12 ,949 14.8 23.6
10,675 12.2 11.7
6,912 7.9 53.7
8,366 9.6 73.8
TOTAL 1190 100 155,032 100 1063 100 10.7 87,363 100 43.7 
Source: KM, col.177.
Cut off from the sources of raw materials by hostile armies, 
railway dislocation, and with the problems compounded by poor 
stock-keeping and inefficiency, factories were gradually forced 
to close. One of the major factors was the shortage of fuel. 
At the height of the fuel crisis in 1919 Donets coal supplied 
only 0.3% of Moscow's fuel needs compared to 44.5% in 1914; 
firewood satisfied 84.1% of Moscow's needs at that time compared 
to 29% in 1914. By 1919 Moscow's consumption of energy had 
fallen to 37.9% of the 1914 level (Appendix 8).
The scale of factory closures can be seen from Table 6. 
By June 1920 nearly two-fifths of Moscow's enterprises were idle,
and those still active were working at an average of 45-60% 
55
capacity. Since March 1919 the giant Danilovskii mill, for
instance, had largely ceased production and its 3000 workers had
been transferred to cleaning and maintenance work. 56 The August
55. KT, 7 November 1920 56. KT, 26 March 1920.
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Table 6
Factory closures, 1918-1920 
Enterprises Workers
Total Active Idle Total In In
Fu- Par- Tot. active idle
lly tly ents ents
July 1918 1190 409 542 951 239 155,032 142,853 12,179 
in % 100 34.4 45.5 79.9 20.1 100 92.1 7.9
June 1919 1154 - - 768 386 105,210 90,704 14,506 
in % 100 - - 66.6 33.4 100 86.1 13.9
June 1920 1063 - - 657 406 87,363 79,033 8,330 
in % 100 - - 61.8 38.2 100 90.5 9.5
Sources: KM, col.179. The figures for the last two columns of 
1918 from K. Leites, Recent Economic Developments in Russia, 
Oxford 1922 , p.148.
1920 census found that the general number of industrial 
enterprises in the city, excluding the very smallest repair 
shops, had plummetted from 9000 before the war to 2560.
The fall in the number of enterprises and workers was 
reflected in the output of Moscow industry. By 1918 this had 
already fallen to half that of 1917, and during the civil war the 
precipitous decline continued. By 1920 the production value of 
Moscow census industry had fallen to 15% of the 1913 level 
(Appendix 9), 2% higher than the rest of the country. Cut off 
from cotton-producing areas and the sources of other materials 
the textile industry, as shown in Table 5, was hit the hardest. 
By October 1920 out of the 253 small and medium textile mills 
administered by the Moscow economic council (MSNKh) only 90 were
C O
functioning. Nationally in early 1921 the textile industry was
57. KT, 22 October 1920. 58. KT, 7 November 1920.
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59 
only producing 4% of the 1913 level, but the city mills were in
a slightly better state and producing 7.4% of the 1913 level 
(Appendix 9).
Even though the metal industry had become the dominant one 
in Moscow city by the end of 1920 it was only producing 15% of 
the 1913 level (Appendix 9), though this was still higher than 
the national average of only 3-4%. The Dinamo plant was 
producing 5% of 1913 output, while the Guzhon plant was producing 
2% of 1913 output with 24% of the workforce (Appendix 13). By 
autumn 1920 the Guzhon plant was at the trough of its fortunes 
with only 680 workers on its lists, while in practice only half 
that number were actually working. In other plants the story 
was the same. In the Bromlei plant the numbers employed had 
fallen from 2394 in 1916 to 700 in October 1919. 62
It was therefore against the background of deurbanisation, 
changes in the size and composition of the workforce, and the 
collapse of the industrial economy that the attempt was made to 
introduce the elements of the socialist economy in Moscow. The 
transition from workers' control to the state regulation of 
industry was prepared in Moscow by the expulsion of the 
Mensheviks and capitalist industry representatives from the 
economic bodies. This was achieved by the abolition of the Moscow 
Raion Economic Committee (MREK), formed in December 1917, and the 
creation in its place of the Moscow Oblast Council of the
59. N. Rodionova, Gody napryazhennogo truda. Iz istorii 
Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii 1921~1925gg. M. 1963, p. 4.
60. KT, 17 December 1920. 61. TsGAOR, 7952/3/210/189. 
62. Istoriya Moskvy, vol.6, book 1, M. 1957, p.206.
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Economy (MOSNKh) at the II oblast economic conference (20-25 May 
1918), 63
The slogan of the state capitalist period of accounting and 
control by the terms of the 28 June 1918 nationalisation decree 
became generalised to national accounting and control. Even 
before this many Moscow enterprises had already been sequestered 
or nationa lised in response to internal necessities and usually 
initiated by the workers themselves. The exact number of these
has been debated, but it is clear that the figure of 200
64 
enterprises is exaggerated. Recent calculations show that by
June 1918 in the city 23 enterprises were directly under the 
control of MOSNKh and another 14 under some form of supervision, 
a total of 37 of the largest enterprises. All the other 
enterprises were under their previous managements supervised by 
control commissions elected by the factory committees.
By the terms of the June decree all of Moscow's large and 
most of its medium industry was officially nationalised. The 
status of many hitherto sequestered enterprises began to be 
regularised and the difference between formal and actual 
nationalisation eliminated. For example, the Tilmans Bros. 
Screw Plant had been sequestered as early as 1915 and transferred
63. Rudzutak was the first chairman of MOSNKh, replaced by 
Al'perovich in July 1918. The majority of the members of the 
MOSNKh bureau came from a trade union background, 
Izvestiya MQSNKh, 1, 1 September 1918, p.3.
64. This figure comes from the MREK list of 2 April 1918 (in 
Uprochenie sovetskoi vlasti v Moskve i moskovskoi gubernii: 
dokumenty i materialy,M^1958, pp.243-9),and that of VSNKh of 
1 June, in Narodnoe khozyaistvo, 4, 1918, p.5.
65. A.V. Strakhov, 'Natsionalaizatsiya krupnoi promyshlennosti 
goroda Moskvy', Uchenye zapiski MGPI im. V.I. Lenina, 200, 1964, 
p.223.
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to the Main Artillery Board. After October 1917 it was 
transferred to MREK with the sequestration order still in force. 
Only at the end of 1918, however, was a new MOSNKh board appointd 
to replace the one instated by MREK in March of that year. 
Worker and trade union representation on the board was now 
formalised. Though working under MOSNKh it was formally only 
nationalised by a VTsIK decree of 28 November 1918.
The story illustrates the slowness of the transition to full 
nationalisation in Moscow. This was particularly the case with 
the heterogeneous textile industry. A general textile body was 
formed under MOSNKh in the summer of 1918 in which Ya.E. Rudzutak 
played a key role. By November 1918 40 of the largest textile 
enterprises had been surveyed and it was decided to nationalise 
18 of them, including the Trekhgornaya and Danilovskii mills. A 
number of smaller mills were nationalised and amalgamated. The
final nationalisation of Moscow textile industry was only
6 8 
completed in summer 1919.
By the end of 1918 more than 600 enterprises had been 
nationalised in Moscow. At the II SNKh congress (19-27 
December 1918) Rykov pronounced the epitaph on cooperation with 
capitalists. Nationalisation had been largely completed and 
now, he stated, basically only organisational work remained, 
trustification and the formation of production groupings. 
Lenin put it more vividly: 'It is necessary... for all the
66. Strakhov, p.256. 67. ibid, p-257.
68. ibid, p.273. 69. Aleshchenko (1973), p.90.
70. Trudy II vserossiiskogo s"ezda sovetov narodnogo 
khozyaistva, 19-27 dekabrya 1918g.: stenografichesksii otchet, 
M. 1919, pp.1-6.
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economic forces of the country to be held in one fist 1 . 71 This 
fist was VSNKh and its glavki in the centre and the economic 
councils in the localities.
With the great concentration of industry in the Moscow 
region it was felt that MOSNKh, covering 15 gubernii, was 
inadeguate to serve the city. In September 1918 the Moscow 
soviet resolved to form a city economic council, a proposal 
ratified by VSNKh on 31 October, and within the city limits a
sovnarkhoz was formed (MosGorSNKh, or MGSNKh) with the rights of
72 guberniya SNKh. By December MGSNKh, under the chairmanship of
M.F. Vladimirskii, was responsible for 185 enterprises. 73 It had 
departments covering all the main Moscow industries plus those 
for fuel, army supplies, transport, workers' control, finance, 
statistics, and enterprise management. Each department was 
headed by a collegium.
The relationship between the local sovnarkhozy and the local 
Soviets on the one hand, and the sovnarkhozy and VSNKh and its 
glavki on the other, was the source of much confusion throughout 
the civil war. Up to mid-1918 the Soviets had carried large 
responsibility for economic management and initially the local
71. ibid., p.18.
"72. Izvestiya MOSNKh, 1, 1918, p.l. In Moscow guberniya an SNKh 
was formed on 25 April 1918. The II SNKh congress at the end of 
1918 abolished oblast SNKh. Once again it was felt that oblast 
groupings encouraged separatism and localism.
73. N.M. Aleshchenko, 'Moskovskii sovet v 1918-1920gg.' 
Istoricheskie zapiski, 91, 1973, p.90.
74. ibid, p.95.
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SNKh were their departments, as in the case of the MGSNKh, but 
they were removed from this subordination and in February 1919 VSNKh
affirmed that the local SNKh were purely its own executive
76 
organs. Even before this the large and medium enterprises had
been under the direct control of VSNKh and beyond the
"7 "7
jurisdiction of the local Soviets, and this move only served to 
intensify the separation of the municipal authorities from the 
direct control of the economy. By 1920, for example, Moscow's 12 
major metal plants (Guzhon, List Butyrskii and List Sofiiskii, 
Bromlei, Grachev, Russkaya Mashina (Mikhel'son), Dobrov and 
Nabgol'ts, Dangauer and Kaizer, etc.,) were under the control of 
VSNKh (Gomomez), and now employed a total of 5745 people, 4609 
workers (80%) and 1136 employees. About 80 of the smaller plants 
were under the metal department of MSNKh (Moskvamet) and 
employed less than 5000 in total. 78
The first world war had seen the split in Moscow industry 
between the privileged sector working for the war effort and a
75. Stated in the summer 1918 VSNKh instructions on them see 
Gimpel'son (1977), p.18.
76. Gimpel'son (1977), p.53.
77. In 1918 alone 42 glavki were formed with wide powers of 
running enterprises and controlling raw materials and products 
(II s"ezd SNKh, p.76). The III all-Russsian SNKh congress in 
January 1920 divided enterprises into three categories: those 
under direct administration of VSNKh ('trustified'); those 
managed by local SNKh under VSNKh supervision; and enterprises 
of local significance managed by the local SNKh (Carr, 2, pp.184- 
5). The number of glavki mushroomed to cover ever smaller 
segments of industry. In early 1921, for example, the Moscow 
metal and chemical industries were run by 14 glavki apiece 
(Byulleten 1 MSNKh, 5, 10 April 1921, p.l).      '
78. Byulleten' MSNKh, 14, 31 August 1921, pp.5-6. These figures 
are lower than those shown in Table 5 and Appendix 7 but are 
probably more reliable.
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deprived sector, including the municipal services, starved of
capital, labour and raw materials. This division reappeared in
an intensified form under war communism. In 1919 66 city
enterprises (8.6% of the total active) were working purely for
79 
military orders. In order to supply the needs of the front in
summer 1920 over 20 Moscow factories, including Guzhon, G. List, 
and Bromlei, were declared udarnye (shock-working). To preserve 
a corps of skilled workers they were given preference in the 
distribution of the limited supply of food, raw materials and 
fuel. On 5 November 1920 V.M. Likhachev reported that the
majority of Moscow's enterprises were not working for local needs
80 but for glavki and centres. Between 15 July and 1 November
1920 three-quarters of the output of Moscow's clothing industry
81 
went to the front, and a similar proportion of metal output.
The economy was transformed into a war economy whose main 
function was to supply the army and not the population.
The nationalisation of small enterprises was not part of the 
28 June 1918 nationalisation decree nor of the revolutionary 
programme in general. However, the length of the civil war, the 
dislocation of the financial system, raw material and supply 
shortages, the necessity of mobilising small industry to work for 
the army, the attempt to eliminate the free market, and perhaps 
most importantly the political motive of extirpating all
79. 11 for the Red Army Artillery Board, 23 for the Military 
Engineering board, 14 under the VSNKh metal department, and 13 
chemical plants under the VSNKh chemical department, Lenin i 
Moskovskie bol'sheviki, M. 1969, p.365.
80. KT, 6 November 1920.
81. N. Nikolaev, Moskovskii rabochii i krest'yanin, M. 1921, 
p.12.
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capitalist and commodity relations, all led to the extension of 
nationalisation. In August-November 1920 small industrial and 
commercial interests were expropriated, culminating in the 29 
November 1920 VSNKh decree on the general nationaliation of small 
interests, including craft industries. 82
The state at the end of 1920 therefore extended its economic 
control over the last independent corners of Moscow's economic 
life. The problem of how to manage this new flood of state 
ownership was never resolved during war communism. A few months 
earlier the Moscow Soviet's own economic department had been 
abolished following the unification of the city and guberniya 
SNKh to form MSNKh on 19 June 1920. 83 This move, together with 
the general nationalisation, marked the high water mark of war 
communist centralisation, but by the end of 1920 the first 
attempts were being made to allow more local involvement.
One sign of the decentralising wind was the idea of forming 
guberniya economic conferences (gubekoso) to take on some of the 
functions of the glavki, though in Moscow one was only formed in 
mid-1921. Another sign was the revival of the Moscow Soviet's 
economic department on 4 November 1920 with Likhachev, also head 
of MSNKh, as its chairman. Its duties now included the right to 
supervise MSNKh, the glavki and VSNKh centres, in order to 'root 
out bureaucratism and rationally to organise the labour force'. 84 
Economic management still very much remained in the hands of the 
economic councils. By November 1920 MSNKh, with the guberniya,
82. Byulleten 1 MSNKh, 1, 30 January 1921, p.13.
83. KT, 3 September 1920.
84. Byulleten' MSNKh, 2, 15 December 1920, p.17.
I
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O c
had 1138 enterprises under its control, while the largest 
plants remained under the direct control of VSNKh.
The lack of coherence in the relationships between the 
various economic bodies was criticised throughout the period. 
Already in September 1918 Al'perovich complained about the poor 
organisation of MOSNKh, especially the lack of competent 
personnel, but above all he criticised the chaotic relations 
between enterprises, local and higher economic bodies, which he 
characterised as meshochnichestvo (borrowing the term used for 
non-state supply) and marked by excessive petty interference of 
higher bodies in local affairs, and the lack of initiative from
o c
below. By the IX party conference in March 1920 attempts were 
made to instil coherence in the economy by accepting Trotsky's 
call for a comprehensive national plan. The likelihood of a 
national plan succeeding when even partial local ones had proved 
failures indicates the excess of faith in centralisation typical 
of war communism. The first attempts at planning for individual 
industries in Moscow, such as one for the garment industry in 
1920, had proved utter failures. In the case of the garment 
industry the plan was only fulfilled by 20-25%, and not only 
were unpredictable factors such as the supply of fuel and raw 
materials not taken into consideration, but even basic factors 
were not taken into consideration leading to wildly optimistic
O "7
targets. At the II guberniya soviet congress (15-17 December 
1920) Likhachev described the economic chaos: the massive
85. KT, 18 November 1920.
86. Izvestiya MOSNKh, 2, 15 September 1918, p.2
87. Byulleten 1 MSNKh, 2, 15 December 1920, p.2.
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economic apparatus worked badly, VSNKh had too many units, it was 
too large and therefore could not give each department specific 
tasks, and no general plan for Moscow could be drawn up because
of the enormous number of glavki and the parallelism of the
8 8 
economic bodies. Planning was impossible, he argued, because
of the friction between VSNKh and MSNKh, and instead he called 
for a massive dose of decentralisation with MSNKh to be
responsible for all of Moscow industry with the exception of some
8 9 trusts. Such measures, as with the formation of the gubekoso,
had to await the NEP, and in the meantime the 'bureaucratic 
unreality 1 noted by Chamberlin reigned supreme.
The economy was centralised and run from a central 
bureaucracy in Moscow, and even its own industry was largely 
beyond the purview of the city authorities and the local economic 
council. A first awareness that such intense centralisation was 
counter-productive appeared in late 1920 but the fear that 
decentralisation would stimulate 'localism 1 , the abiding concern 
of the period, militated against serious attempts to return the 
management of industry to the localities. As with all state 
bodies the economic management organisations expanded into vast
bureaucracies. By the end of 1918 the staff of VSNKh had
90 
expanded from its original 300 to 6000, and the staff of MOSNKh
91 had expanded from 460 at the end of July 1918 to 4200 in
88. KT, 17 December 1920.
89. Byulleten 1 MSNKh, 1, 30 January 1921, p.13.
90. VIMS, 7 October 1918.
91. A survey of the 460 employees of MOSNKh at the end of July 
1918 found that out of 383 technical employees 180 had previously 
worked for capitalist economic regulatory bodies. Only 7
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MGSNKh, now covering only the city and guberniya, by December
1920. Few of these were in the party and those that were, it was
92 
reported, rarely attended cell meetings. P.G. Smidovich,
chairman of MSNKh in early 1920, at no stage was a member of the 
Moscow party committee (MK), and Likhachev himself only joined as 
a candidate member in November 1920 (Appendix 14). Central and 
local economic management largely functioned without direct party 
interference, and this was only one of two spheres that escaped 
close local party involvement (the other was the Cheka). The 
party was responsible for providing a satisfactory environment 
for industry to function, and to minimise the dislocating social 
effects of the centralised system of economic management.
The whole guestion of the baleful influence of bureaucracy, 
of the attempt to hold the whole economy in one fist, was to be a 
central concern of the party throughout the civil war. The 
extension of nationalisation and the growth of institutions meant 
that by the end of the civil war the vast majority of Moscow's 
population stood in an employee relationship to the state. In 
this respect war communism was successful in eliminating all 
potential sources of opposition based on property ownership to
(1.8%) were communists, and of the whole 460 only 25 (5.4%) were 
communists. The executive apparatus of MOSNKh was therefore 
largely composed of civil servants and specialists of the old 
bourgeois organisations. At the same time all 77 of its leading 
workers had earlier worked in various soviet organisations and in 
the workers' groups of bourgeois bodies, and 18 (23.4%) of them 
were party members, V.Z. Drobizhev, 'Obrazovanie sovetov 
narodnogo khozyaistva v Moskovskom promyshlennom raione (1917- 
1918gg.)', in Iz istorii velikoi oktyabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi 
revolyutsii, M. 1957, pp.107-8.
92. KT, 6 February 1921.
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Bolshevik state hegemony. The development of the working class's 
relationship to this state property, however, was a more complex 
process. At the same time, the locality'5 tenuous control over 
its industry, and the weak links between the local party and the 
economic functions of the state, were to prove the local party's 
Achilles heel once the 'socialist offensive' of rapid 
industrialisation was launched.
b. Trade and supply
The characteristic feature of war communism was the attempt 
to destroy the free market. The emphasis was on maintaining 
industry and the working class at an adequate level to provide 
the needs of the Red Army. All surpluses, above all those of the 
peasantry, were to be in the hands of the state and distributed 
to further its objectives.
In spring 1918 the nationalisation of trade enterprises 
began. Wholesale trade firms were handed over to central state 
institutions and retail outlets to the Moscow soviet. The latter 
in July 1918 formed a commission to municipalise private trade. 
By autumn 1918 the greater part of trade was in the hands of the 
city, though in practice this was often a legal fiction with 
shops simply rechristened the property of the soviet. With the 
development of war communism the capitalist sectors of the 
economy were progressively declared illegal: trade capital 
(internal trade) on 21 November 1918; cooperatives on 30 November 
1918. This measure was extended by the nationalisation of the 
cooperative (Moscow narodnyi) bank on 7 December 1918. The 
remaining autonomy of the cooperatives was eliminated by the 
decree of 20 March 1919 by which they were fused with
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Narkomprod.
The aim was to ensure the population with the planned supply 
of products by concentrating resources in a single body, 
Narkomprod. However between this aim and reality, between the 
decrees and their implementation, there remained a gulf which was 
not bridged within the framework of war communism. As Lozovskii 
stated at the II SNKh congress in December 1918: 'We are setting
ourselves tasks that we cannot fulfil... or to fulfil them we use
94 the old apparatus'.
Already by the spring of 1918 the receipt of supplies to
95 Moscow had become very irregular. The city was separated from
the grain producing regions by the Germans in the Ukraine, 
Krasnov on the Don, the Dutov groups in Central Asia, and with 
the Czech revolt in May 1918 supplies from the Volga region were 
halted. Addressing a meeting of the Moscow soviet executive 
committee (EC) on 28 May M.E. Sheptev, of the Soviet's supply 
department, reported that in the second half of May grain arrivals 
in Moscow had almost ceased. Some of the grain designated for 
the city had been diverted to aid the near starving Petrograd.
In response to the supply crisis the presidium of VTsIK on 9 
and 27 May 1918 adopted decrees on the supply dictatorship 
whereby the grain monopoly (introduced by the Provisional
93. Kritsman, p.65. 94. II s"ezd SNKh, p.111.
95. The plan for supplying the city in January 1918 was 
fulfilled by only 1.1%, in February by 16%, in April by 6.1%, and 
in May by only 5.1%. Istoriya velikoi oktyabr'skoi 
sotsialisticheskoi revolyutsii, M. 1962, p.436.
96. G.S. Ignat'ev, Moskva v pervyi god proletarskoi diktatury, 
M. 1975, p.248.
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Government in spring 1917) was strengthened and supplies
were concentrated in the hands of the state. Committees of the
poor (kombedy) were founded by the joint SNK and VTsIK decree of
97 11 June 1918. They were directed against the kulak by
intensifying the class war in the countryside and served as 
part of the non-economic methods of extracting the surplus from 
the countryside typical of war communism. The 28 May 1918 city 
party conference had talked of sending thousands of the best
workers on a 'revolutionary crusade 1 to obtain grain from the
9 8 producing regions. The problem of grain supply was seen as the
technical one of transporting the available surpluses to the
99 
cities.
To this end workers' detachments were formed to aid in the 
requisitioning programme. On 4 June 1918 the MK confirmed 
proposals for the formation of supply detachments under party and 
trade union control. In fact, while the party insisted on its 
influence over them, and in its instructions of 11 June the MK 
called on every raion party organisation to donate 5% of its 
membership to them, they were officially subordinate to the
97. In 1918 4461 kombedy were formed in Moscow guberniya: 7 
city, 9 raion, 14 uezd, 154 volost, and 4227 village ones (M.B. 
Dolgovyazova, Demokraticheskie preobrazovaniya v khode 
sotsialisticheskoi revolyutii oktyabr' 1917-1918, po materialiam 
moskovsksoi gubernii, Avtoref. diss., M. 1971, p.12). By the end 
of 1918, with the adoption of Lenin's middle-peasant line, they 
were gradually phased out.
98. P_, 30 May 1918.
99. Moskovskaya gorodskaya i Moskovskaya oblastnaya organizatsii KPSS 
v tsifrakh, M. 1972, p.21.
100. Uprochenie, pp.319-20. 101. ibid., p.325.
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102 
soviet supply bodies. Despite the party influence the
'revolutionary crusade 1 often took on violent forms. At the IV 
Moscow trade union and factory conference on 27 June 1918 Lenin 
admitted that the supply detachments 'often stray from the right 
path and turn into criminals'. Concern over the behaviour of 
these detachments prompted the 13 August 1918 SNK decree shifting 
responsibility for them from the Soviets to the trade unions. 
Nevertheless, the worries were not allayed, and at the 9 
September 1918 inter-raion party conference, by which time Moscow
had sent 1500 people, Zelenskii urged that Moscow should cease
104 participating in them. His motion was rejected but the
meeting urged that participants should be strictly screened by 
the TUs. In February 1919 the MK formed a special commission 
to oversee the formation of the units, and in that month alone 
sent 300 communists on them. By 1920 detachments were being 
formed less frequently with less than a third sent out than in 
1919. 107
While the supply detachments provided some grain they did 
not end the shortages. At various times during the civil war the 
government and the Moscow soviet were induced to ease the grain 
monopoly by legalising the so-called meshochniki (bagmen), a 
system whereby people were allowed to bring grain into the city, 
usually with an upper limit of 1.5 poods (24 kgs). The story of
102. ibid., pp.323-4; 330-2; 337-42; 345.
103. Lenin PSS, vol.36, p.448. 104. £, 13 September 1918.
105. £, 22 September 1918. 106. Moskovskaya gorodskaya, p.X
107. 71 detachments had been sent out in 1918; 384 in 1919; and 
116 up to October 1920, Bor'ba klassov, 7-8, 1934, p.184; KT, 21 
September 1920.
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these polutorapudniki illustrates the problems confronting the 
soviet in supplying the city: it was hindered both by central 
policy, and by the enthusiasm of the party activists in the 
raions who considered the relaxation of supply policy a breach in 
the bulwarks of socialism.
When on 24 August 1918 the soviet for the first time
LOS 
announced the legalisation of the bagmen, it was welcomed by
the Zamoskvorech'e party organisation, but the majority of the 
other raions criticised the measure and their opposition was led
by the guberniya party committee (MGK) meeting in Moscow on 29
109 August. In September the polutorapudniki brought 4.5 million
poods of grain to Moscow, three million journeys if the legal 
maximum was adhered to, and this obviously led to congestion on 
the railways. At the X Moscow guberniya party conference on 3 
November 1918 Minkov argued that the MGK could take the credit 
for having forced the Moscow soviet to rescind permission for 
this activity.
The government supply monopoly covered not only grain but 
most other foods. In a debate in the Moscow soviet on 21 January 
1919, held against a background of near famine in the city, 
Maksimov, head of the Soviet's supply department, supported the
108. P_, 25 August 1918. 109. _P, 1 September 1918.
110. Kritsman, p.140.
111. I?, 12 November 1918. In a decree of 5 September 1918 the 
SNK insisted that the Moscow soviet rescind the legalisation of 
bagmanism by 1 October 1918 (Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti, vol.3, 
M. 1964, pp.292, 295). Narkomprod had banned the bagmen in mid- 
September 1918 (P_, 22 September 1918). Armed roadblocks 
(zagraditel'nye otryady) were placed around cities to enforce the 
measures against bagmanism, and their removal was one of the 
demands of the Kronstadt insurgents of 1 March 1921.
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demands to return some foods to an independent supply status. 
Supporters of a liberalisation of supply policy called for some 
of the cafes to be reopened, and criticised the bureaucratic 
organisation of supply. Particular anger was aroused over the 
incident where a canteen, used by thousands of workers, had been 
closed on the grounds of staff shortages even though workers had 
offered to run it themselves. Other speakers, however, put their 
faith in the current supply policies and called for vigorous 
action against bagmen. In his summing up the chairman of the 
session, Vladimirskii, insisted that the soviet had little
latitude in supply policy in any case since the problem was the
112 
responsibility of central government. On this guestion, as in
the economy, Moscow's freedom of action was severely 
circumscribed. Nevertheless, it appears that soon after, 
bagmanism was once again legalised in attempt to relieve the 
worst shortages at a time of particularly severe shortages.
In June 1919 the government once again summarily terminated 
legal bagmanism on the grounds that railway transport could be 
used more effectively to transport government supplies. Faced 
with increasing discontent and intensified shortages the soviet 
at the end of the month rejected calls for the reintroduction of 
the allowance (which it could not do anyway without the centre's 
permission), but it did relax some of the restrictions on railway 
travel. The party was mobilised to explain the termination of 
legal bagmanism as part of the attempt to defuse the tension in 
the city. By early July 1919 the government itself was unable
112. Stenotchety MS, 2, 1919, pp.17-32.
113. P, 25 June 1919.
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to issue rations in Moscow. Kamenev reported to the soviet on 12 
July 1919 that the masses were 'gripped by a mood of
dissatisfaction 1 and that several factories had gone on strike
114 (see below). In 1920 bagmanism remained illegal despite the
poor harvest and the increased decrepitude of the railways. By 
the end of the year there were periods when no grain at all 
reached Moscow, and in early 1921 the supply shortages provoked a 
massive confrontation between the workers and the government. At 
the same time between the chaos of the economy and the 
inefficiency of the supply mechanism there arose an illegal 
economy.
c. The illegal economy
The illegal market had already developed during the first 
war, but with the development of war communism it became the only 
market. Despite the increasing role of state natural supply, 
the development of a system of preferential rations, and the 
growth of a system of canteens, the free market still remained
114. £, 15 July 1919.
115. Nationally, the average workers' budget (including housing) 
from state natural (moneyless) supply was as follows: 1917 - 5%; 
1918 - 41%; 1919 - 63%; and 1920 - 75%, Kritsman, p.130.
116. The population was variously divided into categories, at 
first 4 and then 3, depending on the type of work. Thus in April 
1920 674,179 people were in the first category, 364,193 in the 
second, and 94,459 in the third. 261,383 workers and 240,000 
employees had a right to supplementary rations. 356,000 people 
were in juvenile categories (KT, 17 April 1920). Far more 
rations were issued than the total population, and the issue of 
supplementary rations tended to negate the whole system's aim 
of giving priority to those engaged in physical labour.
117. On 1 March 1920 479 canteens were functioning in the city 
used daily by 376,000 people. Half of them served only tea and 
sandwiches, KT, 20 March 1920.
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the provenance of a large, though apparently declining, 
proportion of food. In the first half of 1918 in Moscow 85% of 
workers and 77% of non-workers used the free market to buy bread; 
in March-April 1919 the proportions (in both capitals) were 75% 
and 74%, respectively, and by 1920 only a quarter of the workers'
budget was devoted to the free market, but that of the non-worker
118 
was higher.
The lack of an effective exchange mechanism became ever more 
marked with the development of war communism. New forms arose to 
fill the gap and the foremost of these was speculation. As the 
Menshevik Dalin put it at the II SNKh congress:
Speculation has grown to such an extent as never 
before...You say that it is a small fault of the 
mechanism. Hurry. Shoot. That is not terrible, we've 
got used to it. Speculation is the gsurrogate that you 
have created for the bourgeoisie.
Bagmanism was only one facet of the free market. Many 
enterprises requiring goods in short supply entered into the free 
market, i.e., into commodity relations, to obtain essential 
supplies. But the free market was above all the Sukharevka, 
which has taken on a meaning that lasts to this day. It 
symbolises the inextirpability of commodity and commodity 
capitalist relations under socialist economic systems. The 
Sukharevka itself was an enormous, perpetually crowded market
square to the North-East of the Moscow city centre (now
120 Kolkhoznaya). All goods were sold there, especially those on
118. Kritsman, p.139.
119. II s"ezd SNKh, p.26.
120. The Sukharevka and other markets have been described by
many authors. Among the most vivid are, Emma Goldman,
My Disillusionment in Russia, London 1923, pp.23-4; Aieksander
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which a state monopoly had been declared. The socialist economy 
and repressive apparatus could not eliminate this excrescence of 
the underground. And they were partially responsible for its 
existence. The natural economy (food, transport, housing and 
services issued free) increased in importance, and fixed prices 
were extended to cover ever more goods to restrict the commodity 
economy, and yet money was still issued by the state, above all 
in the form of wages, which could hardly be used in the moneyless
part of the economy and so was forced to go outside it, into the
121 illegal economy. The logical step would have been to abolish
money altogether and make barter the means of exchange, but the 
free market itself played an important role in sustaining the 
population and the socialist economy.
In 1919-20 the battle against speculation became a central 
concern of the authorities in Moscow. A report in late 1919
noted that speculation had reached unheard of proportions and now
122 
encompassed the larger part of the population. Another
correspondent in July 1920 claimed that there was a vast army of
123 
speculators 'sitting openly in the cafes'. The campaign for
universal labour duty was closely linked with the offensive 
against the speculator. In April 1920, for example, it was
claimed that up to 20% of the population of the guberniya lived a
124 
'parasitical existence 1 . At the same time speculation in the
Berkman, The Bolshevik Myth: Diary 1920-22, London 1925, pp.55- 
60; and Marguerite Harrison, Marooned in Moscow, New York 1921, 
pp.150-7.
121. Kritsman, p.142. 122. £, 17 September 1919 
123. VIMS, 21 July 1919. 124. KT, 28 April 1920.
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contemporary sense was not restricted to individual initiative 
but involved cooperative organisations and enterprises. A report 
in mid-1920 admitted that the Sukharevka market still continued
despite the elimination of the bagmen, who had previously been
125 held responsible for supplying it. Most of the material sold
there now came from the soviet organs themselves.
The development of Rabkrin (workers' inspection) was an 
attempt to plug the leakage of state goods to the market. 
Another was the increased role of the Moscow Cheka (MChK) in 
policing the economic system. At a Moscow soviet EC meeting on 1 
October 1920 Messing, the MChK chairman, argued that the Cheka 1 s 
main purpose was the battle against speculation and 'crises at 
the workplace'. In 1920 alone the MChK had arrested about 14,000 
'speculators' in raids on the Sukharevka and other markets, 70%
I 9 /r
of whom, it was reported, had no defined profession. The 
pervasive influence of abolishing the legal market and, in the 
context, its pernicious influence on social relations by 
classifying a whole range of activities as 'speculation', 
provided the milieu in which the party sought to protect itself 
from what was seen as a dangerous corruption.
The economic debates of 1920 in the party were largely over 
the admissability of making concessions to the consumer. Trotsky 
at one pole was joined by Rykov, his opponent over 
militarisation, on this issue, while Kamenev emerged as the
champion of the consumer in urging the liberalisation of supply
12 7 policy and allowing some free trade. At the IX party congress
125. KT, 4 June 1920. 126. KT, 2 October 1920. 
127. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 12, 4 January 1920.
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he vividly described the slow death of the capitals. He argued 
that about 80% of the economy was conducted in the illegal second
economy and urged timely concessions which would allow victory in
128 the long-term. Rykov at the congress dismissed Kamenev's
arguments as a capitulation to the consumer point of view, and
instead put his faith in the single economic plan to integrate
129 the various branches of the economy. For Lenin Kamenev's
ideas, if implemented, signified quite simply, the end of Soviet 
power. It would take the major political crisis from late 
1920 to change Lenin's mind.
The civil war saw a major demographic collapse in Moscow, 
the dispersion of a large part of Moscow's working class and 
changes in the composition of those who remained. Industry was 
run as a single vast state trust in which even local Moscow party 
and soviet authorities had little say. It concentrated on 
supplying the needs of the army while the population lacked basic 
goods. The illegal economy expanded to fill the gaps in the 
official mechanism and to provide what the state sector could not 
provide, but the increasingly narrow definition of legal economic 
activity enhanced the role of the police apparatus. It was in 
this context that the labour relations of war communism were 
developed.
128. IX s"ezd RKP(b), mart-aprel' 1920 goda: protokoly, M. I960., 
pp.195-6.
129. ibid., pp.179-80. 130. ibid., p.27.
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CHAPTER 3 
Labour and the Labour Process
The attempt to extend state control over industry at a time 
of economic collapse had major political consequences. The main 
problem for the Bolsheviks was to ensure that the working class 
kept up a certain minimum level of productivity and did not fall 
sway to hostile political currents. As war communism intensified 
the emphasis was increasingly placed on coercion, but by the end 
of 1920 even this proved inadequate when faced with catastrophic 
economic collapse and supply shortages. The role of the trade 
unions was undermined, labour was increasingly militarised, and 
in response unrest increased to an extent that finally posed a 
threat to the regime and hence led to a change in economic 
policies.
1 . The trade unions
a. Size and organisation
The debate over the role of the trade unions in the soviet 
state has been described by several authors so we shall restrict 
ourselves to some aspects of the question in Moscow. The trade 
unions were the location of a potential divergence betwen the 
party-state and the working class. They looked both to the state 
and reflected its labour and economic policies, and to the
1. On the national debate see, A. Brodersen, The Soviet Worker:
Labour and Government in Soviet Society, NY 1966; M. Dewar, 
Labour Policy in the USSR 1917-1928, London 1956; Isaac 
Deutscher, Soviet Trade Unions: Their Place in Soviet Labour 
Policy, London 1950; T. T. Hammond, Lenin on Trade unions and 
Revolution 1893-1917, New York 1957.
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working class and in theory defended its interests. As 
Al'perovich, having moved from the economic council to become 
chairman of the Moscow TUs, put it in 1921, the main task of the 
trade unions during war communism had been to support the Soviet 
state, This had required the formation of an apparatus based on 
centralised authority and the creation of massive unions covering 
whole industries:
With such a backward working class it could not be 
allowed into the centre of decision-making. Thus 
centralism, the obedience of the lower to the higher, 
was necessary.
Unions covering whole industries, he argued, were designed to
break down the attraction among the working class of group or
2 professional interests.
Such a policy carried its own penalties, as Mel'nichanskii 
recognised:
During the civil war the boards of the unions became 
isolated from the masses... Objective conditions did 
not allow the extension of the influence of the trade 
unions on the masses by becoming close to the workers. 
The organs of the trade unions and their members became 
an insignificant and insufficiently qualified contingent 
of workers. All [TU] workers were constantly mobilised 
leaving only two or three qualified people in each 
union. In these circumstances the conduct of general 
work was concentrated in the chancelleries of the 
unions, and it was difficult to conduct organisational 
work in the factories.
During the civil war the trade unions underwent the paradoxical 
process of inflated numerical growth and at the same time the 
loss of internal moral authority and a fall in their relative 
position in regard to the party and the Soviets.
A central bureau of Moscow trade unions had been formed in
2. S. Al'perovich, Chetvertyi s"ezd profsoyuzov i puti Russkogo 
profdvizheniya, M. 1921, p.2.
3. IV Mosk. gub. konf. profsoyuzov , p.18.
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1905, but from 1906 to 1917 it had been illegal and had only an 
episodic existence. In February 1917 it was resurrected by F.D. 
Denisov (the first chairman), E.N. Ignatov and T.V. Sapronov. By 
November 1917 it included Tomsksii as chairman, Mel'nichanskii as 
secretary, and other leading trade unionists. All boards of 
unions organised on a professional basis sent representatives 
to the MSPS (as it was now called), and in November 1917 
representation was reorganised on the principle of 
proportionality depending on the size of the union. The MSPS 
plenum had formed an executive committee (EC) on 3 March 1917 
and its powers were extended by the plenum meeting on 1 December
1917. 39 trade unions were represented at the December plenum,
4 
and it elected an EC of 15. At the first session of the EC on
4 December a presidium of 5 was elected with Mel'nichanskii as 
secretary. The II ail-Russian trade union congress 1 January 
1919 called for the formation of united guberniya trade union 
councils. In Moscow this only took place on 29 September 1919 
at the I guberniya trade union conference. A new Moscow 
guberniya TU council (MGSPS) representing the city and guberniya 
was elected, which in turn elected a presidium to conduct 
current work. The conference denounced the idea of union
4. Andreev (50), Kozelev, Mel'nichanskii, Polonskii, Tomskii , 
Rykunov, Rudzutak, Denisov, Bakhutov, Kudryashev, Poznanskii, 
Krol', Moskovich, Libin, Maksimov, Moskovskii sovet 
professional'nykh soyuzov v 1917g., M. 1927, p.135.
5. Bakhutov, Kozlovskii, Mel'nichanskii, Polonskii and Tomskii, 
MSPS v 1917g., p.141.
6. Out of the 765 delegates 412 were communists, but over a 
fifth of the delegates (169) were sympathetic to the Menshevik 
position of 'independence and unity 1 , P_, 27 September 1919.
7. KM, col.679.
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independence (nezavisimost') from soviet power.
Membership of the trade unions grew rapidly during the civil 
war, even though the number of workers in industry fell. Union 
membership was obligatory with dues collected directly from the 
accounts department of the enterprise or institution. The 
largest growth in union membership came from institutions and not 
from factories. Between the I and II guberniya trade union 
conferences (September 1919 - September 1920) the proportion of
office union delegates rose from 21.6% to 32.5%, and those from
9 industrial unions fell from 46.4% to 38.2%. Trade union
membership figures in Moscow in the early period are confused, 
and complicated by the unclear distinction between the city and 
the guberniya. By October 1917 in the city and guberniya there 
were about 474,000 members in 53 trade unions, rising to 
552,664 in 61 unions in mid-1918. Thereafter the number of 
unions fell sharply to 32 in early 1919 with 639,678 members, and 
22 in January 1921 with 786,950 members (Appendix 10). Clearly 
these figures are grossly inflated, even including the guberniya, 
and reveal the largely formal nature of union membership during 
the civil war. Almost everyone in employment was automatically 
considered a union member. The changed occupational structure of 
the city is revealed by the fact that by early 1921 the number of
8. £, 27 September 1919.
9. Obzor deyatel'nosti MGSPS za period mezhdu II i m 
gubernskimi s"ezdami (sentyabr 1 1920-mai 1921gg) , M~. I9~21, p. 7 3 
In Russia as a whole the percentage of TU members working 
directly in production fell as follows: 1918 57.4; 1919 45.5; 
1920 37; 1921 34.7, A. Aluf, Professional'nye soyuzy v period 
voennogo kommunizma, M. 1925, p.28.
10. Koenker (1976), pp.500-2;
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unionised soviet workers had surpassed the railway and textile 
workers as the single largest union.
The plenum of the MGSPS consisted of representatives of the 
individual guberniya unions in proportion to their membership. 
For example, after the II guberniya trade union conference in 
September 1920 the plenum consisted of 118 representatives from 
the 22 unions (plus 14 delegates from each uezd): 15 apiece
from the textile and railway unions, the metal union 10, the
12 print workers 3, and so on. The presidium at that time
consisted of nine people, who in turn selected an inner presidium 
of 3. Every member of the presidium was given the 
responsibility to oversee several unions. As a member of the 
MGSPS he had no right to change resolutions or decisions of 
union bodies. In case of a disagreement between a member of the
presidium and an individual union the full MGSPS plenum had to
14 be consulted, though there is no record of such a conflict in
this period being discussed by the full MGSPS. Work was 
clearly concentrated in the hands of the presididum, which 
between 26 September 1920 and 15 April 1921 met 57 times, 15 while 
over the same period the plenum met only 14 times.
11 . Qbzor deyatel ' nos^ti MGSPS , p . 3 .
12. Protokoly MGSPS, 1, 26 September 1920, p.6.
13. ibid., p.3. Mel'nichanskii was no longer chairman, having 
joined Budyenny's cavalry in Poland. His place was taken by 
Antselovich briefly, and then in December 1920 by Lozovskii.
14. Protokoly MGSPS, 9, 1920, pp.36-7.
15. Obzor deyatel'nosti MGSPS, p.3.
16. ibid., p.8.
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The caucus principle was applied to the trade unions in a 
similar way as in the Soviets. The MK had a representative on
the MSPS (central bureau) from its first meeting on 2 March
17 18 1917, and on 5 May 1917 a party fraction was formed.
Thereafter the TU leadership in Moscow worked closely with the 
party committee. Party control was ensured through the party 
fraction in the MGSPS and individual unions. The relationship was 
codified by an MK instruction of 28 August 1919. All major TU 
questions were to be decided by the MSPS fraction after initial 
consultation with the MK. In a move designed to counter any 
attempts at Bolshevik TU fraction autonomy the instruction 
stressed that all Bolshevik trade union activists were under the 
same obligations of party discipline as any other party member 
and were at the disposal of the MK. This point was mitigated by 
allowing that transfers of personnel were to take place with the 
knowledge of the TU party fraction. All collegia and boards were 
to be appointed by the party organisation, the MSPS fraction was
to give monthly reports to the MK bureau, and there was to be
19 
mutual representation on the party and TU fraction bureau.
These measures were confirmed by the party statute adopted in
December 1919 which reiterated the principle of fraction
20 
subordination to party organisations.
17. MSPS v 1917g., p.5.
18. Velikaya Oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya. 
Dokumenty i materialy. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie ~ ~v Rossii v~ 
aprele~917g. Aprel'skii krizilT M. 1958, pp.41-42.
19. P_, 2 September 1919.
20. VIII konferentsiya RKP(b), dekabr' 1919g.: protokoly, M. 
1961, pp.231-2.
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Party reports of the period stressed the control of the MK 
over the MGSPS. For instance, the report for September 1920 
stated that the list of MGSPS presidium members had been approved
by the MK and that a plan of its work had been checked by the
21 MK. While the economic bodies largely evaded party control in
the localities, a facet of glavkism, the trade unions were under 
detailed supervision, facilitated by their centralised 
organisation. In practice MK involvement in the MGSPS centred on 
the MK's right to dispose of personnel, which in a period of 
acute manpower shortage took on central importance. These 
factors together with personal links and mutual representation 
between the party and the unions, meant that during the period of 
the trade union discussion from the end of 1920 the MGSPS and its 
presidium did not challenge the party's dominance.
b. Bolshevisation
Throughout the civil war the communist party waged a 
campaign to bring all the unions under their control. The issue 
was not so much over the forms that unions should take, since the 
Mensheviks agreed with the principle of a single production union 
for each industry, but over the relationship of the unions to the 
state. In June 1918, for example, the I all-Russian congress of 
the employees' union passed a Menshevik-inspired resolution 
urging a single production union for each industry, but in 
another called for the unions to defend the class interests of 
the working class independent of the state 'guided in its
21 Otchet MK za sentyabr' 1920g., M. 1920, p.4 In July 1920, 
for example, there was only one Menshevik out of over 100 people 
in the MGSPS, Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g., M. 1920, p.3.
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activity by the principles of the international class struggle of
22 the proletariat 1 .
Already in early summer 1918 the Mensheviks had played an 
active part in the 'non-party worker conferences' and 
'conferences of factory and plant delegates' (soveshchaniya 
upolnomochennykh fabrik i zavodov). The aims of the movement 
were encapsulated in the resolution passed in the Bogatyr' plant 
on 16 May 1918: against the civil war and Bolshevik supply 
policies; for the convocation of a freely elected Constituent 
Assembly; for freedom of speech and meeting; the restoration of
the municipal authorities; and for an end to the shooting of
23 
citizens and workers. Lenin's assertion at the IV Moscow
factory committee conference on 28 June 1918 that the movement
24 
was backed by only a very small number of workers was belied by
his admission earlier that month that 'the agitation of enemies
25 
and "waverers"' had had some influence on Moscow's workers.
The high point of the movement was the organisational meeting of
? f> 5 June 1918, attended by about 4000 workers, whose ultimate aim
was the convention of a national conference. By the end of the
22. I vserossiiskii s"ezd profsoyuzov sluzhashchikh (June 1918), 
M. 1918, p.9.
23. M.S. Bernshtam (ed), Issledovaniya noveishei russkoi 
istorii, vol.2, Nezavisimoe rabochee dvizhenie v 1918 godu, 
dokumerrby i materialy, YMCA Press, Paris 1981, pp.145-6.
24. Lenin PSS , vol.37, pp.90-1.
25. Lenin PSS, vol. 50, p.90. In late May 1918 Martov had 
claimed at a session of VTsIK that the supply detachments had 
been used 'to remove from Petrograd and Moscow all discontented 
workers... and thus strangle the healthy protest of the working 
class', quoted by Israel Getzler, Martov: A Political Biography, 
CUP 1967, p.180.
26. Bernshtam, p.185.
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month the upolnomochennyi movement had lost its momentum in the
27 face of severe repression and was engulfed by the civil war.
Among the railway workers support lingered with sporadic strikes
and resolutions in favour of the Constituent Assembly, and even in
2 8 
December 1918 'anti-soviet 1 Soviets were being purged.
Non-Bolshevik parties retained their support in several 
Moscow unions throughout the civil war. The anarchists had some 
influence in the bakers' union, but it was the Mensheviks who 
presented the greatest challenge in the print and chemicals 
unions, and to some extent in the office workers' union, not to 
mention on the railways. The Menshevik strongholds were in the
Bogatyr' chemical plant in Sokol'nicheskii raion, where they
29 
retained their influence until 1920, the Aleksandrov railway,
and the Bromlei metal plant, where they dominated up to December 
1921. The factory committee of the Dukat tobacco plant in 
Presnenskii raion was dominated by the Mensheviks until the end 
of July 1918. Indeed, Presnenskii raion was one of the few 
raions where the Mensheviks had widespread support. Apart from 
the above plant they were also strong in the giant Prokhorovskaya
27. Moscow was placed on a war footing on 29 May 1918 (Dekrety, 
vol.2, p.343) and street meetings and demonstrations were banned. 
In an appeal to the population the next day the SNK promised that 
'counter-revolution' in the city would be suppressed, ibid. 
pp.360-2.
28. P_, 1 December 1918.
29. Desyat 1 let: sbornik materialov Yu.O.K. Sokol'nicheskogo 
raiona - k 10-letiyu oktyabr'skoi revolyutsiii, M. 1927, p.60. 
In January 1919 the plant employed 5300 people, 2260 of whom were 
women and 700 juveniles, loc.cit.
30. KT, 17 December 1921. 31. P, 1 August 1918.
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32 
mill. In mid-1918 the Bolsheviks were excluded from the
factory committees and control commissions in several plants 
including Guzhon itself, the Postavshchik and Gnom i Rom 
plants.
The formation of the one-party state (discussed below) was 
not restricted to the expulsion of non-Bolshevik parties from the 
Soviets but included the destruction of their organised influence 
in worker organisations. This was achieved in its entirety only 
after the end of the civil war when the bolsheviks could 
concentrate their resources on this battle. The most important 
example of this was the battle waged throughout the war for 
control of the printworkers' union. Among the reasons for 
Menshevik support in the union the following can be briefly 
mentioned: a highly developed sense of solidarity in a 
traditionally skilled and cohesive profession; the relative 
success of the Menshevik leadership in defending the interests of 
their members vis-a-vis the Moscow soviet and the economic 
organs; the type of union organisation which allowed a responsive 
relationship between the leaders and the membership, evidenced 
above all by the existence of a 'council of delegates' (sovet 
upolnomochennykh); and the popularity of the Menshevik leadership 
in the print shops.
In 1918 the Bolsheviks were split over tactics: whether to 
contest the elections in the existing union or to form their own, 
the successful tactic with the railway union. Unsure of 
sufficient support the Bolsheviks attempted to win control of the
32. Vechernyaya krasnaya gazeta. 61, 28 September 1918.
33. Ignat'ev, p.150.
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existing union and contested the elections to the board in April 
1918. Out of 20,000 Moscow print workers 50% voted, only 4000
for the Bolsheviks who received 10 out of the 25 seats on the
34 board. By the end of the year the Bolsheviks called for new
elections to the board hoping for a majority. The Menshevik 
refusal of 2 January 1919 led to a series of stormy meetings, 
which came to a head at a general meeting of Moscow print workers 
on 9 February 1919. The Bolsheviks were violently attacked at 
the meeting and accused of treachery to the duly constituted 
union bodies. Finding themselves in a minority they stormed out 
and finally decided to form a temporary board of a new union. 
The move was supported by the MK meeting on 22 February 1919 when 
Borshchevskii, the leader of the Bolshevik print workers, and 
Mel'nichanskii reported on the situation in the union. On the 
grounds that the union was a 'citadel of Menshevism 1 the meeting 
urged the MSPS to create a new union.
The creation of a new union moved slowly but by August 1919 
a new Bolshevik national union had been formed, but in Moscow the 
Mensheviks still dominated. Elections to the Moscow print TU 
board in December 1919 confirmed the Menshevik supremacy. Out of
12,000 print workers in Moscow 9000 voted, 7000 for the 'yellow'
3 8 
union and 2000 for the 'red 1 . It appears that following this
34. Pechatnik, 5, 31 May 1918, pp.6-7.
35. Moskovskii pechatnik, 1, 15 January 1921, p.6; Pechatnik 1- 2, 15 January 1919, p.3.         '
36. Moskovskii pechatnik, 1, 15 January 1921, p.7.
37. The Petrograd union had been taken over by the Bolsheviks in 
November 1918, Pechatnik, 1-2, 25 January 1919.
38. VIMS. 25 December 1919.
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defeat the Bolshevik print workers in Moscow rejoined the main 
union and continued the struggle from within. The strategy was 
outlined at the MK meeting on 20 December 1919 when the party 
raion committees (RKs) were urged to continue the struggle and
Borshchevskii was assigned to recall all Bolshevik print workers
39 to aid in the struggle. At the height of the Polish war the
board of the Moscow print union was dissolved by fiat of MGSPS on
40 18 June 1920 and measures were taken to conduct a purge of the
41 
union. A long and bitter struggle now ensued, with over 25
42 
strikes in Moscow print shops and the arrest by the MChK of 11
members of the Moscow print board elected in December 1919 and a
43 
number of other Menshevik leaders. From this point the story
is difficult to follow, but apparently despite the repression the
Mensheviks retained control of the Moscow print union until the
44 beginning of NEP.
The campaign to eliminate the organised forces of the 
peasant anarchist leader Nestor Makhno in the Ukraine was 
accompanied by repression against anarchist influence in the 
Moscow unions. This culminated in mass arrests in November 1920
of anarchist unionists, including the leaders of the bakers'
45 
union. The board of the bakers' union in Moscow was dissolved
39. P_, 20 December 1919. 40. P_, 23 June 1920. 
41. KT, 19 June 1920. 42. KT_, 25 June 1920.
43. Sotsialisticheskii vestnik (SV), 1, 1 February 1921, p.15; 
2, 16 February 1921, p.15.
44. Profsoyuzy Moskvy, M. 1975, p.156.
45. Victor Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary 1901-1941, OUP 
1967, (trans Peter Sedgwick), p.122.
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and reorganised with a Bolshevik majority. The Menshevik-led 
Moscow chemical workers' union still remained obdurate, however, 
and the Menshevik board was careful to maintain close links with 
its supporters in the Moscow chemical plants by organising
fortnightly meetings with factory committee representatives and
47 by a variety of other means, including the intensive
application of bonus forms of payment which allowed wages to rise 
faster than in other industries (below and Appendix 11) The 
union elected Martov instead of Lenin as their honorary chairman 
on 26 March 1921. 4B
With the arrest of Menshevik and SR leaders in early 1921 it 
was relatively easy for the Bolsheviks, supported by the central
trade union leadership, to eliminate the remnants of non-
49 Bolshevik union leadership in Moscow by the end of the year.
At the same time the trade unions and the party cells worked 
together to gain control of the factory committees still in non- 
Bolshevik hands (Chapter 6). It was the new circumstances of peace 
and the NEP that saw the final elimination of this breach in 
Bolshevik hegemony.
46. Harrison, Marooned, p.73. Anarchist influence in the food 
workers' union is described by Paul Avrich, The Russian 
Anarchists, New York 1978, p.223.
47. KT, 6 March 1921. 48. Schapiro, p. 203.
49. At the IV guberniya chemical TU conference in early October 
1921, for instance, the majority of the 202 delegates were 
'independent' (129), and a resolution was passed defending the 
independence of the unions. The Bolshevik delegation of 91 left 
the conference and founded their own union, which was accredited 
by the MGSPS, KT, 4, 7 October 1921.
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c . Wages and rations
The central dilemma of the unions in their relationship with 
their members was the ambiguity between their state role and 
their traditional one of defending the interests of the workers. 
Nowhere was the contradiction more sharp than in wages policy. 
Because of the predominance of the low-wage textile industry, 
wages in Moscow before the war were lower than elsewhere. The 
average annual income of a Moscow worker in 1913 was 253 rubles, 
rising to 256 rubles in 1914. . The highest wages were in the 
print, metal and power industries which employed the highest 
proportion of skilled male labour, and the lowest in the chemical 
and food industries. Appendix 11 shows that wages rose from an 
average 28 rubles per month in 1913 (in fact it was lower) to 153 
rubles in 1917, thereafter rising rapidly to over 11,000 rubles a 
month at the end of 1920, a 400-fold increase over 1913 on 
average, and in the chemical industry nearly double that.
Between 1913 and the end of 1920 prices had increased by
51 just under 25,000 times. On these figures prices had therefore
52 
outstripped wages by 62 times. In other words the purchasing
power of factory workers by the end of 1920 had fallen by more 
than 50 times in comparison with 1913. However, such a
50. In Petrograd 339 and 376 rubles, and the average for all of 
Russia 264 and 371 rubles, respectively, Byulleten' MGSPS, 2 (15), 
15 February 1922, p.6.
51. Calculated from the range of foods in Appendix 12 on the 
free market. With the destruction of the free market after 
October 1917 fixed prices had only a conditional accounting 
significance.
52. 52 times according to another source, Byulleten' statistiki 
truda mosksovskoi gubernii, MGSPS, 5-6, March-April 1921, p.6.
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conclusion has only formal significance. Beginning in 1918, and
even more in 1919-20, wages were increasingly paid in kind
and rations at fixed, purely nominal, prices became increasingly
important. According to Strumilin the role of money wages
decreased from 90% in 1917, 52% in 1918, 23% in 1919, to 7% in
1920. In 1913 money wages covered the cost of food
for one worker by 3.7 times, whereas in the last third of 1920
wages, including the nominal cost of rations at fixed prices,
covered 42-49% of this norm, so the fall in real wages was
373:42-49, about 8 times. 54
The end of 1918 saw attempts by the party leadership to
stabilise the currency so that it could retain its functions as
55 
a medium of exchange. At the same time many of the leaders and
the rank and file in Moscow were demanding the abolition of 
money. This conflict was only apparently one between 
pragmatism and idealism. The failure to restrain the
53. Cited by Yarotskii, p.259. In Moscow money wages in the 
first third of 1920 comprised 16% of the wages of workers 
receiving special rations, and 20% for general workers. By the 
end of the year this had fallen to 15 and 18%, respectively 
(Byulleten 1 stat. truda, 5-6, p.8). The figures are higher than 
Strumilin 1 s because the issue of goods of own production, the 
issue of trade unions and other organisations, and the 
contribution of public feeding are not included.
54. Byulleten 1 stat. truda, 5-6, p.11. The guestion of family 
upkeep is not included.
55. R.W. Davies, The Development of the Soviet Budgetary System, 
CUP 1958, p.26.
56. In October 1918 Shlyapnikov argued that the naturalisation 
of wages was a process similar to that of the development of 
workers' control: as the only way of saving the masses from 
hunger (VIMS, 15 October 1918). The party programme adopted at 
the VIII party congress (section 15) declared the intention to 
eliminate money, though not immediately. On the abolition of 
money and the transition to a 'budget in kind 1 see, R.W. Davies, 
op cit, p.40; Carr, 2, pp.261-8.
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inflation, with the amount of money in circulation more than 
doubling every year between 1917 and 1920, and to develop an 
efficient exchange mechanism between town and country, in itself 
destroyed money as a means of exchange and led to the 
naturalisation of wages. The state gradually moved towards a 
system of free distribution, defined by the SNK decree of 16 
August 1920 on free travel and 11 October 1920 on free food and 
housing. On the eve of the NEP (3 February 1921) taxes were 
abolished. During war communism the payment of wages in kind was 
a means of distributing scarce resources on the 'living minimum 1 
principle: if there had been sufficient goods and an effective 
distribution system hard prices alone would have sufficed.
The manner of supply was to play an increasingly large part 
in the attempt to stimulate productivity and to retain skilled 
workers. From 30 April 1920 ear-marked supply (tselevoe 
snabzhenie), formulated by the III TU congress earlier that 
month, began to be applied in Moscow. Special rations were 
issued depending on the state importance of the enterprise where 
the worker was employed (the principle of udarnosti) and 
according to the productivity of individual groups within them. 
The aim was to forge a link between the social wage (especially
rations) and the productivity of labour under conditions of an
5 8 increasing separation of income budget from production. In the
57. Byulleten' stat. truda, 5-6, p.6. Under the NEP the system 
developed into 'collective supply 1 based on each factory.
58. Strumilin calculated that the proportion of income budget 
linked to production fell from 42. 5% in 1918; 16% in 1919; to 
6.2% in 1920, Yarotskii, p.263.
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circumstances the attempt to link rations to productivity, as in 
the introduction a a 'labour ration 1 to be issued only to those 
who actually worked, by the Moscow soviet in February 1920, could 
achieve little.
At the same time the increased use of bonuses and piece 
rates was an attempt to use the other main component of wages 
(money) as a mechanism to increase productivity. From 1918 there 
had been attempts to link wages to productivity by sanctioning 
piece rates and norming, but at first they were not extensively 
applied. The egalitarian mood was captured by a certain 
Biryakov, supported by other deputies, at the 23 January 1919 
Moscow soviet plenum when he called for complete equality. 
However, contrary to the common impression that war communism was 
a period of planned uravnilovka (egalitarianism or wage 
levelling) 1919-21 saw an opening up of differentials in Moscow
by a decrease in the 55 union tariffs of late 1918 to 12 in
ft ? 
early 1921. In 1920 major inequalities developed in the
payment of money wages. The percentage of man hours covered by 
bonus systems of money payment rose from 40.6 in January to 65.9 
in November; over the same period the percentage paid by piece 
rates rose from 6.7 to 15, and correspondingly the hours paid by 
basic time fell from 52.7 to 19. Over the year wages rose 
fastest where piece rates were applied, followed by bonus 
systems, while basic rates increased by only 2-2.5 times. 64
59. KM, col.12.
60. Stenotchety MS, 1, 1919, p.14. 61. KM, col.684.
62. Obzor deyatel'nosti MGSPS, M. 1921, p.48.
63. Byulleten 1 stat. truda, 5-6, p.l. 64. ibid., p.2.
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The high earning piece and bonus systems were not applied 
equally to all industries and the lowest wages were found where 
basic rates predominated, such as the food industry where in 
November 1920 80.3% of man-hours were on basic wages, and the 
highest wages where piece and bonus systems were more extensively 
applied, such as the chemical industry. There were therefore 
great variations in wages between the various categories of 
labour within industries, by decreasing the number of tariffs, 
but also great inequalities between industries because of 
differential money wages. The range of money wages had almost 
doubled from the 1913 ratio of 1:1.6 to 1:2.8 by December 1920 
(Appendix 11) Rationing, of course, made for greater equality 
than these figures would suggest, but this in itself ensured that 
fairness in rationing became a highly emotive issue. .
War communism in Moscow was therefore accompanied not by the 
equalisation of money wages but by an increase in inequality as 
the general system of shock work was introduced. At the same 
time the attempt to apply material incentives in late 1920 was 
hampered by the lack of supplies, but was neverthless 
increasingly used. Gimpel'son argues that the use of 
incentives and the national reduction in the wage scale only from 
1-5 to 1-4 indicate that war communism was never fully 
achieved. It could be argued, however, that war communism 
retained a certain amount of flexibility in tackling economic
6 5. Byulleten' stat. truda, 5-6, p.3.
66. In October 1920 18 enterprises with 12,908 workers received 
bonuses in kind in the city and guberniya; by December 1920 this 
had risen to 160 enterprises with 107,350 workers, obzor 
deyatel'nosti MGSPS, pp.47-8. ~~
67. Quoted in Malle, p.23.
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problems, and indeed the above account indicates that coercion, 
considered the hallmark of war communism, was not incompatible
ft 8
with the application of inducements. War communism was a 
period of experimentation and many of its labour and wages 
aspects were carried over to the following period.
With money losing its value and a shortage of skilled and 
unskilled workers, economic bodies and factory managements 
resorted to increasing wages arbitrarily in order to keep scarce 
labour and thus infringed the set rates. This was a problem not 
only in industry but, as Polidorov (chairman of the Moscow 
guberniya soviet EC) informed the IX party congress, all the 
commissariats and even the local party organisation in Moscow
were guilty of this in order to attract competent employees to
,-u   .69 their service.
Aware of the dangers of unfair rationing the MGSPS waged a 
vigorous campaign to ensure eguality in general ration 
distribution which ran counter to the principle of udarnosti and 
the attempt to retain skilled workers. In particular, the MGSPS 
tried to limit the issue of goods of own production (e.g., bread 
to bakers) which gave some groups an unfair advantage over 
others. As it was, the skilled groups of metal and print workers 
had slipped in the wages league. The importance of the accurate 
issue of rations, to avoid disturbances developing on this basis, 
led to the creation of a permanent commission under the MK in
68. Cf. Alec Nove, 'Socialism, Centralised Planning and the One- 
Party State 1 , in T.H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway 
(eds), Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR, Macmillan 1980, 
pp.77-97.
69. IX s"ezd RKP, p.73.
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70 
early 1920 to oversee ration policy in all its forms.
In the factories and plants a bitter struggle developed over the 
issue of goods produced on the premises as part of wages, 
especially in the food and tobacco industries. Despite the 
unpopularity of its position amongst those who benefitted from 
this issue, the MGSPS argued that such issue as part of wages
contradicted the basic principle of eguality and the 'living
72 
minimum 1 for all. Only with the introduction of NEP were
concessions made in this field, though illegal issue clearly took 
place in order to retain workers and to minimise theft.
By the end of 1920 disturbances did develop over the 
question of inequality in general and not just over the 
privileges of the specialists. In response the MGSPS attempted
to decrease the variations in wages and the numbers on special
73 
rations. The MGSPS was caught in the horns of the dilemma of
attempting to keep rations fair, while trying to stimulate 
productivity, and hence it relied on the money part of wages to 
maintain productivity. Under war communism and the attendant 
scarcity the policy of incentives was not only ineffective but 
also politically dangerous.
70. Protokoly MGSPS, 30, p.15.
71. Stenotchety MS, 16, 1919, pp.246, 258; KT, 25 March 1920. 
There were 20,000 tobacco workers at this time, and tobacco acted 
as a second, more stable, currency.
72. Protokoly MGSPS, 18, 1920, p.9; 29, 1920, p.13.
73. Obzor deyatel'nosti MGSPS, p.48.
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d. Economic management
Following the June 1918 nationalisation decree the trade 
unions in conjunction with the SNKh were to participate in the 
formation of the new management boards of enterprises. At first 
the collegiate boards, in which the unions participated, took on 
a variety of forms. The boards were responsible to the SNKh for 
work fulfilment and finances, while the trade unions were 
responsible for labour discipline, wage norming, and other tasks. 
Already the I ail-Russian TU congress of January 1918 had 
insisted on the subordination of the factory committees to the 
unions. The transition from workers' control to state management 
was as drawn out a process as nationalisation itself. The key 
point, however, was that the management of enterprises was not 
transferred to the unions but to the economic bodies.
In contrast to Petrograd and elsewhere there was no city-
74 
wide factory committee organisation in Moscow, and attempts to
form such a coordinating body in early 1918 were not
75 
successful. Its functions continued to be carried out by the
departments of workers' control (control commissions) under the 
raion Soviets. Following the nationalisation decree these 
departments were transformed into the local control organs of
MOSNKh and a city control commission was formed under it to
7 6 
coordinate their work. In some enterprises factory committees
74. There was a council of workers' control covering the central 
Industrial Region which was considered subordinate to the Moscow 
soviet, E. Al'perovich, 'Ot rabochego kontrolya k pervym shagam 
promyshlennogo stroitel'stva', in Ocherki po istorii oktyabr'skoi 
revolyutsii v Moskve, M. 1927, p.148.
75. MSPS v 1917g. p.135.
76. Izvestiya MOSNKh, 1, 1 September 1918, p.3.
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elected control commissions to which MOSNKh sent its 
representatives, which then became the kernel of collegiate 
management. A statute adopted by the VTsSPS and MSPS on 2 
August 1918 defined the factory committees as the cells of the 
TUs and the control commissions as responsible to the SNKh. 
In this way the factory committees were fractured: the factory 
committees came under the TUs and their control commissions under 
the economic bodies. This split was the specific manifestation 
of the fact that the management of industry was to be conducted 
not by the TUs but by economic agencies. The TUs themselves 
gradually lost any direct management functions. By April 1919, 
for example, the functions of the Moscow metalworkers' union
O rv
(VSRM) control commission had been transferred to the MGSNKh.
The aims and functions of the unions and workers' control in 
nationalised enterprises were enunciated in a resolution adopted 
by the Moscow VSRM plenum of 20 July 1918. The duties of the 
union and its cell the factory committee were to be restricted to 
ensuring internal order and labour discipline and not to
interfere in management: 'The organs of workers' control... must
81 
not carry out any administrative or economic functions'. As we
shall see later, precisely the same restrictions were placed on 
the activities of party cells in the factories. The instruction
77. This was the case in the Til'mans screw plant, Izvestiya MOSNKh, 1, p.23.          
78. A.M. Pankratova, Istoriya razvitiya fabzav. 
predstavitel'stva i fabzav. komitetov v Rossii,M. 1924, p.89.
79. Izvestiya MOSNKh, 2, 15 September 1918.
80. VIMS, 11 April 1919.
81. TsGAOR, 7952/3/212/197-8.
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in the event was to prove ambiguous. The state management of 
Guzhon, for example, now argued on its basis that the control
commission in the plant was no longer necessary since both VSNKh
8 2 
and the management looked after the interests of the workers.
After a vigorous protest by the Guzhon control commission the
8 3 
union clarified that it had not called for its abolition. The
Guzhon argued was to be revived by Trotsky during the TU debate.
A major fillip to the centralisation of the unions, noted by 
Mel'nichanskii above, was the abolition of the raion trade union 
boards in late 1918. They had consisted of delegates from 
factories and paralleled the organisation in raion Soviets of 
factory committee delegates. Both represented the high water 
mark of workers' democracy in 1917. In the second half of 1918 
factory TU committees (mestkomy) became directly subordinate to 
the local TU branches without the intermediary raion 
organisations. These mestkomy were designed to replace the
factory committees, but by early 1919 the process was still far
84 from complete. By the end of the war the mestkomy had become
8 5 the primary union organisation in the factories though the
situation is confused because they often still called themselves 
factory committees.
Throughout the civil war, conflicts between the factory
O f.
committees and the factory managements were endemic. Both the
82. ibid., pp.231-2. 83. ibid., pp.228-30. 
84. VIMS, 11 April 1919. 85. KM, col.679.
86. In the second half of 1918 in the city there were 3507 
disputes (an average of 585 a month), usually over wages; in the 
first half of 1919 766 (average 128 a month); and in the second 
half of 1919 416 (average 67 a month), KM, col.684.
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8 7 
trade unions and the party RKs took part in resolving them.
The summary dissolution of the factory committee at the Moscow- 
Kazan railway printshop in March 1919, whether because of its 
Menshevik allegiance or as part of the militarisation of the 
railways is not clear, was followed by widespread strikes and is
a case in point of the expendability of the factory committees in
8 8 this period. Nevertheless, factory committee members were an
important group. In a proletarian raion such as Rogozhsko- 
Simonovskii there were 454 factory committee members by November
1919 in the 154 enterprises, 2.8% of the total number of
89 
workers.
In the first period there were nearly as many variations in 
the management of nationalised enterprises as there were 
enterprises themselves. The Bogatyr' plant is fairly
representative however, in having a board with 2 representatives
90 from the workers, 2 from the technical staff, and 2 from VSNKh.
More democratic initially was the Til'mans plant where supreme 
authority was vested in a control commission consisting of 
management and factory committee representatives: the management 
was responsible for general administration while the factory 
committee was responsible for labour discipline and the attempts
to raise productivity and both were subordinate to the control
91 
commission. In other plants, such as Guzhon, a more
centralised state board dominated from the first.
87. P_, 11 July 1919.
88. Pechatnik, 3-4, 1 April 1919, p.11.
89. VIMS, 3 November 1919.
90. P, 5 January 1919 91. Izvestiya MOSNKh, 1, p.23
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Following Lenin's strictures against the 'chattering 1 of
collegiate management and the resolutions on strengthening one-
92 
man management at the II SNKh congress in December 1918 there
was increased pressure on collegiate management. The new policy
93 
was opposed by the VTsSPS and the MGSPS urged caution in its
implementation. Many party leaders were also wary of the move, 
above all in Moscow. It encountered the opposition of VSNKh and
Democratic Centralists at the IX party congress, and MGK at
94 the XVII guberniya party conference (13-14 March 1920) and the
March 1920 Moscow city party conference (Chapter 9). Defending 
collegiate management in a debate in the Moscow soviet on 28 
January 1919, a certain II'in put his finger on the problem when
he argued that it had become difficult to 'use' the working class
95 since its most active members had been destroyed by the war.
The introduction of one-man management in 1919 in
enterprises moved very slowly, and few examples can be found for 
its introduction in Moscow. In the great majority of factories 
some form of collegiate management was retained. 1920, however, 
against the background of militarisation policies, saw an
acceleration in its introduction despite the opposition mentioned
96 
above. in autumn 1920, for example, a special plenipotentiary
92. II s"ezd SNKh, pp.128-9.
93. e.g., on 15 August 1919 17 out of 23 people present voted 
against and 5 abstained, Gimpel'son (1977), p.39.
94. Ocherki istorii Moskovskoi organizatsii KPSS, vol.2, M. 
1983, p.177.
95. Stenotchety MS, 3, 1919, p.39.
96. By December 1920 nationally out of 2483 enterprises under 
VSNKh 2183 (87.9%) had one-man management, and 300 collegiate, Iz 
1st. grazh. voiny, vol. 3, M. 1961, p.672.
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was sent from Gomomez to Guzhon with extraordinary powers, though
the collegiate board remained but now subordinate to him. Soon
97 
after he became the first 'red director' of Guzhon.
It would appear that up to the end of 1920 the unions, at 
least in Moscow, were increasingly on the defensive vis--a^vis the 
party and state organisations. In a conflict with Rabkrin in 
mid-1920, for example, the MGSPS insisted that Rabkrin did not 
have the right to look into the affairs of factory committees,
mestkomy and other higher trade union bodies and argued that this
98 
would be an infringement of internal union affairs. At the
same time the MGSPS insisted on its prerogatives as the 
representative of all Moscow unions. In the case of the conflict 
between the Moscow supply committee and the public feeding union 
the MGSPS insisted that as a matter of principle the Moscow
soviet and the MK should deal with the MGSPS and not the
99 individual union. In this case the collective resposibility of
unions took on a rather centralistic guise. In the circumstances 
this was inevitable given the extensive powers of the glavki. In 
the long-drawn out conflict provoked by the closure of a food 
plant (Bodlo) by a centre (Tsentrozhir) without consultation with 
any union the MGSPS riposted that 'any measures affecting 
workers and employees should be carried out with the knowledge 
and agreement of the corresponding trade union 1 . Following
97. Bor'ba klassov, 7-8, 1934, p.189.
98. Protokoly MGSPS, 17, 1920, p.7; 23, 1920, p.17.
99. Protokoly MGSPS, 29, 1920, p.13.
100. Protokoly MGSPS, 17, 1920, p.8; Obzor deyatel'nosti MGSPS, 
p.22.
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the assault on the anarchist bakers' union the Moscow soviet in 
October 1920 militarised all the bakeries without consulting the 
MGSPS. Shortly afterwards the MGSPS was even more aggrieved 
when the factory committee in a cooking oil plant (Masloboinogo
zavoda No.3) was arrested by the MChK and a new director was
102 
appointed without consulting the food union.
The weakness of the Moscow unions was acknowledged by 
Briskin, the secretary of the MGSPS, at the II guberniya TU 
conference on 20 September 1920. He specifically pointed out the 
lack of permanent TU activists at the MGSPS, no more than 2-3 at 
any one time, supported by about 50 technical personnel, and the 
poor links with the lower union organisations and with the mass 
of the workers. At that conference Davydova, responsible for 
cultural work, bewailed the ineffectiveness of cultural and 
educational work. There was confusion over the responsibilities 
of each body with Narkompros and its local organ MONO poaching
any club, library or school established by the unions. As a
104 
result the TU centre was isolated from the proletariat.
At the end of 1920 the MGSPS began to reassert itself. 
With the beginning of demobilisation the MGSPS waged a vigorous 
campaign to obtain TU activists directly from the front, albeit 
through the MK which had sole rights in distributing party 
members. The party layer in the Moscow unions was extremely
101. Protokoly MGSPS, 13, 1920, p.50.
102. Protokoly MGSPS, 14, 1920, p.5.
103. KT, 21 September 1920.
104. KT, 23 September 1920; KM, col.685.
105. Protokoly MGSPS, 18, 1920, p.11; 30, 1920, p.15.
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small qroup of communists at 2.4% of total membership, 6% of whom 
were employed by the trade unions themselves. At the same 
time the secretariat of the MGSPS increased from the 56 in 
September 1920 to 165 in April 1920. Apart from the 
secretariat the MGSPS had three other departments from September 
1920: culture and education, labour, and an economic department. 
The first two need no comment but the formation of the economic
department on 26 September 1920 after the decision of the II
108 guberniya TU conference marked an important stage in the
revival of the trade unions.
The high hopes for a large role for the TUs in running 
production after the revolution were given concrete expression by
the formation of an economic commission under the MSPS on 26
109 October 1917. At the 15 November 1917 plenum Kozelev, the
chairman of the Moscow metal TU, even argued that to avoid 
parallelism the economic department of the Moscow soviet should 
be abolished and its powers transferred to the MSPS. This 
economic commission at some unknown stage disappeared, but now
106. In Moscow out of a TU membership of 689,763 in September 
1920 (Appendix 10) only 16,763 were communists (2.4%). A total 
of 1042 communists (678 of whom were in the city) were employed 
in the movement, 664 of whom (540 in the city) were full-time 
union organisers (Table 16).
107. Obzor deyatel'nosti MGSPS, p.2.
108. Protokoly MGSPS, 7, 1920, p.30.
109. MSPS v 1917g., p.124.
110. ibid. , p.131. To crown the MSPS ' s bouquet Kozelev hoped at 
the end of 1917 that the highest workers' control body should be 
formed under the MSPS (MSPS v 1917g., p.135); instead, as we have 
seen, MOSNKh took over this function later.
- 94 -
its revival was viewed by the MK with major reservations. The 
struggle for the economic department to establish itself need not 
detain us, but the attempts to increase the role of the TUs in 
production were boosted by the success of Rudzutak's resolution 
at the V ail-Russian TU conference (3-7 November 1920) on TU 
participation in economic management and planning. Even so, it
was only on 19 January 1921 that the MGSPS achieved permanent
112 
representation on MSNKh. From mid-1918 a large number of
trade unionists were drafted into the economic organisations and 
many clearly retained personal links with their former union 
companions, but on the formal level the links between the MGSPS 
and MSNKh up to this point had been tenuous to say the least.
While the trade union debate raged the unions were de facto 
preparing themselves for the management of the economy. The 
MGSPS presidium on 21 December 1920 urged that a report be 
completed as soon as possible on various proposals for the 
participation of the TUs in the organisation of production, 
but it does not seem to have reported its findings.
Against the background of worker unrest and the trade union 
debate the MGSPS and its constituent unions attempted to forge
closer contacts with workers by holding meeting in the factories
114 themselves. The 5 January 1921 session of the MGSPS
presidium called for a whole range of factory, delegate, raion
111. Protokoly MGSPS, 7, 1920, p.30.
112. Obzor deyatel'nosti MGSPS, p.5. With the transition to the 
NEP the MGSPS had a group of its representatives on MSNKh, from 
22 March 1921, ibid., p.7.
113. Protokoly MGSPS, 33, 1920, p.21.
114. Protokoly MGSPS, 34, 1920, p.22: 37, 1921, p.4.
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and inter-raion meetings of factory managers, trade unions, 
factory committees and workers to discuss economic questions. 
In practice these democratic fora never really developed with any 
success and soon faded away. One practical gain of the TU 
movement, however, was the concession agreed between the MGSPS 
and the Moscow labour department at the end of January 1921 on 
trade union personnel. During the civil war the disposition of 
workers and cadres was a key question, and both the Workers' 
Opposition and the Ignatov group (Part III) had called for the 
TUs to have a voice in this. Now the agreement stated that no 
elected member of a factory committee or mestkom could be fired, 
transferred to another enterprise or institution, or sent on 
assignments by managements without the permission of the relevant 
trade union. The significance of these changes during the 
trade union debate within the framework of war communism changed 
with the radically new conditions inaugurated by the NEP.
Alfred Rosmer was in Moscow at this time and wrote later
that the unions 'were like poor relations' with the available
118 
reserves of manpower and supplies going to the party. And
again, apropos of the trade union debate: 'Nobody basically
disputed that the unions were in a state of semi-lethargy; the
119 
only difference of opinion was on the causes and cures'.
According to the Workers' Opposition, as Lutovinov put it, not 
only was the party bureaucratised but also the trade unions:
115. Protokoly MGSPS, 37, 1921, p.4.
116. £, 19 January 1921. 117. P_, 26 January 1921
118. Alfred Rosmer, Lenin's Moscow, Pluto 1971, p.93.
119. ibid., p.117.
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The trade unions are cut off from the healthy influence 
of the masses... The old methods of educating the broad 
masses by way of agitation and propaganda are being 
replaced by circulars and orders.
The complaint of the Workers' Opposition that the TUs were 
overshadowed by the state and party was a valid one:
The practice of party centres and state organs in the 
last two years has systematically narrowed the range of 
the trade unions' work and has reduced to almost nothing 
the influence of workers' unions in the soviet state.
As Lozovskii himself put it, 'Three years after the October 
revolution the Russian trade unions are further from managing
production than they were in the months after the October
122 
revolution'.
Rosmer's comments, together with Mel'nichanskii's guoted 
above, illustrate that by 1920 there was not only a general 
economic crisis but also a specific crisis of the trade unions. 
The centralised management of the economy was reflected in the 
centralisation of the unions. At the same time, the weight of 
the trade union hierarchy vis-a-vis the state and party bodies 
was relatively weak. Both these factors provide the essential 
background to undertanding the trade union debate of late 1920. 
During the debate the unions introduced certain internal reforms 
and tried to reassert their economic role and powers. The 
ambiguous role of the unions in the Soviet state, as revealed in 
wages and rations policy, was not resolved during war communism, 
but a pattern of union subalternacy emerged which was confirmed 
following the trade union debate.
120. Vestnik trudd, 11, December 1920, pp.11-14.
121. Partiya i soyuzy, Pbg, 1921, p.362.
122. ibid., p.166.
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2. Universal labour duty
War communism was a hitherto almost unique experiment in 
abolishing unemployment, though under NEP it returned and by 1923 
in Moscow had returned to the early 1918 level. Both the full 
employment of war communism and that of the period inaugurated by 
the five-year plans were accompanied by punitive measures against 
those who failed to work.
The disorganisation of the economy and the rundown in 
defence orders led to increasing unemployment from late 1917. 
The metal industries were particularly affected since their 
ability to redeploy to peacetime production was less than, for 
example, the textile industry. Metalworkers comprised one of the
largest groups of unemployed, standing at 18,000 in early
123 1918. During the civil war the working class to some extent
disappeared from the factories, therefore with the development of 
the war and exodus from the city unemployment almost disappeared 
in the city. From a high point of 89,003 in spring 1918 
(Appendix 5), a total which represented nearly 10% of the
independent population, unemployment fell sharply to reach 27,783
1 ?4 in December of that year, 15,822 in June 1919, and had
dwindled to a few hundred in 1920. With the premium on skilled 
workers unemployment at first was only significant among female 
textile workers unable to leave the city because of family 
commitments.
By 1919-20 a severe shortage of skilled workers had 
developed, and of unqualified workers in industry and transport. 
In January 1920 for every 100 unemployed there were 123.3
123. Stat. ezhegodnik, p.207. 124. Piletskii, p.18.
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vacancies in the city and guberniya, but the demand for labour 
was greater than these figures suggest. In June 1920 there were
5000 unfilled places for metalworkers, 50,000 for building
125 
workers, and 20,000 for unskilled workers. In early September
1920 there were 30,154 vacancies registered for workers, and in
1 7 f> 
that month alone this demand increased by 31%, The labour
shortage by November 1920 was such that Narkomtrud issued a list 
of jobs, such as tram conductors, postpersons, concierges, and
so on, that were to be reserved for women between the ages of 16-
127 50. Such measures were inadeguate and the government
increasingly resorted to compulsory labour duty.
Labour duty was a basic principle of war communism and was 
incorporated into the Soviet constitution of 10 July 1918 and the 
labour code of 10 December 1918. In July 1918 Bukharin was 
already arguing that there would be 'bread only for toilers, and
1 9 P
labour duty for the rich 1 . When introduced labour duty was 
not restricted to the rich alone. An important step towards the 
social direction of labour and the first move away from free 
labour was the decree of 3 September 1918 abolishing the right of 
an unemployed worker to refuse the job offered to him or her on 
pain of loss of unemployment benefit. In 1919 the system of 
labour distribution developed in the military supply factories, 
transport and agriculture. A decree of 12 April 1919 prohibited 
the spontaneous movement of workers and employees from one place 
of work to another in an attempt to staunch the flow to the
125. KT. 24 June 1920.
126. Leites, p.150. 127. KT, 9 November 1920 
128. Vechernyaya krasnaya gazeta, 3, 19 July 1918.
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129 
countryside.
In 1918-19 labour duty was still largely a matter of 
principle despite the partial attempts to implement it. One of 
the major steps on this road was the introduction of labour books 
as a means of keeping track of workers and eliminating 'parasitism' 
The idea of labour books had been mooted as early as September 
1918, though their introduction moved slowly. The Moscow 
soviet EC on 31 May 1919 urged their rapid introduction, but 
the SNK decree on them restricted their introduction to Moscow 
and Petrograd. The intention of the books was to eliminate the 
vast army of 'speculators' noted above, to tie skilled workers to 
their jobs, and in general to control the labour market. By 
early 1920 every able-bodied Muscovite between the ages of 16 and 
50 (40 for women) had exchanged their passport for a labour book 
without which it was impossible to obtain government housing, 
food or clothing. The person was also liable to arrest for 
labour desertion and a period of compulsory labour.
The intensified use of existing labour resources was, 
Bukharin argued in December 1920, the only recourse in
129. G. Leggett, The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police, OUP 1981 
p.241.
130. VIMS, 16 September 1918. 131. VIMS, 2 June 1919.
132. Izvestiya VTsIK, 28 June 1919; Dekrety, vol.5, pp.304-6.
133. Harrison, Marooned, p.95. Emma Goldman writes that the 
labour book 'was somewhat of the yellow ticket issued to 
prostitutes under the Tsarist regime. It was a record of every 
step one made, and without it no steps could be made. It bound 
its holder to his job, to the city he lived in, and to the room 
he occupied. It recorded one's political faith and party 
adherence, and the number of times he was arrested. In short, a 
yellow ticket. Even some communists resented the degrading 
innovation 1 , Goldman, Disillusionment, p.109.
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circumstances where the stock of worn-out machines could not be
134 
renewed by purchases from abroad. It was at this time that
Trotsky developed a general programme of militarisation of the 
economy (Part III). By early 1920 the system had developed 
beyond partial attempts at labour distribution into a scheme of 
universal compulsory labour duty effected by a central labour 
committee (Glavkomtrud), under the Council of Defence, and local
committees. The scheme had been established by an SNK decree of
135 29 January 1920 and confirmed by the IX party congress.
In March 1920 the Moscow city committee of labour duty 
(Moskomtrud) was established with two main departments, 
mobilisation and the fight against labour desertion. Its aims
were 'to use the available labour' and to 'eliminate
138 parasitism'. Labour duty was obligatory for all healthy male
citizens between the ages of 19-50, and women up to 40 except
139 those with young children. According to the committee there
were 375,000 people in Moscow unaccounted for and living off 
unknown means: 'This mass comprises a hundred thousand 
Sukharevka, countless craft and domestic enterprises of a 
speculative type.' It estimated that labour duty would give 100-
134. £, 18 December 1920.
135. On labour duty, see Leggett, p.242; Dewar, pp.52-6-; Carr, 
2, pp.211-8.
136. KT, 20 March 1920.
137. A.M. Anikst, Organizatsiya rabochei sily v 1920 godu, M. 
1920, p.8.
138. Izvestiya Moskovskogo komiteta po trudovoi povinnosti, 5, 
21 June 1920.
139. ibid., 8, 16 October 1920.
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150,000 extra workers, as well as ridding the soviet apparatus of
140 thousands of able-bodied workers.
Moskomtrud was subordinate to the Moscow soviet EC and 
consisted of three people (a troika): a representative of the 
military commissariat, one from the soviet management body 
(upravlenie delami - which had taken over the practical functions 
of the soviet presidium), and one from the soviet labour 
department. The committee was only a directing body and all of
its acts were to be implemented through existing bodies such as
141 the labour departments, trade unions and military organs. The
absence of a TU representative once again indicates their low 
status, even though the III TU congress in April 1920 charged
unions to ensure that jobs were not changed arbitrarily and to
142 
combat absenteeism. The use of the MGSPS for labour duty
further alienated workers from it. When the MGSPS, for example, 
in November 1920 ordered the transfer of 79 workers from the
Danilovskii to the Prokhorovskii mill at the request of
143 Moskomtrud it aroused a storm of protest against itself.
144 Troiki were formed in the raions of Moscow and by the time of
the II guberniya TU conference in September 1920 every quarter of
140. KT_, 5 May 1920. The census of August 1920, which was 
fairly Tellable, revealed that this estimate, calculated on the 
basis of the issue of ration cards, was a massive exaggeration: 
only 60,000 non-labouring people were accounted for (KT, 17 
December 1920), though by then the activities of Mosk'omtrud may 
have had some effect, and also, on the day of the census 'non- 
labouring elements' may have gone to ground.
141. Izvestiya MK po trud. pov., 5, 21 June 1920.
142. KT, 20 march 1920.
143. Protokoly MGSPS, 20, 1920, p.12.
144. KT. 25 March 1920.
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the city and guberniya was covered by a network of 993 labour
145 
commissions. Attempts to form labour desertion committees in
the factories were abandoned on the grounds that they would
146 
weaken the already feeble factory committees (mestkomy).
In all between February and October 1920 Moskomtrud 
organised 308,400 worker days in Moscow guberniya, and 167,516 in 
the city (excluding cartage). The work centred on fuel, 
unloading, market gardening, and unskilled work on the railways
»
and enterprises. The committee had also mobilised back to work
2780 construction workers, 171 water workers, 700 metal
craftsmen, 2400 tailoring craftsmen (the last two groups being
sent into state enterprises), and 1060 people were drafted from
147 the villages to work in the fuel body (Moskvotop). In all, by
the end of the year about 8625 workers had been mobilised in
148 Moscow.
The figures in fact belie the work of Moskomtrud. Its major 
campaign was to return building workers from the country to the 
city in the first large-scale attempt at labour mobilisation to 
deal with the area of the greatest labour shortage. The war 
department was closely involved and therefore it was a test case 
of the use of the army apparatus on the home front. In the event 
between June and October 1920 only 3591 building workers were 
sent to Moscow, and from the above figures not all arrived. The 
report on the campaign admitted that 'We must concede the
145. KT, 24 September 1920. 146. Anikst (1920), p.55.
147. Izvestiya MK po trud. pov., 8, 16 October 1920.
148. A. Bubnov (ed), Grazhdanskaya voina, 1918-lj32j.gg;. , M. 1928, 
Appendix 11.
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149 
complete failure of this labour mobilisation 1 . Since the
mobilisation affected only one industry workers took cover under 
another. Nevertheless, the TsK in October 1920 was still calling 
for the 'systematic extraction of skilled workers who have 
settled in the countryside 1 . No greater success met the 
committee in its other major campaign, waged in conjunction with 
the MGSPS and Rabkrin: the attempt to shake out the offices and 
to return 'surplus' employees to the factories. No 
appreciable fall in the number of office workers was registered.
The attempt at labour mobilisation in Moscow cannot be 
judged a success in terms of the objectives it had set itself and 
few extra workers were made available for Moscow's factories. 
The end of unemployment was achieved at the price of the end of 
free labour but even militarisation under war communism could 
achieve little. The labour process of war communism did not 
eschew coercion, but coercion, in conditions of scarcity, proved 
unable to secure sufficient labour or increase productivity. The 
main effect of the militarisation of labour was to intensify 
worker alienation from continuing the war communist forced march 
to socialism.
3. Productivity and labour discipline
From 1917 there was a steady, and at times dramatic, fall in 
labour productivity. The decline appears to have been little 
affected by rations or wages policies, or indeed by 
militarisation and attempts at improving discipline.
149. Anikst (1920), pp.32, 34. 150. _P, 9 October 1920. 
151. KT, 14 September 1920; Protokoly MGSPS, 24, 1920, p.20.
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Productivity had already fallen dramatically in 1917 when, for
example, in the the Guzhon plant in that year wages rose by 300-
152 400% while productivity fell by 40-70%. By 1920 productivity
per worker in that plant had fallen to 9.5% of the 1913-14 level 
by weight, and 8% by value (Appendix 13). P.G. Smidovich, at the 
time chairman of the city SNKh, informed the Moscow soviet EC on 
19 January 1920 that in the previous year productivity had halved 
in Moscow with most industries fulfilling less than half their
allotted tasks. Output per worker in Moscow between 1913 and
154 1920 fell from 2781 pre-war rubles per annum to 713. , a
quarter of the 1913 level.
There were many reasons for the decline. They include 
disruptions in raw material and fuel supplies,the time spent in 
queues, the search for fuel, trips to the countryside in search 
of food, and so on. In these circumstances absenteeism naturally 
increased and was an indicator of the break-down of the legal 
economy. In every plant the management issued warnings against 
taking days off without permission. One such in the Guzhon plant 
on 23 December 1918 called on heads of departments to take action 
against absenteeism and stated that written reasons must be 
presented for an absence of even one day. In the Til'mans 
plant in late 1918 a guard was placed on the factory gates to 
check on workers arriving late and to prevent people leaving 
early. In the last third of 1919 absenteeism in Moscow
152. VIMS, 7 September 1918. 153. VIMS, 20 January 1920.
154. Moskovskii sovet za desyat' let raboty 1917-1927gg., M.
1927, p.19.
155. TsGAQR, 7952/3/212/274. 156. Izvestiya MOSNKh, 1, p.24
- 105 -
factories reached 25% (one day off in every three worked), lower 
where food supplies were better as in the food industry
itself. In March 1920 absenteeism on some Moscow railway
158 lines reached 80% a week, and in April in the factories
absenteeism averaged 44% a week. The factory committees were
159 
urged to take severe measures to improve the situation, but
disciplinary actions alone were insufficient when faced with 
desperate food shortages. In September 1920 absenteeism remained 
at the 40-50% level of the enrolled workers as they searched for 
food on the black market.
The norming of labour, the organisation of piece rates, the 
payment of bonuses, were all attempts to increase productivity, 
as were the early attempts at organising socialist emulation. 
But increasingly reliance was placed on elements of labour 
discipline external to the labour process: the Cheka, the party 
committees, the local Soviets, and the whole weight of the 
agitprop apparatus inflating the cult of labour in socialist 
society. The IX party congress in a resolution stated that it
views as one of the urgent tasks of the Soviet 
government and the trade unions a planned, systematic, 
persistent and implacable campaign against labour 
desertion, in particular by the publication of lists of 
deserters who have been punished, and the formation of 
punitive brigades composed of deserters, or as a Igst 
resort, their confinement in concentration camps.
In Moscow's factories 'red lists', extolling labour heroes, and 
'black boards', excoriating slackers, appeared. Various commissions
157. KM, col.187. 158. KT, 11 May 1920. 
159. KT, 3 April 1920. 160. Malle, p.597.
161. KPSS v rezolyutsiakh i resheniyakh s"ezdov, konferentsii 1 
plenumov TsK, vol.2, M. 1970, p.192.
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were established to combat labour desertion, to use the 
contemporary term, in various industries, such as one for
transport in Moscow in May 1920 with the brief to use both
 *. *.   162 
repression and agitation.
In 1920 the movement of comrade-disciplinary courts 
developed on the basis of the SNKh decree of 14 November 1919, 
though earlier versions had existed. The III TU congress of 
April 1920 approved their formation under the TUs, and by May 
1920 they were functioning under 19 of the 22 Moscow unions. 
Because of their militarisation they were not formed under the 
railway and water workers' unions. Their main task was to
ensure discipline among workers and initially technical and
164 
administrative staff were excluded from their purview. As
Mel'nichanksii said, 'They were useful in getting the workers to 
fulfil labour norms, and to enforce the labour discipline 
established by the trade unions'. Between 1 January and 1 
December 1920, for example, the court under the metal TU heard 
2151 cases, in 1341 of which there were acguittals and 810
convictions, with the greatest involving absenteeism, followed by
1 fi f> 
sabotage and indiscipline. The punishments included extra
work, firing, docking of wages or non-issue of rations. In 
January 1921 346 case were heard by all the union courts in the 
guberniya and city, in February 762, and a peak of 1112 was 
reached in March 1921 at a time of maximum disturbances in the
162. KT, 11 May 1920.
163. KT, 11 May 1920; KM, col.685.
164. IV Mosk. gub. konf. profsoyuzov, p.11.
165. ibid. , p.16. 166. KT, 22 December 1920
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city. An attempt by the official legal system (Narsud- 
Chapter 6) to encroach on the prerogatives of these courts was 
repulsed by a conference of representatives of the disciplinary 
courts on 10 February 1921. The meeting insisted that all 
questions of a purely production character were to be decided 
only in the factories. In keeping with the anti-specialist mood 
of the times the conference extended the jurisdiction of the
I f- O
courts to administrative and technical personnel, which may 
account for some of the increased cases brought in March.
The latter democratic measure was clearly part of the 
response to the growing wave of protest in the city directed 
partially against the harsh discipline in factories. Another 
response was the formation of disciplinary courts not attached to 
the unions to judge not only labour desertion but also 
'bureaucracy 1 . One of these was formed in Rogozhsko-Simonovskii 
raion in the first days of 1921 by the party RK with both 
prosecutors and defenders available.
The measures described above indicate some of the first 
responses to the perennial problem of ensuring labour discipline 
and productivity under the conditions of a state-run economy. In 
keeping with the general authoritarian tenor of war communism 
under conditions of civil war and scarcity these measures tended 
to rely on coercion since the state had few incentives to offer. 
Despite the use of the courts and other disciplinary methods 
absenteeism remained high and productivity low.
167. Byulleten 1 MGSPS , 1, 23 January 1921, pp.8-9.
168. KT, 15 February 1921.
169. KT, 14 January 1921.
- 108 -
4. Labour protest in Moscow
Throughout the civil war there was an underlying current of 
labour militancy in Moscow, and this was not restricted to the 
intra-plant conflicts discussed above. As Ziegler has recently 
put it:
The first decade of Soviet labour history witnessed the 
gradual incorporation of the radicalised Russian workers 
into the Party-state structure. The Bolsheviks 
exercised little semblance of control over the working 
class until the end of the war communism period.
Both the introduction and the phasing out of war communism were 
marked by particularly active periods of this militancy. 
Throughout the authorities treated them as arising from supply 
shortages and the lack of consciousness. In response to the 
disturbances in early summer 1918 mentioned above the metal TU 
wrote:
The VSRM oblast committee holds that the partial 
elemental disturbances by certain groups of metal 
workers that took place in a period of particularly 
severe supply crisis was a manifestation of the 
insufficient consciousness of these groups. They were 
evoked by the criminal demagogy of people who are 
setting the masses on the path of the liguidation of 
their power, the power of workers, and the restoration 
of the former social and economic relations...
Here the themes of the protest movement and the official response 
are stated: the danger of restoration of capitalism, the alleged 
role of counter-revolutionaries, and the need for greater 
consciousness to combat them. A lack of identification with the 
Bolshevik party was treated as the absence of consciousness 
altogether. In practice, the party consciousness as it had
170. Charles E. Ziegler, 'Worker Participation and Worker 
Discontent in the Soviet Union 1 , Political Science Quarterly, 
Summer 1983, p.247.
171. TsGAOR, 7952/3/212/199.
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developed in 1917 was reversed and a general consciousness of 
workers' needs was restored.
It is impossible to say what proportion of workers were 
involved in the various disturbances, though following the lull 
after the defeat of the workers' conference movement of 1918 each 
wave of unrest was more powerful than the last, culminating in the 
mass movement from late 1920 (Chapter 10). The protest movement 
attests to the erosion of the political basis of the government 
as the contradiction between the economic principles of war 
communism and the realities of worker life was closed by methods 
of compulsion.
Both in 1917 and during the civil war the pattern of worker 
protest differed from that in Petrograd. This was a reflection 
not only of the differing social composition of the city, or of
i
its cultural and political traditions, but also a facet of the 
geography of the city. In Moscow there was no Vyborg side with 
massive plants isolated from the rest of the city, and the 
closest Moscow came to having a Putilov was the Guzhon plant, 
less than a tenth of its size . Here no raion can be singled out 
for its special militancy, and the Moscow river was not such a 
barrier as to allow any separate traditions to develop in 
Zamoskvorech'e. Instead, the concentric and radial pattern of 
the city focused all of life on the administrative centre, and on 
the Kremlin itself.
There are few details about the sporadic disturbances. At
172. The development of party consciousness in 1917 is described 
by Diane Koenker,'The Evolution of Party Consciousness in 1917: 
The Case of the Moscow Worker', Soviet Studies, XXX, 1, January 
1978, pp.36-62.
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the Moscow soviet plenum of 13 January 1919 several references 
were made to recent disorders among Moscow workers, and
Vladimirskii barely restrained the communist deputies from taking
1 73 
on summary powers to deal with them. In February 1919 a
report noted the increased activity of the LSRs (supporters of
Spiridonova) in the Guzhon plant, especially in the plant
174 
club. On 15 July 1919 Kamenev admitted that the mood of the
workers had become significantly more hostile in the past few 
months. Several concessions were announced to the soviet, 
including the above-mentioned relaxation of supply policies 
permitting the bagmen to bring in grain (though this was not to 
be announced in the press) and a relaxation of travel 
restrictions from the city.
A Moscow committee of defence (KOM) was formed at the end of 
June to deal with the rising tide of disturbances provoked, at 
least partially, by the desperate supply shortages. The MK, 
Moscow soviet and the Cheka were represented on the body, and in 
every raion a troika (sometimes called political bureau) was 
formed. Party members were now given the right to arrest people 
involved in 'counter-revolutionary' agitation. Workers in 
some enterprises in Sokol'nicheskii and Lefortovo raions ran up 
the white flag as a sign of protest. KOM concentrated 
emergency powers in its hands, overriding the Moscow soviet, and
173. Stenotchety MS,1, pp.14-5. 174. VIMS, 6 February 1919.
175. Stenotchety MS, 18, 1919, pp.265-7.
176. N.G. Dumova, Sekretar' MK (povest 1 o V.M. Zagor^skom^, 
M. 1966, p.109.
177. ibid., p.110.
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178 demanded obedience from the population of the city. With the
easing of the supply difficulties as the first of the new harvest 
was brought in and the use of repression the disturbances died 
down and KOM was temporarily disbanded (it was revived in 
September 1919, Chapter 6).
The non-party conferences from the end of 1919 were the 
scene of bitter attacks on the Bolsheviks (Chapter 7). At the 
end of March 1920 there were strikes in some factories, and in
the Sokol'nicheskii tram park. The immediate demands of the
179 
workers apparantly centred on food shortages. A non-party
conference of female workers in Khamovnicheskii raion at the end 
of March 1920, attended by 550 delegates representing 5280 female 
workers, was the scene of bitter protest.
At the height of the Polish war the protests and strikes, 
usually provoked by economic issues but not restricted to them, 
became particularly freguent, especially in Rogozhsko-Simonovskii
and Gorodskoi raions. As usual, they were attributed to
181 Menshevik and SR agitation. Communists were urged by the MK
to be the 'eyes and ears' of the authorities in the localities
182 
and to report on malfeasants. The assault on non-Bolshevik
trade unionism launched at this time was probably connected with
178. P_, 27 September 1919.
179. KT, 28 March 1920. 180. KT, 1 April 1920.
181. KT, 4 June 1920; Iz Istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR^. 
Sbornik~dokumentov i materialov, vol.3, M. 1961, pp.213-4. 
Leites reports that there was a wave of strikes against 
militarisation in 1920: in the first six months strikes occurred 
in 77% of medium and large enterprises in the country. At the 
same time he asserts that most strikes were declared for food 
rather than wages, Leites, pp.195-7.
182. KT. 8 June 1920.
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the wave of disturbances. Mel'nichanskii reported on them to the 
Moscow soviet meeting with the trade unions on 2 June 1920, but 
no more details are given other than that they were provoked by 
supply shortages. A resolution was adopted which accused certain 
groups of taking advantage of the difficulties. This was
obviously directed against the Mensheviks, and they
183 demonstratively left the hall led by Dan (Gurevich). The
accusation indicates that while the disturbances might have begun 
as supply disturbances political demands followed. By the end of 
1920 the protest movement developed beyond deprecating the supply 
shortages and threatened the very foundations of war communism. 
They will be discussed in the context of the political debates of 
the time.
Faced with urban and economic collapse at a time of bitter 
civil war the 'commune state 1 under war communism increasingly 
resorted to centralism, as illustrated by the case of the Moscow 
trade unions, and more and more relied on coercion. While 
glavkist methods may have been provoked by the circumstances, the 
forms that the dictatorship of the proletariat took in the 
economy undermined the direct participation of the working class 
and the trade unions in managing production, weakened the 
economic role of the Moscow soviet, and restricted the role of 
the party in the economy. But in the political sphere the party 
became the key element in the new state.
183. KT. 3 June 1920.
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PART II 
The Party Process During War Communism
Introduction: the 'May programme
Following the October revolution, and especially in the 
first half of 1918, the party devoted its resources and attention 
to consolidating Soviet power and to the major political crisis 
associated with the peace of Brest-Litovsk. In organisational 
terms the party was in danger of 'withering away 1 . A party 
meeting in the Dinamo plant on 1 April 1918, for example, 
discovered that party life in the plant had almost ceased because 
all of its members were involved in some sort of social work. 
At the same time the economic crisis and mass redundancies 
reduced the numbers of the working class. Enthusiastic workers 
were leaving for the Red Army leading to hitherto large party 
cells, such as in the Guzhon plant, being left with only a few 
members.
On behalf of the Khamovnicheskii party raion committee (RK) 
Savel'ev described the elements of the decline in the party in 
early July 1918: active members had left for the fronts or the 
Soviets; enterprises had closed so workers had left for the 
countryside; and above all, the rank and file party member had 
become less active and, he claimed, waited for leadership from 
the centre. The fall in party work had affected the workers who 
had become less 'Bolshevik-minded...wavering', a reference to
1. £, 4 April 1918. 2. P_, 5 April 1918. 
3. P, 7 July 1918.
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the non-party workers' movement of the time. The economic 
crisis, the decline in the internal coherence of party 
organisation, and worker disaffection, stimulated the change in 
emphasis, noted by Neil Harding, from commune state forms to the 
dictatorship of the proletariat.
This shift had been maturing even while the dominance of 
state work and the bitter discussion over the Brest peace and 
economic policies had relegated party organisation itself to the 
background. During the hectic first few months of the Bolshevik 
revolution an awareness gradually became apparent that the party 
itself required attention. A letter from the party secretariat 
on 20 January 1918 stated that the party had 'bled out 1 its best
forces and that this could only be remedied by increased
4 
attention to organisational questions. At the VII party
congress in March 1918 Sverdlov took this a stage further when he 
argued, in the light of the near split in the Moscow party 
organisation (MPO) over the Brest peace, that 'the interests of 
the party as a whole are higher than the interests of the 
individual party member 1 . A new approach was required, he 
argued, in which both internal party organisation and the party's 
integrity vis-a-vis mass organisations such as the Soviets had to 
be improved.
The turning point in the reevaluation of the role of the 
party in the new state came with the TsK resolution of 18 May
4. Perepiska sekretariata TsK RSDRP(b) s mestnymi partiinymi 
organizatsiyami (henceforth Perepiska), vol.11, M. 1957, p.171
5. VII ekstrennyi s"ezd RKP(b), mart 1918 goda: 
stenograficheskii otchet, M. 1962, p.172.
6. ibid., p.171.
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1918 passed at Sverdlov's prompting. It required that 'the 
centre of gravity of our work be shifted somewhat towards party 
building 1 , and stated, inter alia, that:
All party members irrespective of the type of their 
work and the functions that they fulfil are obliged to 
participate directly in party organisations and must not 
deviate from party instructions issued by the 
corresponding party centre.
In other words, all party members including those staffing the 
new state structures were primarily subordinate to the party and 
only then to the organisation in which they worked. The 
resolution for the first time in a party document then went on to 
incorporate the main concerns of the civil war period: on the 
purity of membership and purging undesirables even if this were 
to lead to a fall in numbers; the problem of the actual working 
of local party organisations; and the question of party education 
and training. In stressing the need for quality in a cadre party 
and arguing against its dilution into a mass party, the 
resolution marks the end of the whole period from February 1917. 
On the threshold of the civil war some of the elements of the 
party in underground conditions were revived. At the same time 
the definition of the party as separate from state bodies and the 
emphasis on purity and the obligations of members towards the 
party were attempts to prevent the absorption of the party into
o
the pervading bureaucratism.
Helgesen has characterised the resolution and the two 
follow-up letters as constituting a 'May programme' for the
7. Perepiska, vol.Ill, M. 1967, p.64; _P, 19 May 1918.
8. The themes of this resolution were developed in two circular 
letters to local party organisations of 22 and 29 May 1918, 
Perepiska, vol.Ill, pp.72-4, 81-3; P, 22, 29 May 1918.
- 116 -
9 
revival of the party. He argues that not only the Lenin-
Sverdlov group proposed the revival but also the Left Communists, 
who were afraid of the weakening of party influence in the 
Soviets and the infiltration of the party by petty-bourgeois 
careerists. There is some truth in this view. The Left 
Communist VI. Sorin, one of the leading figures in the MGK, 
stressed that
The party itself, which is comparatively better inured 
against degeneration, must strengthen control over 
soviet fractions and make public workers subordinate and 
responsible to it.
But Helgesen's case fails to take into account the nature of the 
organisational revival envisaged by the May programme, and the 
different ideas held on the question by the left. Throughout the 
civil war all wings of the party were agreed that an effective 
party organisation was essential and that it should exert a 
guiding influence over mass bodies, such as the Soviets. 
However, the various oppositions during the civil war insisted 
that this should not be at the expense of limiting the party 
member's right to criticise party policy or that the rights of 
the mass bodies should be infringed.
In this respect the Left Communists censured the one- 
sidedness of the TsK's attempts in May 1918 to improve the work 
of the party organisations. The TsK was concerned with the
9. M.M. Helgesen, The Origins of the Party-State Monolith in 
Soviet Russia: Relations-Between the Soviets and the Party 
Committees in the Central Provinces, October 1917 - March 1921, 
PhD dissertation, State University of New York, Stony Brook, 
1980, p.196.
10. ibid., p.194.
11. Kommunist, 4, June 1918, p.7.
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formal, organisational, resurrection of the party, and was not 
interested in making it, as the left put it, a forum for all 
proletarian democracy:
The TsK has lately issued several circulars sounding 
the alarm over the condition of our party. There is no 
doubt that the situation is a very unhappy one with many 
alarming phenomena. But we consider that the most 
dangerous thing for the party and its intellectual 
(dukhovnoi) growth is the circumstance that the leading 
figures (~verkhi) of the party have stopped drumming into 
its organisation autonomous thought but try simply, 
without further discussion, to subordinate them to the 
leadership of the TsK, and that these leading figures,, 
present themselves as the carriers of party thought.
The whole concept of the party member was changing and this was 
to be confirmed during the civil war. The party member was to be 
an activist first and a discussant of theoretical problems 
second. This psychological division within each party member was 
given organisational expression within the party by the 
development of an inner corps of party leaders. Resistance to 
this process took the form of the many oppositions of the war 
period. The organisational consolidation of the party at the X 
party congress in March 1921 and the ban on factions in the party 
was a logical continuation of the 'May programme 1 .
On the eve of the civil war the TsK outlined the general 
programme for the new period:
If we can consider that the first period of the 
achievement of political power over the bourgeoisie as a 
whole completed, then the second period, the building of 
society^on new communist principles, has only just 
begun.
The centrepiece of the new period of communist construction was 
to be the party in the political sphere and the elimination of
12. Kommunist, 4, p.15.
13. 22 May 1918 TsK circular, Perepiska, vol.Ill, p.72.
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commodity production in the economy. The Russian revolution was 
isolated, the circular went on, and the departure of active 
communists to soviet work and the influx of new communists had 
weakened party organisation leading to the emergence of the 
'Left' Communist tendency. In language and analysis remarkably 
similar to that of the X party congress resolutions the TsK 
added:
Without a firmly united party, acting as one person, we 
will not be able to cope with the tasks facing us. The 
working masses will not be able to retain in their hands 
the power gained during the October days if there is not 
a powerful core, permeated with a single will and a 
single aspiration.
The May programme was a recognition of the limited bases of 
national order in Russia and hence the success of the socialist 
revolution was identified with the domination of the 
Bolshevik party. More than a defensive reaction to the 
developing civil war, a programme was outlined for the new period 
which defined both the type of party required and its central 
role in the new society.
14. ibid., p.73.
15. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, CUP 
1979, p.206.
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CHAPTER 4 
Membership
Recruitment policy and the nature of the changes in the 
social composition and occupational structure of party membership 
were a central concern and cause of controversy throughout the 
civil war. With the growth of the state bureaucracy attempts 
were made to ensure a flow of party members to occupy the key 
positions and hence their training and political education became 
an important issue. The vetting of party recruits and the 
expulsion of undesirables had wider implications for the party's 
self-definition.
1. The pattern of recruitment
The numbers in the Moscow party organisation are difficult 
to establish with any accuracy until the reregistration of August 
1920. The figures before then are often contradictory and 
usually inflated. The problem is compounded by the movement of 
party members to the fronts, on various assignments, and by the 
many communists who came to Moscow for training or on missions. 
The pattern however can be established (Table 7). From the high 
point of 17,306 members in October 1917 numbers had halved to 
under 8000 in mid-1918. After the revolution organisations were 
drained of their most active members and as functioning party 
groupings they atrophied. The party cells in factories donated 
the bulk of their membership to the state apparatus and many were 
disbanded totally. Sverdlov's estimate, backed by Avanesov, of 
20,000 members in the city in March 1918 was clearly an
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Table 7 
Size of Moscow party organisation
City Guberniya Joint organisation 
Members Cands Total Total Members Cands Total
1917 
Feb
Oct 
Dec
1918 
Mar Jun" 
Nov (
1919 . 
Mar . 
Aug. 
Oct D
1920 } 
Mar, 
May 
Jun
Jul 
Sep
1921 
Jan, 
Jun Sep c
m 
m
600
6,000
15,000
17.306
600
6,000
15,000
17.306
20,000
7,300
14,694
20,000
7,300
14,694
17,000 
15,834 
32,600
4,818 
4,818
17,000 
20,652 
37,418
34,015
35,044
38,061
23.069
3,767
4 .463
37,782
39.507
2.900 25.969
32,475
26,565
7,886
4 .240
40,361
30.805
200
8.554
10,000
15,000 
2,881 ]
5.000
6,488
6,819
5,528
4.572
41,683
39,854
42.697
8,936
9,557
48,790J
52,264
27.641
7,809
7,926
36,720 9,280
40,284 10,552
34,491 6,726
46,000
50,836
40.767
n
Sources: (a) Ocherki ist. MO KPSS, p.214. (b) VII
(aprel'skaya) vserossiiskaya konferentsiya RSDRP(b): protokoly, 
M. 1958, pp.152, 154.(c) VI s"ezd RSDRP(b), avgust 19lT 
goda: protokoly, M. 1958, p.204.(d) Perepiska, vol.VII, M. 
1972, p.438 nl. (e) VII s"ezd RKP, pp.4, 115, 116. 
(f) D.A. Chugaev (ed), Rabochii klass sovetskoi rossii v pervyi 
god diktatury proletariata, W. 1964 , p.76. Tgl Perepiska, 
vol.Ill, p.197.Thl£7 25 January 1919. (i) VIII s"ezd 
RKP(b), mart 1918g.: protokoly, M. 1959, p.471. 
(j) Moskovskaya organizatsiya~RKP(b) v tsifrakh, issue 1, M. 
1925"] p. 3 . (k) Moskovskaya gorodskaya i Moskovskaya oblastnaya 
organizatsii KPSS v tsifrakh, M. 1972, pp.27-8. (1) Otchet MK 
za iyul' 1920g., M. 1920, p.7. (m) Otchet MK-za sentyabr 1 
1920g., M. 1920, p.6. (n) V Moskovskaya gubernskaya 
partiinaya konferentsiya (RKP), 19-21 fevralya 1921g. kratkii 
ocherk i rezolyutsii, W. 1921, p. 3. Tol Otchet~o 
deyatel'nosti MK-ta RKP(b) za iyul' avgust, i sentyabr' 1921g., 
M. 1921, p.22.
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16 
exaggeration.
By the end of 1918 membership had risen to nearly 15,000, and 
remained at this level up to the mass recruitment of the party 
week in October 1919. At the VIII party congress Sosnovskii drew 
on the low membership figures for the MPO to challenge Zinoviev's 
exaggerated claims on the growth of party membership after 
October 1917. During the party week the membership of the MPO 
doubled to 32,600, while the number of candidates remained 
unchanged at 4818. The figures available for the following 
period vary considerably, ostensibly reaching a peak of over 
40,000 members and over 9000 candidates in July 1920 for the joint 
city and guberniya organisation, which had been united since May 
1920. This rapid increase was reversed by the August 1920 
reregistration which saw a massive drop in party membership in 
the city, leaving only 23,063 members and 2900 candidates in 
October 1920. Up to March 1921 there was a slow rise as soldiers 
returned from the fronts and recruitment continued.
The pattern of recruitment is therefore marked by a rapid rise 
to October 1917, a slow fall to March 1918, then a precipitous 
decline to mid-1918, thereafter rising as mobilisations were 
compensated by more effective recruiting. At the same time the 
worker communists were the first to be mobilised and the new 
intake was predominantly from the offices. To counteract this 
worker recruitment from the factories was encouraged from late 
1918, but still the proportion of employees rose. The party week 
in October 1919 led to a massive rise in numbers and partially
16. VI s"ezd RKP, pp.4, 115.
17. VIII s"ezd RKP, p.173.
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restored the balance of workers in factories. The growth 
continued as the civil war ended, punctuated only by the 
reregistration of August 1920, as communists returned from the 
front and the attractions of party membership were no longer 
balanced by fear of mobilisation. This growth was only halted by 
the party purge of 1921.
The pattern of recruitment reveals the importance of the 
party week in maintaining the level of membership:
Table 8 
Length of party membership (stazh) of MPQ on 1 September 1920
City Gub Total % for % for
No. % 36 gubs 38 gubs 
exc. M.+ P. inc.
pre- 
1905
1908
1917
1917
1919
1919
1920
Not
TOTA
1905 
-1907
-1916
Jan-Oct
Nov-Dec,1918
Jan-Aug
Sep-Dec
known
L 2
3
5
3
8
6
9
Source: Materialy
497 
415
684
,117
,807
, 729
,084
,999
488
,820
po st
30 
48
39
52
1,18
60
7
7
3
1,326
1,580
6
5,406
atisti
6
35
ke
3,
6,
4,
9,
8,
,22
527 
463
723
644
994
332
410
579
554
6 100
lichnogo
2
1
2
10
20
12
27
24
2
1
1
7
21
12
31
26
1
100
sostava
1 
1
1
7
20
12
2
2
100
RKP(b)
9
7
1
/
M. 1921, pp.62-3.
Members with a pre-1917 stazh in Moscow city in August 1920 
exceeded the total membership of only 600 in February 1917, 
indicating the concentration of old revolutionaries in the city. 
To a lesser degree the same is true for the January - October 
1917 group, with the MPO containing 3% more than the rest of the 
party without the two capitals. But from 1917 the stazh groups 
consistently return a total less than the membership total of the 
respective periods. From this the retention rate of members can
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be calculated, though because of the contradictory membership 
figures this can only be taken as an approximate indicator.
Between 1917 and 1920 the retention rate averaged 26% per annum,
1 8 
compared to 30.9% nationally.
During the civil war the MPO had not simply doubled in size 
but had to a large degree renewed itself. Only 4713 (21.2%) of 
the city membership of 17,306 in October 1917 remained in August 
1920. Only 15.8% had joined before October 1917, and only 5.3% 
had been members under the autocracy. Therefore a substantial 
majority of the MPO was a product of the revolution itself: 84.2% 
of the city party as it stood in late 1920 had joined after 
October 1917. 19
The massive recruitment of the civil war overshadowed the 
original membership of 1917. The recruitment had major 
repercussions not only on the composition of the party but also 
on its political practice. The party was no longer a group of 
determined revolutionaries working for a future revolution but 
was forced to adapt itself to the problem of managing a vast 
country in unfavourable circumstances. The group of about 5000 
in Moscow who had been party members before the October 
revolution became the kernel of the party in power and took the 
key posts. A parallel can be drawn between this group and the 
absorption of the radicalised workers into the new state 
apparatus. On the one hand there was a group of communists who
18. The national figure from Jonathan R. Adelman. 'The 
Development of the Soviet Party Apparat in the Civil War: Center, 
Localities and Nationality Areas', Russian History/Histoire 
Russe,9, pt 1, 1982, p.93.
19. By late 1921 only 13% of MPO members had joined before October 
1917, and only 4% before February 1917, KT, 21 September 1921.
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had undergone the trials of the Tsarist period and the 
Provisional Government, joined by a few of the most able recruits 
after October. On the other, a shifting group of members, a 
large proportion of whom were soon expelled or left the party for 
one reason or another, often passive in relation to party duties 
and marked by a high degree of political illiteracy. Given the 
departure of the most active workers from the plants, and the 
changes in the social composition of those remaining, it could be 
argued that there simply was not a large enough reserve of 
committed and able workers in the factories to replenish the 
wastage of party members at the fronts and elsewhere. This was 
the basis of the split in the party between the 'old guard 1 and 
the mass of membership, the verkhi (higher-ups) and the nizy 
(rank and file).
2 . The first reregistrations: 1918
During the civil war checks on party membership took the 
form of reregistrations, later called chistki (cleansings or 
purges). There were three main reregistration periods: spring 
1918 - March 1919; the first all-Russian reregistration ordered 
by the VIII party congress because of increasing concern about 
'unhealthy 1 elements joining the party, taking place from May to 
September 1919; and the third decided by the IX party congress in 
March 1920 carried out between July-December 1920. The MPO 
underwent a major purge campaign in every year of the civil war, 
and for over half of the period was in the grip of such a 
campaign.
The first series of reregistrations took place haphazardly 
and on the initiative of the local organisations. They began in
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Moscow in spring 1918 and were intensified following concern
expressed at the VII party congress over 'careerists' joining the
party. During a reregistration all members effectively had to
rejoin their organisation and thus once again their credentials
20 for membership were adjudicated. Contrary to the common view
the first reregistrations, in Moscow at least, began on the 
morrow of the revolution, indicating that one of the first 
tasks of the revolutionary party in power is to check its own 
membership.
There are not many details on the first reregistrations but 
the following examples illustrate the general pattern. In 
February-March 1918 a reregistration took place in Basmannyi
raion. Here membership had risen from about 1800 in October
21 1917 to about 2000 in January 1918. According to the RK
secretary's report for the raion, the Brest peace had revealed
that the organisation was 'not at the required level 1 and so a
22 
reregistration had been declared, leaving only 400 members.
These figures illustrate both the small amount of 'October 
communists', those joining the victorious party, and the massive 
scale of expulsions of 'unsuitable' people. In this raion the
number of cells fell from 48 to 15 between January and June
23 1918. The figures could indicate that the earlier membership
figures were grossly inflated, or they can be taken as a measure
20. Marcel Liebman, Leninism under Lenin (trans Brian Pearce),
Merlin Press, London 1980, p.308, states that the first
reregistrations were held in 1919.
21. Y.I. Baganov, Moskovskie bol'sheviki v ogne revolyutsionnykh 
boev, M. 1976, p.143.
22. Chugaev, p.96. 23. Chugaev, pp.96, 99.
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of the tremendous 'withering away of the party' in the first half 
of 1918.
The 18 May 1918 TsK meeting and the two letters insisted on 
the application of the VI party congress (August 1917) decision 
incorporated in the party statute that recruits had to be
recommended by two party members and endorsed (or expelled) by a
24 general meeting of party members in the given organisation.
The 29 May 1918 letter argued that many 'alien elements' had
25 
entered the party who baulked at 'proletarian discipline'.
Following the 18 May resolution the TsK urged the MK to put its 
own house in order, and Sverdlov was successful in ensuring that 
the 28 May 1918 city party conference was dominated by 
organisational guestions. At the conference he severely 
criticised infringments of party discipline by communists. The 
resolution noted that the 'all-party point of view had fallen 
into the background behind the local, professional, group view'. 
Communists working in soviet and other institutions were to form 
fractions or cells and ensure that the TsK or MK line was 
fulfilled, 'purging the party of all elements of decay and 
degeneration'. The party, the resolution concluded, was to be
built on the basis of unswerving devotion to the principles of
? 6democratic centralism.
24. VI s"ezd RSDRP(b), avgust 1917 goda: protokoly, M. 1958 
p-265.
25. P, 29 May 1918.
26. K.I. Varlamov, N.I. Slamikhin, Razoblachenie V.I. Leninym 
teorii i taktiki "levykh kommunistov" (noyabr 1 1917 - 1918gg.), 
M. 1964, p.372; I.A. Popov, 'Deyatel'nost' Moskovskoi partiinoi 
organizatsii po ukrepleniu svoikh ryadov (okt. 1917-yan. 
1919gg.)', Uch. zap. MOPI im. Krupskoi, Istoriya KPSS, vol.215, 
issue 13, 1968 , p.73.
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There are some indications that the reregistrations were 
used against the Left Communists. The 22 May 1918 TsK circular 
had suggested that the Left Communist movement was a result of
the organisational weakness of the party and of the influx of new
97 
members. The 10 June 1918 MK meeting noted that 'the raions
are increasingly interested in purging the party 1 , and I.A. 
Pyatnitskii made the point explicit when he said of the Left 
Communists: 'If they do not want to bear responsibility for the
general line of the party, they can leave it. We do not need
? p 
honorary party members'. The 'May programme 1 was not only a
response to the organisational anaemia of the party but also a 
specific reaction to the opposition of the left. Unfortunately, 
the extent to which the 1918 reregistrations were used to 
discipline the Left Communists is as unfathomable as is the 
extent to which the 1921 purge was used against the Workers' 
Opposition.
From the end of May 1918 attempts were made to implement the 
new programme. In Khamovnicheskii raion the procedure for 
screening applicants was strengthened by the provision that the 
candidate and his or her recomendees had not only to attend a 
general meeting but also to undergo an interview by the RK bureau
beforehand. Failure to attend either meeting by any of those
29 concerned meant that the application automatically lapsed. In
Sokol'nicheskii raion membership since the end of 1917 had fallen 
from 1500 to under a thousand in May 1918, and following a
27. Perepisksa, vol.Ill, p.73. 28. Varlamov, p.373 
29. p, 28 May 1918.
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reregistration in early summer the RK insisted that all party 
members had to undertake some party work, to pay dues regularly,
and to attend meetings. Against the background of the civil war
32 the RK called for the general arming of party members. The
attempt to inculcate party discipline coincided with the need to 
instil military discipline. All party members were to be 'tied 1 
(prikreplenie) to a cell, and the party members employed in 
offices (for brevity they will be called state party workers -
SPW) were to participate in party life.
34 In summer 1918 reregistrations continued in the MPO. A
general reregistration was declared for all of Moscow in 
September 1918. In Basmannyi raion membership had increased to 
816 since the first reregistration in early 1918, and in this 
second purge it fell to 550. A third reregistration in early 
1919 decreased the numbers from 1180 to 600. In the three 
reregistrations in the raion about 2250 people had left or been 
expelled, more than the membership itself. What happened to 
these people is not known, but it can be assumed that some of
30. V.V. Anikeev, 'Svedeniya o bol'shevistskikh organizatsiyakh 
s marta po dekabr 1 1917 goda', VI KPSS, 2, 1958, p.147.
31. Between May and July 1918 membership fell from 1015 to 
3-350, P_, 25 May, 18 July 1918.
32. P_, 5 June 1918. A motion to this effect was also passed by 
a general meeting of communists in Presnenskii raion on 1 June 
1918, E>, 6 June 1918.
33. Resolutions to this effect were passed by party general 
meetings in Zamoskvorech'e and Sokol'nicheskii raions in mid- 
July, p_, 18 July 1918.
34. E.g., in the reregistration in Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raion 
in June 1918 (£, 9 June 1918) membership fell from 800 to 489 by 
the end of July", Chugaev, p.76, P_, 23 July 1918.
35. Chugaev, p.96.
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them formed a potential focus of dissatisfaction against the 
party. The scale of the reregistrations indicates that the 
attempt to achieve a stricter enforcement of recruitment 
procedure after the May 1918 TsK initiative was not very 
effective in screening the party from 'undesirable elements'.
While the above measures were taken to implement the 'May 
programme' in Moscow, the period up to the VIII party congress in 
March 1919 was marked by mounting alarm over the condition of the 
organisation. On the eve of a reregistration in Butyrskii raion, 
for example, in summer 1918 (when membership stood at about 600) 
concern was expressed over the extreme passivity of the majority 
of them. A meeting of active party workers (APWs) at the end of 
July 1918 noted that all the most conscious members were occupied 
in soviet work and devoted no time to party affairs. A major 
article in Pravda in August 1918 argued that since the revolution 
there had been both a quantitative and qualitative decline in
party membership, alien elements had infiltrated, and that the
3 7 party was permeated by corruption. These general alarms about
the condition of the party became a common feature of the party 
press and meetings at this time, usually focusing on the passivity
of party members, the lack of party discipline, and the intake of
3 8 
'alien' elements. A. Lisitsyn, a member of the Butyrskii RK,
36. This was one of the first raions to insist on a 'candidate' 
stage of 3-4 months for catechumens. This was dropped when the 
sympathisers' groups were organised (P_, 1 August 1918). Further 
restrictions on membership were introduced by a party general 
meeting on 3 August which stipulated that recomendees were each 
to have been in the party for over six months, P_, 15 August 1918.
37. N. Kopylev in P_, 25 August 1918.
38. Examples of such articles can be found in P_, 21 September, 1 
October 1918. ~~
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in October 1918 inveighed against passive party members and
39 insisted that all were to be active in one way or another.
Towards the end of October 1918 Bergman described the case of the 
recruit in Moscow who insisted on party membership 'tonight, in
order to get the job tomorrow 1 . Recommendations were being given
40 by friends (po znakomstvu) to help one another. The party was
not 'widening 1 he argued: it was degenerating.
The rapidly changing physiognomy of party membership was 
noted in Zamoskvorech'e at the end of November 1918. At the time 
there were 1650 party members organised in 45 cells. Even though 
the raion had just completed the third mobilisation of party 
members to the fronts numbers were still increasing. But, as one 
correspondent noted, the atmosphere at general meetings (as in 
the factories) had changed radically. Few of the old comrades
were to be found and the atmosphere at meetings was 'philistine'
41 (obyvatel'skii). There was no particular revolutionary mood.
An article in Pravda a few weeks later argued that it was clear 
to all communists that the party was 'sick' with petty-bourgeois 
Philistinism. The party was filling up with peasants and 
careerists, the article argued, and the main symptoms of the
sickness were endless personal sguabbles and quitting the party
42 
on the eve of mobilisations.
It would appear that the concern was justified, and there 
was a steady stream of expulsions from the party alongside the
39. P_, 8 October 1918.
40. P, 19 October 1918. This was the incident recounted by 
ZinovTev at the VIII party congress, VIII s"ezd RKP, p.294.
41. P 30 November 1918. 42. P, 17 December 1918.
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reregistrations. For example, Butyrskii RPO expelled six members 
in August 1918: 3 for 'behaviour not becoming for communists', 2
for refusing to go to the front, and 1 for not attending raion
43 
meetings. While these figures are low, the raion party
membership following a reregistration in autumn 1918, taken
together with tighter entry procedures and mobilisations, fell
44 45 from 600 in August to 380 in January 1919. Earlier a major
'squabble 1 had erupted in Sushchevsko-Mar'inskii raion where it 
was allegedly discovered that some responsible party leaders 
'only pretended to be Bolsheviks'. An investigation commission 
barred them from holding responsible posts and the case was 
transferred to the MK court of honour (sud chesti) for final 
judgement.
On 11 January 1919 the MK called on all raions which had not 
conducted a reregistration to do so immediately. The MK bureau
was called on to draw up a list of demands to be made of all
47 party members during the check. Gradually the limited aims of
the first reregistrations, to clear the party of 'careerist and 
unworthy elements', gave way to the specific policy of improving 
the social composition of the party by increasing the intake of 
workers and minimising the recruitment of non-workers. 
Deindustrialisation, the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus, 
and the pervasive influence of the illegal economy with its
43. P_, 15 August 1918. 44. P_, 1 August 1918.
45. _P, 5 January 1919.
46. P_, 17 August 1918. On 16 August Lomskii, Rutman and Kozlov 
were elected to preside over the court (£, 20 August 1918). The 
punishments were confirmed by the court (£, 30 August 1918).
47. p, 18 January 1919.
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attendant pernicious effect on social relations provided the 
milieu for the debates over the corruption threatening to engulf 
the party at this time. The response was to emphasise the role 
of the old guard and at the same time to encourage the 
development of the party as an exclusive organisation and to 
intensify controls over the communist.
3. Sympathisers' groups and candidature
From mid-1918 the fluidity of the membership of the MPO 
increased dramatically. Every day trains left Moscow bearing 
communists to the fronts, on grain requisitioning detachments, 
and to act as organisers of soviet power throughout the country. 
The answer to the shortage of personnel was found in the 
organisation of sympathisers' groups. Later some of their 
functions were transferred to the system of candidature, with the 
difference that while the sympathisers' groups were part of a 
continuing recruitment campaign, candidature was a way of 
screening new members and reflected increased concern about the
quality of recruitment.
48 The earliest groups were established in spring 1918. The
IV Moscow oblast party conference on 15 May 1918 called on all
party organisations to form groups of sympathisers around the
49 
cells. The MK first discussed the question on 9 August 1918
when Zagorskii called for their formation as schools of communist 
education. Decision was postponed until 16 August, when Lenin 
spoke in favour of 'widening the sphere of our influence' by 
'showing greater faith in the worker masses and drawing on them
48. P, 22 February 1918. 49. Chugaev, p.370, n33.
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for forces'. Lenin called for the attraction of sympathisers to 
the party from youth and the trade unions to replace those 
departing for the fronts. In Lenin's conception they were 
intended to give workers a political education by drawing them 
into political and social work. They were to act as a testing 
ground and as a reservoir for entrance into the party. The 
former functions were later fulfilled by the trade unions, 
women's and youth organisations, acting as Stalin's famous 
'transmission belts' between the party and the masses. Their 
more direct functions as a training ground before membership into 
the party were taken over by the more specialised candidate stage 
directly controlled by the party.
The MK meeting of 16 August decided that a special statute
52
was to be drawn up by the MK bureau to regulate them. After
discussion in the raions this statute was ratified at the 31 
August city party conference on the motion of one of the MK 
secretaries, D.I. Efremov. The statute stated that 'anyone who 
supports the RKP(b) in its struggle for the liberation of the 
proletariat and the whole labouring people from political and 
economic exploitation' could be a member of the groups, 
recruitment was to take place on the recommendation 
of one party member or one sympathiser subject to the 
ratification of the local party cell. The statute gave 
sympathisers fairly wide powers up to voting rights in the
50. Lenin PSS, vol.37, pp.46-7.
51. T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR 1917 
1967, Princeton 1968, p.72.
52. p, 22 August 1918. 53. P_, 3 September 1918.
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cell or local committee during the discussion of local or general 
political questions. They were banned from closed party meetings 
and existed as groups around the kernel of a party cell.
The MK call to form these groups met with considerable 
opposition. In view of the intense concern about the quality of 
party membership, noted above, the raions were reluctant 
simultaneously to conduct both a purge and a recruitment 
campaign. The general meeting of Gorodskoi raion on 22 August 
1918, for example, by a majority of 72-22 with 10 absentions
voted against them. At that meeting Fidler argued that quality
54 
and not quantity was the priority.
Results varied from raion to raion, the most successful 
being Rogozhsko-Simonovskii with half of the total of 1000 
sympathisers in Moscow by the end of September 1918. Success 
naturally depended on the initial strength of the party cells in 
any raion since they were founded not on the initiative of the 
sympathisers themselves but of the local party organisations. 
They did act as a stimulant to the creation of new party cells, 
and in some factories there were more sympathisers than party 
members. By mid-1919 there were about 5000 officially registered 
sympathisers, and they helped maintain the balance of numbers in 
the MPO with the departure of communists to the fronts.
Sympathisers were subject to the reregistrations as any full
54. £, 31 August 1918. The 22 August general meeting in 
Khamovnichskii raion also passed a resolution against the 
formation of the groups, arguing that it would open the party to 
1 undersirable elements' (£, 4 September 1918). Basmannyi 
raion agreed to their formation only with great reluctance, £, 13 
September 1918. ~
55. Ocherki ist. MO KPSS , p.363.
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party member and no latitude was allowed in their views or 
behaviour. They were subject to party mobilisations. In 
November 1918, for example, 600 sympathisers were sent from 
Moscow to the front with the communist levy, and over 1500
c c
participated in the supply detachments. Other party 
organisations modelled their sympathisers' groups on Moscow's, 
and used the Moscow statute as the basis of their own. They 
acted as communist auxiliaries under party control, and were not 
allowed to develop any organisational autonomy.
As a form of recruitment they were increasingly seen as a
5 8 back entrance into the party, justifying the earlier
suspicions. Following the VIII party congress sympathisers' 
groups were abolished in several large party organisations, 
including Petrograd. In Moscow criticism centred on their role 
in allowing employees from soviet institutions, who were 
predominantly recruited from the petty-bourgeoisie, to inveigle 
their way into the party. When in mid-1919, for example, the 
situation at the front became perilous with Denikin's advance the 
cell under the Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raion soviet, two-thirds of 
whose members were sympathisers, dissolved, and the 'soviet 
baryshni' (ladies, usually employed in secretarial duties), it
was reported, pleaded to be expelled on the grounds of illness in
59 
order to avoid mobilisation.
56. Chugaev, p.370, n.33. 57. Perepiska, vol.IV, p.39.
58. Butyrskii RK, for example, in early 1919 criticised the poor 
quality of the sympathisers. In late 1918 it had halted 
recruitment to the groups, with a membership of 800, to check on 
the party affiliations of those joining. The RK argued that many 
would have to be expelled since no more than 2-300 attended 
meetings, and that many 'unhealthy elements' had entered the 
groups as a way of joining the party, P_, 5 January 1919.
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By mid-1919 restrictions were introduced to the formation of 
sympathisers' groups in soviet institutions. Following the XV 
guberniya party conference (27-29 July 1919), where calls were 
made for their abolition on the grounds that the groups were 
allowing bourgeois elements to join the party, they were
abolished in the guberniya on 28 August 1919 with some of the
fi 9 
more suitable members joining the party. The groups were
dropped from the party statute adopted in December 1919. 
Zinoviev argued that the party now had more powerful means at its 
disposal to attract new members, above all the non-party 
conferences and the party weeks. When in early 1922 the idea 
was raised to form support (sodeistviya) groups for the party the 
restrictive organisational structure of the sympathisers' groups, 
with a statute and the insistence that members carry out various
party duties, was explicitly avoided, and a much looser form
, ^ , 64 
adopted.
The system of candidature took over from the sympathisers' 
groups as the testing period for aspirants to party membership. 
In late 1918 certain Moscow raions, as in Butyrskii, had adopted 
the practice of placing recruits on a probationary period of 2-3 
months. The system was instituted in the guberniya at the time 
and gradually became formalised for the city as a whole. An 
applicant could be accepted as a candidate on the recommendation 
of two party members whose own membership was each not less than
59. £, 23 July 1919. 60. £, 11 July 1919.
61. £, 30 July 1919. 62. £, 7 September 1919.
63. VIII konf. RKP, p-140.
64. Izvestiya MK RKP(b), 1, 20 March 1920, p.54.
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six months. The candidate then had to be accepted by a general 
meeting of the organisation. They had the right to attend open 
party meetings, but without voting rights. Taking into account 
the need to mould the social composition of the party 
differential lengths were adopted for the period of candidature: 
for workers not less than a month; peasants three months; and 
others not less than six months. Acceptance even then was not 
automatic, but only if the candidates had proved 'that they were 
devoted to the party 1 . The practice was generalised for the 
rest of the party on the basis of Moscow's example by the party 
statute of December 1919. Candidature in principle was a more 
effective vetting procedure than the sympathisers' groups, but 
from the evidence of continuing concern over the guality of 
recruitment to the party it was not a particularly effective 
screen.
4. Social pattern of recruitment and the 1919 reregistration
The decline of external constraints over recruitment with 
the rise of the Bolshevik party to supreme power resulted in 
internal decay becoming the greatest danger as 'the old 
supporters are joined by hordes of opportunists eager to get to 
the trough', as Brzezinskii vividly puts it. The response as 
we have seen was to conduct internal campaigns in the form of 
reregistrations to expel the undesirables.
This did not prevent a major crisis over recruitment
65. P_, 7 September 1919. 66. VIII konf. RKP, p.227.
67. Z.K. Brzezinzkii, The Permanent Purge, Harvard UP, 1956, 
p.18.
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developing in the period preceding and at the VIII party 
congress. For the first time since the revolution general 
concern was expressed over the social composition of the party. 
In the party as a whole 65% of recruitment in 1917 had been 
designated workers. By 1920 this had fallen to 35%, with the
fi Q
greatest decline in 1918 and early 1919. In Moscow tendencies 
in the social composition of the party changed in the same 
direction as in the rest of the country but not with such great 
force. Only in 1917 in Moscow was the intake of workers over 
half of the total, and the percentage declined thereafter (Table 
9) as the social composition of the city changed in favour of 
employees.
The high intake of office staff - the rising bureaucratic 
corps of secretaries, functionaries, clerks, and so on - was a 
pronounced feature of recruitment in Moscow with its vast 
bureaucratic apparatuses serving the whole country. From a 
peak in 1918 the recruitment of employees remained remarkably 
stable at 20% in 1919-20 despite all the attempts to give 
preference to workers. In Moscow the recruitment of workers was a 
lower proportion than in Petrograd, but higher than in the party as 
a whole. But the fact that workers were in a minority was the 
basis for the major crisis over recruitment policy and party
68. Materialy po statistike lichnogo sostava RKP(b), M. 1921, 
p.XI
69. The concern at the end of 1918 over 'careerist' recruitment 
and the continuing use of sympathisers' groups for 'back door 1 
entrance into the party has already been noted. There is a mass 
of anecdotal evidence on the sale of recommendations and other 
abuses of entrance regulations at this time. Paul Dukes, 
Red Dusk and the Morrow, London 1923, p.267, describes the 
chaotic state of entrance procedures in 1919.
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Table 9
Social pattern of recruitment (in %) Moscow & Petrograd, 1917-20
Workers Peasants Craft- Intell- Office Other
workers igentsia staff
pre-1917 43
1917 55
1918 47
1919 47
1920 44
2
3
5
9
11
2
2
3
4
4
Moscow
22
8
8
5
5
18
18
23
20
20
8
8
8
7
7
Not 
known
TOTAL
5
6
6
8
9
100
100
100
100
100
pre-1917 68
1917 71
1918 60
1919 59
1920 55
1
3
7
9
11
Petrograd
1 11 14
2 4 15
3 5 21
3 3 19
5 3 20
5
5
4
6
6
1
100
100
100
100
100
Source: Materialy po statistike lichnogo sostava RKP(b), M. 
each1921, p.XII. The table shows the social composition of 
intake group as it stood after the August 1920 reregistration. 
It therefore only shows the situation after the reregistrations, 
mobilisations, and so on, had altered the picture, but it does 
serve as a general guide to the changes in the social composition 
of recruitment. According to official statistics the class 
composition of the party as a whole changed as follows (%) 
(Rigby, p.85):
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
Workers 
60.2 
56.9 
47.8 
43.8 
41.0
Peasants
7.5 
14.5 
21.8 
25.1 
28.2
Office staff 
32.2 
28.6 
30.4 
31.1 
30.8
etc.
organisation in early 1919. 70
70. One aspect of the crisis was the attempt to prevent the 
consolidation of what Rigby calls the tendency for 'local 
communists to merge with soviet officialdom in a new privileged 
stratum 1 with advantages over non-party members in rations, 
housing and job procurement (Rigby, p.75). At the same time the 
rather nebulous principle of the 'party maximum' (partmax), 
established by SNK soon after October 1917 and stipulating that 
persons in positions of political leadership should not gain any 
material advantages and their pay should not exceed a skilled
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The months preceding the VIII party congress were marked by 
calls from the Democratic Centralists and others in the raions of 
Moscow to eliminate bureaucracy and to overcome the split in the 
party between the active party workers (APWs) and the rank and 
file party member (RFPM), a breach perceived as one between the 
verkhi and the nizy. While the rank and file membership had been 
successively purged and mobilised to the army, the cells weakened 
and in many cases dissolved in the factories, the only stable 
core to the local party organisations increasingly became the 
party committees themselves. In Moscow this meant the RKs and MK 
itself, though even they, as will be seen in Chapter 5, were much 
weakened by the mobilisations. The Rogozhsko-Sirnonovskii RK 
report for December 1918 - January 1919 illustrated the 
predominance of the non-worker element in the organisation. At 
general meetings of its 600 members the few communists from the 
factories were overshadowed by the great number of commissars and 
soviet employees. The animosity between the two groups was
indicated by the fact that they split into two hostile camps over
,. . . . 71 divisive issues.
An important TsK circular of 4 February 1919 outlined the 
response to the threatened renewed 'emptying 1 of the party by the 
mobilisations. Recruitment was to be stepped up since only the
workman's wages, lost its credibility with the devaluation of 
money and the increased importance of access to various services, 
such as reserved foodshops, and to the jobs themselves. The 
party leaders in the Kremlin received special rations. Lower 
level leaders in the Lux, National 1 and Metropol' Hotels were 
served with above average food and rations.
71. p, 2 February 1919.
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top layers of the proletariat had so far been tapped, it insisted,
but increased emphasis was to be placed on training in the
party schools to prepare them to replace the departed activists.
The circular put its faith in a strong organisation to effect
72 
educational and organisational work.
On the eve of the VIII party congress in Moscow calls for a 
thorough purge of the party grew in intensity. On 3 February 
1919 I.V. Mgeladze's motion calling for a party cleansed of 
unhealthy elements was passed by the MK. It argued that a purge 
would improve the work of the local organisations with a clear 
line set down on all important questions and the TsK secretariat 
ensuring that they were carried out. When MK member G.Ya. 
Belen'kii informed a general party meeting in Presnenskii raion 
on 6 February that the MK was taking strict measures for the
purging of the party he linked this with the enforcement of
74 
strict party discipline. The implication was that a party
cleared of 'hangers on 1 and composed only of people who 
participated in party life would be able to overcome the 
fractures in the party: between the verkhi and the nizy, and those 
in state occupations.
The MK returned to the question on 15 February 1919 when it 
passed a resolution on the organisational questions to be 
discussed at the VIII party congress. A large part of the 
resolution was concerned with the 'adventuristic' elements who 
had worked their way into the party to pursue their own ends.
72. Partiya v period inostrannoi voennoi interventsii i 
grazhdanskoi voiny (1918-1920gg.): dokumenty i materialy, M 
1962, p.75.
73. p, 6 February 1919. 74. P_, 8 February 1919.
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Their shameful behaviour, the resolution stated, had lowered the
prestige of the party in the eyes of the masses and provided
fertile ground for counter-revolutionary agitation. The MK
called for a thorough purge of the party to be initiated by the
75 
congress.
Mgeladze once again called for a purge and for strict 
discipline in the party at a general meeting of Rogozhsko- 
Simonovskii party organisation on 13 February 1919, attended by 
254 party members and 56 sympathisers. His resolution 
acknowledged that the party was undergoing a severe crisis and 
that the VIII congress could begin the healing process. A 
counter-resolution proposed by Svobodnyi called for all issues to 
be raised at the congress to be first discussed at all party 
meetings and that the TsK should allow a full discussion to take 
place in the party. He thus gave voice to the rank and file 
party members who increasingly felt that decisions of cardinal 
importance for the party were no longer being discussed by the 
party as a whole. A delegate meeting in Zheleznodorozhnyi 
(railway) raion at the end of February 1919, attended by 60 
representatives from 20 cells, called for a purge of the party. 
It added the caveat that the verkhi and nizy should be allowed to 
participate in a businesslike (delovoi) way in the party and thus 
their self-activity would be encouraged. The resolution called 
for party work to be at the centre of attention.
75. £, 19 February 1919. 76. P_, 20 February 1919.
77. P_ f 28 February 1919. Zheleznodorozhnyi raion was one of the 
first~~to apply differential entrance reguirements: workers could 
be accepted by a cell and confirmed by the RK secretariat (EC), 
whereas employees could only be accepted by the full RK P_, 4 
September 1918. ~
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The hopes of the MK and the MPO that the VIII party congress 
would respond to the crisis by reintegrating the groups in the 
party were disappointed. It stressed the need to attract new 
cadres, and thus once again, as with the sympathisers' groups, 
the MPO was forced to absorb a new intake before it had digested 
the old. The party itself was to act as a massive transmission 
belt for the recruitment and training of thousands of new cadres 
to staff the new state apparatus: "One of the most important
tasks of the party at the moment is to introduce new thousands of
78 its best workers into the network of state administration 1 .
The congress discussions on the changing social composition 
of the party prompted the first general all-Russian re- 
registration of party membership, to be completed by 1 May 1919 
and with special attention to those who had joined since October 
1917. Entrance to the party was halted for the duration. Each 
party member was obliged to complete a personal questionnaire and 
present the recommendations of two well-known communists who had 
been party members themselves for not less than six months. Non- 
fulfilment of these conditions meant relegation to sympathiser or 
candidate status, or expulsion. Many simply failed to comply
with these conditions and were automatically no longer considered
79 
members. The large number in this category is partially
explained by the fact that many of those who had been mobilised 
to the fronts had not been taken off the membership registers.
The reregistration was planned to have been completed by 1 
June 1919, but in many organisations, including Moscow, it 
continued up to September. In the raions reregistration
78. VIII s"ezd RKP, p.423. 79. P, 12 June 1919.
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commissions were established. In Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raion, 
for example, a five-man commission composed of A.Sokolov from the 
TsK, Myasnikov from the MK, and three members of the RK reviewed 
each member, aided by representatives of the cells in the raions. 
The committee members themselves were not obliged to
O Q
reregister. They worked from 11 May to 13 June in 13 sessions.
81 
In this raion membership fell from 934 to 360, a fall of 61.5%.
No global figures for the reregistration as a whole are available 
for the city, though Rigby estimates that in urban organisations 
there was an average drop of 10-15%, and Adelman suggests a fall
O p
of 46.8% for the party as a whole. The example above would 
suggest that in some raions this was higher, but in the city 
between the VIII party congress and the eve of the party week
membership only fell from 17,000 to 15,834, a fall of 6.7%,
8 3 though this includes recruits to cover those purged. The issue
is confused by the large-scale mobilisations of the period, which 
Lenin considered also acted as a mechanism for purging the party 
of 'cowards and malcontents'. He added that 'Such a decrease in
numbers in the party was an enormous increase in its strength and
84 
weight'.
The 1919 reregistration was designed to purge the party of
80. Rigby, p.76. 81. P_, 12 June 1919.
82. Rigby, p.11, Adelman, p.97.
83. VIII s"ezd RKP, pp.471, 544, n.78. In the party as a 
whole membership fell from 211,000 in the 36 central gubernii on 
the eve of the VIII congress to 120,000 in October 1919, a fall 
of 43% (Izvestiya TsK RKP, 15, 24 March 1920). An earlier 
issue states that between March and August 1919 membership fell 
from 350,000 to 150,000 (57%), ibid., 8, 2 December 1919.
84. Lenin PSS, vol.39, p.27.
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the 'unhealthy 1 elements who had joined the party between the 
October Revolution and the VIII congress, especially the urban 
petty-bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. At the VIII conference 
Krestinkii argued that the reregistration had cleared the way to
opening the party to workers and peasants during the party
85 
weeks.
5. Party weeks: mass recruitment or exclusivity
With the party weeks in the autumn of 1919 the history of 
party recruitment entered a qualitatively new phase. They were an 
attempt to solve the chronic problem of the shortage of personnel 
by a massive intake of workers (and poor peasants). They were 
designed to fulfil several functions: to improve the social 
composition of the party, to give the party a new reserve of 
manpower (with the petering out of the sympathisers' groups) as 
cadres in state posts and in the army, and also for political 
reasons, as a way of reasserting the party's authority in 
society. This aspect in particular was pointed out by Lenin in 
assessing the results of the weeks when he stressed that the 
voluntary enlistment of workers into the party at a time of grave
o c
military danger was a great moral victory.
This was a desperate period for the Soviet government. It 
was still not apparent that Denikin's Moscow directive (3 July 
1919), launching an attack spearheaded by Mamontov's cavalry on 
the central front to reach Moscow via Kursk, Orel, and Tula, was
85. VIII konf. RKP, p.26.
86. Lenin, 'The Results of the Party Week in Moscow and Our 
Tasks', PSS, vol. 39, p.234.
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8 7 doomed to failure. A series of plots were discovered in Moscow
itself, including the Kadet inspired National Centre which, 
allegedly, planned to seize the city. On 25 September 1919 an 
explosion at the MK headquarters, organised by the LSR Donata 
Cherepanova working with the so-called Anarchist Underground, 
during a meeting attended by over 120 party activists killed 12 
of the MPO ' s leading members, including the MK secretary V.M.
Zagorskii, and A. Safonov, and wounded 55 more including M.S.
8 8 Ol'minskii.
The TsK plenum of 26 September 1919 decided on a rapid 
intake of workers and peasants into the party, though stressed
that the aim of a membership of a million was not to be at the
89 
expense of quality. As we shall see, while successful in
90 doubling party membership by an increase of about 160,000 the
mass recruitment of the weeks only aggravated the split in the 
party between an inner core of activists and the mass of the 
party.
The Moscow guberniya party organisation carried out its week
from 21-28 September 1919 and succeeded in attracting only a
91 thousand and a quarter new members. It was a trial run for the
87. John Bradley, Civil War in Russia 1 1917-1920, Batsford, 
London 1975, p.123.
88. L. Bychkov, Vzryv v Leont'evskom pereulke, M. 1934, pp.14- 
22.
89. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 6, 30 September 1919; VIII konf. RKP, 
pp.241-2. Petrograd had held the first party week in August 
1919.
90. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 8, 2 December 1919.
91. Total recruitment was 1254: 1077 male workers, 112 female
workers, 32 Red Army soldiers, and 33 peasants (and 10
intelligenty), (P, 6 November 1919). The most successful areas
- 147 -
city party week and the entrance requirements were the same as
92 those for candidates. The MK bureau on 1 October and the
plenum on 2 October decided that an APW in every raion was to be 
appointed to organise the week, which was to be held from 8-15 
October. To encourage recruitment and to avoid the disappointing 
results of the guberniya the entrance procedure was to be 
relaxed. The need for two written recommendations for workers, 
peasants, and soldiers was dropped, and the candidate stage was 
waived. The only check made was to ask the prospective member's
fellow communist workers to vouch for the entrant. In many cases
93 
even this elementary point was dropped.
94 The number of new members is usually given as 14,581, but
with the addition of the figures for some cells in Sushchevsko-
Mar'inskii and Basmannyi raions this must be increased to
95 16,102. Over half of the intake was of soldiers, and hence the
large peasant group in Table 9. A third of the worker intake was 
women, a far higher proportion than their average in the MPO. 
The number of cells also increased during the week. In Blagushe
were the industrial uezda such as Klin, Orekh-Zuev, Bogorodsk and 
Kolomna, and where there had been detailed preparation. The 
results were the thirteenth highest total in the country but were 
still rather meagre. To compensate for this failure the MGK 
organised a separate peasant week (11-18 October) and Red Army 
week (1-9 October) which gave 500 and 200, respectively, XVI 
Moskovskaya gubernskaya konferentsiya RKP(b): protokoly, M. 1920, 
p.11.
92. P, 7 September 1919. 93. £, 26 October 1919.
94. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 15, 24 October 1919.
95. K.I. Bukov, G.A. Nagapetyan, 'Ideino-organizatsionnoe 
ukreplenie Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii v gody grazhdanskoi 
voiny 1 , VI KPSS, 6, 1959, p.58.
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Table 10
Results of the
Raion
Gorodskoi
Zamoskvorech ' e
Basmannyi 
Sokol'nicheskii
Al-Rostokinksii
Sush-Mar ' inskii
Presnenskii
Zhel-dorozhnyi 
Rog-Simonovskii 
Butyrskii 
Blag-Lefortovskii 
Khamovnicheskii
Kremlin
party week
Male
workers
1000
545
450 
350
64
90
551
688 
185 
133 
249 
300
57
in Moscow,
Female
workers
450
200
357 
250
31
70
300
100 
150 
85 
134 
138
23
8-19 October
Soldiers
2250
155
1500 
300
 
259
949
220 
700 
311 
207 
700
40
1919
TOTAL
3700
900
2307 
900
95
419
1800
1048 
1035 
529 
590 
1138
120
TOTAL 4642 2348 7591 14581
Source: P, 26 October 1919.
the number of cells nearly doubled from 22 to 43. 96 In most
raions membership doubled in the space of a week. In
97 Sokol'nicheskii raion the 1075 members of July 1919 were now
joined by another 900. The most spectacular increase was in the
administrative raion of Gorodskoi. Here membership had risen
98 from 1000 in June 1918 (incomplete figures) to 1540 members and
99 
about 2000 sympathisers on the eve of the week.
the numbers had risen to 6381, 100
After the week
an increase of over 400%. The
greatest rise was in the Red Army membership, but a surprising
96. Manievich (ed), Ocherki po istorii revolyutsionnogo 
dvizheniya i bol'shevistskoi organizatsii v Baumanskom raione, M 
1928, p.170.
97. P, 26 July 1919. 98. Chugaev, p.76.
99. KT, 5 May 1920: 645 workers, 390 intelligentsia, 345 
employees, and 160 unknown.
100. KT, 5 May 1920, of whom 2052 were in the Red Army, 1343 
employees, 1815 workers, and 1171 unknown.
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result in view of the aims of the party week was that while the 
number of workers here increased by 281%, that of office workers 
increased by a massive 389%. Once again, the lack of able (and 
willing) worker reserves in the factories and the changed 
occupational structure of the city was reflected in this intake 
of employees.
The mass intake of new members accentuated the split in the 
party, already noted in the MPO in early 1919, between the active 
party workers and the rank and file members, a division perceived 
as one between the verkhi and the nizy. The weeks therefore 
fuelled the controversy over the question of party democracy, 
were partially responsible for the bitterness of the party debate 
over this question in 1920-1, and were the background to the rise 
of the Workers' Opposition. The very structure of the week, as a 
sharp assault on the chronic recruitment problem, reflected the 
campaign mentality of the war years. In this intake a great 
mass of raw party members were inducted with in many cases, as 
later became apparent, an understanding of the party at odds with 
the official view. The mass intake, justified on the grounds of 
the need to strengthen the proletarian base of the party, 
sacrificed the idea of the party as a whole acting as the elite 
vanguard in favour of a two-tier party in which the leadership of 
the APWs was accentuated and the position of the RFPM undermined.
It was from this point that the debate over a 'narrow 1 
party, restricted only to fully conscious members who would play 
an active part in decision-making, and a 'wide' party, with the 
greatest possible number of workers and peasants who would 
inevitably come under greater central direction, became an issue 
of debate. Following the weeks there was a general consensus
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that recruitment would have to cease for a time. At the VIII 
party conference in December Lenin argued that the party 'gates' 
were now to be locked and great care taken in new recruitment. 
Bukharin posed the issue more starkly: until the new members had
been processed a temporary halt should be called to party
4. 102 
recruitment.
Nevertheless, membership of the MPO rose rapidly in 1920, 
punctuated only by the August reregistration (see below). There 
were calls for a new party week following the reregistration, but 
in the event not only was such mass recruitment rejected but in 
its place in 1921 a purge was launched. As Pravda put it, a 
united and strong party was more important than mere numbers. 
Obviously the fear at this stage was that any large-scale 
increase in membership would only exacerbate the divisions within 
the party revealed by the party and trade union debates. At the 
same time the paper admitted that the great mass of party members 
lacked any theoretical grounding in Marxism but had joined the 
party out of 'instinct'.
The theme was taken up by Lenin in his letters to the TsK 
(via Molotov) at the end of March 1922. He severely criticised 
the level of the majority of the party's 300-400,000 members and 
stated:
If we do not close our eyes to reality we must admit 
that at the present time the proletarian policy of the 
party is not determined by the character of its 
membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige 
enjoyed by the small^group which might be called the old 
guard of the party.
101. VIII konf. RKP, p.24. 102. ibid., p.166.
103. j>, 9, 18 March 1921. 104. P_, 30 March 1921.
105. Lenin PSS, vol.45, pp.18, 20.
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Trotsky in The New Course in 1923 characterised the relations 
between the old and the new generations (pre- and post-October 
1917). He claimed that after October there was a 'rapid, even 
abnormal, growth of the party 1 . The abnormality consisted in the 
influx both of inexperienced workers with low consciousness and 
of some alien elements, hangers-on and functionaries. The party 
preserved its character by relying on the 'internal dictatorship 
of the old guard 1 :
...The party was living, as it were, on two storeys: 
the upper storey, where things are decided, and the 
lower storey,, where all you do is learn of the
, . . 1 u odecisions.
The rapid recruitment of the party weeks therefore provided 
the sociological basis for these analyses of the 'old course 1 of 
the civil war which divided the party into 'a few thousand 
comrades, who form the leading cadres', and 'the rest of the mass 
whom they look upon only as an object of action 1 . As Michael 
Farbman put it at the time:
It is only fair, however, to state that the inclination 
of the 'Old Guard' to favour the absolutism of the CC 
was not the chief reason for the development of the party 
on centralised lines. This must be attributed largely 
to its heterogeneity and to the unassimilable character 
of the great mass of the new adherents.
From this point of view there is a clear connection between the
dramatic settling of the question of a 'wide 1 or 'narrow' party
109 by the Lenin Enrolment of 1924 and the rise of Stalin to
106. Leon Trotsky, The New Course, London 1956, pp.14-15.
107. ibid., p.18.
108 Michael S. Farbman, Bolshevism in Retreat, London 1923, p.165.
109. 24,622 people joined the MPO, 17,361 in the city alone 
(Moskovskaya organizatsiya RKP(b) v tsifrakh, issue 1, M. 1925, 
p.23). Membership increased from 53,121 on 1 January 1924 
(Moskovskaya gorodskaya, p.28) to 77,743, an increase of 46.3%.
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power on the back of the bureaucracy.
The debate over a 'wide 1 or 'narrow 1 party raised questions 
of fundamental importance on the nature and role of the party. 
The implications of a 'wide' party have been described, but at 
the same time a 'narrow 1 party raised its own questions. The 
VIII party congress marked the transition from the generalised 
reregistrations of 1918 to the more purposive ones that followed 
where social and political criteria varied depending on the 
campaign of the time. It was no longer left to the 'market' to 
regulate entrance to anyone who supported the party and its aims. 
Now social background was elevated as a cardinal consideration in 
selecting party members. While understandably concerned about 
the falling proportion of worker recruitment, though this does 
not seem to have fallen as much as was feared (Table 9), and the 
clear evidence that many joined for opportunist reasons, this 
reinforced selective policy not only changed the party's 
relationship to non-proletarian sections of society, but also to 
the working class party membership itself. Henceforth the party 
leadership arrogated for itself direct control over recruitment 
and expulsion which it effected through purges and checks: the 
body of the party became increasingly malleable in the hands of 
the party leadership in this respect as the party member became 
exposed to the threat of expulsion, firstly for social reasons, 
and then for political ones.
110. Initially welcoming the Enrolment, Trotsky later argued 
that it had dissolved the revolutionary vanguard and thus freed 
the bureaucracy from its control, Leon Trotsky, Revolution 
Betrayed, New Park Publications, London 1973, p. 98.
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6. Training and educational level of MPO members
The party week starkly posed the question of the
educational and political level of the mass of party membership. 
At the VIII party conference soon after the week Sorin asserted 
that:
It is no secret that the ideological level of our 
party, especially in the provinces, is not very high. 
A significant part of the party membership^ probably the 
majority, are politically semi-literate.
And he went on to argue that the thousands who had joined
112 
required political processing. On the other hand, Zinoviev
argued at the conference that the new members were to be 'used' 
immediately by involvement in party work, and it was this view 
which was reflected in the conference theses on the new recruits
which stressed that they were to be actively employed in 'the
114 construction of the new communist society'. In other words,
they were to join the state bureaucrcay and the army. As Rigby 
puts it, 'the party leadership was preceding to expose the new 
crop of communists to precisely those influences which had led to 
the "corruption" and "careerism" of so many of their 
predecessors'. The managerial functions of the party were 
given priority over maintaining the link with the workers in the 
factories through the party cell, and it was this which led to 
the grave crisis of 1920-1 as the breach between the APWs, on the 
one hand, and the RFPM and ordinary workers, on the other, 
widened.
111. VIII konf. RKP, p.31. 112. ibid. , p.32.
113. ibid., p.139. 114. ibid., pp.200-3.
115. Rigby, pp.81-2.
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The TsK meeting of 18 May 1918 had emphasised the need to 
raise the ideological level of the party membership. Up to then 
no formal provisions had been made for the processing of new 
members. A school under VTsIK was founded at this time by 
Sverdlov to train cadres for party and soviet posts.
Gradually a network of party schools was established in Moscow to
the
whole city under the MK, down to lecture courses organised by 
clubs. By December 1918 there were already 8 schools in the city
u a ii r K t n i ni n a OSC< 
serve the city organisation. They ranged from those serving
with over 200 students, meeting two or three times a week in the 
evenings. Most of them were temporary institutions lasting 
only for the duration of a particular course.
The December 1918 reglament (instruction) for the RPOs (see 
below) for the first time in the MPO stressed that it was
desirable for every party member to undergo a course of political
118 literacy. In 1919 the main emphasis was to involve young
communists in the schools, and in general party education 
languished at the time. It was only with the party weeks that 
the guestion of party education became a priority. In November
1919 the MK took urgent measures to create a series of schools
120 for the 15,000 'new 1 communists of the week. A delegate
116. Initially it provided only short courses but with 
increasing demand it became more organised and by autumn 1919 it 
was transformed into the Sverdlov university for the training of 
party and soviet activists.
117. Kommunar, 21 December 1918. 118. £, 11 January 1919.
119. The MK RKSM in September 1919 opened a special school 
catering for the Komsomol member. The first intake of 50 was 
designed to form the core of future cadres, _P, 25 September 1919
120. Vestnik propagandy, 8, 12 July 1920, p.78.
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meeting in Krasnopresnenskii raion on 15 March 1920 extended the
idea by insisting that all recruits were to attend a party
121 
school. A course in the schools was to serve as an
additional screening device complementary to their pedagogic 
functions.
On the eve of the unification of the city and guberniya 
organisations the question of recruitment was once again raised 
at the XVII guberniya party conference (13-14 May 1920). A 
certain Korolev argued that mass recruitment was destroying party 
organisation in the localities, and insisted that if educational 
facilities did not improve then recruitment would have to cease
altogether. He estimated that 90% of communists were
1 7 7 insufficiently educated to be party members. Other speakers
supported his argument. Their fears over the quality of the new 
recruits were to be confirmed. Within a few months at least half 
of those who had joined during the party week in Moscow were to 
leave or be expelled.
Political illiteracy was compounded by inadequacies in the 
general educational level of the party in Moscow, reflecting the 
general level of illiteracy in the city noted in chapter 2. Table 
11 shows the marked contrast in the city between those with 
higher education (3.2%) and those with only basic primary 
education (67.9%) The greater number of those with higher and 
medium education in the city compared to the guberniya and the 
rest of the country is significant, and reflects the different
121. KT, 18 march 1920.
122. Vestnik propagandy, 8, 12 July 1920, pp.23, 25.
123. V Mosk. gubpartkonf., p.26.
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social composition of the city organisation and the concentration
124 
of party activists there. Nevertheless, the low educational
level of the party reinforced the gulf between the communist and 
the specialist.
Table 11 
Educational level of the MPO on 1 September 1920
City Guberniya Total % in % in 
No. % No. % No. % 38 gubs 36 gubs 
Education
Higher 944 3.2 33 0.6 977 2.9 1.1 0.7 
Medium 5,555 18.6 775 14.3 6,330 18.0 13.1 11.4 
Primary 20,244 67.9 4,222 78.1 24,466 69.4 71.1 71.5 
Self- 
educated 2,033 6.8 240 4.4 2,273 6.4 10.6 12.1 
Students 383 1.3 20 0.4 403 1.1 0.7 0.4 
Illiterate 218 0.7 27 0.5 245 0.7 2.6 3.3 
Unknown 443 1.5 89 1.6 532 1.5 0.7 0.5
TOTAL 29,820 100 5,406 100 35,226 100 100 100 
Source: Materialy po statistike, pp.16-17.
The main work of party education was conducted by the system 
of raion and ward (uchastok) schools, with the most able students
in the city party schools. In July 1920 there were two city
125 
schools with 300 students, and in September after the summer
I o c.
break only one school with 63 students. Between September 
1920 and February 1921 the number of ward schools increased from 
11 to 55, and the number of raion schools from 1 to 8. At the 
later date a total of 2918 students were enrolled, 2573 in ward
124. By April 1921 the percentage with higher education in the 
joint MPO had fallen to 1.69, and those with medium education 
to 16.29, while those with primary education had increased to 
75.39. Of the rest 4.67 were educated at home and 1.96 were 
illiterate, £, 14 April 1921.
125. Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g., p.4.
126. Otchet MK za sentyabr 1 192Qg., p.38.
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127 
schools and 345 in the raion schools. There were also special
schools organised by the MK military department. By June 1920 it
128 had organised 33 of these, by July 43, and by September 49.
These figures testify to a far greater effort in party 
education in 1920. However, the achievements were more 
impressive on paper than in reality and the party school network 
was often criticised. A report in June 1920 singled out the 
raion schools for special ctiticism. They covered large areas,
lacked competent instructors, and lectors often failed to turn to
129 turn up. The two city schools of July 1920, with 150 students
apiece, were criticised and plans were drawn up for a single 
improved school for 250 students. At the IX party conference 
E.A. Preobrazhenskii attacked the poor state of the schools.
In practice, as he recognised, faced with a multiplicity of 
tasks and a shortage of personnel, the training of communists 
ranked fairly low among the priorities of local party 
organisations. By the X party congress plans were drawn up to 
integrate them into the general system of education under 
Glavpolitprosvet (chief political education board), the glavk of 
the educational world, whose aim was the 'state propagation of 
communism 1 aimed at the non-party masses, but with the subsidiary
127. ibid., p.38; Otchet MK za yanvar' 1921g., 
M. 1921, pp.32-3.
128. Otchet o rabote voennogo otdela-MK-ta RKP za vremya 
sushchestvovaniya s 15-go aprelya 1919 goda, M. 1920, p.15.
129. KT, 24 June 1920.
130. Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g., p.4.
131. IX konferentsiya RKP(b), sentyabr 1 1920 goda: protokoly, M. 
1972, p.124.
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132 function of training party members, but as we shall see
(Chapter 7) the party schools retained their autonomy.
The discussion over the training of neophytes was a 
reflection of the changes in the party process. At the II 
congress of the RSDRP in 1903 Lenin had argued that the party 
member had not only to agree with the tenets of the party, but 
also had to play an active role in the party. Now, after the 
party week, the discussion over the training of new members 
revealed that for the mass of the membership learning in the 
process of participation in party work was to be supplemented by 
reguar lessons in party ideology. This was cause and reflection 
of the decline in the self-activity of the party rank and file. 
The party member as activist and agent rather than creative 
participant in party life is revealed by the following comments 
of the editors of the Moscow guberniya journal for propagandists:
We have no time at the moment to work out a 'complete 
world view 1 out of the inexhaustible treasure house of 
Marxism. We must receive precisely that ration of 
learning that is necessary for today's struggle, and no 
more. The worker, because of the lack of supplies, 
receives from the state a portion of bread not in those 
quantities that a man in general needs, but as much as 
he requires so that he can work and not collapse from 
exhaustion: it is the same with Marxism; it must be 
released in those doses as are necessary so that each of 
us can be a fighting political force, and no more. 
Anything more and academism begins, knowledge for the 
sake of knowledge, refusal of practical work with the,-^ 
excuse of deepening one's understanding of the world.
The normative functions of party education came into prominence 
as the new cohorts were moulded to suit the needs of the party.
132. X s"ezd RKP(b), mart-aprel' 1921 goda: stenograficheskii 
otchet, M. 1963, p.594.
133. Vestnik propagandy, 3, 24 September 1919, p.4.
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7. Recruitment and reregistration in 1920 and early 1921
Despite the calls for the 'door to be locked' and for the 
new members to be processed following the party week, recruitment 
in Moscow continued at a fast rate into 1920. In March 1920 
alone the city organisation gained 1792 new members:
Table 12
Membership dynamic of MPO in March 1920 
Raion Joined Left Total Cells
Gor
Kham
R-Sim
Presn
Basman
Butyr
S-Mar
Sok
Zam
B-Lef
ZhD
Kremlin
190
42
196
387
337
101
 
504
235
65
554
54
216
10
8
-
225
17
10
23
20
18
135
191
7,279
2,028
2,808
6, 786
5, 772
1,620
2,225
2,507
3,940
1,057
3,283
1,726
211
55
81
81
87
40
40
58
118
57
87
19
TOTAL 2,665 873 41,031 934
Sources: KT, 25 April 1920; KM, cols.669-70. These
figures are higher than those given in Table 7 and represent
contemporary estimates.
These figures show that there had been an increase of about 5000 
members since the party week of October 1919, and they illustrate 
the high degree of flux in the MPO. In March 1920 alone there 
was a turnover of about 8% of membership. Such a high level of 
instability in the RPOs led to the inflated membership figures 
revealed during the reregistration later in the year.
The March 1920 Moscow statute tightened up the recruitment 
procedure. In most raions acceptance into the party had 
previously been formalised at delegate meetings. It was now 
admitted that this had often consisted of a purely formal
- 160 -
recitation of names. Now, for the better screening of recruits, 
acceptance became the responsibility of the RK and only then was
the matter referred to the membership meeting for
134 
confirmation. Once again functions were being transferred to
committees from general meetings of communists.
Expulsions from the party continued throughout the period, 
and reportedly a total of 6745 were expelled between 1918 and 
1921 from the city and guberniya organisations, though there 
is no way of telling how this figure was calculated. In 1920 
they appear to have increased, or at least more attention was 
devoted to them. The typical reasons for expulsion included 
insubordination to party discipline, not attending meetings, 
ignoring the orders of the cell, personal reguest due to age or 
health, drunkenness, card playing, misuse of factory stores, and 
desertion from the labour front. Between May and August 1920 
the Sokol'nicheskii RPO expelled 50 members, or just under 3%
of its total membership. Clearly the party was not filled with
138 Rakhmetovs.
Over the same period as above in Sokol'nicheskii raion 
another 400 members and 230 candidates were added to the 
organisation's ranks, and the number of cells increased from 116
134. KT, 21 March 1921. 135. Ocherki ist. MO KPSS, p.366.
136. KT, 20 June 1920. A delegate meeting in Basmannyi raion, 
for ex~ample, on 28 March 1920 expelled three responsible party 
workers for drunkenness, and their cases were transferred to the 
courts, KT, 1 April 1920.
137. p_, 10 September 1920.
138. Rakhmetov, a character in Chernyshevskii's 'What is to be 
Done?', the new model self-abnegatory revolutionary, echoed in 
Lenin's own life and in his 1902 pamphlet of the same title.
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139 to 140. The outstanding feature of 1920 was indeed the great
fluidity of membership: large numbers leaving through expulsion 
or mobilisation, and many also joining. In the two months of 
June and July 1920 alone total membership of the joint 
organisation increased, according to contemporary estimates, by 
7.1% (2843 members and 619 candidates) and the number of cells by 
39 to make a total of 1328. 14 °
Once again fears over the composition of the party prompted 
the IX party congress to call for a second ail-Russian 
reregistration. This time, however, there were broader 
objectives. A new standard party card was to replace those 
issued by the local organisations aimed at the more accurate 
accounting of party members. The move had an economic logic in 
this period of compulsory labour duty and assignment in that the 
profession of communists could be established and thus directed 
to where those skills were required. A three-fold categorisation 
of members was proposed for the MPO by O.A. Pyatnitskii that 
explicitly gave priority to those who had joined before 1917. 
The second category comprised those who had joined at the 
beginning of the revolution and who had not belonged to another
party, and the third consisted of recruits since September 1919
141 
and the victory over Denikin. The aim of the division was to
ensure a flow of rank and file members to replace the mobilised 
activists. Its effect, however, was to reinforce the divisions 
in the party based on length of membership.
139. P_, 10 September 1920. These figures are for the joint 
Sokol'"nicheskii and Alekseevo-Rostokinskii RPOs.
140. Otchet MK za iyul ' 1920g., p.7. 141. KT, 28 August 1920
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For the first time the public nature of the purge was
142 
stressed. Previous ones had been carried out largely as
internal disciplinary measures. The open nature of this 
reregistration was designed to emphasise the party's close links 
with the masses, but precisely reflected concern over the breach 
between the party and the working class. The MK appealed to the 
public for any information on misdemeanours on the part of any 
communists - not only in the present but also in the past. All
those unmasked, the MK promised, would be expelled. All
143 information was to be factual and signed and the MK was at
pains to stress that all information would be treated with 
discretion to allay fears that informants would be liable to
recriminations. The reregistration commission promised that no-
144 
one giving information would suffer in any way.
The reregistration was to have begun in Moscow from 1 July 
1920, but in fact began from 1 August with recruitment halted 
from 15 July. In each raion a reregistration commission was
formed with two representatives from the MK and one from the
145 RK. For the party as a whole the fall in numbers was less
146 than in the 1919 reregistration, but in Moscow a massive
decline was registered (Table 13):
142. Later purges were to make great play of public 
participation in the purge process, cf., the 1929 purge, E.M 
Yaroslavskii (ed), Kak provodit' chistku partii, M/L. 1929, 
pp.23-5.
143. KT, 2 July 1920 144. KT, 21 July 1920.
145. KT, 1 August 1920.
146. Adelman, p.97, gives a figure of 28.6%.
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Table 13
The August 1920 reregistration
Before After
Membs Membs Cands Tot
Members
incr- deer- expe- red not on 
ease ease lied to pres- miss
cand ent ions
Baum 5048
Gor 9787
Zam 4784
K-P 12251
R-S 1709
Sok 2681
Kham 1821
City
TOT 38061
Gub
TOT 5328
TOT 43,389
3422
5749
2867
6728
1229
1870
1204
23069
4572
27,641
Source: Otchet MK
304 3726
1338 7087
541 3408
   
76 1305
326 2196
315 1519
2900 25969
   
   
za sentyabr '
1626
4038
1897
5527
480
811
517
- 14992
157 913
157 15905
1920g. , p. 6
69
19
27
112
19
154
73
 
19
460
74
85
33
31
1557
4000
1310
5337
259
624
300
 
 
100
 
121
 
213
473
140
613
702 13383 434
198 456 119
900 13838 553
In the city there was a 39.4% fall in membership, but only 1.2% 
were actually expelled, while 1.8% were reduced to candidate
status, a total of only 3% in some way disciplined. 147 A far
more significant figure is the massive 35.2% who for one reason
or another failed to attend the reregistration. 148 Part of the
explanation for this large group is, as Soviet sources stress,
147. As a percentage of those who actually presented themselves 
for reregistration (24,244) these figures rise to 1.9% and 2.9%, 
respectively, a total of 4,8%. There were large variations 
between raions, possibly reflecting harsher or softer 
commissions: in Zamoskvorech'e the highest proportion were 
disciplined at 10.1%, or 14.4% of the number who turned up; while 
in Gorodskoi the least were disciplined, 0.4% and 0.6%, 
respectively.
148. This excludes the 434 registered as absent on assignments. 
Here also there were great variations between raions: the lowest 
proportion was in Rogozhsko-Simonovskii at 15.1%, while in 
Gorodskoi raion the proportion of those not attending reached 
40.9%, and in Krasnopresnenskii 43.4%. Both Rigby, p.84, who 
cites a figure of 9% expelled from Sokol'nicheskii raion, and 
Adelman, p.97, who gives a figure of 22.7% purged in the'city and 
guberniya, have cited inaccurate sources.
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poor book-keeping which failed to account for communists who came 
and left the city on various courses, assignments and military 
dispositions. Rigby suggests that a large proportion took the 
opportunity to leave the party, an indication that 'unworthy 1 
elements were still able to join. Further, as Rigby points out 
in connection with Kronstadt where a quarter of the party 
organisation dropped out, this large category takes on political
significance in the light of later opposition to party
.. . 149 policies.
The reregistration revealed serious weaknesses in the party. 
Dorofeev's claim that there many communists in the city who did 
not know who was the chairman of the Moscow soviet was borne 
out by the rergistration. The majority of those demoted to 
candidacy were guilty of not knowing the party programme. A 
large proportion of those expelled had joined during the party
week, and political illiteracy was the main charge against
152 them. An MK circular following the reregistration admitted
the wide level of political illiteracy in the MPO, and argued 
that it was not restricted to the party week cohort but included 
those who had joined much earlier. The circular insisted on
149. Rigby, p.84. 150. £, 2 September 1920.
151. Otchet MK za sentyabr 1 1920g., p.8. Of the 613 who left 
the party 92 did so by request, 284 (64%) were expelled for not 
fulfilling party obligations, 34 for job-associated offences, 33 
for careerism, 28 for religious belief, 26 for drunkenness, 24 
for speculation, and the rest for unknown reasons (loc.cit.). Of 
the 112 members expelled in Krasnopresnenskii raion 82 were men 
and 30 women, 43 (38.4%) were workers, 44 soviet employees, 17 in 
the Red Army, and 8 military academy students, KT, 23 September 
1920.
152. In Krasnopresnenskii 58 (51.8%) out of the 112 expelled
(KT, 24 September 1920); in Sokol'nicheskii 60 (39%) out of the
154, KT, 3 September 1920.
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improved party schools and compulsory attendance for all party
members and not just recruits. As Bukharin put it, the party
154 had not succeeded in 'digesting 1 the new members.
Despite this the reregistration was followed by calls for a 
repetition of the party weeks to strengthen links with 
workers. The idea was not taken up though a vigorous 
discussion took place at the time. Instead, piecemeal mechanisms 
were introduced. The IX party conference in September 1920 
decided to make it easier for workers and peasants to join the 
party, and to erect greater obstacles for others.
There are conflicting claims over the pattern of recruitment 
between the end of the 1920 reregistration and the X party 
congress in March 1921. At the congress Bukharin argued that
there had been a great numerical increase since the last
i s ft 
congress, while the Workers' Opposition insisted that there
had been a mass exodus of workers, above all during the debates 
since the reregistration. Numbers as a whole did increase in
the MPO in this period. In September there was a large increase
158 
of nearly a fifth, presumably because the ban on recruitment
during the registration had created a back-log of party hopefuls.
153. Otchet MK za sentyabr' 1920g., pp.49-51.
154. P_, 17 September 1920.
155. N. Meshcheryakov in P_, 26 September 1920.
156. X s"ezd RKP, p.326. 157. ibid., pp.236-7.
158. Khamovnicheskii RPO increased by 21%, Krasnopresnenskii by 
12.3%, Rogozhsko-Simonovskii by 34.1%, an especially interesting 
figure since the raion was heavily working class, Sokol'nicheskii 
by 11.9%, and Zamoskvorech'e by 5.5%. In the five raions there 
was a total increase of 1957 new members, an average of 18.2%, 
Otchet MK za sentyabr 1 1920g, p.6; Otchet MK za oktyabr' 1920g., 
p.17.
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In October 1920 recruitment slowed to only 335 new members in 5
raions, and at the same time 455 members left the city and 329
159 
arrived, giving a net increase of only 1.2%.
The pattern of a steady turnover of members as communists 
left on assignments and new ones arrived is once again 
illustrated. This particularly affected the army communists, who in 
October 1920 in the five raions represented a third of total 
membership, and 38.9% of total male membership. In late 1920, 
as the MPO was gripped by political debate, membership grew at a 
faster rate. In the proletarian Baumanskii raion, the centre of 
support for the Workers' Opposition, membership between November 
1920 and January 1921 increased by 1067, representing an increase 
of nearly a third over the September 1920 level. In December
I C J
1920 alone membership here increased by 712. Part of the 
increase can be attributed to the movement of communists to the 
city and demobilised soldiers, but significant recruitment still 
continued. By January 1921 there had been an increase of 32.8%
159. 22 members and 7 candidates were expelled in that month, 
and 5 died. The greatest net increase was once again in
Rogozhsko-Simonovskii RPO of 7.9%, Qtchet MK za oktyabr' 1920g.,p.17. ——————————————————————
160. 5371 out of a total of 15,855 (13,793 of whom were men), 
Otchet MK za oktyabr 1 1920g., p.17.
161. KT, 5 February 1921.
162. Membership also increased in other raions. In December 
1920 the Zamoskvorech'e RPO gained 500 members (KT, 30 January 
1921). In Sokol' nicheskii raion in the last four~~months of 1920 
membership increased by 531 to 2473, an increase of 27.3% 
(Otchet Sokol'nicheskogo raionnogo komiteta RKP za vremya s 
1/IX 1920g. po I/I 1921g., M. 1921, p.7). The rise was not a 
result of an increased military presence: over this period the 
proportion of soldiers actually fell from 26.7% (Otchet MK za 
sentyabr' 1920g., p.9) to 17.8%, Otchet Sok. RK , p.7 .
- 167 -
  4. <-  163 
of members in the joint organisation since the reregistration,
but what proportion were new members or workers is not known. 
Therefore the Workers' Opposition claim that workers were leaving 
the party must remain unproved.
The major party purge ordered by the X party congress lies 
beyond the scope of this work but some comments are called for. 
The level of actual expulsions increased quite dramatically in
comparison to the 1920 reregistration. While the party as a
164 
whole lost a quarter of its total membership, the city
organisation lost 18.2% of its membership through direct 
expulsions. Service has recently confirmed that the purge was 
used to punish oppositionists, and this was facilitated by the 
fact that for the first time the purge commissions were 
independent of local party organisations. There is no direct 
evidence that the purge was used to punish oppositionists in 
Moscow, but of the 7270 expelled in the joint organisation a high 
proportion were accused of insubordination, a charge that could 
cover a multitude of sins including oppositional activity, and a 
full 12.4% left of their own accord (46% of these were workers) 
which indicates a certain level of dissatisfaction with party
163. In January 1921 there were 36,720 members and 9280 
candidates in the joint organisation (V Mosk. gubpartkonf.,p.3). 
The X congress mandate commission reportedatotalmembership of 
41,000 for the joint organisation (X s"ezd RKP, p.763).
164. Rigby, p.97.
165. A total of 5200 were expelled in the city and 2070 in the 
guberniya. Of the 5101 in the city for whom details are 
available 1314 (25.7%) were workers, 3159 (61.9%) were employees 
and office workers, 378 (7.4%) were peasants, and 250 others, 
Izvestiya MK RKP(b), 1, 20 March 1922, pp.14-15.
166. Service, pp.164-5. 167. Rigby, p.96.
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policies. As in the 1920 reregistration information from non- 
party people was encouraged. The accumulated experience of the 
reregistrations during the civil war provided the essential 
organisational experience for the new model purges.
8. Analysis of MPQ membership, 1918-1921
The city party organisation, and even more so the guberniya 
organisation, never represented more than a very small proportion 
of their respective populations. In mid-1918 the party as a 
whole was less than one per cent of the total population of the 
city and 1.6% of the independent population. By September 1920 
these proportions had increased to just under 3% and 4.6%, 
respectively. In 1918 there was one communist for every 62 of 
the independent population, and by September 1920 this had 
increased to 1 communist for every 22. Given the party's
168. Of the 7270 expelled 3614 were employees, 2090 workers, 
1027 peasants, and 539 others. 417 workers left of their own 
accord, 232 were expelled for 'passivity 1 , 250 for 
insubordination, 108 for 'wavering'. 157 as alien elements, and 
so on. The high number of employees expelled marks the purge's 
second main concern, and the 583 ex-members of other parties 
indicates the third (Izvestiya MK RKP(b), 1, pp.16-8). The 
'Declaration of the 22' in early 1922 also pointed to the 
departure of workers from the party: according to them 306 left 
the MPO between May and August 1921 (XI s"ezd RKP, p.754).
169. Lenin PSS , vol.44, p.123.
170. If we take party membership at 15,000 and the city 
population at 1,716,022, the party membership comes out as 0.87% 
of the population.
171. Following the 1920 reregistration the membership of the 
guberniya organisation was 4572. At the same time the population 
of the guberniya was 2,161,000, of whom 1,340,574 were rural and 
821,326 urban (_P, 1 October 1920). At that time the party 
represented 0.2% of the total population of the guberniya, 0.6% 
of the urban population, and 4.1% of the industrial working' 
class. There were only 700 peasant communists out of over one 
million peasants.
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vanguard role the relative smallness of the MPO is not 
surprising, but at the same time the party in the city was a 
small proportion of the working class. At the end of 1920 the 
city party had about 6000 of its members employed in industrial 
enterprises, or just under 1% of the total industrial workforce 
of 87,000. A large part of the working class was either not 
willing to join the party, or was prevented from doing so by the 
general rules governing entrance.
Party representation, or 'saturation 1 , in each age group 
showed a marked disparity between a fairly high saturation for 
the 18-24 population age group, of whom communists represented 
6.4%, even higher saturation in the 25-29 group at 7.1%, and 
thereafter falling sharply to 4.3% for the 30-39 year olds and 
reaching the miniscule representation of 0.9% for those over 40 
years old (Appendix 3, Table 18). This reveals not only the 
effect of the historical persecution before February 1917, but 
that recruitment in 1917 and after was overwhelmingly from 
amongst young people: those over 40 were a 'lost generation 1 as 
far as the party was concerned.
The 1920 reregistration allowed the social composition of 
the raions to be established for the first time (Table 14). 
The low percentage of peasant party members in the guberniya is 
noteworthy. The greatest concentration of office workers was in 
the two inner raions of Gorodskoi and Khamovnicheskii, dominated 
as they were by the offices of the commissariats and local 
government bodies. The proportion of workers was higher in the 
outlying industrial raions. If we compare the preceding table 
with that of the social pattern of recruitment (Table 9) we can 
see that the figure of 55% of the city organisation being workers
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Table 14
Social composition of RPOs in August 1920
Workers
No.
Baum 1722
Gor 2596
Zam 1664
K-P 4012
R-S 630
Sok 1228
Kham 743
City
TOT 12595
Gub
TOT 2960
MPO
TOT 15555
RKP
TOT 96611
Sources: KM
Figures for
1920 god, M.
%
54.0
51.5
59.6
54.0
65.7
63.0
46.4
54.9
59.6
55.8
45.2
, col
the 3
1921
Peasants 
No. %
Employees Intelligentsia Total 
No. % No. %
3188
5035
2792
7426
959
1949
1601
22940
4966
27906
213669
402
338
286
1130
114
163
216
2649
700
3349
40534
12.
6.
10.
15.
11.
8.
13.
11.
14.
12.
19.
76 ; Otchet
guberni i f
6
7
2
2
9
4
5
5
1
0
0
MK
rom
727
1266
591
1530
168
454
371
5007
1089
6096
48814
22
23
21
20
17
23
23
21
21
21
22
.8
.2
.2
.6
.5
.3
.1
.8
.9
.8
.8
za sentyabr
Lichnyi SOS
337
935
251
754
47
104
271
2699
217
2916
10302
1 1920g
tav RKP
10
18
9
10
4
5
17
11
4
10
4
  i
(b)
.6
.6
.0
.2
.9
.3
.0
.8
.4
.4
.8
P-
V
craftsmen and 5327 others. This table probably exaggerates the 
proportion of workers and intelligentsia, cf. Table 15.
by profession is an exaggeration. Even if we accept this figure 
it illustrates that the party week in Moscow, when nearly 7000 
workers joined, had no more than restored the balance for the 
percentage of workers in the city organisation. Table 15 is 
probably more accurate.
Table 15 
Social composition of MPO in August 1920
Workers
Employees
Peasants
Intelligentsia
Craftsmen
Others
Unknown
TOTAL
City
No.
14496
6047
2188
1999
905
2676
1509
29820
%
49
20
7
7
3
9
5
100
Guberniya
No.
2803
1026
437
181
205
572
182
5406
%
52
19
8
3
4
11
3
100
Total %
No.
17299
7073
2625
2180
1110
3248
1691
35226
in 36 gubs
% exc. M . + P .
49
20
8
6
3
9
5
100
40
21
22
5
7
4
1
100
Source: Materialy po statistike, pp.22-3, 80-1.
- 171 -
The large number of peasants in the city organisation is because 
no separate table was made for members of the Red Army. In 
Moscow the percentage of workers was higher than in the party as 
a whole. Another general indication of the social composition of 
the MPO is the distribution of cells. In September 1920 less 
than a third (30%) of the 776 cells in six raions were in 
enterprises, while the single largest group were those in offices 
(31%), with the rest in the army (26%) and in transport 
(12%) (Table 20). 172 Out of the 1537 cells in the joint 
organisation in April 1921 515 (33.5%) were factory and
transport, 470 (30.5%) soviet, 119 (7.7%) rural, and 433 (28.2%)
173 
military. Membership of a factory cell, however, did not
automatically entail employment in a manual task, as Zelenskii,
by then secretary of the MK, pointed out at the XI party
1 74 
congress in March 1922.
From Table 16 it can be seen that in Moscow city 9791 (33%) 
of party members were in a production trade union, 5712 (19%) in 
other trade unions, and with no information on 14,317 (48%) of
172. Otchet MK za sentyabr 1 1920g., p.9. There were 909 cells 
in the city at the time but no information on the 133 cells in 
Zamoskvorech'e.
173. VI Moskovskaya gubernskaya konferentsia RKP. 25-28 iyunya 
1921g.r doklady, kratkii otchet MK i rezolyutsii, M. 1921, p.31.
174. XI s"ezd RKP, p.443. There are some dubious figures for 
the socialcomposition of the 7 raion and 17 uezd party 
organisations on 1 March 1921, reported as 56% worker, 22% 
employee, 12% peasant, and 10% intelligentsia. These figures 
cover only 33,759 out of a reported MPO membership of 49,154. 
The figure of 56% worker is recognised as an exaggeration by the 
source, which states that many employees claimed to be workers 
(possibly in view of the impending purge), and that others 
supported their claim to be workers on the grounds that they did 
not own any property, Byulleten 1 MK RKP, 1, 8 April 1921; P_, 14 
April 1921.
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Table 16 
Profession and trade union membership of MPQ members in August 1920
Profession TU membership 
No. % No. %
Miners
Woodworkers
Metalworkers-technicians
-others 
Printers 
Stationers 
Foodworkers 
Leatherworkers 
Agriculture/forestry-agronomists
-others
Construction workers 
Transport-drivers, mates
-other railway jobs
-waterworkers
-local transport 
Chemical workers 
Clothing workers 
Tobacco workers 
Textile workers 
Unskilled workers 
Municipal workers 
Public feeding, hostels 
Medical-doctors, midwives, vets
-others 
Office workers-statisticians, etc.
-others
Communications workers 
Education-, teachers
-others
Cultural workers 
Military specialists 
Without profession 
Not known 
Not belonging to TU or not known
TOTAL
161
1082
918
6107
970
42
630
908
132
3159
1134
190
542
223
713
464
1202
40
1546
1865
420
230
194
563
555
5771
768
746
493
383
546
2568
2249
0
2
2
16
2
0
1
2
0
8
3
0
1
0
1
1
3
0
4
5
1
0
0
1
1
15
2
2
1
1
1
6
6
.4
.9
.4
.3
.6
.1
. 7
.4
.3
.4
.0
.5
.4
.6
.9
.2
.2
.1
.1
.0
.1
.6
.5
.5
.5
.4
.0
.0
.3
.0
.4
.8
.0
109
236
3549
n
754
38
429
464
178
1 1
325
2555
"
"
11
516
544
94
2209
 
1108
166
725
n
1 1
3395
407
629
"
129
0.3
0.7
10.0
11
2.1
0.1
1.2
1.3
0.5
"
0.9
7.2
"
11
"
1.5
1.5
0.3
6.3
 
3.1
0.5
2.1
1 1
"
9.6
1.1
1.8
"
0.4
16667 47.3
37514 100 35226 100
Source: Materialy po statistike, pp.28-9, 52-3.
29,820. Ten per cent of the joint organisation's members were in 
the metal TU, 1% in transport, 10% in the office workers trade 
union, and 6% in the textile union. The single largest 
profession of MPO members was metalworking, reflecting Lenin's
idea of the advanced consciousness associated with that
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profession. Less satisfactory for Lenin was the second largest 
group, that of soviet employees. Many chose to name this 
profession as their speciality even if they had not been occupied 
in it for any length of time to cover, from the Bolshevik point 
of view, a less salubrious profession.
A national sample of party members in October 1919 revealed 
that only 11% of party membership were actually working in 
factories. More than 60% were employed in state and party posts, 
and another quarter were in the Red Army, often occupying the key 
posts. So less than a quarter of the party was in its rank and 
file. This clearly showed the tendency for party members to 
move from the factory to non-manual or military work during war 
communism. The situation in Moscow in 1920 is shown by Table 17. 
The single largest occupational group for MPO members was in 
the various soviet institutions (27.4%), followed by industrial 
enterprises, including economic management (22.9%) and the Red 
Army (18.3%). The corresponding figures for the party as a whole 
of 213,669 members in 38 gubernii are 34.7%, 14.1%, and 20.7%, 
and in 36 gubernii with 156,751 members (excluding Moscow and 
Petrograd) 36.5%, 11.8%, and 20%. Therefore in the party as a 
whole, and especially in Petrograd, the managerial functions of 
the party stood in starker contrast than in Moscow where the 
party was larger than any other single organisation and the 
weight of industry was more pronounced. Nevertheless, over a 
quarter of the Moscow party was involved in office work in the
175. Rigby, p.81; Izvestiya TsK RKP, 15, 24 March 1920. The 
sample was of 17,312 communists.
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Table 17
Industrial enterprises:
- responsible w
- of whom f
- office/accounts
- junior employees
- workers 
Total
Artisan and craft 
Agriculture 
Transport:
- responsible w
- of whom f
- office/accounts
- junior employe 
Total
Soviet institutions
- Responsible wo
- of whom fr
- office/accounts
- junior employees 
Total 
Red Army:
- political lea
- higher staff
- other staff o
- admin, and me
- cadets
- soldiers - line 
- non- 
Total
Party organisation:
- total in party
- of whom in 
Trade unions:
- responsible wo]
- of whom fr<
- FZK members
- office/account; 
Total
House workers 
Not working 
No information
TOTAL
.on of MPO members in
>es : 
 kers
>m workers
;s
idustry
 kers
>m workers
;s/workers
 kers
>m workers
«
;s
;rs
r f icers
: icers
.cal
: units
 line units
work
party work
only
 kers
>m workers
/juniors
Ci
No.
161
82
187
22
5994
6364
423
739
225
92
202
1152
1579
2629
309
3108
2427
8164
118
90
1126
899
1247
1782
313
5575
1461
540
288
152
363
27
678
14
264
5480
ty
%
0.5
51.0
0.6
0.1
20.1
21.3
1.4
2.5
0.7
40.9
0.7
3.9
5.3
8.8
11.7
10.4
8.1
27.4
0.4
0.3
3.8
3.0
4.2
6.0
1.0
18.7
4.9
1.8
1.0
52.8
1.2
0.1
2.8
0.1
0.9
18.4
Guberniya 
No. %
43 0.8
22 51.2
135 2.5
7 0.1
1522 2.8
1707 31.6
93
270
1. 7 
5.0
4 0.1
2 50.0
28 0.5
95 1.8
127 2.3
719 13.3
281 39.1
530 9.8
271 5.0
1520 28.1
15
14
208
191
41
337
60
0
0
469
124
4
29
302
3
3
3.8 
3.5 
0. 7 
6.2 
1.1
866 16.0
8.7 
2.3
122 2.2
71 58.2
233 4.3
9 0.2
364 6.7
0.1 
0.5 
5.9
Total 
No. %
204 0.6
104 51.0
322 0.9
29 0.1
7516 21.3
8071 22.9
516 1.5
1009 2.9
229 0.6
94 41.0
230 0.7
1247 3.5
1706 4.8
3346 9.5
590 18.0
3638 10.3
2698 7.6
9684 27.4
133
104
1334
1090
1288
2119
373
6441
1930
664
0.4 
0.3 
3.8 
3.1 
3.6 
6.0 
1.1 
18.3
5.4 
1.9
410 1.2
223 54.0
596 1.2
36 0.1
1042 2.5
18 0.1
293 0.8
5782 16.4
29820 100 5406 100 35226 100
Source: Materialy po statistike, pp.42-7 ; 90-3.
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institutions, and only just over a fifth (21.3%) were actually 
involved in manual production work. Another fifth at the time 
were serving soldiers in Moscow. Agriculture was not very 
significant in the joint organisation, which at 2.9% of the total 
membership reflected the minimal presence of the party amongst 
the peasantry in Moscow guberniya. In the party as a whole 7.7% 
were involved in agriculture, and excluding the two capitals 
9.5%. The party during the civil war became one not so much in 
the working class as one concerned with management and the army.
The corps of key party activists devoted exclusively to 
party work consisted of 664 members of the MPO (1.9%), while in 
Petrograd and the party as a whole the proportion was higher, 
nearly 3% in the former and 3.4% (7295) in the latter, and 3.9% 
(6004) if the two capitals are excluded, illustrating that the 
development of the party apparatus in the localities imposed a 
proportionately greater strain on these organisations than in the 
relatively proletarian Moscow. Here a total of 1930 members were 
involved in party work as well as some other duties, 5.4% of the 
total membership, of whom 34% were the full-time APWs. Once 
again these figures are higher in the party as a whole (20,148 or 
9.4%) and in the party without the two capitals 16,175 or 10.3%, 
with the full-time APWs reprresenting 36.2% and 37.1%, 
respectively, of these totals.
An important concern of the 1920 reregistration was to 
discover the number of communists who had previously belonged to 
another party. In Moscow of those joining the party in 1918
176. Table 17, and Materialy po statistike, pp.42-7, 90-3.
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11.4% had previously belonged to another party. By August 
1920 2416 (8%) of the total of 29,822 communists in the city had
once belonged to another party, and the same proportion in the
178 
whole MPO. By March 1921 this had ostensibly fallen to 1523
179 (4.5%) in the whole MPO, though the fall is almost certainly
partially explained by members covering their past affiliations. 
Nevertheless, the trend was clear for one-time members of other 
parties as a group to decline as a proportion of the MPO during
the civil war. Nevertheless, the fear that the party was being
180 
swamped by them was a major concern of the 1921 purge, and
reflects the increasing siege mentality of the party.
The 1920 reregistration illustrated once again that the 
party by the end of war communism had changed dramatically from 
that of 1917. One indicator is the decline in the number of 
those who had undergone some sort of persecution under the 
autocracy. By August 1920 only 3474 (11.6%) out of 29,820 in 
the city fell into this category, and in the guberniya only 316
(5.8%) out of 5406, giving a total of 3790 (10.7%) out of 35,226
181 in the joint MPO. Moscow city had a higher proportion of
people who had undergone some sort of repression than the party 
as a whole (8%) reflecting the concentration of dedicated
177. Vserossiiskaya perepis' chlenov RKP(b), 1922g. issue 4 M. 
1923, p.47.
178. In the guberniya 305 (6%) out of 5406 had once belonged to
another party giving a total of 2721 (8%) out of the total MPO
membership of 35,226. In the 38 gubernii 14,190 (7%) out of
213,669 members are so categorised, Materialy po statistike, p.66
179. Byulleten' MK RKP(b), 1, 8 April 1921, p.6.
180. Lenin PSS, vol.44, p.124.
181. Materialy po statistike, p.66.
- 177 -
revolutionaries. Despite this, the great majority of the Moscow 
party by the end of the civil war had not been seasoned by 
Tsarist repression. This was yet another factor reinforcing the 
division of the party into two groups.
Table 18
Age and sex structure of the MPO in August 1920
Age
Up to 18
18-19
20-23
24-29
30-39
40 +
City
Men
206
1731
5802
8829
6818
2168
313
% Women %
1
7
22
34
26
9
1
44
316
1089
1232
839
301
132
1
8
28
31
21
8
3
Total %
250
2047
6891
10061
7657
2469
445
1
7
23
34
26
8
1
Joint MPO 
Men % Women % Total %
87 13 100
279 1
2022 6
6476 21
10093 33
8450 28
2968 10
365 1
87
53 1
386 8
1260 28
1413 31
962 21
349 8
150 3
13
322 1
2408 7
7738 22
11506 33
9412 27
3317 9
515 1
100
TOTAL 25867 100 3953 100 29820 100 30653 100 4573 100 35226 100
Source: Materialy po statistike, pp.22-7.
The great preponderance of men over women in the
organisation is marked. These figures represent the high point 
of female membership during the civil war, and thereafter the 
proportion fell. In Sokol'nicheskii raion, for example, by 
December 1920 the proportion of female communists had fallen to
8.7% from the 11% in September of that year. 182 The youth of the
party is also marked: 63% of the joint organisation was under 30, 
and 90% under 40, with the single largest group in their late 
twenties. The rule that no party member was to be under 18 
clearly was not observed.
Fewer female party members were married than men, but a
182. Otchet Sok. RK-ta, p.7.
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Table 19 
Marital status of MPO members in August 1920
Men Women Total % for 
No. % No. % No. % 38 gubs
Single 14178 46 2657 58 16835 48 33
Married 15132 50 1644 36 16776 48 63
Not known 1343 4 272 6 1615 4 4
TOTAL 30653 100 4573 100 35226 100 100
With
dependents 6253 20 1992 44 8245 23 19
Without
dependents 24400 80 2581 56 26981 77 81
Source: Materialy po statistike, pp.8-9.
greater proportion had people dependent on them. A smaller 
proportion of people in Moscow were married than in the party as 
a whole. Men who were married were unlikely to have had 
children. Therefore for men marriage was not such a barrier to 
party membership as it was for women, but childlessness was an 
important factor in party membership. The very concept of the 
activist party member outlined by Lenin before the revolution 
militated against the active participation of women until 
adequate resources were devoted to freeing them from domestic 
toil.
From the preceding material we can draw up a composite 
picture of the typical communist in Moscow at the end of 1920. 
This communist was male, Russian (though there are no details on 
the national composition of the MPO), possibly married but 
without children, and in his late twenties. He had joined the 
party in 1919 or 1920, and had therefore not suffered repression 
for his political beliefs under the autocracy. His background 
was likely to have been manual work in industry, possibly in a 
metal plant, but now he would more than likely be working in some
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office. It was unlikely that he would have been a member of 
another party before joining the Bolsheviks. To survive the 
periodic reregistrations he had to fulfil several duties, such as 
the subbotniks and communist detachments, and to attend party 
meetings. He had almost certainly undergone military training, 
and probably served at the front, but now with the peace his 
greatest fear was that he would be returned to the factories. It 
was this communist that the party had to control and organise, 
and how this was achieved we shall see in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5 
Organisation
An important feature of Leninism as it developed during the 
civil war was that theoretical positions were translated into 
organisational forms. As Georg Lukacs put it in a 1922 essay, 
written as he later admitted under the influence of the 
'messianic utopianism 1 of the civil war, organisation was 'the 
form of mediation between theory and practice 1 . Recruitment 
policy, as we have seen, provided the basis for the emergence of 
an 'old guard 1 , but organisational practice tended to consolidate 
this group during the civil war. The X party congress resolution 
on party building admitted that the main 'contradiction 1 of the 
war period was rapid numerical growth balanced by the stifling of
self-activity through 'extreme centralisation and the system of
2 
military orders'. A small active group developed in the party,
a bureaucracy, which dominated a passive group which was 'only 
occasionally brought into play and then only at the behest of the 
former'.
The 'May programme' had called for a centralised, 
disciplined, and united party in which all party members were 
subordinate to the territorial committees. This chapter will 
look at how this programme was implemented during the civil war.
1. Georg Lukacs, 'Towards a Methodology of the Problem of 
Organisation', in History and Class Consciousness, Merlin Press, 
London 1971, p.299.
2. X s"ezd RKP, p.561. 3. Lukacs, p.319.
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1. The Moscow committee (MK)
Up to May 1920, when it was united with the guberniya 
committee, the MK exercised the rights and functions of a 
guberniya party committee. In the first phase of Soviet power 
the MK existed more as a general poitical coordinating body than 
the organisational centre of party work in the city. From mid- 
1918 all party committees began to reorganise themselves, but 
these new model committees, as they were to become, differed in 
several respects from the old committees of 1917. They were 
recreated as part of a governing body and structured not for the 
struggle to achieve power, but for the exercise of that power 
over the Soviets, trade unions, other social bodies, and their 
own membership. They were increasingly integrated into a general 
party structure superimposed on the state system. The party 
committees issued instructions for the acceptance of new members 
and printed party cards until this function was taken over by the 
TsK in late 1920. They drew up regulations for the governance of 
the local party organisation, and in general became the supreme 
political authority in a locality.
The Moscow party organisation illustrates the
crystallisation of the party process. In the shadow of the TsK 
it was united by close personal and organisational links with the 
party centre. Nevertheless, the Moscow party and its committee 
developed both in interaction with the centre but more 
importantly in this period through the social and political 
traditions of the city itself. In 1920 the secretary of the MK, 
A.F. Myasnikov was still proud of the independent traditions of 
the city organisation:
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The Moscow party organisation is unique in the Russian 
Communist Party, not like that of Petrograd or any other 
organisation...because of its specific features, the 
intake of workers and its strong traditions, whose 
reasons have to be sought in the composition of the 
Moscow proletariat and the structure of Moscow 
industry.
A major anomaly of the MPO was the practice of direct 
delegation to the MK from the raions and not by election at a 
city party conference. The first city conference on 3-4 April 
1917 had elected a committee, but once the raion party 
organisations (RPO) had established themselves the role of the 
conference, beginning from the third city conference on 10 May 
1917, was restricted to confirming the delegates from the raions 
to the MK. This system remained in operation, with various 
modifications, until May 1920. The RPOs had a variable number of 
representatives depending on their size, with one delegate for 
250 party members. Thus the railway RPO had between 2-5 on the 
MK throughout the period, Basmannyi 4 representatives in 
February 1919, and a large RPO such as Gorodskoi 8 in March
Q
1920. The raion representatives usually included members of the 
raion soviet EC.
Each raion elected its representatives to the MK at a raion 
party conference, the highest body in the raions in the early 
period, and later at a delegate party conference. The norms 
and periods of representation changed. In August 1919, for 
example, the MK bureau even decided 'Not to set a period of
4. KM, col.657.
5. Ustav Moskovskoi organizatsii RKP, M. 1918, pp.4-5
6. Zheleznodorozhniki i revolyutsii, M. 1923, p.47.
7. P, 20 February 1919. 8. P, 26 March 1920.
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authority for members, since the raions have the right to re-
9 
elect them at every delegate meeting 1 . This flexible system is
reflected in the lack of information on the membership of the MK 
between 1918 and March 1920 as delegates were recalled or sent to 
other work. The size of the MK varied between 30 and 40 members 
(Appendix 14).
This procedure allowed the RPOs to exert a direct influence 
over the MK. Direct representation and the right of recall 
suggests that within the MPO at least some of the elements of the 
commune state were being practiced. At the end of 1920 Myasnikov 
wrote that this system was not democratic centralism, but 
federalism, and indeed for the first part of the war the MPO 
consisted of allied but largely autonomous raion party 
organisations. Therefore, he argued, 'The MK did not lead the 
work of the raions either politically or organisationally 1 . As 
we shall see, unification with the guberniya prompted a major 
debate on the role and manner of electing the MK.
Local party organisations were governed in their internal 
affairs by their own statutes, while their relationships with 
other bodies were established by the general party statutes 
adopted by the VI party congress in August 1917 and the new 
statute adopted by the VIII party conference in December 1919. 
The Moscow statute adopted by the 30 July 1918 city party 
conference reflected both the desire for a more ordered city 
organisation following the May circulars, and the attempt to
9. V.N. Tarusov, Iz istorii Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii, 
issue 2, Uchenye zapiski MGPI, issue 239, M. 1973, p.29.
10. KM, col.658.
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enshrine the rights of the lower party organisations, above all 
the RPOs. The statute stated that the city party conference was 
to be elected by general raion party meetings and to meet 
monthly, and that it was the highest party body in the city. The 
MK delegated by the raions was 'To guide all the political and 
organisational work of all raion party organisations and all 
communist fractions of the various institutions in Moscow'.
In practice, however, for most of the period it was in no 
position to exert significant supervision over the work of the 
raions for lack of its own apparatus and staff. In the early 
period of Soviet power the organisation of the party in the 
localities was marked by diversity and often by extreme 
informality. In many of the committees in Moscow, and especially 
in the raions, all offices were elected and circulated among the 
members. Posts were not strictly appointed and often no-one was 
responsible for carrying out any particular policy or job. At 
the end of 1918 the MK's own commissions, later called
departments (organisation, agitation, soviet, military, and one
12 for the TUs and the economy) were barely functioning.
From the first because of its size the MK selected a bureau 
(variously called a presidium, executive committee or commission) 
to carry out current work, and initially consisted of about 5 
people but by 1920-1 this had expanded to about 10 (Appendix 14). 
It prepared the agenda for MK meetings and also had the important 
right of distributing active party workers. On 26 July 1918 the
11. Ustav MPO 1918, pp.3-4 .
12. KM, col.658.
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MK decided to form a secretariat of three, meeting about 
three times a week, that acted as the main motor of the MK. At
that time the whole staff of the MK apparat consisted of between
14 16-20 people. Zagorskii's role in the MK was equivalent to
that of Sverdlov in the TsK in the early period, with membership
statistics and personnel notes confined to what his own briefcase
15 
could carry.
In February 1919, at a time of debate in the organisation 
over the effectiveness of the MK and its alleged lack of 
leadership, the work of the MK bureau was reorganised. The 
seven-person bureau and the RKs were now obliged to report on 
their activities to the full MK, which was to meet once a week 
apart from emergency meetings. The bureau was to select two 
assistants for the MK secretary who were to act as an 
organisation committee. The March 1920 statute changed the 
status of the bureau from a purely technical body to one with 
decision-making powers between conferences. On unification 
with the guberniya in May 1920 the bureau's independence was 
further enhanced as the stipulation that all of its work was to 
be discussed by the MK was dropped, and it now only had to report
13. Zagorskii, Breslav, and D.I. Efremov as first secretary 
(Dumova, p.93). With Efremov's departure for the front in 
September 1918 Zagorskii became first secretary, ibid., p.99.
14. Dumova, p.93
15. Dumova, p.93. Sverdlov and Zagorskii were old friends from 
Nizhni-Novgorod, and it was Sverdlov who called Zagorskii back to 
Moscow in mid-1918 even though the latter had had no contact with 
the MPO for four years.
16. Tarusov, p.25.
17. A.F. Myasnikov, Izbrannye proizvedeniya, Erevan 1965, p.260.
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18 
on the more important topics. Unfortunately, there are no
details on the size of the MK secretariat at the end of the war, 
but it was probably still not a very large organisation even if 
the clerical staff are included. It did, however, have at its 
disposal the 540 party members (Table 17) in the city who were 
devoted purely to party work.
While Moscow was no exception to the national phenomenon of 
guberniya and city committees being led by active party workers
of pre-revolutionary vintage, this standing at 75% in late
19 1919, the actual composition of the MK over the period was
marked by a high degree of flux. Only one person (Zelenskii) 
elected to the first MK in May 1917 was elected to the one of 
February 1921, and only Belen'kii sat on every committee elected 
between September 1918 and early 1921 (Appendix 14). With the 
change to the election of the MK at a guberniya party conference 
in 1920 the stability of the MK membership markedly increased.
2. The raion party organisations (RPO)
As a consequence of the clandestine forms of party activity 
before February 1917 and the nature of the revolutionary struggle 
in 1917, a large degree of autonomy was vested in the raion party 
organisations. They were the final arbiters of membership in the 
raions, controlled the work of the cells, and were the scene of 
the debates over the most important political questions facing 
the party and the country.
Raion committees (RK) were initially elected at general
18. Ustav Moskovskoi organizatsii RKP(b), M. 1920, p.5
19. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 9, 20 December 1919.
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meetings of the raion organisations, and from mid-1918 at 
delegate meetings. During the civil war there was a tendency for 
the RKs to decrease in size as personnel became scarcer and 
functions were centralised. At the end of July 1918, for 
instance, the Khamovnicheskii RK was re-elected and now had only
6 members instead of 19. The RK bureau was abolished and its
20 functions were transferred to a secretariat. A general meeting
of Butyrskii RPO on 3 August 1918 even went so far as to propose
21 giving the RK dictatorial powers.
During the 'withering away of the party 1 period the RKs had 
barely functioned. In Gorodskoi raion, for example, up to August
1918 there had not been a single full-time party organiser. In
22 that month a secretariat of three was formed. Until mid-July
1918 Alekseevsko-Rostokinskii RK did not have a full-time
23 
activist, or even a permanent secretary, and this was the case
in most raions. With the onset of the war and the mass 
mobilisations which weakened the cells at the base of the party, 
party work became increasingly concentrated in the hands of the 
committees. A major response to the party crisis on the eve of 
the VIII party congress was to strengthen the party apparatus 
itself by ensuring a corps of people devoted to party work alone. 
The MK meeting of 11 January 1919 heard Zagorskii demand the
strict enforcement of an earlier MK resolution on the return from
24 the front of one responsible official for each raion.
Nevertheless the chronic shortage of party workers continued.
20. P, 23 July 1918. 21. £, 15 August 1918.
22. ]?, 31 August 1918. 23. P_, 18 July 1918.
24. p, 18 January 1919.
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In February 1919 the Rogozhsko-Simonovskii RK complained that its 
greatest weakness was the lack of APWs. In the past two months 
alone, the RK stated, the raion had lost six of its leading
members. The December 1918 mobilisation had ruptured the
25 
committee's links with many of the factories in the raion.
Lefortovskii RK reported that after the same mobilisation work in 
the cells had collapsed because of the lack of organisers and
0 C
instructors. The lack of APWs was to be a central motif of 
party life during the civil war. The response, apart from 
strengthening the apparatus, included recruitment and training 
new members to ensure a flow of activists.
Despite the difficulties the party committees began to 
consolidate themselves. The Sokol'nicheskii RK report for July- 
November 1918 illustrates the improvement in party work. 
Functions had been specialised and particular bodies had been 
created to carry out specific duties, such as an agitprop 
department. In June 1918 the RK had occupied a single room and 
had only one secretary, with all the work being carried out by an 
RK of 11-13 people. By November 1918 the RK occupied a whole 
floor of a fairly large building, and instead of a single 
secretary there was a whole secretariat. Following the 
reregistration of mid-1918, mentioned above, membership towards 
the end of the year increased sharply, and the number of cells
had increased from 20 in July to 45 in November, with over half
27 
of the enterprises in the raion having one.
The revival in party organisation coincided with the war,
25. p_, 2 February 1919. 26 P_, 30 January 1919. 
27. p, 12 December 1918.
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which inevitably gave that revival a centralised flavour. The 
TsK circular of 4 February 1919 vividly described the connection 
between the departure of party members and the compensatory 
concentration of party life in the committees:
The organisational disintegration suffered by our party 
with the departure of the best forces to soviet work has 
now been replaced by the development of a strongly 
centralised party apparatus. We have marched a long way 
on this path, but the^process is in no way to be 
considered completed.
In Basmannyi raion, for instance, in the first period of the war 
work was rapidly concentrated in the hands of the RK bureau. The 
RK itself, elected in November 1918, had only met twice in plenary 
session by February 1919. A delegate meeting on 5-6 February 
1919 even proposed abolishing the RK and concentrating work in 
the bureau, a clear breach of democratic centralism. Instead,
the meeting decided to decrease the RK from 15 to 7 members, and
29 this at its first meeting decided to abolish the bureau.
Elsewhere work was also concentrated in the hands of a small 
group of raion activists. In Zamoskvorech'e, for example, the RK 
bureau was abolished in July 1919, and the work of the raion 
soviet was similarly concentrated. In large raions such as 
Gorodskoi the RKs consisted of 15-20 people with current work 
carried out by a bureau of 3-5 elected by the RK.
In each raion there was a revisional commission, initially
established in 1917 and elected at a general meeting to oversee
32 the financial affairs of the RPO. Concern over the chronic
28. Partiya v period inostrannoi voennoi interventsii, p.74.
29. £, 20 February 1919. 30. VIMS, 1 August 1919.
31. P, 8 July 1919. 32. £, 11 January 1919.
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organisational fluidity in the raions prompted an extension of 
their functions, codified by an MK instruction of 7 June 1919. 
This established that they were to be composed of three MK 
members, and their duties included supervising the activities 
of the RKs, their organisations, and the state of the party in 
the raions. They were therefore the precursors of the Control 
Commissions established by the IX party conference, and before 
then they acted as a check on the RKs.
The lack of personnel and the organisational heterogeneity in
the raions had prompted several plans to unite the raions in
34 1919. The proposals had been shelved in the heat of the war,
but with the breathing space of early 1920 the 13 raions were
35 
reduced to 7 in March of that year. The MK justified the move
both on the grounds that it would save on personnel, and that it 
would facilitate the fulfilment of orders from the centre.
The July 1918 MPO statute had stated that the highest body
in the raions was the general meeting which could elect an RK of
37 
whatever size it felt necessary. It provided little indication
33. P_, 17 June 1919. 34. P_, 17 June, 11 July 1919.
35. Butyrskii raion was united with Sushchevsko-Mar'inskii and 
Presnenskii raions to form a massive new raion called 
Krasnopresnenskii covering a third of Moscow ; Alekseevo- 
Rostokinskii was joined with Sokol'nicheskii and the new raion 
was known by the latter's name; and Basmannyi was merged with 
Blagushe-Lefortovo to form Baumanskii raion.
36. KT, 18 March 1920. The new RKs had the following standard 
departments: general; accounting and statistics; organisation and 
agitation; female workers; Komsomol; subbotniks; and military 
(KT, 23 May 1920). By early 1921 the number of departments had 
beeVi reduced to five: general; accounts and statistics; women; 
organisation and agitation; and subbotniks, Ocherki ist MO KPSS, 
vol.2, p.212.
37. Ustav MPO 1918, p.6.
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of the relationships in the RPOs between the various bodies. In 
early December 1918 the Sokol'nicheskii RPO, the most lively 
organisation at the time, adopted a reglament (standing orders). 
It attempted to give a more precise definition of the 
functions of the cells; the delegate meetings, which were now 
elevated as the highest body in the raions for organisational 
questions; the general meetings, which were to deal now with 
political questions only; and the RK, with a bureau to conduct
-5 o
current work. This reglament was adopted by the MK on 25
39 December 1918 and was generalised with the force of a party
statute for the whole organisation by the city conference on 18 
January 1919. 40
The adoption of this reglament registered the centrality of 
the RPOs in the Moscow organisation. Party work in the raions 
was focused on the delegate meetings, and the MK, in its party 
building resolution of 15 February 1919 on the eve of the VIII 
congress, argued that this would develop the 'self-activity and 
collective creativity 1 of the party and its members. The MK
insisted that this was of universal application to all urban
41 party organisations. While party work was being concentrated
in the raions, no corresponding movement was yet taking place 
between the RPOs and the MK. In this sense Myasnikov in late 
1920 was justified in stating that both the reglament and the
1918 statute reflected a 'lack of centralism or ordered
42 system'.
38. P_, 12 December 1918. 39. P_, 11 January 1919.
40. p_, 1 February 1919. 41. P_, 19 February 1919.
42. KM, col.658.
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Nevertheless, important organisational principles were being 
established which defined the operation of democratic centralism 
within the ruling party. For instance, in January 1919 the MK 
severely censured the practice of holding private inter-raion 
meetings of party members without seeking the permission of 
either the RKs or the MK. It declared that such meetings
infringed the statute and that their organisers would be strictly
43 
reprimanded. Meetings of party members for whatever purpose
could only take place within the given structures, and it was 
over this principle that the later oppositions stumbled. At the 
same time it ensured that the 'self-activity' of party members 
was channelled to further the objectives set by higher party 
bodies.
3. Reform proposals
On the eve of the VIII party congress a wide debate 
developed over the 'crisis' in the party. Against the background 
of fears over the quality of recruitment and the development of a 
group of verkhi dominating the nizy, discussed in chapter 4, the 
problem of the nature and level of guidance to be obtained from 
the TsK and MK over lower party bodies was raised. At issue was 
the question of how to establish effective central leadership 
without undermining local authority. The debate focused on the 
party's relationship with the Soviets and will therefore be 
discussed in that context (Chapter 8), and for now we will 
restrict ourselves to internal party questions alone.
Three main positions emerged in the pre-congress discussion.
43. p, 18 January 1919.
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The first is represented by those whom Service calls the 'Strict
44 45 Centralists', otherwise called by Helgesen the apparatchiki,
whose views were articulated by Sverdlov in the TsK and whose 
main strength was concentrated in the Nizhni-Novgorod party 
organisation around Sergushev and Lazar Kaganovich. The latter
called for a 'sleek hierarchy of uniformly organised party
46 
committees' working under the guidance of an improved central
4 7 party apparatus. At the other extreme were a group based in
Moscow guberniya known as the Democratic Centralists (DCs). The 
DCs, joined by E.N. Ignatov and other representatives of Moscow's 
raions, agreed with the 'strict 1 group that the TsK displayed 
'extreme inertia' and a lack of ' planned leadership 1 and 
provided insufficient detailed guidance for the local party
organisations, but as opposed to the other group stressed the
48 
need for democracy and accountability. In the run-up to the
conference, therefore, an unholy alliance formed between these
49 two groups in criticising the party centre.
The third view was represented by the traditionally moderate 
MK. The manner of its formation as a body of delegates from the
44. Service, p.108. 45. Helgesen, p.312.
46. Service, p.106.
47. One of the victories to the credit of the centralisers was 
the abolition of the Moscow Oblast Committee (Bureau) on 22 
January 1919. Together with the other oblast organisations it 
represented an intermediary aggregation between the TsK and the 
guberniya committees. Its functions largely duplicated those of 
the TsK and the local committees, and with the consolidation of 
both it was deemed no longer necessary.
48. Resolution passed by 2 March 1919 Moscow guberniya party 
conference, P_, 5 March 1919.
49. Helgesen, p.313.
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raions in itself retarded the development of an apparatchik 
mentality. In its 15 February 1919 resolution on the VIII 
congress the MK claimed to steer a course mid-way between 
separatism, on the one hand, and 'bureaucratic centralism 1 , on 
the other. The now customary calls for strict party discipline 
over all members irrespective of their posts, and over soviet 
fractions in particular, were balanced by a range of proposals 
aimed at drawing in new party workers by increasing the 
importance of the delegate meetings, for party conferences to be 
held every few months, more guidance from the centre through 
circulars, and an improvement in the effectiveness of the centre 
by forming a three-man secretariat (in the event formed only in 
April 1920). At the congress the MK's moderate line on the 
question of party changes was the dominant one. Zinoviev's 
keynote speech on the topic promised enough to both extremes to 
satisfy neither but conceded too little to anger the moderates.
Following the VIII congress little attention was paid to 
organisational reform as the pressing needs of the front and 
current campaigns took priority. The Blagushe-Lefortovo RK 
report for May 1919, for example, admitted that at not one of the 
4 RK and 2 bureau sessions that month had general organisational 
work, or even the general state of the party in the raion, been
discussed. It accused the MK and the city party conferences of a
52 similar omission. The accusation was justified. For the
larger part of 1919 party work developed in response to immediate 
needs and the available resources. Awareness of the ramshackle
50. p_, 19 February 1919. 51. VIII s"ezd RKP, pp.284-7. 
52. p, 11 July 1919; Perepiska, vol.VIII, pp.369-70.
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condition of the organisation, however, in July 1919 prompted a 
review of all aspects of the work of the MPO from the MK's own 
departments to the raion organisations and a plan was drawn up 
recommending a thorough reform. Pressure of current work 
prevented the implementation of the plan at the time.
With the breathing space of early 1920 the MK convened an 
inter-raion conference of RK representatives on 9 January to 
discuss the reform of the MPO on the basis of the earlier plan. 
Myasnikov presented the main report and launched a scathing 
attack on all aspects of the party organisation: there was no 
single model or system in the work of the party committees; 
delegate and general meeting did not everywhere meet uniformly, 
and in some places did not meet at all; the Komsomol organisation 
'dragged out a miserable existence'; the party schools were 
'moribund'; party statistics and files were inadeguate; there
were too many plants without cells; and the Soviets had to be
54 
revived. Myasnikov's speech not so much revealed the poor
condition of the organisation, though this it did vividly enough, 
but portrayed the vision of the future organisation.
The discussion, to Myasnikov's stated displeasure, centred 
on the MK's own inadequacies. One speaker called for greater 
guidance of the MK over the raions; another for the MK to be 
elected at a city conference; yet another criticised the tendency 
of the bureau to take on the functions of the full MK, and so on. 
Belen'kii, the representative of Presnenskii RK and MK member, 
argued that electing the MK at a conference would isolate the MK
53. p_ t 11 January 1920; KM, col.666.
54. KM, cols.666-7.
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from the raions, while Myasnikov, who was later to change his 
mind on the question, argued that the existing method of 
constituting the MK was 'the most democratic and allows the 
committee to be closely linked to the raions'. A commission 
was appointed to draft a plan on the basis of the discussion at 
the meeting, and its recommendations were adopted by the MK on 21 
January 1920. A new statute was to be drafted to incorporate the 
reform proposals, the raions were to be united and divided into 
wards (uchastki), a reorganisation of the MK secretariat was 
envisaged, and enhanced party control over Komsomol and the trade 
unions was planned. The conference shows that calls for 
greater central guidance, voiced before the VIII party congress 
and now, must be understood in the context in which they were 
made. They represented not so much a demand for greater 
centralisation as for the greater efficiency of the existing 
system. The calls for a delineation of functions, with the 
powers and responsibilities of the MK clearly established, was a 
way of preventing central encroachments of local prerogatives and 
arbitrary administrative actions.
The new draft statute was adopted by the city party 
conference on 18 March 1920, and it superseded the July 1918 
statute and the December 1918 reglament. The new statute 
enhanced the role of the city party conference by insisting that 
it was the highest juridical and guiding body in the MPO. Hitherto, 
according to Myasnikov, it had been a 'ceremonial' body with 
large numbers from the raions and the centre attending to hear
55. p_, 13 January 1920; KM, col.667.
56. p, 28 January 1920; KM, col.668.
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 fancy reports' and 'triumphal voting 1 . The statute continued 
the system of raion delegation to the MK, though a definite 
term was set (6 months). Now the city conference was not only 
to confirm the MK members but the MK was made responsible to it, 
whereas previously only the individual MK member was responsible 
to his raion. Nevertheless, the manner of forming the MK, 
despite the changes, still contravened articles 33-4 of the
party statute adopted by the VIII party conference, stating that
5 8 the conference elects the committee.
The role of the delegate meetings in the raions was enhanced 
and their decisions were obligatory on the RK, which they 
elected. They did however, lose the deciding role in the 
acceptance and expulsion of members which was transferred to the
RK. Delegate meetings were to restrict the size of RKs to 5-7
59 
members. The general meetings were downgraded and they were no
longer even in principle the highest body in the raion, and
instead were only to hear reports meeting once every three
6 0 
months and play a passive role. At the same time the city was
divided into about 50 wards (uchastki) based on production and 
territorial principles, each with about 15-20 cells and headed by 
a responsible organiser who formed a ward bureau of himself and
two local representatives. The aim of the ward organisations was 
to increase member participation in party life, and to make the
57. Myasnikov, Izb. proiz., p.258.
58. KPSS v rez. i resh., pp.130-1.
59. KT, 21 March 1920. In fact the raions ignored this. A
delegate meeting of Sokol'nicheskii raion in mid-May, for
example, elected a new RK of 15 members, KT, 15 May 1920.
60. VIMS. 11 March 1920.
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party more responsive to local needs. After heated debate the
conference accepted the basic provisions of the draft and the
ft ? final wording was left to a commission of six. This statute
was the last to reflect the opinion of the city alone, and it was 
substantially altered on unification with the guberniya.
4. The creation of a single guberniya organisation
At the VIII party conference in December 1919 Kaganovich, 
one of the 'strict' centralists, had called for the abolition of 
autonomous city committees (though excluded those in the 
capitals) in favour of a uniform system of guberniya party 
committees. In Moscow the idea of unification had been raised 
by the gubkom in August 1919 but had been rejected by the MK on 
28 August on various specious grounds, and it argued that 
unification was unlikely to lead to a saving of personnel. It 
was agreed, however, that the two committees would enter into 
closer cooperation, including mutual representation. Clearly 
the city was trying to maintain its independence.
With economic tasks becoming the priority in early 1920 and 
the intensified pressure for standardised party organisations the 
question of unification was once again raised. At the IX party 
congress Kamenev now called for a uniform structure of gubkomy 
and departments. The TsK in March 1920 issued instructions on 
the standardised gubkomy: each was to be headed by a secretariat 
and a secretary; and the secretariat was to have three basic
61. KT, 18 March 1920. 62. KT, 20 March 1920.
63. VIII konf. RKP, p.152. 64. P_, 2 September 1919.
65. ix s"ezd RKP, p.309.
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departments (organisation and instruction; accounts, information 
and statistics; and special sections for work in the countryside, 
women, and nationalities).
Moscow was now forced to adapt to this model. On 21 April 
1920 the MK agreed to the unification of the two regions and a
C ~]
commission was assigned to draw up a plan. The 15 May 1920 
city party conference, the last to be held until the revival of 
the city organisation in February 1931, adopted the plan for 
unification. The first joint guberniya party conference on 21 
May, with 285 delegates from the city and 70 from the guberniya,
/- O
formally agreed to the unification. Among the reasons given at 
the conference for the measure was the argument that it would 
save on personnel, reduce duplication, increase party influence 
in the countryside by employing the greater resources of the 
city, and as the gubispolkom (guberniya soviet EC) had noted 
earlier, it would make it easier to implement the policies of the 
centre.
66. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 14, 1920
67. KT, 24 April 1920. The commission consisted of 
representatives of the MK, Moscow soviet, MGSPS, MGK, and the 
gubispolkom.
69. P_, 23 May 1920.
69. KT, 25 April; 22 May 1920. The joint MPO now consisted of 
45,000 members according to figures given at the conference, 
distributed among 26 organisations: 7 raion organisations in the 
city and 19 uezd organisations (KM, col.674). Following 
unification the MK (still known by that name but now covering the 
guberniya as well) consisted of 8 departments: general; 
organisation and instruction; agitprop; military; countryside; 
women; subbotniks; and national minorities (P_, 23 May 1920). 
Further standardisation in gubkom structure was pressed by the 
TsK in 1920-1: in September 1920 an all-Russian conference of 
gubkom secretaries, chaired by TsK secretary Preobrazhenskii, 
called for the abolition of certain departments (countryside, 
military and subbotniks), and insisted that gubkomy were to be
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Unification once again posed the controversial question of 
constituting the MK. The MK bureau meeting of 18 May 1920 
decided that the existing MK and MGK would draw up a list of 31 
candidates to be elected by the joint conference (which duly took 
place) with current work carried out by a bureau of 7. At a 
stroke direct raion control over the MK was abolished, and the 
change marked an important step in the development in the MPO of 
greater MK control and intensified integration into the national 
party organisation.
The changes were marked by the adoption of a new statute 
governing the joint organisation. The guberniya conference 
became the highest body in the region, meeting every six months 
and electing the MK. The delegate meetings in the raions were 
confirmed as the highest local body, but were now to meet only 
once every three months to hear reports and elect the RK. The 
statute loosened direct membership control over the party's 
executive bodies, and the rights of discussion of rank and file 
party members were limited. The statute stressed, for example, 
that the delegate meetings could only discuss political or
elected by conferences, to have a secretary and not a chairman,and so 
on (Izvestiya TsK RKP, 24, 12 October 1920, pp.5-7; IX konf. RKP, 
pp.331-7). A TsK circular of November 1920 called for further 
standardisation (Izvestiya TsK RKP, 25, 1920, pp.3-6). In early 
1921 the TsK recommended that there should only be three 
departments: organisation and instruction; general; agitprop, 
Izvestiya TsK RKP, 27, 1921, pp.1-4. By early 1921 the MK had 
five departments (agitation, with 6 sub-departments including 
national minorities; general; organisation and instruction, with 
4 sub-departments; female workers; and subbotniks, Ocherki ist. 
MO KPSS, vol. 2, p.212.
70. KT, 20 May 1920. 71. Ustav MPO 1920, pp.1-7.
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72 
organisational questions with the permission of the RK. The
statute marked the apogee of centralisation in the MPO during the 
civil war. With the development of a wide debate over party 
democracy at the end of 1920-early 1921 (Part III) an amendment 
was introduced at the V Moscow guberniya conference (19-21 
February 1921) dropping the stipulation that delegate meetings 
could only discuss questions of principle with the agreement of RK, 
and stated that they were to meet every month.
The new model MK now had direct responsibility for the work
of the whole MPO, and of the Soviets, trade unions, and other
74 
social organisations through the party fractions. Myasnikov
commented on this at the end of 1920:
If previously the highest practical organ of the Moscow 
organisation, the bureau... had only been a 'staff 
between raions' it now became a real general 
headquarters of the MPO. The MK itself 7C.from a 'high 
gathering' became a controlling centre.
The old federative principle had been replaced by strong 
democratic centralism with the complete subordination of lower 
party units to higher ones up to the MK and beyond. This was a
72. Ustav MPO 1920, p.6.
73. V Mosk. gubpartkonf. pp.40-1. This resolution was 
followed by a campaign for re-elections of the delegates which 
continued into March 1921, KT, 15, 20 March 1921.
74. Ustav MPO 1920, p.4.
75. KM, col.668. An indication of the changing role of the MK 
can be~gained by comparing its meetings in 1918 and 1920. Out 
of the 20 sessions of the MK between 13 November 1917 and 20 
April 1918 specifically party questions were only ninth place in 
the amount of time devoted to them. Only one session (10 March 
1918) discussed the state of the party in any depth (Popov, 
p.72). By comparison, in September 1920 the MK met in full 
session 4 times, and the bureau met 7 times at which 171 
questions were discussed: 120 (70%) of an organisational 
character, 22 party, 16 soviet, and 13 other questions, 
Otchet MK'za sentyabr' 1920g., p.4.
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crucial step in the 'internal metamorphosis' of the MPO as the 
RPOs became integrated into a hierarchical structure and thus lost 
the independence of the 'federalist 1 period. And, it should be 
noted, this was a response not to the war but to what appeared at 
the time as peace. The price of the increased bureaucratisation, 
in the sense of professionalisation, of the MPO was the emergence 
of an apparatus which brought the formally democratic procedures 
in the organisation under its own control, and therefore 
largely freed itself of the control of the rank and file 
membership. The organisation became more efficient, but it lost 
its participatory character. However, before the new system was 
accepted the MPO had to undergo a bitter period of discussion as 
the centralisers and reformers clashed in the party and trade 
union debates.
5. The party cells
a. Number
Throughout the civil war the party committees insisted with 
varying success that all party members were to belong to a 
cell. The statute adopted by the VI party congress had defined 
that the basic unit uniting party members were the raion and 
oblast groupings, and in 1917 the cell was eclipsed by the 
general meeting of communists of a given raion or ward as the key 
organisational unit. With the decline in the activity of the 
party and the absorption of members in office jobs in the first 
half of 1918 many cells in enterprises and institutions simply 
dissolved. The communist's links with the party, insofar as it 
existed, was through a party fraction or the general meeting. As 
in so many other respects, it was the May 1918 TsK initiatives
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which signalled a resurgence in the significance of the cells, 
and by the end of the war it was the cell that had in principle 
become the basic link for party members.
Over the whole period of the civil war the number of cells 
in the city doubled: from 563 in March 1918 to 934 in March 
1920, then falling to 909 in September of that year owing to
the reregistration, and thereafter a slight increase to 1035
7 8 
cells in March 1921. The lowest point in the number of cells
came in the summer and autumn of 1918.
The 1920 reregistration for the first time gave detailed 
figures on the type and distribution of cells in six out of the 
seven raions:
Table 20
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20 30.0 77
242 31.2 776
____ ______________nt  p. 9 
cells in Zamoskvorech'e.
The concentration of communists in the army was reflected in the 
large number of military cells. Throughout the civil war cells
76. KT, 25 April 1920; KM, cols.669-70.
77. Qtchet MK za sentyabr' 1920g., p.9. At that time there were 
349 cells in the guberniya.
78. Moskovskaya gorodskaya, pp.148-9. There were 581 cells in 
the guberniya.
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in army units and rear military establishments comprised about a 
quarter of the total, with 102 cells by the end of 1918, 135 in
June 1919, 221 in January 1920, 291 in August, and a peak of 311
79 in September before falling to 199 in October 1920. During the
war priority was given to staffing the army and the state with 
cadres, and this inevitably weakened the party's base in the 
factories. In September 1920, as mentioned, less than a third of 
the cells were in factories, and less than half of the active 
census enterprises had one. At this time the party layer in the 
industrial working class was only 7%.
The party organisations in even the largest plants numbered 
at most a few dozen members. In the Bogatyr' resin plant in 
Sokol'nicheskii raion, for example, which employed 5300 and was 
dominated by the Mensheviks, the cell was only founded in late
O Q
1918 and by January 1919 had only 26 members and 1 sympathiser. 
In the 'Russkabel'' cable and metal plant the party cell only 
represented a miniscule proportion of the workforce, with only 20 
members out of 2015 workers in 1917, 8 out of 900 in 1918, 5 out
of 435 in 1919, 9 out of 345 in 1920, and 15 out of 580 workers
81 in 1921. In mid-1921 the average worker cell had 14-15 members,
8 2 
whereas the average in a soviet office had 60. The cells in
the factories were the first reserve of recruitment to the army
79. Otchet voennogo otdela, p.13, with the last figure from 
Otchet MK za sentyabr' 192"0g., p.9.
80. £,5 January 1919.
81. Shest 1 let na revolyutsionnom puti. K yubileyu zavodskikh 
organizatsii 1917-23gg. Cos. russko-kabel'nyi i metalloprokatnyi 
zavod 'Russkabel', M. 1923, pp.13, 19.
82. KT, 4 November 1921.
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and for other tasks. In the second half of 1918, for example, 
certain cells in the railway raion donated all their members to
take up responsible posts elsewhere, the majority gave 40-70%,
8 3 
and many cells were disbanded altogether. Whenever a military
or other mobilisation was announced by the TsK, the MK would be 
informed how many communists were required from the MPO, a quota 
would then be set for each RK, which in turn would demand a 
certain number of communists from each cell. For example, in 
November 1919 an urgent order came from the MK to Basmanny RK to 
mobilise 42 for the fuel front. On 19 November the RK allotted
this throughout the raion's cells: Mostyazhart 6, the gas plant
84 2, Mars 3, and so on.
Table 21 reveals the enormous toll of the various 1918 
mobilisations. Later, military mobilisations were kept to a 
minimum because of the plant's defence work, but still it was 
only in 1921 that the party cell was able to expand. In other 
enterprises where the work was unskilled or was not directly 
involved in production for the front the chances of a communist 
being drafted were very high. In the main military stores, for 
example, a cell was only founded in late 1919 with 4 members, 
which increased to 16 in early 1920 out of a workforce of 718. 
Despite the cells' smallness 6 of its members were sent to the
p £-
Polish and Wrangel fronts, 2 of whom died.
The constant drain on the cells not only weakened them 
numerically but also in their effectiveness. A delegate meeting
83. p_, 1 December 1918. 84. Manievich, p.172.
85. Pyat' let raboty - yacheika RKP(b) i mestkoma Glavkhoz- 
sklada RKKA, 1919-1924gg. , M. 1925, p.14.
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Table 21 
The communist cell in the Military Artillery (V. art.) plant,
1917-1921
No. of workers 
and employees ...........
No. of communists .......
No. of symps. & cands. ..
No. of communists sent to 
- Moscow soviet .......
- Raion soviet ........
- Raion duma ..........
- Fronts post-Oct .1917 
- Other party orgs . ...
No. of comms & cands sent
- On supply detachments 
- To social orgs . . . . . .
Total comms & cands sent 
No. of Mensheviks .......
No. of SRs ..............
Source: S. Chernomordik
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in Blagushe-Lefortovo on 14 May 1919 discussed the miserable 
condition of the cells. They had all become much smaller with 
the mass of their membership on assignments or in the army, they
met infrequently, and were mainly concerned, it was reported,
86with minor issues. A questionnaire sent out by the RK in June
1919 revealed the following of the 22 cells in the raion (16 were
in factories, 5 in institutions, and 1 in the army). 87 Their
total membership was 92 with 214 sympathisers out of 3735 workers 
in the raion. The majority of the cells had been formed in 1918 
(14), 7 in 1919, and 1 in 1917. In answer to the question of 
whether the cell enjoyed any prestige and authority 5 gave a
86. p, 21 May 1919. 87. Manievich, p.170.
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definite negative answer, the majority were doubtful, and only a 
handful gave a positive answer. To the question of whether the 
workers where the cell was based were interested in meetings, all 
the cells answered in the affirmative, but added that the workers 
were almost exclusively interested in 'economic or selfish 
issues'. The report noted that the cells 'were completely
failing to encompass new layers of the proletariat', and blamed
8 8 the general circumstances and poor organisational work.
In Khamovnicheskii raion on 10 May 1919 out of the 45 cells 
in the raion only 5 were in factories, and the rest were in 
offices or the army. Between February and May 1919 not a single 
new cell had been formed. According to the RK the large plants 
in the raion, dominated by the textile industry, had largely 
closed, and so 'the industrial proletariat has largely 
disappeared 1 . The party organisation was faced with the remnants 
of the proletariat in half-closed factories, and a mass of 
employees and craftworkers in smaller enterprises and 
workshops.
A report from the enterprises in Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raion 
to a delegate meeting on 3 September 1919 confirmed the 
listless state of the party. The number of communists in the 
major plant, Guzhon, decreased from 75 in October 1917 (2.5%
of the workforce of over 3000) to 51 (4.6% out of 460 workers) in
90 March 1921 , and it was probably less at this time. The meeting
insisted that the cells were to meet weekly with all party 
members obliged to attend. The party school in the raion had
88. p, 11 July 1919. 89. P_, 29 May 1919. 
90. Appendix 13, TsGAOR , 7952/3/209/186.
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collapsed, and even the raion's representative on the MK had been
91 
assigned to work in Siberia. By early 1921 in the Guzhon ward
there were only 301 communists and 72 candidates in the 17 
enterprises with 6000 workers and employees, 8000 in the army
(mostly peasants), and 2500 railway workers, a membership total
92 
of 1.8% out of 16,500 people.
By April 1919 in the proletarian Basmannyi raion there were
1212 party members and 201 sympathisers in 42 cells, 26 of which
93 
were in factories, 12 in the army, and 4 in offices. By July
1919 numbers had risen to 1375 and 453, respectively, 50% of whom
were workers and 25% apiece in offices and the army, distributed
94 in 53 cells: 29 in factories, 14 in offices and 10 in the army.
Even here the greatest increase had taken place in the office and 
army cells, and this continued despite the party week. By April
1920 out of 81 cells only 32 were in enterprises, whose number 
had barely increased, while the number of army cells had 
increased to 25, soviet ones to 17, with 5 in the militia and 2
in colleges. Cells of 2-3 members in the factories were not
95 
rare. On unification with Blagushe-Lefortovo the factory cells
became the majority (Table 20).
The Gorodskoi RPO illustrates the way that office workers 
became the single largest group in the MPO. In this raion were 
concentrated the government offices, and it had few large 
enterprises and a mass of small workshops with 25-100 workers, 
leading reportedly to 'no clear class consciousness'. The
91. P_, 7 September 1919. 92. KT, 5 February 1921.
93. p_, 20 May 1919. 94. P_, 17 July 1919.
95. Manievich, p.167. 96. P, 7 July 1918.
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organisation was the largest in the city, with 1017 members in
97 98 May 1918, rising to 5085 in September 1920. As early as mid-
1918 the majority of these were not workers, and many were not
even from Moscow, reflecting the raion's preoccupation with
99 
administration. In July 1919 75% of the membership were
'chinovniki 1 in the various offices. The number of cells had 
increased from 40 in October 1918 to 195 at that time, of which 
128 (66%) were in offices, and only 28 in factories, 24 in the 
army, and 15 in TU offices. 100 By May 1920 11 (54%) of the 211 
cells were in offices and only 34 in factories (with 62 in the
army), 101 in September 1920 134 (60%) out of 222 (Table 20), and
1 02 in September 1921 176 (70%) out of 250.
Throughout the civil war the TsK and the MK had called for 
the formation of cells in enterprises, but the very pressure of 
the war hindered these attempts. By January 1921 only 21 out of 
the 140 cells in Sokol'nicheskii raion were in the 68 
enterprises, leaving 47 without a cell. With the approach of 
peace increased efforts were made to redistribute communists from 
offices to the factories , though by March 1921 little had been 
achieved to this end in Moscow. The priority at first was to 
strengthen the cells in the 'shock' factories, which tended to 
weaken the cells in other enterprises. At the same time the TsK 
in September 1920 relieved party members employed in metal plants
97. p_, 16 July 1918. 98. KM, col.676. 
99. p_, 25 July 1918. 100. P_, 8 July 1919.
101. KT, 5 May 1920.
102. Otchet MK za iyul', avgust i sentyabr 1 1921g., p.22
103. Otchet Sok. RK-ta, P.7.
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104 from further mobilisations. This may well have been a
response to the increasing strike wave in these plants. At the 
same time more party activists were freed of all other duties and 
assigned (prikreplenie) to cells and wards. The X party 
congress once again called for the transfer of communists from 
offices to plants, but as Zelenskii admitted at the XI congress a
year later, the attempt to strengthen the party base in this way
u j x, f •  . 106 had proved a failure.
The party's weakness in the factories and its isolation from 
the great mass of the workers was one of the major contributory 
factors to the disturbances from late 1920. During the civil war 
the party's base in the factories had been undermined, and when 
once again it was recreated it was no longer an organic growth 
from the factory itself but a directed process from the centre to 
the locality. Inevitably this affected the working of the cell, 
its role, and its relationship to the workforce.
b. Role and organisation of cells
The extent to which the civilian cell and its activists 
could be involved in the management of an enterprise or 
institution remained a controversial question throughout the war. 
Before nationalisation the cell, often in conjunction with the 
Bolshevik factory committees, were encouraged to play an active
104 Izvestiya TsK RKP, 22, 18 September 1920, pp.23-4.
105. KT, 17 November 1920.
106. XI s"ezd RKP, pp.444-5. There are no statistics for the 
civil war period in Moscow on the employment of communists in 
specific industries, or even for the number of cells in the 
various branches of industry.
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role in the plants, but with the introduction of general state 
management their role became much more problematic. As at the 
beginning of the five-year plans, initial cell involvement in a 
high degree of supervision over management gradually gave way to 
a more restricted definition of their functions. Increasingly 
they were limited to the organisation and training of party 
members, providing information on local affairs to higher bodies, 
and conducting the ideological and organisational struggle 
against non-Bolshevik forces. The cells were given a variety of 
responsibilities but no real power. The change illustrates how 
in practice the transition took place from concepts of the 
commune state, as discussed above, to the theory of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. Both the working class and the 
party activists in the factories were separated from the direct 
management of industrial affairs.
The restricted definition of the role of the cells only 
slowly emerged. The July 1918 statute had only briefly mentioned 
the cells to state that they were to meet not less than once a 
week, and that the RK was to call weekly meetings (soveshchanie) 
with cell representatives. The main focus of party life in 
the raions was, as we have seen, the general meeting and the RK.
The first major statement of the role of the cells in Moscow 
following nationalisation was made by the MK, meeting with the 
leading managers in nationalised industry, on 16 August 1918. 
The MK passed a resolution stating that every decision of 
responsible leaders of nationalised enterprises or soviet offices 
was to be strictly regulated and limited by the directives of
107. Ustav MPO 1918, pp.6-7.
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the party cell and taken with its agreement. The managers were 
to give a report of their work to the weekly cell meeting, and
hence the cell was to be an integral part of collegiate
108 
management. In other words, the 'specialists' were to be kept
under strict party control by the communist factory workers 
themselves, a view which veered towards the 'party' syndicalist.
By all accounts this resolution encountered a hostile 
reception and gave rise to a mass of conflicts. Its provisions 
concerning the institutions were reversed by the MK in a 
resolution of 2 October 1918 which stated, inter alia:
The [communist] fraction of commisariat employees does 
not have the right to interfere in the directives of 
the people's commissariats and their collegia. They do 
not have the right to demand reports from the latter. 
They only conduct party work among the commissariat 
employees and ensure-the correct course of work within 
the commissariats.
It was at this time that a city commissariat fraction bureau 
(Chapter 8) was abolished. While the tide had turned against the 
fractions (cells) in the offices, the time was still not ripe to 
begin the offensive against them in the factories. A report from 
Lefortovo raion at the end of 1918 even went so far as to applaud 
the cells for taking over the management of the factories and 
considered it a healthy sign of cell activity. The December 
1918 reglament once again only briefly mentioned the cells to 
state that they were to be formed wherever there were three or 
more communists.
The endemic conflicts between the factory committees 
(mestkomy) and factory managements have been mentioned, and since
108. p, 20 August 1918. 109. P_, 5 November 1918. 
110. p, 4 December 1918. 111. £, 11 January 1919.
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the majority of the committees were composed of communists, the 
cells were inevitably involved in these disputes. Where the 
factory committees were not composed of communists, as in the 
notable examples of the Bogatyr' and Guzhon plants, the communist 
cells were placed in a difficult position. In many cases the 
cells and the factory committees merged. A report from 
Khamovnicheskii raion in early 1919 argued that the cells were 
mainly concerned with local affairs and were gradually taking on 
the functions designated to the trade unions, such as trying to 
regulate conditions. Hence, the report went on, the general 
political level of the cells was low as participation in the day 
to day affairs of the plants inhibited the general propagandist 
and political functions of the party.
The more active cells hoped to play in the civilian sphere 
an equivalent role to that attempted by the army cells, described 
by Sokol'nikov at the VIII congress as 'party syndicalism 1 . 
And as in the army the cell's functions began t.o be limited, and 
hence an important stage in undermining the iniative of the rank 
and file party member was reached. An MK instruction of March 
1919 issued guidelines on the cell's role and insisted that they 
were primarily to conduct party work, while the soviet collegia 
and factory boards were to run their respective organisations. 
The cell's supervisory functions, however, were not altogether 
denied, as they had not been in the 2 October 1918 MK motion on 
the commissariat fractions. The cell was to be kept informed and 
was to participate in the more important decision-making.
112. p, 8 February 1919. 113. VIII s"ezd RKP, p.148.
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114 Disputes were to be taken to the corresponding party centre.
The cell therefore had no absolute rights over the factory 
management, and the role of the party member in the 
factories was undermined as final responsibility was 
transferred to higher party bodies outside the factory.
By mid-1919 the position had become clearer. An article in 
Pravda insisted that the cells were 'not to stand before workers 
as part of the administrative body 1 but were to restrict 
themselves to a supervisory role, though what this was to mean in 
practice was not defined. Above all, they were to conduct 
agitprop among the worker nizy who, the article stated, were far 
from being influenced by the party. In the same issue 
Bukharin insisted that the cells were to find a path mid-way 
between 'kasha and world revolution' and concentrate on detailed 
political campaigning.
This view was reflected in an instruction, drafted by 
Belen'kii, adopted by the Presnenskii RK and ratified by a 
delegate meeting on 28 July 1919. The cells were to concentrate 
on ensuring the accurate fulfilment of party duties by the cell 
members by meeting weekly, distributing party literature, and so 
on. Above all, they were to ensure that communists had a 'normal' 
relationship with the broad mass of the workers and had no 
'privileges', while at the same time reporting any counter- 
revolutionary behaviour. But the tension over limits to their 
authority is illustrated by the following passage:
It is absolutely inadmissible for factory party cells 
to interfere in the economic affairs of the factory
114. p, 4 March 1919. 115. P, 19 July 1919.
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committee, but constant supervision over their [the 
committee's] work is essential.
The instruction was one of the first attempts to provide a 
general definition of the role of the cells. Direct communist 
participation in management was considered a 'privilege' that 
would set the communist above the mass of the workers and hence 
was to be condemned. Soon after Myasnikov gave a more detailed 
exposition of the cell's functions. For him they were 
recruiting, educational, and supervisory bodies, but the last 
aspect was on no account to include settling major questions of 
principle. He criticised the vast majority of cells for 
interfering in technical, economic or political questions, thus 
engendering disputes. Above all the cells were to be concerned 
with the affairs of their enterprises. Hence a two-fold 
restriction was placed on the cells: not to interfere in 
management; and to limit political discussion - 'world 
revolution 1 as Bukharin had put it.
Myasnikov gave details on the internal organisation of 
cells. They were to be led by a bureau of three, comprising the 
cell secretary, a cell organiser, and a delegate to the party 
committee and delegate meetings. He was categoric that the cell 
was not to have a chairman but that the bureau was to run the 
cell collectively. Cells did not have the right to collect
membership dues, and they were formed and dissolved by the higher
118 party body.
It was only with the adoption of the party statute at the
116. P_, 2 August 1919; VIMS, 29 July, 8 August 1919.
117. P, 13 August 1919. 118. £, 13 August 1919.
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VIII party conference that a general definition of the role of 
the cell was advanced. For the first time it was stressed that 
the cell was the basic unit of the party, and not the RK or any 
other larger territorial unit as proposed by the old statute. 
The party was to be based on the 'production' principle, the 
individual factory and institution. The statute then gave 
details on the functions of the cells:
The cell is an organisation linking the worker and 
peasant masses with the leading party organ in the given 
locality. The tasks of the cell are: 1. diffusing party 
slogans and decisions among the masses; 2. recruiting 
new members; 3. supporting the local [factory] committee 
in its organisational and agitational work; 4. active 
participation, as a party organ in the economic and 
political life of the country.
This formulation gave no definition of what the last point meant 
in practice and still left the field open to conflicts. The 
March 1920 MPO statute combined Myasnikov's detailed provisions
on organising cells with the general statute's definition of
120 their role. The IX party congress resolution on
organisational questions refined the limited role of the cells. 
Its members were to act as a moral example to other workers in 
their devotion to labour, to have no advantages over other 
workers, and 'in no circumstances to interfere in management 1 but 
only to ensure that the latter's decisions were fulfilled. 121
The Moscow statute for the joint organisation (May 1920) now 
devoted a considerable section (25 clauses out of 72) to the 
cells. The RKs were to redistribute communists so that a cell 
could be formed in every enterprise. The cells were 'to fulfil
119. VIII konf. RKP, p.197. 120. VIMS, 11 March 1920. 
121. IX s"ezd RKP, p.426.
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all decisions of higher party organs', to conduct communist 
propaganda, and to wage a 'merciless struggle against 
infringennents of labour discipline 1 . Amongst their many tasks, 
such as ensuring the military training of its members, 
participation in subbotniks, agitprop among women workers, youth, 
and so on, the cells were to ensure that the plant was managed in 
'strict accordance with the principles of the RKP'. Disciplinary 
measures could now be taken by the cell against its own members 
with the permission of the RK. Once again it was stressed that
conflicts betv;een cells and management were to be taken to a
122 higher party body. By the 1930s the latter provision had
changed and it was the economic body that mediated between cell 
and management.
The adoption of this statute marked the important shift that 
had taken place towards making the cells the chief focus of party 
life, but at the same time gave little scope for cell initiative 
beyond the strictly defined limits set down by the statute. The 
change in the definition of the cell was an important element in 
the 'internal metamorphosis' of the party. In contrast, for 
example, the December 1918 statute adopted by the Moscow 
guberniya organisation, dominated by the Democratic Centralists,
had stated that 'the cell discusses all decrees, resolutions,
123 instructions from soviet and party centres'. By 1920 the cell
was allowed to discuss questions, as the December 1919 statute
124 put it, only up to the time that a decision had been taken,
122. Ustav MPO 1920, pp.10-13.
123. Ustav Moskovskoi gubernskoi organizatsii RKP(b), M. 1919, 
p. 3 .
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and instead its nain role was to execute higher party policy, and 
the change was one more aspect of the split between the verkhi 
and the nizy.
The restricted role of the cell was applied in the TsK's 
instructions on their functions in labour duty. They were to set 
personal examples of labour discipline, to lead the 'merciless 
struggle 1 mentioned above, conduct agitation, and to inform local 
bodies of any failings. In keeping with earlier decisions, no
cell member wa.s to interfere in the work of any body but to
124 inform the labour committee (Moskomtrud) of any problems.
One of the key duties of the cells outlined by the May 1920 
statute, and mentioned in earlier instructions, was to advance 
its members into key positions in the factory committees 
(mestkomy). As a report from Gorodskoi raion put it in 1918, by
July 13 out of the 30 major plants had been 'seized' by the
125 Bolsheviks. In factories where the SRs had been strong the
Bolsheviks cells had at an early stage become the legatees of their 
declining popularity, though during the civil war they did stage 
a minor comeback as in the Guzhon plant. By October 1917, for 
example, the Bolsheviks dominated the Dinamo plant in Simonovsku. 
raion where once the SRs had been influential. But Bolshevik 
dominance was not expressed through a large cell, which only had 
about 10-12 members out of 400 workers in July 1918 and remained
at this level for the duration of the war, but through control of
1 7 6 the factory committee.
124. Izvestiya po trud. pov., 5, 21 June 1920.
125. £, 16 July 1918.
126. Dinamo-25 let revolyutsionnie bor'by, MK RKP(b), M. 1923.
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The cells had more difficulty seizing the mestkomy of plants 
that were or had been Menshevik. This was true above all of the 
printshops. The struggle against the Moscow print union at the 
city level was paralleled by a stra 4,egy of gradual pressure at 
the shopfloor. At the ex-Kushner print shop in Krasnopresnenskii 
raion, for exairple, a cell of 3 had been founded after the 
October 1919 party week and by January 1920 had grown to 13 out 
of 565 workers. Despite its smallness the communist group waged 
a long struggle to dominate the mestkom as part of the strategy
to 'seize' the print union as enunciated by Pravda in early
127 1920. In this plant the mestkom was led by an experienced and
popular Menshevik and remained in Menshevik hands until 1922. 
In general, the major task of the cell WG.S to ensure the 
1 communisation ' of the TU committee by ensuring that communists 
were a majority on them. The cell in the main military stores, 
for example, waged a long struggle to ensure this, though the
chairman of the committee remained non-party until 1923 owing to
129 his popularity giving him large majorities at elections.
In all of their activities the cells were hampered by the 
lack of communists at their disposal and by their poor 
organisation, the repetitive nature of meetings, and the general
p. 79; L. Shiplin, Sh. Gekhman, N. Sominskii, Bol ' shevistskii 
put' bor ' by i pobed (30 let yacheiki VKP(b) zavoda 'Dinamo)' M . 
1933, p. 92. '
127. p_ t 12 February 1919.
128. Pyat 1 let raboty yacheiki RKP(b) tipografii 'Krasnyi
proletarii ' 1919-24gg. , M. 1925, pp.8-9, 23.———————————
129. Pyat' let raboty - Glavkhozsklada RKKA, pp.14, 39.
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apathy of party members. At a meeting of eel], secretaries of
Khamovnicheskii raion on 19 March 1920, for instance, only half 
130turned up,
attended a general meeting.
and in July in that raion only a few communists
131 Only 15 cell secretaries out of
50 attended a meeting called for them in a ward of Gorodskoi
raion in July 1920. 132 Attendance was particularly poor in the
office cells. The Narkompros cell officially numbered 130 
commirunists, but at a meeting on 9 May 1920 only 3 attended. 133
Such examples could be multiplied, and were frequently reported 
in the press.
Some attempts were made in 1920 to improve the cells as 
attention was focused on them. First of all, the MK bureau on 2 
March 1920 ruled that cells, and not fractions, were to be formed 
in the soviet and military institutions. Fractions were to 
be formed only in elected representative organisations such as the 
Soviets and trade unions, and at conferences, otherwise the more
restricted cells were to be the rule. 134 At the same time the
bureau decided that the cell secretary was to be a responsible
raion party worker. 135 This measure was facilitated by merging
weaker cells with stronger ones on the division of raions into
wards. 136 As mentioned, the first attempts were made to shift
communists from offices to factories.
Cell membership appears to have become a formal commitment, 
lacking enthusiasm on the part of communists. In May 1920 the MK
130. KT. 21 March 1920
132. KT, 31 July 1920.
134. VIMS. 6 March 1920.
131. KT, 31 July 1920.
133. KT, 15 May 1920.
135. Tarusov, p.25.
136. KT. 18 March 1920.
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admitted that there was little activity in the cells and that 
they restricted themselves to fulfilling directives from above 
and getting meetings over with. ' The MK urged that discipline 
could be inculcated by using the party court, especially in the
matter of missing meetings, or arriving late and leaving 
138
early. A report on the cells in Gorodskoi raion noted that
they were still mainly concerned with local 'economic 1 problems 
and disputes with management at the expense with general party
work. 139 The war still prevented! a concentration of resources on
the cells. A few days after this report once again a list of 
cell members was distributed by the RK for mobilisation to the 
Polish front prefaced by the warning that recalcitrancy would be
treated as desertion. 140 Moroz, the Gorodskoi RK secretary, on
27 August 1920 informed a pc'rty meeting that the majority of 
cells still lacked organisers and secretaries. In his RK report 
on 1 September he declared that work in organising cells had
barely begun. 141 On Jrhat day he announced that the MK considered
the cells the main priority, and stated that the cell secretaries
in the raion were to have a permanent secretary in order to
142 devote all their time to organisational improvement.
Following the IX party conference the MK called on the RKs to 
register all able party activists according to a three-fold
division of descending ability, and to use this as the basis of
assigning (prikreplenie) activists to cells as organisers. 143 In
137. KT, 8 May 1920.
139. KT, 16 June 1920.
141. ]?, 12 September 1920.
143. Otchet Sok. RK-ta, p.8
138. KT, 15 May 1920.
140. KT, 18 June 1920
142. KT, 7 September 1920
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the great majority of cells in the MPO there were no full-time 
party secretaries until well into the 1920s.
The civil war therefore i:aw the redefinition of the role of 
the cells and the first attempts to consolidate the workplace- 
cell as the basis of the party, but the very pressure of the war 
ensured that this programme would only be effected with the 
coming of peace. The oblast party organisations had been 
abolished, and with the system of electing the MK at a city 
conference the RPOs were undermined. Henceforth it was to be the 
uniformly organised gubkomy and the cells that were to be the 
main centres of party life. Party life in the raions was above- 
all concentrated in the hands of the RKs who had become the 
executive agents of the MK, and the individual party member 
increasingly became the executor of policy decided far from the 
workplace.
6 . The party member
With the exodus of party members into state posts after 
October 1917 the link between the individual communist and the 
party organisation often became extremely tenuous. From the 
summer of 1918 the attempt began, if not to halt the tide into 
state work, at least to reassert the member's affiliation with 
the organisation and thus to ensure control over state cadres and 
hence the organisations in which they worked. As the 22 May 1918 
TsK letter put it:
...Every party member, whatever work they are 
fulfilling, must pay the most serious attention to party 
construction. We must raise the discipline of the party 
ranks. Resolutions and decisions of party centres must 
be binding on all and must be undeviatingly implemented
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by every party member. From the moment a decision is 
taken discussion ends and the time for action alone 
arrives.
This party discipline was to be both in the physical sense of 
making demands on the member (military training, subbotniks, 
attending meetings, etc.,) in order to prevent the formation 
of a 'passive 1 group of members, and also in the ideological 
sense to ensure their subordination to central decisions 
and to avoid a new elite developing based on an ideology 
of state service. A survey in Moscow at the end of May 
1918 discovered, in the words of the TsK, that '...it is clear
that a whole number of comrade communists are so only in name
145 
since they are not involved in any party work'. The attempt
was now made to effect Sverdlov's words at the VII party congress 
that the interests of the party were higher than those of the 
individual party member.
One of the first measures to be adopted in this sphere was 
the reservation of Fridays for party work. This was the main 
concrete result of two meetings held to improve the condition of
the MPO, the first on 30 March 1918 chaired by Sverdlov, and the
146 
second on 4 May with Lenin present. Party leaders and those
in state posts were to address factory meetings as a way of 
involving them in party work. The measure encountered some 
resistance. Lomov for example, at the time working in VSNKh, 
answered the MK's request not to arrange meetings on Fridays by
writing: 'Comrades, I am not a child and you are not infants. I
147 therefore ask you not to make such requests'. The demand
144. Perepiska, vol.Ill, p.73. 145. ibid., p.121 
146. Lenin i Moskovskie bol'sheviki, p.305. 147. ibid., p.322
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became less formalised later with the simple exhortation for
responsible workers not to speak less than once a week at
148 
workers' meetings, and this remained in force for the rest of
the war.
The 28 May 1918 city party conference called on all MPO
members to join a cell and 'to unite around party
149 
organisations'. In Zamoskvorech'e the party committee and
soviet on 13 June 1918 insisted that no party member could leave 
their post without the sanction of the committee in a measure 
designed to conserve cadres and to ensure that members could be 
traced. At the same time the MK urged all members to attend a 
party meeting at least once a week. These various measures 
were systematised by the 30 July city party conference special 
decree on the party duties of communists. All were to be 
attached to an organisation and were to participate in party work 
in a disciplined way, and in tune with the increasingly military 
atm^osphere it was now stated that irrespective of family
circumstances in case of necessity every party member was at the
152 full disposal of the party organisation. The military note
was emphasised a few days later when the MK decided that 
communists working in soviet institutions could only take 
holidays with the permission of the MK or RK.
With the great numbers of communists working in offices it 
was only natural that the party committees concentrated on 
ensuring a modicum of party discipline over them, considered at
148. £, 20 June 1918. 149. £, 30 May 1918.
150. Uprochenie, p.41. 151. £, 20 June 1918.
152. £, 2 August 1918. 153. £, 8 August 1918
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the time a way of averting their bureaucratisation. The MK 
meeting of of 14-15 September 1918 emphasised the need for what 
it called 'party duty 1 . All RKs were to have accurate registers 
of party members and that all were to be drawn into party work
irrespective of their post in soviet institutions or
154 
commissariats. As part of this campaign at the end of 1918,
at a time of concern over the issue as we have seen, the TsK 
called on all LPOs to conduct a census of party members working 
in soviet offices, a measure which also had military 
implications. Both the TsK and the MK on the eve of the 
VIII party congress intensified the campaign to involve all party 
members in their organisations. On 7 February the MK adopted a 
series of measures to ensure that all communists were linked to 
an organisation by insisting that they registered with the RPOs 
and were obliged 'once a week, on the day designated by the RK, 
to carry out party work...in the evenings'. In all spheres of 
party and soviet activity the committees were trying to establish 
a sense of party discipline. These measures, designed to prevent 
the formation of a soviet bureaucratic caste, inevitably 
strengthened the role of the party committees over the party 
member and thus stimulated the formation of a party bureaucracy. 
In December 1918 the MK issued a list of desiderata (nakaz) 
of every communist. Any free time not spent on study was to be
ico
devoted to party work, and all were to read the party press. 
The VIII party congress took the notion to the limit when
154. P_, 15, 16, September 1918. 155. Perepiska, vol.V, p.60
156. P_, 8 February 1919. 157. Lenin i Mosk. bols. , p.375
158. Kommunar, 56, 14 December 1918.
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Kaganovich, the strict centralist, took up the notion of 'party duty 1
(analogous to labour duty) to be established whereby every party
159 
member was to be registered and 'correctly 1 used. The idea
was greeted favourably, with Osinskii only asking that in party 
duty a certain proportion were to be devoted to party work 
itself. While Osinskii devoted most of his attention to the 
deficiencies of the TsK, he noted that both in the centre and the 
localities work was being transferred to the committees as the 
main beneficiaries of the party process as it had developed in 
the first phase of the civil war.
The problem was that the party itself had turned into a giant 
transmission belt extracting workers from factories and 
transferring them to the state bodies and the army. Given the 
lack of maturity of the Moscow working class, so many of whose 
members had recently arrived from the countryside, and its 
relative smallness in relation to the magnitude of the tasks set 
by the Bolsheviks after the revolution, the available reserves 
of able and willing workers were rapidly exhausted. At the 
congress Osinskii noted that at the grass roots the party was 
'filling up with rubbish 1 , with tickets in hand but carrying no 
'mental baggage 1 . Nogin concurred that the party had 'gone to 
pieces' and that the behaviour of communists was bad enough to 
'make your hair stand on end', and he argued that this was due to 
the fact that the majority of senior party members were no longer 
active party workers. In his analysis, and in Sapronov's,
159. VIII s"ezd RKP, p.180. 160. ibid., pp.183-4. 164-6.
161. ibid., pp.164-6. 162. ibid., pp.168-9.
163. ibid., p.170.
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there was a tendency was to insist that the party could be saved 
by reinforcing the hegemony of the APW corps over the party, and 
further, that this corps was to consist mainly of the 'old guard 1 
of the party.
It was left to Ignatov to identify the real problem: the 
bureaucratisation of the party and its isolation from the working 
class. He gave the example of the cell in the Prokhorovskaya
mill which was 'isolated from the masses as if by a wall'. The
164 priority should be party work, he argued, and not soviet work.
Both rank and file party members and workers from this time 
appear to have become apathetic. The Guzhon cell on 1 February 
1919, for example, noted that the majority of its members failed 
to attend. The passive response of those who did attend was 
increasingly highlighted. A report in April 1919 noted that the 
Friday meetings no longer interested workers. Their wavering 
could only be overcome, it was argued, if every party member
•I C £1
devoted half of his time to party work. An example of the 
passivity of party members, criticised at the time, was the 27 
April 1920 Gorodskoi delegate meeting. The RK report for the
I C -7
previous six months was passed with almost no discussion. The
passivity of the membership was balanced by the activity of the
RK which had met regularly every week, and by the bureau, which
I C. O
had met twice weekly. There was inevitably a tension within 
every rank and file worker communist between loyalty to the 
party and loyalty to his or her workmates. This would be
164. ibid., pp.181-2. 165. VIMS, 6 February 1919
166. VIMS, 5 April 1919. 167. KT, 4 May 1920.
168. KT, 5 May 1920.
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particularly acute when the call went out for the communist to 
act as the 'eyes and ears' of the authorities in the localities, 
as in mid-1920. There was the obvious danger that the rank and 
file member would identify too closely with fellow workers.
To counter this there were endless exhortations for party 
members to participate in the various party ventures, and when 
exhortations failed stricter measures were proposed. Kotov, 
active in the Sokol'nicheskii RK and in 1920 a supporter of 
Trotsky's militarisation plans, on 8 September 1919 attacked the 
poor attitude of party members to their duties and insisted that 
this was to be remedied by 'barracks discipline'. An MK 
circular of March 1920 on party discipline pointed out that the 
MPO still had a long way to go to reach the required level. 
This contention appeared to be borne out by the August 1920 
reregistration. The main problem was the sheer burden of 
activities placed on the average party member. The example was 
given in December 1920 of the communist who in one month had to 
attend the ward school eight times, cell meetings four times, two 
subbotniks, two military (ChON) training sessions, one general 
party meeting, two factory meetings, one ChON patrol, quite 
apart from other general meetings, not to mention his work. At 
the time the MK tried to lighten the burden somewhat for those 
involved in military training and studies.
Breaches of party discipline and lapses in Bolshevik moral 
probity were dealt with by the court of honour (sud chesti) under 
the MK. In early 1918 the court was an elective body. Later the
169. £, 12 September 1920. 170. VIMS, 9 March 1920. 
171. KT, 12 December 1920.
- 229 -
MK decided that three raions at a time were to send 
representatives of mature members to sit on the court. In 
September 1919 this was once again amended and the MK made direct
appointments to it, in the first instance Belikov, Myasnikov and
172 Ignatov. It dealt with such cases as return from the front
without permission, not fulfilling party directives on 
employment, drunkenness, and so on. In 1920 it was increasingly 
used to ensure the active participation of members in party 
work. The punishment of the court was mainly censure, 
though it could order expulsion.
The earlier Moscow party statutes had barely mentioned the 
individual party member. While the general party statute of
December 1919 had allowed the party member free discussion of
175 issues up the time that a decision was taken, the May 1920
Moscow statute, which for the first time had a large section on 
individual member discipline, omitted all mention of this right 
and instead listed duties:
Communists are responsible to the party organ for every 
step of their activity, therefore they must be precise 
and ardent executors of their party duties. Diligence, 
precision, and attention must be constantly ensured;
deviations,from them will incur the severest
, . . I/O penalties.
172. _P, 2 September 1919. 173. KT, 23 April 1920.
174. In a letter sent out on behalf of the TsK on 29 May 1919 by 
Elena Stasova she attacked the practice of imposing fines on 
party members: 'Their punishment should only be of a moral 
character: social obloguy, publication of their names in 
newspapers, temporary suspension from active party work...The 
party member should be of a different moral calibre than those 
around him 1 , Perepiska, vol.VII, pp.146-7.
175. VIII konf. RKP, pp.197-8.
176. Ustav MPO 1920, p.14.
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This was a measure of the change that had taken place since 1917-
18.
By 1920 passivity had become an offence, punishable by 
expulsion, and as an offence figured prominently in the 1921 
purge. The campaigns waged against it were aimed at integrating 
all members irrespective of the post held into the organisations. 
Whether working in an office or a factory the allegiance was to 
be primarily to the party. But passivity, in the sense used by 
Lukacs, had become the hallmark of the individual party member by 
the end of the war. Decision-making had become the 
responsibility of the higher party bodies, and the cell member, 
the individual communist, was left to execute these decisions. 
The changing definition of the rights and duties of the 
individual party member illustrate the changes that had taken 
place during the civil war. The MK had become the supreme 
political authority in the localities, the raion party 
organisations acted as its local departments as the federalist 
period gave way to democratic centralism. The lively committees 
of 1917-18 had changed into administrative organisations and the 
party member organised in the cell had been deprived of direct 
management functions and instead was concerned with fulfilling 
party duties. The party's political functions were no longer the 
prerogative of each and every party member, but of the party as a 
whole and its new model committees.
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CHAPTER 6 
The Party and the Civil War: Militarisation
War communism was both a method of concentrating the 
country's human and material resources on winning the war, and a 
positive project for the rapid introduction of the elements of 
socialism in a backward country. The link between the two 
aspects was militarisation, the constant militant battle on all 
fronts to defeat the remnants of the old ideology and its 
material base. As Lenin put it at the VII congress of Soviets in 
December 1919: 'Our war is a continuation of revolutionary 
policies... 1 . At the same time all Bolshevik leaders were 
united in the belief that the civil war was only part of the 
global struggle against capitalism, and indeed, that on
the outcome of the civil war hung not only the fate of the
2Russian revolution but also that of the world revolution.
The methods chosen to prosecute the war, however, tended to 
reinforce traditional, hierarchical, and authoritarian patterns 
in the new context. The war accelerated the destruction of the 
old society but did not allow novel revolutionary relationships 
to emerge as part of the military struggle. Strict 
organisational discipline combined with mass mobilisation were 
the enduring legacies of the war.
1. Lenin PSS, vol.39, p.406
2. Lenin PSS, vol.37, p.15.
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1. The formation of the Red Army and the party mobilisations
The SNK decree on the formation of the Red Army of 15 
January 1918 was followed by a period of voluntary enlistment. 
So-called revolutionary detachments, usually based on Red Guard 
units, were formed in Moscow. The largest of these was the I 
Moscow volunteer detachment of 500 people which saw action in the 
Ukraine. Committed activists joined them during the Brest 
negotiations: 'The majority of workers did not accept the
position taken by the Soviet government at Brest, and
4 enthusiastically joined the volunteer detachments'. The
formation of these groups was the basis of the Left Communist's 
enthusiasm for a revolutionary war fought by partisan methods. 
The MK in February 1918, then opposed to the peace, forwarded 
communist volunteers to the German front, and by April 1918 
about 2000 Moscow communists had joined the Red Army.
With the confirmation on 22 April 1918 by VTsIK of the SNK 
decree of 8 April the first steps were taken towards conscription 
by the universal military training of workers. At the same time 
the army was professionalised as it became clear, following the 
Brest peace, that the civil war would be fought in a conventional 
manner with commanders, specialists and spiced by Trotsky's calls
3. Put 1 k oktyabryu, issue 3, M. 1923, pp.116-124.
4. ibid., p.119.
5. Yu. P. Petrov, Partiinoe stroitel'stvo v sovetskoi armii i 
flote (1918-1961gg.) , M. 1964, p.10.
6. Yu. P. Petrov, KPSS - Rukovoditel' i vospitatel' krasnoi 
armii (1918-1920gg.), M. 1961, p.101.In the first half of 1918 
about 100,000 communists joined the army, with whole units 
composed of them, Petrov (1964), p.10.
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for iron discipline. In response the Left Communists argued that 
the abandonment of the idea of a revolutionary war fought by 
partisan methods would entail a retreat from the direct 
organisation of the rear by the working class. The use of 
military specialists was the counterpart to the employment of the 
old technical intelligentsia in the factories and was opposed 
within the same terms.
By October 1917 the officer corps of the Russian army 
numbered about 260,000, and some of these were willing to serve 
the Bolsheviks after the revolution. At first they joined 
voluntarily, but by the SNK decree of 25 July 1918 they became
gliable to conscription. In 1918 alone 22,000 ex-officers were 
called into the new army. By April 1919 8142 ex-officers and
56,585 ex-NCOs had been drafted into the MVO (Moscow military
9 district). As the Soviet training schools began to produce
their own officers the proportion of the old specialists in the 
commanding staff fell from 75% in late 1918, 53% in 1919, to 42% 
in 1920. 10
There were two main types of party mobilisation to the Red 
Army. The most extensive was the mass mobilisation of party 
members in response to critical developments at the fronts. They 
were ordered by the TsK and usually ratified by a city party 
conference, and then implemented, as we have seen, by the raion
7. E.g., the Left Communist theses, Kommunist, 1, pp.4-9.
8. Petrov (1961) , p.54.
9. Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR, vol.2, M. 1961, p.104.
10. Petrov (1961), p.55; John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: 
A Military Political History, London 1962, p.33.
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party organisations down to the cells. In 1918 there were four, 
and in 1919-20 five, major party mobilisations in Moscow.
The second type of mobilisation was personal direction to 
some responsible post either at the fronts or in the rear. In 
the centre these were carried out by the All-Russian Bureau of 
Military Commissars (the central military and political body of 
the Red Army in the early period) and then by the Political 
Administration of the Council of Defence (Politicheskoe 
upravlenie revvoensoveta - PUR RVSR) .
The first mass party mobilisations took place in the Urals 
at the end of May 1918 following the Czech legion's revolt. For 
the local party organisations this signified the start of the 
military civil war. In the second half of 1918 over 5000 
communists and another 40,000 were mobilised en masse. During 
the first phase of the civil war a total of 80,000 communists
were sent to the fronts, and between April and November 1920
12 
another 24,244 were sent.
Following reverses against the Czechs in July 1918 the TsK 
decided that communist drafts were essential to stiffen the 
resistance of the Red Army. As a result the Moscow city party 
conference on 30 July decided that within a week one-fifth of the 
total membership of the MPO, including all those with military 
experience and especially commander training, were to be placed 
at the disposal of the military commissariat for the needs of the 
front, and all party organisations were placed on a war
11. Istoriya KPSS, issue 12, L. 1972, pp.167-8.
12. X s"ezd RKP, p.797.
13. 29 July 1918, Perepiska, vol.Ill, pp.127-9.
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footing. This first MPO mobilisation led to 700 communists 
leaving for the front, including many of the most experienced 
members. A second MPO mobilisation took place after the 29 
August 1918 city party conference. It is from this period that 
the beginning of the special communist detachments (ChON) can be 
dated (see below).
With successes registered at the fronts in September 1918 a 
notable relaxation of military discipline took place. It 
appeared as if the war would be a short one. This attitude was 
encouraged by over-optimistic expectations of the revolution 
spreading to Western Europe stimulated by news of the events in 
Germany. However, the military situation took a turn for the 
worse in autumn 1918, and the 15 October 1918 city party 
conference sent another group of communists to the front. A 
fourth city mobilisation was ordered by the MK on 19 November 
which covered not only party members but also 25% of the 
sympathisers. According to incomplete figures the city sent 
about 2000 communists, over a tenth of its membership, to the
I O
Eastern front in 1918. This pattern of frequent mobilisations 
continued throughout the civil war.
With the renewed threat from Kolchak in the East in spring 
1919 new mobilisations were declared. In fulfilment of the 13 
April 1919 TsK declaration of party mobilisations of 10-20% of
14. P_, 2 August 1918.
15. Ocherki 1st. MO KP5S, p.330; Istoriya Moskvy, vol.6, book 1, 
p. 161.
16. Moskovskaya gorodskaya, p.21; I.M. Razgon, Moskva v period 
inostrannoi interventsii i grazhdanskoi voiny, M. 1947, p.13.
17. Ignat'ev, p.210. 18. Bukov, p.64.
- 236 -
each organisation Sushchevsko-Mar'inskii and Butyrskii raions, 
for example, sent up to 60% of their membership. In
Sokol'nicheskii raion out of 54 cells only 34 remained after the
19 
mobilisations. A special target was the communists in the
various commissariats and offices. At the city party conference 
on 3 May 1919 Smilga demanded that the offices gave up their
\
employees even if this meant that they could no longer function. 
Yaroslavskii pointed out, however, that even communist heads of 
department were hindering the release of staff on the grounds 
that they were irreplaceable. The conference called for a survey 
to be conducted of all the staff in offices, the replacement of 
male labour by female, and for the campaign against desertion to 
be intensified.
With Yudenich's advance on Petrograd the TsK called for
21 
renewed mobilisations of party, TU, and office personnel. A
party circular of 18 June 1919 stressed that the mobilisation of 
communists to the fronts was reguired not only for military but 
also for political reasons. It insisted that communists were to 
be taken from responsible posts even if departments collapsed
19. Ocherki ist. MO KPSS, vol.2, p.123; P_, 9 May 1919.
20. P_, 6 May 1919.
21. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 1, 28 May 1919. In a guixotic gesture of 
solidarity with Petrograd Kamenev in May 1919 suggested that half 
of the Moscow Soviet's deputies should be sent to defend the 
Northern city (Stenotchety MS, 15, 1919, p.232). In the event 
only 44 deputies went since it was felt that more would seriously 
disrupt the work of the soviet (ibid., 17, 1919, p.252). Raion 
soviet deputies went to Petrograd in this draft (ibid., 16, 1919, 
p.245). On later occasions there were mass drafts from the 
Moscow soviet: in April 1920; and at the end of the month another 
20% were sent to fight the Poles, KT, 4 May 1919.
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22without them. The pressure for communists to leave was so
intense that even the sick and the old were caught in the
2 3 trawl. These desperate measures were confirmed by the TsK on
19 July 1919 which insisted that communists except those
involved in all but the most political agitprop work in offices
24 
were to be replaced by trustworthy non-party people.
In mid-1919 Soviet forces registered successes against 
Kolchak, but the main danger shifted to Denikin's advance from 
the South. Trotsky drove home the implications of the war and 
mobilisations at the 24 September 1919 city party conference 
where he was the main military rapporteur. He presented a 
pessimistic survey of the possibilities of revolution in the West, 
but was more hopeful of the East (India, Persia, Afghanistan). 
On his motion the MPO was placed under martial law: all communists 
were to be removed from 'civilian and undoubtedly necessary posts 
and transferred to military work 1 ; all bodies and institutions 
were to devote themselves to the needs of the garrison; and the
intensity of labour in all enterprises directly serving the army
25 
was to be raised.
Between April and October 1919 PUR RVSR sent 8953 communists
2 6 to the front. Of the 5427 sent in October 1919 3624 were from
the MPO, one thousand of whom went directly to the Denikin
2 7 front. The mobilisations had a disastrous effect on the local
22. Perepiska, vol.VIII, pp.56-7. 23. Manievich, p.169.
24. Perepiska, vol.VIII, p.169.
25. £, 26 September 1919. 26. KT, 8 May 1920.
27. Ocherki ist. MO KPSS , p.331. Between 1 April 1919 and 1
March 1920 PUR RVSR sent a total of 11,675 commuists to the
fronts, 1451 of whom as political workers. Of the total, 875
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party organisations. For instance, in the small Blagushe-
Lefortovo raion between October 1918 and March 1919 248
2 8 
communists were mobilised, over half of its total membership.
In June 1919 alone 69 communists were taken, most of whom were
29 
sent to the Petrograd front. When a mobilisation of communists
was announced at a delegate meeting in Zamoskvorech'e on 1 
October 1919 the order was imposed that not a single communist 
was to leave the city without permission. This was a 
recognition that some communists would attempt to avoid the draft 
by going into the countryside because, as Zagorskii told an MK 
meeting earlier, 'all the best communists have gone'.
The guality of the recruits was rapidly falling as the party 
was sgueezed ever harder to fill the guotas. Krestinskii 
admitted as much to the VIII conference when he reported that 
mass party mobilisations had ceased since 8 July 1919 because of
their poor guality. Instead, personal mobilisation for specific
32 tasks had been applied. Mgeladze agreed that there had been a
fall in quality and blamed the lack of coordination between the 
military and political departments and the local party 
organisations.
(7.5%) had joined before 1917, 1894 (16.2%) in 1917, and the 
great majority, 5148 (44.1%), in 1918 or later, 
Izist. grazh. voiny, vol.2, p.779.
28. Manievich, p.169. 207 for the front, 30 for supplies, and 
11 for transport.
29. ibid., p.170. 30. P, 4 October 1919.
31. Lenin i Mosk. bols., p.348.
32. VIII konf. RKP, p.28. 33. ibid., p.34.
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The TsK itself was increasingly concerned about the quality 
of the latest recruits. It noted in mid-1919 that there were 
many cases of communists either leaving the front of their own 
accord or refusing to obey orders. It drew the conclusion that
despite the reregistration there were still many communists
34 
unworthy of the name. The TsK still called for nine-tenths of
the party to be given to the army, 'the sword of the working 
class 1 , and insisted that the army party member was to have no 
privileges except to be in the most dangerous place. We have 
noted that the cells in the rear were gradually restricted in 
their functions, and below we shall look at the same process in 
the army. A few weeks later in a key circular the TsK summed up 
the organisational experience of the war. In the usual 
antinomian language of the time it called for the Soviet republic 
to be turned into a single armed camp. Collegiality was to be 
restricted as the source of much bureaucratism and red tape, and 
discussion was to be cut to a minimum.
The influence of the general militarisation of life was 
reflected in the TsK Politburo call for the semi-military, semi- 
civilian forms of organisation employed at the fronts to be
3 7 
extended to the rear. In Moscow in late 1919 semi-military
forms of state organisation were already being practiced through 
the KOM (Moscow Committee of Defence). The body has already been 
mentioned (Chapter 3). It was revived on 5 September 1919, in
34. 5 July 1919, Perepiska, vol.VIII, pp.105-6.
35. 14 July 1919, Perepiska, vol.VIII, p.146.
36. Vse na bor'bu s Denikinym, 9 July 1919, Perepiska, vol.VIII, 
p.114-29.
37. VIMS, 23 October 1919.
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response to the Denikin threat, and martial law was declared for 
the city the next day. Kamenev was chairman, and the committee 
included Zagorskii (MK secretary) until his death on 25 September 
1919, representatives of the Cheka including Peters, and members
o o
of the city and guberniya soviet ispolkomy. KOM worked in 
close liason with the TsK and the Council of Defence. With a
general headquarters, partisan detachments were organised in the
39 factories, and the ChON were put on alert.
KOM's powers cut across the jurisdictions of all the other 
civil bodies in Moscow. At the 24 September 1919 city party 
conference Zagorskii reported on its work (Kamenev being ill). 
Its measures had included the registration of all the 'non- 
labouring elements' and the intensified battle against desertion,
speculation, and other 'destabilising phenomena'. In the previous
40 
week alone the Cheka had arrested 700 people in the city, who,
according to Dzerzhinskii at the conference, had been involved in
41 the National Centre's plot to seize the city. While it lasted
KOM had dictatorial powers in the city, and decrees affecting all 
aspects of Moscow's life were issued either in its name or 
jointly with other bodies. With the military advantage turning
in the republic's favour by the end of the year the Moscow soviet
42 ispolkom on 25 December 1919 decided on its abolition.
38. On 24 September Peters was replaced by Dzerzhinskii whose 
task was to ensure that KOM's orders were carried out. The 
chairman of the gubispolkom Safronov and the chairman of the MChK 
Mantsev also joined,andfollowing Zagorskii's death Myasnikov 
took his place, Aleshchenko (1976), p.129.
39. VIMS, 30 September 1919. 40. P_, 27 September 1919.
41. Iz ist. grazh. voiny, vol.2, p.461.
42. VIMS, 26 December 1919. In mid-1920 KOM was briefly revived.
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With the advent of the Polish war in 1920 the civil war took 
on some of the characteristics of a national war. For Lenin 
this war signified the emergence of the Soviet state as a factor 
in the international arena and revived the concept of a 
revolutionary war. From April 1920 there were frequent drafts 
of Moscow communists to the Western front. A feature of these 
mobilisations was the high number of responsible communists sent 
by personal assignment, reflecting both the need for more 
poitical workers on a sensitive front, and the reduced
effectiveness of mass mobilisations. Between April and September
44 1920 about 2000 Moscow communists were sent to this front. The
final military mobilisations were against Wrangel and Makhno, and 
began with the mobilisation of 75 Moscow communists on 18 August 
1920. 45
As we have seen there were instances of reluctance on the 
part of communists, both rank and file and activists, to go to 
the fronts. To enforce the mobilisations the MK's own role as
arbiter of manpower disposition was strengthened. The MK insisted
46 that refusal to be mobilised meant expulsion from the party,
and there were cases of this in the 1920 reregistration as we 
have seen. It was during the civil war that the MK took on the
43. Lenin PSS, vol.41, p.283. This aspect of the Polish war is 
argued by Norman Davies, 'The Missing Revolutionary War 1 , 
Soviet Studies, vol.27, (April 1975), pp.178-95.
44. KT, 29 April, 4, 9 May, 20, 23 June, 9 July, 28, 31 August 
1920. Between January and December 1920 PUR RVSR sent a total of 
14,659 political workers to the fronts and soviet institutions, 
with a peak of 3692 in May alone in connection with the Polish 
war, Iz 1st, grazh. voiny, vol.3, pp.166-7. The TsK carried out 
14 mobilisations between April and December 1920 involving 26,211 
communists, ibid., p.181.
45. KT, 18 August 1920. 46. KT, 18 May 1920.
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militarised function of centralised assignment of party members. 
It emphasised that it alone was responsible for the distribution 
of communists in Moscow.
Moscow's communists were liable also to non-military
mobilisations. The most important of these were for supply,
48 fuel, transport, sowing, and general military work. The list
below shows the pattern of mobilisation for the typical month of
49 July 1920:
To the front from factories and soviet institutions 549
To the front from defence enterprises 184
Responsible party workers for fuel work 28
Rank and file party members for fuel work 111
To gather the harvest 104
TOTAL 1276
A clear distinction was drawn between activists and rank and file 
party members and the mobilisations tended to reinforce the 
distinction between the two groups. The mobilisations continued 
after the end of the war. 50 In the first half of 1921 the MK 
carried out 14 mobilisations in which over a thousand activists 
were sent to various fields of economic, soviet and party work
47. KT, 26 August 1920.
48. In early February 1920 the MK announced a major campaign to 
send communists to help with the spring sowing in the Moscow, 
Voronezh, and Tambov gubernii. Moscow was initially to send 500 
communists (KT, 3 February 1920). In early April 1920 the MK sent 
102 communists 'to raise the political level' of the railway 
workers, KT, 3 April 1920.
49. Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g., p.6; KT, 4 August 1920.
50. In October 1920 there were three non-military mobilisations: 
the TsK took 30 for its own purposes, 35 women were sent to 
Astrakhan for work among fishermen, and a third group of 145 were 
sent to work in the MChK special department (OO) (Otchet MK za 
oktyabr' 1920g., p.9). At the end of January 1921 the MK received 
from the TsK the reguest to mobilise 850 rank and file members 
and 55 responsible communists for the sowing campaign, Otchet MK 
za yanvar' 1920g., p.4.
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throughout the country.
Between 1918 and 1921 66-70% of all Moscow communists served
52 in the Red Army. The 1920 reregistration revealed that only
8040 (31.1%) out of 25,501 members were exempt from military 
service, while 13,890 (53.7%) were in or had been in line units,
and the proportion rises to 62.7% if those training are
53 included. The party layer in the army during the volunteer
period had been very high at between 15-20% in most units in
54 Moscow, and in some 25%. With the mass mobilisations of late
1918 and early 1919 the party layer in Moscow fallen rapidly to 
4.6% but the intensified mobilisation of communists boosted it to 
just over 8% in mid-1919, and this level was maintained to 
the end of 1920. The influx of nearly 8000 communists to the 
Moscow garrison during the party week of October 1919 was rapidly
51. Otchet o deyatel'nosti MK za iyul' y avgust i sentyabr' 
1921g., p.30.
52. Vserossiiskaya perepis' chlenov RKP 1922g., issue 4, M. 
1922, p.11. Out of 32,000 members in 1922 21,000 (65.6%) had 
served at the front, Izvestiya MK RKP, 2, 20 June 1920, p.9.
53. The rest were training or their status was not known. In 
the guberniya 2312 (48.3%) out of 4786 members were exempt, 
revealing the higher proportion of party members in positions 
which were deemed vital. In the country as a whole in 36 
gubernii, excluding the two capitals, 90,270 (63%) were in or had 
been in line units, while 42,024 (30%) were exempt, Materialy po statistike, pp.10-11. ————————
54. Petrov (1964), p.12.
55. The party layer in the Moscow city garrison in early 1919 
ranged from a high of 11% in Krasnopresnenskii to a low of 0.1% 
in Zamoskvorech'e. By early 1920 the party layer had reached 
8.5%, ranging from a high of 12.6% in Basmannyi to the low of 4%, 
once again in Zamoskvorech'e. The Polish war saw the departure 
of communists to this politically sensitive front and by 
September 1920 the party layer had fallen slightly to 7.3%, with 
a high of 10% in Khamovnicheskii raion and a low of 4.9% in 
Sokol'nicheskii, Otchet voennogo otdela, p.14.
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dispersed as units moved out of Moscow. The size of the Moscow 
city garrison had a tendency to increase: from about 100,000 men 
in June 1919 it had expanded to over 150,000 in June 1920, and 
correspondingly the number of units had increased from 178 to 
265. Almost every unit had a party cell in which, for example, 
the 7250 army communists and 149 candidates in June 1919 and the
9792 communists and 2513 candidates of June 1920, were
  * 56 
organised.
The average military cell both in Moscow and the country 
consisted of 46 communists and candidates. By August 1920 there 
were 278,043 communists in the army spread over 6937 cells and 
comprised about 8% of the Red Army. A large proportion of the 
RPOs consisted of soldiers, this standing at 39.3% of male
membership (excluding candidates) in six raions (excluding
5 8 Baumanskii) in September 1920. A high percentage of these,
however, were not rank and file soldiers, and indeed the average 
party layer of 8% in Moscow exaggerates the proportion of 
communists in line units. Out of a total of 8848 military 
communists in all seven raions on 1 October 1920 
only 2500 (28.2%) were in line units, while 3356 (37.9%) were on
56. Otchet voennogo otdela, appendix.
57. Petrov (1964), pp.107-8. Of these, 120,185 communists and 
candidates were at the fronts in 2962 cells; and 157,858 in 3975 
cells in the 12 rear military districts. The Moscow garrison's 
communists at that time comprised 3.9% of all the communists in 
the army, and 6.3% of those in the rear.
58. The proportion ranges from a peak of 731 soldiers out of 
1238 members (59%) in Khamovnicheskii raion, 2720 out of 5871 
(46.3%) in Krasnopresnenskii, 1650 out of 4748 (34.7%) in 
Gorodskoi, 282 out of 822 (34.3%) in Zamoskvorech'e, down to 428 
out of 1675 (25.5%) in Sokol'nicheskii, otchet MK za sentyabr' 
1920g., p.10.
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courses and a massive 21.2% (1879) were in staff headquarters,
59 
military boards and institutions.
Therefore, the party layer in line units is lower than the 
figures would at first suggest, and in Moscow it would be more 
accurate to put it at 3-4%. Table 17 supports this conclusion by 
showing that out of 5575 city members in the army on 1 September 
1920 only 2095 (37.6%) were rank and file soldiers. This is 
consistent with the general pattern of under-representation of 
rank and file soldiers in army party organisations which 
continues to this day.
It was the emerging officer group which acted as the 
intermediary in the inculcation of military virtues in the 
party. Much later Trotsky identified the army communists as a 
definite group:
The demobilisation of the Red Army of five million 
played no small role in the formation of the 
bureaucracy. The victorious commanders assumed leading 
posts in the local Soviets, in economy, in education, 
and they persistently introduced everywhere that regime 
which had ensured success in the civil war. Thus on all 
sides the masses were pushed away gradually from the 
actual participation in the leadership of the country.
The root of the problem lay in the very organisation of the army 
on traditional lines, as the Left Communists had warned in 
1918. Not only were the rank and file factory communists 
as a group weakened as by the mobilisations but once in 
the army the party rank and file in it were deprived of an
59. Another 1113 were in military hospitals, the militia, and 
the fire brigade, Otchet voennogo otdela, p.17.
60. T.J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority 
The Structure of Soviet Military Politics, Harvard UP, 1979, 
p.16.
61. Trotsky, Revolution Betrayed, pp.89-90.
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effective voice in organising the army. At the same time the 
party commanders and activists imbued the military spirit while 
serving at the fronts.
The mobilisations reinforced the spirit of 'campaignology' 
in the party. Faced with one threat after another the party 
centres consolidated their prerogatives over the party member and 
took on quasi-military forms themselves. The shock-style 
permeated all spheres of the MPO's work. Nevertheless, the 
internal changes of the MPO, while marked by the war, were not 
determined by it. Military methods were accepted as necessary, 
but as soon as the chance arose they were mitigated, as in the 
abolition of KOM. The civil war did not guarantee the victory of 
the centralisers over the democratisers: this was to be the 
legacy of the debates from late 1920.
2. Party organisation in the Red Army
Civil-military relations in the Soviet republic from the 
first have been marked by the party's dominant role, reflecting 
the fact that the army was the child of the party. In China the 
role that the Soviets played in Russia in mobilising 
revolutionary energies was taken by the People's Liberation Army, 
and hence the army remained as the residual fount of the 
democratic phase of the revolution - a source tapped by Lin Piao 
during the Cultural Revolution. In Russia the creation of the 
traditionally-organised Red Army marked precisely the beginning 
of the revolutionary compromise, as the Left Communists were 
quick to point out. The creation of the Red Army entailed the 
adoption of traditional military command structures and the 
curtailment of soldier control of the officers, typical of late
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1917, and its replacement by party supervision by commissars over 
the military specialists. The party arrogated to itself the 
responsibilities of political control previously vested in the 
popular movement, but the actual relationships between the LPOs 
and the military authorities was only gradually established.
In the centre a plethora of bodies during the civil war held 
responsibility for military affairs: from the Military 
Commissariat itself and its local departments; the All-Russian 
Bureau of Military Commissars formed on 3 April 1918; the 
Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR) formed on 6 
September 1918; to the civilian Glavpolitprosvet in early 1921 
responsible for political education in the army. The confusion 
at the centre was reflected in the localities, above all in the 
relationship between army and local party organisation, party 
cells and commissars, and commissariats and party military 
departments.
The high percentage of communists in the army during the 
volunteer phase has been noted. All decisions concerning their 
units, including recruitment, supply, political education, and so 
on, were concentrated in this party group. With the introduction 
of conscription in 1918 the party layer decreased and at the same 
time the development of a conventional army restricted their 
rights. The role of the military commissars, both as supervisors 
over the military specialists and over the party cells, 
increased. Inevitably freguent conflicts between the cells, 
accustomed to controlling their units, and the commissars, 
erupted. At the same time political departments under armies, 
and then under regiments, were formed. Initially they were 
concerned with agitation but by the end of 1918 claimed tutelage
- 248 -
• 4- • 4-U 62over communists in the army.
In Moscow views in 1918 were divided over the rights of 
army cells. The instruction adopted by the conference of soldier 
communists in April 1918 had given them extensive powers over the 
life of the units and thus steered them on a collision course 
with the commissars. Over the summer several meetings were 
held, including one in the Khodynka army camp in July, where 
opinion divided evenly over whether the cells were to be
subordinate to the military commissariats and commissars, or to
64 
retain extensive prerogatives. With the development of the
political department as the political organiser in the army the 
TsK at the end of August 1918 warned the local party 
organisations against interfering in the work of military
ft Spolitical bodies, especially in the appointment of commissars. 
The attempts of the cells to control the units, and thus the 
commissars, were further restricted by the TsK decree of 25 
October 1918 and their tasks were defined as essentially 
agitational. At the same time the decree forbade any party 
organisations, committees, groups, or any independent party
62. Schapiro, p.242; Petrov (1964), pp.49-51. In October 1918 
the RVSR formed its own political department for the fronts, 
which in November 1918 was fused with the Bureau of Military 
Commissars' own political department, which is the one Moscow 
dealt with, Petrov (1964), pp.56-7.
63. Erickson, pp.43-4. 64. Petrov (1964), p.60.
65. £, 19 August 1918. Although command appointments had been 
centralised in April 1918 commissars in the units of the Moscow 
garrison had still been appointed in some cases by the RKs 
directly, some by the Bureau of Commissars, and some by the MVO. 
Of 14 commissars appointed in summer 1918 5 had been designated 
by the RKs, 4 by the MVO (whose commissar was E.M. Yaroslavskii), 
and 5 by the Bureau, though all had to be confirmed by the 
Bureau, Petrov (1961), p.51.
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institutions in the army. In this way party committees as such 
were abolished in the army and the army cells in the rear became 
part of the local party organisation.
The precise rights of the local organisations still remained 
undefined and the MK on 11 November 1918 called for a general 
instruction on the rights of the cells in the army. In response 
in early January 1919 the TsK issued an instruction which finally 
subordinated the cells to the commissars and restricted their 
functions to agitation and carrying out the party line. By the 
terms of the instruction the political departments were the 
general party organiser at the fronts and the local party 
organisations in the rear. It was at this time, it will be 
recalled, that the rights of the cells in the factories began to 
be limited; conventional militarisation in the army was 
accompanied by limitations to cell rights in industry. In the 
army, the ground was cut away from beneath the development of 
autonomous party organisations, the continuation of pre- 
revolutionary forms in the post-revolutionary situation, in 
what Trotsky (and Sokol'nikov) called 'army syndicalism 1 .
On the eve of the VIII party congress opposition gathered 
to the use of specialists, the elimination of electability, 
and the overbearing behaviour of commissars. A general 
meeting of communists in Basmannyi raion on 16 December 1918 
protested against the repression against party activists at the
front and criticised the development of 'boss-like 1 relations
6 8 (nachal'nichestvo). Other meetings, such as one in Gorodskoi
66. Perepiska, vol.IV, p.74. 67. P_, 10 January 1919. 
68. p, 19 December 1918.
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raion on 19 December, criticised the use of specialists. The 
MK itself supported the rapid deployment of red commanders to 
replace the bourgeois specialists. The call for a proletarian- 
based army and communist officer corps was supported by the 14 
March 1919 city party conference in a resolution which urged the
rapid transition to a militia system to ensure the 'class
71 
character 1 of the army. Opposition to the use of the military
specialists and authoritarian methods of organising the Red Army 
therefore found strong support in Moscow.
This opposition came to a head at the VIII party congress. 
A grouping led by such ex-Left Communists as Yaroslavskii, 
Sapronov, and V.M. Smirnov formed a 'military opposition 1 , whose 
ranks included the future MK secretary Myasnikov, Zemlyachka, 
with Stalin playing a shadowy role motivated by hostilty to 
Trotsky. The opposition criticised the use of the old 
specialists and called for greater collegiality in the army with 
respect to the conduct of party work. Smirnov attacked the
development of political departments and argued for greater
72 
autonomy for the communist commissars. In calling both for
greater powers for the commissars and for the cells (and thus for 
the local party organisations) the opposition argument contained 
contradiction. In the event Lenin's calls for a centralised 
conventional army using the specilaists won the day
69. p_, 24 December 1918.
70. VIMS, 25 February 1919. The XII Moscow guberniya party 
conference on 3 March 1919 passed a similar resolution but 
protested in sharper tones against 'repression against 
communists', P_, 1 March 1919.
71. £, 16 March 1919. 72. VIII s"ezd RKP, pp.158-9. 
73. ibid., p.20.
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74 
- but only just. The party programme adopted by the congress
rejected the idea of a militia army in the short term. The 
powers of the political departments under the commissars' bureau 
were transferred to one under the RVSR to conduct all party and
political work in the army at the fronts while the local party
75 
organisations were responsible for the rear. Osinskii summed
up the mood of the congress by arguing that 'We shall for a long 
time to come have to practice military-command forms of the
7 ftproletarian dictatorship 1 .
In 1918 the cultural and educational departments of the 
raion military commissariats had played the key role in party and 
educational work in the army. The MK's main contribution had
been the organisation of a temporary party organisation in the
77 Khodynka army summer camp. In early 1919 the raion
7 8 
commissariats were abolished and party work was transferred to
the RKs in the localities and to the city war commissariat
79 (Gorvoenkom) in the centre. An MK instruction of 11 January
1919 had already called for the formation of party cells in the
garrison as part of the MPO and now every RK formed a military
8 0 
commission to organise the army communists.
74. ibid., p.273.
75. ibid., p.421; Petrov (1964), p.73. In May 1919 the 
political department was transferred to PUR, ibid., p.89.
76. VIII s"ezd RKP, p.190. 77. Petrov (1964), p.31.
78. VIMS, 4 April 1919.
79. Otchet voennogo otdela, p.3. The Gorvoenkom had been formed 
in March 1918 as the successor to the Red Guard headquarters and 
was the closest that the Moscow soviet came to having a military 
department, P_, 11 May 1919.
80. p, 18 May 1919.
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The VIII congress's call for party work in the rear to be 
conducted by the local party organisations was achieved finally 
in Moscow by the formation at the end of April 1919 of a
permanent military department under the MK, headed at first by
81 Myasnikov. Its functions were defined by the 3 May 1919 city
party conference, which also defeated a resolution proposed by
O J
supporters of the Military Opposition. Its main aim, according 
to Myasnikov, was to raise the political level of the army to be 
achieved by the strict subordination of the unit cells to the 
RKS. 83
The creation of the MK military department signalled the 
MK's assertiveness in claiming its role in the army and was part 
of the programme of ensuring party influence in it. At the same 
time it only increased the confusion between respective 
responsibilities and added to the bitterness in the conflicts 
between the military and civil authorities. An attempt to 
coordinate the work of the various bodies was the creation of a 
'council of five 1 (pyaterka) in mid-1919. It contained 
representatives of the MK military department, the Gorvoenkom 
political education department, PUR RVSR, the political department 
of the MVO (PUOKR), and the supreme military inspectorate. The 
body was designed to concentrate all political work in the Moscow 
garrison by eliminating parallelism by centralised direction. 
This organisation tried to bridge the civil and military 
authorities, but it failed to harmonise their relations and by
81. p_, 6 May 1919. 82. Ocherki ist. MO KPSS, vol.2, p.122.
83. Otchet voennogo otdela, pp.19-20; KM, cols. 671-2; P_, 6 May 
1919.
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84 July 1919 this hybrid body had disappeared.
Within the army itself there were conflicts between the 
political commissars (behind the shoulders of the 'spetsy'), and 
the responsible party workers (APWs) and the cells themselves. 
Conflicts between them rose in nearly every unit of the Moscow 
garrison. Lines of military and party discipline here became 
confused. For Trotsky, undoubtedly, the army commissar was 
senior to the others, though not always to the specialist, as a 
matter of military discipline. The MK insisted, however, that
even the commissars were units of the party hierarchy and
8 5 therefore subordinate to it.
This was the main thrust of an instruction adopted by a 
conference of army cell representatives on 17 August 1919. It 
recognised that the political education of the army was the 
central task facing the MK, but that it could not undertake this 
task on its own resources alone. Therefore, it required the help 
of the commissars themselves. They should not only be 
commanders, but also political educators. On the basis of these 
considerations the MK military department reiterated that within 
the city and guberniya all Red Army party members were subordinate
to the MPO regardless of the post they might hold. Thus the MK
8 6 hoped to extend its authority over the political commissars.
The instruction emphasised that 'The communist party does 
not know and cannot know privileged members'. This applied
84. Otchet voennogo otdela, p.5.
85. ibid., p.9. By the end of 1919 there were about 6000
commissars, 1430 of whom were in the rear, Petrov (1964), pp.94-5.
In principle the commissars were not part of the party hierarchy.
86. ibid., p.9.
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equally to the commanders as to the rank and file: 'Among many of 
the administrators there are many examples of laxity and complete 
disregard for party work 1 . The commissar was to regard the cell 
as the key to improving the effectiveness of the Red Army. Any
conflicts between them were to be taken to a higher party body,
8 7 
not to administrative authorities. Apparently this
instruction helped to decrease the number of conflicts between 
commissars and cells. Later, the MK admitted that the attempt to
run political work in the army through the commissars (i.e., the
8 8 political departments) had been unsuccessful.
The statute commission under Dzerzhinskii reporting to the 
VIII conference attempted to regulate the relationship by 
insisting that the heads of the political departments should join
the local party organisation, though the military authorities
89 
were to retain their autonomy. A TsK circular of 17 October
1919 stressed once again that every party member (including
presumably commissars) was to have 'close links' with the local
90 party organisations. A division of responsibilities therefore
seems to have taken place whereby the LPO was responsible for the 
organisation of communists and some agitprop work in the
barracks, but final responsibility for the military assignment of
91 
communists lay with the political departments.
87. ibid., p.10. 88. ibid., p.11.
89. VIII. konf. RKP, pp.232-3.
90. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 7, 22 October 1919.
91. PUR was able to exert enormous control over party life in the
army by its control over transfers. Between April and November
1920 alone, for instance, it assigned over 24,000 communists, 
Izvestiya TsK RKP, 29, 7 March 1921.
- 255 -
An MK instruction of January 1920 stressed that its military 
department was not an autonomous organisation but strictly 
subordinate to the MK as a whole. Its collegium consisted of two
representatives of the MK and one from the Gorvoenkom . At the
92 
same time military departments were formed under the RKs.
Although party work in the city was now carried out by the 
military department, Pyatnitskii reported to the MK on 29 March
1920 that the relationship between the army political departments
93 
and the MK's department were still unclear. In May 1920 the
TsK repeated the injunction that responsibility for party work in 
the rear lay with the LPOs.
Besides the conflicts mentioned above over the role of the 
commissars there was the further problem of departmental 
prerogatives as each institution and department in the army tried 
to gain as much authority as possible. The party cells in them 
took a similar path. An example of this revival of 'army 
syndicalism', albeit in a 'localist' guise, was the attempt of 
the party cell in the MVO commissariat headquarters to take 
control over all the cells in the garrison. The MK military
department rebuffed this attempt to institute a parallel chain
94 
of authority.
The unresolved conflict between the commissars and the party 
organisations continued throughout 1920. By the end of 1920, 
with the political department model being extended to spheres 
beyond the army (e.g., Tsektran) the local organisations fought 
hard to retain control over all the communists in their area. In
92. P_, 25 January 1920. 93. KT, 30 March 1920 
94. Otchet voennogo otdela, p.5.
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October 1920, for example, the MK once again stressed that any 
conflicts between the commissars and the cells were to be taken 
to the higher party instance: 'The commissar must above all be a
communist, not to stand over the cell but to guide and lead its
95 
work as a senior comrade among equal members'. In January 1921
the MK military department was abolished and the Red Army cells 
were integrated into the raion party organisations. By early 
1921 the army communist was subordinate politically to the LPO, 
and between the military and party authorities a balance had been 
established. The calls for a militia army, led by Podvoiskii, were 
proposed as a way of integrating civil and military authority.
3. Political education in the Red Army
The organisation of party work in the army was aimed at both 
raising the military commitment of communists themselves and at 
raising the consciousness of the mass of the soldiers in the 
army. The development of the civil war revealed severe 
shortcomings in the steadfastness of the army, leading for 
example to the fall of Simbirsk in July 1918 and a series of 
reverses in early autumn 1918. The reasons for the first failure 
were stated by the TsK at the end of July 1918: not only was it a 
consequence of the youth and the lack of training of the soldiers, 
but more importantly it was due to the lack of agitation in the
localities - the soldiers did not understand what they were
97 fighting for.
95. Otchet MK za oktyabr 1 1920g., p.35.
96. KT, 18 February 1921.
97. Perepiska, vol.Ill, pp.127-9.
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As Schapiro points out , Trotsky's insistence on complete 
centralisation and iron discipline was directed not only towards 
the military specialists but also at compelling the peasants, who
had so recently stripped themselves of their uniforms, to don
9 8 them once again. At one stage in 1919 the number of deserters
99 
almost equalled the combat strength of the Red Army. The
increasing peasant composition of the army undermined its ability 
to deal with peasant disturbances, and correspondingly enhanced 
the role of communist cadres both as commissars and in the ranks.
The majority of communists in the army units were peasant 
youths, 'village types, not conscious, less influenced by the 
spirit of communism than the proletarian masses'. The largest 
influx of them was in the second half of 1919, notably during the 
party week, and in early 1920. The cells and commissars were 
faced with this great mass of, from their point of view, 
politically illiterate people. Hence the importance of party 
work in the army, and the insistence by the MK that communists 
mobilised into the army should form cells in their units if none 
existed already.
The creation of the MK military department allowed the 
development of systematic agitprop and political work in the 
army. The number of party schools in the units increased from a 
mere 4, all in Basmannyi raion, in June 1919 to a peak of 58 in 
February 1920. On average in this period cells met just over
98. Schapiro, p.240. By the second half of 1918 the Red Army 
had changed from a primarily working class body to a 
predominantly peasant levy. In 1919 two-thirds of the army was 
peasant, and in August 1920 they constituted 77.4% of the army 
while workers comprised 14.9%, Izmeneniya sots, struktury, p.314
99. Erickson (1962), p.78. 100. P, 11 November 1919.
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twice a month. Between June 1919 and August 1920 there were 
an average of 616 meetings a month, 422 lectures, and 766 
discussional gatherings (sobesedy) attended by about a quarter of 
a million soldiers a month. Over the same period there were 21 
non-party Red Army conferences, 18 of which were held in January 
and February alone, attended by a total of 18,700 delegates.
The non-party conferences in the city from late 1919 were 
used as platforms for criticism of the government, and this 
probably explains the steep decline in the numbers held. At the 
end of the year they were revived in the guise simply of Red Army 
conferences. By mid-1920 the signs of discontent in the Moscow 
garrison were clear (Chapter 10). Nevertheless, the MK in 
September 1920 presented an optimistic picture of the political 
situation in the barracks. It accepted that conditions were very 
hard, with a lack of warm clothing and food, and that this was 
used by 'counter-revolutionary propaganda 1 . The commissars were 
still often isolated from party work in the cells, and there were 
many cells that were isolated from the soldiers. Despite this,
the report stated, the communists still retained their dominance
102 
over the soldiers. This would appear to be an over-sanguine
description of the situation. The 6 Red Army (non-party) 
conferences in October 1920, attended by 2500 delegates, revealed 
that the soldiers were 'dissatisfied with military and civil 
"bureaucratism" and the arbitrariness of the local 
authorities', 103
101. Otchet voennogo otdela, appendix.
102. Otchet MK za sentyabr' 192Qg., pp.23-4
103. Otchet MK za oktyabr' 1920g., p.35.
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Once again the report states that this grumbling was not 
 tainted with counter-revolution 1 . Nevertheless, the authorities 
were worried enough to organise a series of emergency meetings of 
commissars, political organisers, and cell secretaries, and to 
draft in more activists for the MK military department. Attempts 
were made to improve the conditions of the soldiers (Chapter 10). 
These measures, together with punitive ones, were sufficient to 
contain the crisis and the Moscow garrison played little part in 
the disturbances of early 1921.
4. Special purpose communist detachments (ChON)
While the induction of communists to military life took a 
traditional path in the army, in the rear it was no less intense 
but in an original form. The TsK urged that all communists 
should be taught military skills:
We must awaken in the very widest circles an interest 
and love for military matters. Friedrich Engels, 
already half a century ago, learnt military affairs, 
foreseeing that its knowledge would ben essential for the 
task of liberating the working class.
The specific instrument for this were the special communist 
detachments (chasti osobogo naznacheniya - ChON, known by various 
names up to April 1919), the irregular territorial militia 
organisation of communists and Komsomol members.
The ChON grew out of the voluntary detachments of communists 
formed in the first months after October 1917 and lasted up to 
1924. While the Red Guard was a more fissiparous organisation, 
with limited tasks and a weak organisational structure, the ChON, 
not yet exclusively made up of party members, from the first
104. TsK circular letter of 14 July 1919, Perepiska, vol.VIII, 
p.148.
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played the role of the armed force of the revolution and a solid 
reserve for the red Army. They were the first forces to march 
against the German advance in March 1918 in the absence of a 
strong enough conventional army. At the same time the MK 
organised forces for combatting counter-revolution in Moscow by
arming all party members and established compulsory controls in
105 the raions.
The basis for the formation of purely communist detachments 
was laid with the TsK directive of March 1918 on the arming and 
training of communists. With the threat of another German 
advance and the country in an ever-increasing state of 
lawlessness, with widespread banditry on the streets of Moscow, 
discontent and disturbances in the factories and increased 
agitation by anarchists and various anti-Bolshevik tendencies,the 
Soviet government required reliable forces at its disposal. The 
process therefore began whereby the party became not only the 
abstract source of authority but was also physically organised 
to combat disorder through the militarisation of every party 
member in the communist detachments. As part of the same process 
political opponents were rendered not only outcasts in the 
political sphere but criminals as well.
On 8 May 1918 the TsK once again demanded that all party 
members should immediately start military training. They 
were required to present a certficate to their organisation 
attesting that they had taken a military training
105. S.M. Tel'nov, 'Boevye kommunisticheskie otryady osobogo 
naznacheniya v bor'be s kontrrevolyutsiei (1918 god)', Istoriya 
KPSS, Uch. zap. MOPI im. Krupskoi, vol.215, issue 13, M. 1968, 
p-190.
- 261 -
course. The directive laid the foundations for communists to 
become commanders in the conventional army, and for the special 
communist detachments to defend enterprises, carry out patrols, 
and so on.
Communist detachments were formed in all the major 
proletarian centres of Russia. They were considered an 
autonomous part of the Red Army subordinate to the local party 
committee and not the military commissariats. In the cities they 
were sometimes used in conjunction with the Cheka forces. At 
first the units had no clear organisational disposition and 
little military efficiency, lacking competent commanders, arms 
and a clear command structure. They were formed as a specific 
response to immediate dangers, and in lieu of any other large 
military organisation, apart from the Cheka, they were considered 
essential for defending the government in the cities. However, 
neither the communist detachments, nor the Cheka forces, played a 
significant role in suppressing the LSR uprising in Moscow in 
early July 1918. In future, it was to be the troops placed at 
the disposal of the Cheka with the communist detachments as 
auxiliaries that were to be responsible for domestic control. 
The LSR uprising did however lead to changes being made in the 
organisation of ChON detachments. A new plan was adopted by the 
MK on 26 July with more accurate accounting, better organisation 
and training. All raions were to compile lists of communists
106. Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny, vol.1, p.127.
107. During the uprising the main military force was a group of 
Latvian soldiers. In the raions, however, communists were under 
arms guarding the party and state buildings, and arrested the 
local LSR leaders and raion committees, Tel'nov, p.190.
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able to fight, both experienced soldiers and raw candidates. 
Already on 20 July 1918 the Lefortovo RK, for example, had issued 
a decree calling for the immediate registration of communists in 
armed detachments, which were to be under the strict control of
the party committees. Failure to register meant expulsion from
109 the party. The 30 July 1918 city party conference, which
authorised the first party mobilisations for the fronts, also 
emphasised the suppression of counter-revolution in the rear. A 
headquarters for the Moscow units was found, headed by a 
political commission of Zagorskii, Myasnikov and Pyatnitskii.
By autumn 1918 some of these units had been launched en 
masse to the fronts. Zagorskii and the MK bureau insisted that 
the units should be broken up and distributed throughout the army 
to give backbone to Red Army units rather than concentrating them 
in groups which could easily be destroyed. Their view 
prevailed and communist units, as far as possible, were 
restricted to a rear role.
On 17 April 1919 the TsK passed a resolution which officially
112 founded the ChON, and instructions on their formation were
sent to all party organisations. They were formed on a 
militia territorial basis, composed exclusively of party members, 
and under direct party control. They were formed under factory, 
raion, and city party committees, initially exclusively of 
communists who had joined the party before the revolution, and
108. Tel'nov, p.191. 109. P_, 20 July 1918.
110. P_, 2 August 1918.
111. 23 September 1918, Perepiska, vol.IV, p.273.
112. P_, 23 April 1919. 113. Perepiska, vol.VII, pp.40-2, 94
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other communists on the recommendation of the RK. In July 1919 
these restrictions were lifted in the face of overwhelming 
military need. The TsK report of July 1919 stated that in
principle all party members capable of carrying a gun were to
114 
enlist. Each raion was to form a battalion of chonovtsy of
not les than 216 men, directly subordinate to the head of Moscow 
ChON, with 4 hours a week of training. By mid-1919 there were 
12 ChON detachments in the city with 7814 members, about half of 
the total membership of the organisation. By the summer of that 
year 3700 of these were considered capable of carrying out 
military tasks.
At the VIII party conference in December 1919 Bukharin 
stressed that all communists, above all those recruited during 
the party weeks, should participate in the ChON:
All this creates of our party a military organisation, 
although military organisation and a military structure 
of our party has been noted throughout the course of the 
revolution. Until we overcome the,critical phase this 
will become more and more marked.
The structure of the Bolshevik party was particularly suited to 
the waging of war, whether on the fronts or in the streets. The 
idea was to have a totally dependable force that could be relied 
on in any crisis, a political fire brigade. The role of the ChON 
was enhanced by the 10 December 1918 SNK decree prohibiting the
-] I O
keeping of arms at home with the exception of communists. The
114. Perepiska, vol.VIII, pp.98-9.
115. Ocherki ist. MO KPSS, p.343.
116. K.I. Bukov, V bitve velikoi, M. 1960, p.113.
117. VIII konf. RKP, p.165.
118. Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti, vol.4, M. 1968, pp.196-200.
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units were given such tasks as the protection of the Soviets, the 
RKs, and other key points in the raions. On disturbed days they
patrolled the streets, conducted raids (oblavy), searches and
119 
arrests of 'speculators and counter-revolutionaries'.
Every party committee was required to appoint an instructor 
responsible for them. V.M. Smirnov (and then Yanushevskii) held 
overall responsibility under the TsK secretariat. The 
initial instructions were strengthened in May 1919 when certain 
irregularities came to light. Time spent for training in ChON 
had been used as a way of avoiding work, so the instruction 
insisted that training should only take place in free time. 
Membership in ChON could not serve as an excuse to avoid being
drafted into the army. Expulsion from ChON meant expulsion from
^ 120 the party.
The circular insisted that the ChON should not be used at the 
fronts as complete units, echoing Zagorskii's warning in 
September 1918, but only individuals drafted from them. However,
the disastrous military situation from mid-1919 forced their
121 
wholesale use against Denikin and Yudenich in the autumn. At
the critical moment in the defence of Petrograd 500 chonovtsy 
were rapidly despatched to the North. These units gradually came
to resemble regular units, especially since they were supplied
122 
with weapons from the military supply departments.
The inadequacies of the ChON were often criticised. A
119. Manievich, p.171.
120. 8 May 1919 TsK circular, Perepiska, vol.VII, p.94.
121. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 5, 20 September 1919.
122. KM. cols.663-4.
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delegate meeting of Basmannyi raion in March 1920, for instance,
123 heard of many defects in their work. A special commission at
the end of summer 1920 investigated the reason why the ChON were 
not used to combat the peat and forest fires during the drought 
months. The MK bureau insisted on their greater accountability 
to itself, an insistence that extended to the MK military 
department itself.
The increasingly tense atmosphere in the city in autumn 1920 
led to more attention being paid to the ChON. A call went out at 
the end of September for all communists and candidates,
irrespective of their jobs, to be divided into companies for
125 training. At the same time the MK announced that the 1920
reregistration had shown that in some places up to 60% of 
communists did not participate in the units, and that every
mobilisation revealed their lack of discipline. From 10 October,
126 the MK announced, military training would be compulsory, and a
few days later the MK RKSM announced that all Komsomol members
12 7 
were also to join the ChON. The ChON were to take an active
part in suppressing the disturbances of early 1921.
123. KT, 25 March 1920.
124. KT, 3 September 1920.
125. KT, 29 September 1920.
126. KT, 30 September 1920; £, 30 September 1920; Otchet MK za
sentyabr' 1920g., pp.50-1.
127. KT. 1 October 1920.
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5. ChON and universal military training (Vseobuch)
The confirmation by VTsIK on 22 April 1918 of the decree on 
universal military training of workers was an important step 
towards erasing the distinction between the army and labour. In 
spring 1918 universal military training (Vseobuch) was introduced 
in the cities, though it suffered lacked of experienced personnel
and resources. By the autumn most worker Muscovites were
128 involved in military training. At the same time, the war at
the fronts became an extension of the civil war in the rear as 
the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and the attempt to end 
commodity production were intensified. The system of Vseobuch, in 
introducing the population to military service, broke down the 
barriers to the use of the Red Army apparatus for labour 
mobilisation. In late 1920 it was appraised as follows:
Vseobuch is the antechamber of a militia army. At 
present we need a Red Army, but the existence side by 
side with it of Vseobuch is an indicator of what we will 
do when the civil war ends - form a militia army. We 
are now preparing for it by the training of workers and 
peasants. Therefore Vseobuch is the seed of the future 
army. Vseobuch militarises the workers while not 
separating them from their jobs, not secreting them in 
barracks. It teaches not only adult workers but also 
children, developing in them an interest in sport, 
games, drawing,them gradually into the conditions of 
military life.
One of the main charges levelled against ChON was that it 
divided communist military training from mass training, and 
thus weakened the latter. Vseobuch had developed in a haphazard 
way in response to the military dangers facing the country. For 
various reasons it was a politically weak organisation as far as 
the Bolsheviks were concerned, and their dominance in it was not
128. Aleshchenko (1976), p.133. 129. KM, col.664.
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assured. This reflected the development of Vseobuch indeed as 
the germ of the militia army, of the armed nation, and this was a 
large part of the reason for the creation of the ChON as separate 
military organisations under the party committees, and not under 
state bodies.
In November 1919 the ChON were incorporated into the 
Vseobuch system by decree of the RVSR. The aim was to strengthen 
Vseobuch by reinforcement with party members and instructors. 
The ChON nevertheless retained their independence as an armed 
corps of party members. In a sense the ChON became the party 
fraction of Vseobuch, the party core directing the non-party 
mass. By early 1920 the merger was complete. Vseobuch turned 
into a body under the military commissariat in the military 
sense, and under the party in the political sense. On 4 May 
1920 the MK adopted a series of measures to improve party work in 
the Terbrigady (the units of Vseobuch). Moscow ChON and the 
ChON brigade leaders became subordinate to the Terbrigady, but at 
the same time were appointed by the MK and RKs. For a period in 
1920 the ChON lost their identity in Vseobuch, against the 
expectations of the November 1919 decree. Now communists were 
not being given any special military instruction since the 
communist in Vseobuch had the same status as the ordinary non- 
party trainee. They were badly armed and trained, and suffered
132 heavy losses when sent to the fronts.
The ChON, however, did not disappear. At the end of 1920 
their political significance rose as they were committed to the
130. KM, col.665. 131. Iz 1st, grazh. voiny, vol.3, p.184. 
132. V.L. Kratov, Chonovtsy, M. 1974, p.23.
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peasant uprisings in Tambov and elsewhere, and later against the 
widespread 'banditry' in the countryside and disorders in the 
city. Large numbers of demobilised commmunists were absorbed in 
them. From late 1920 and at the X party congress their 
organisation was debated, and on 9 July 1921 they were formally 
separated from Vseobuch. On 26 September 1921 the TsK adopted 
a new ChON regulation which instituted an ordered system of call- 
up in order to ensure that the ChON did not interfere
134 
with recruitment to the Red Army or the Cheka.
6 . The militia system
Throughout the civil war a muted discussion had continued 
over the balance to be struck between a regular army and the 
possibility of a transition to a militia system. While the war 
continued the partisans of a regular army had the upper hand, but 
with the end of wide-scale military action the guestion of the 
transition to the militia system became more pressing. 
The debate was not simply between militarisers and 
demilitarisers: in a perverse way, those in favour of a 
militia system, like Trotsky, were precisely the most ardent 
advocates of militarisation.
The militia camp was split, and they were opposed by 
defenders of a regular army organised on traditional professional 
lines separate from civil society. To the supporters of what 
could be called the 'soft' militarisers such as Podvoiskii the 
militia system represented the adherence to revolutionary 
principles of 1917 and expressed the repugnance of Marxists for a
133. Kratov, p.68. 134 ibid., p.71.
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standing army. For them the militia system would be based on the 
system of Vseobuch organised on a territorial basis in the 
territorial brigades (Terbrigady) and in this way the split 
between the army and labour could be avoided.
For Trotsky the militia system was to form the basis for the 
militarisation of labour. While previously exhorting strict 
labour discipline, as he did at the 24 September 1919 city party 
conference, and military methods, above all on the railways, by 
the end of 1919 he came to the conclusion that if war communism 
was to continue (and in February 1920 he put forward some 
mild proposals for a tax in kind but was outvoted by 11 to 4 by 
the TsK), then general militarisation was the only solution to 
the most pressing economic problems. With Kolchak, Yudenich and 
Denikin repulsed, at the end of 1919 Trotsky outlined his plans 
at the XVI guberniya party conference (23 November 1919):
I believe that if we can soon end most of our fronts we 
will have at our disposal an apparatus of universal 
labour duty. In May 1918 we hesitated if we could 
mobilise 10,000 workers. Now we can mobilise millions 
of workers and peasants. This is part of our general 
soviet apparatus. We will liquidate the war, go over to 
Vseobuch, and the military apparatus will be available 
for the economic needs of the country... Victories 
at the front prepare the ground for victories in~the 
fields of culture, the economy and management.
In the absence of the European revolution and the decimation of
TOO
the working class and the old layer of underground fighters
the methods that had proved themselves in war were to be applied
to the home fronts. At the VII congress of Soviets in December
135. £, 20 May 1920. 136. Szamuely, p.71.
137. XVI Mosk. gubpartkonf., pp.46-7.
138. ibid., pp.24-44.
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1919 he put forward concrete proposals for the extension of the
139 
militia system based on Vseobuch, and the IX congress, despite
140 
some reservations, agreed to the transition. The congress was
followed by the vigorous application of labour duty (Chapter 3) 
as the distinction between the army and labour was blurred. By 
November 1920 Trotsky's militarisation plans were extended to the 
statisation of the trade unions, provoking the TU debate.
The opponents of the militia system, such as Tukhachevskii 
and Smilga, considered that it would destroy an effective armed 
force for the soviet republic and submerge workers in a sea of 
peasants. The meeting of the RVSR on 16 December 1920 marked the 
point when the militia system was largely rejected under war 
communism. As Lenin had said a few days earlier at the VIII
soviet congress, a reliable force was required in case of further
141 
attacks. In the event it was not so much external attacks
that were the priority at the time, but a regular force was 
required to maintain internal order as in Tambov and Kronstadt. 
It was in this context that the MK passed a resolution,
clearly influenced by Smilga 1 s views, urging extreme caution in
142 implementing the militia system. It pointed out that the
numerical smallness of the industrial proletariat made its 
hegemony over the Terbrigady problematic. As we have seen the 
Vseobuch system had been 'politically weak' in Moscow, the 
largest proletarian centre in the country, and this fact 
obviously increased the MK's doubts about a militia system.
139. Erickson 1962, p.49.
140. KPSS v rez. i resh. , pp.176-8.
141. Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.131. 142. Erickson 1962, p.119.
- 271 -
Nevertheless, the MK compromised by allowing some limited 
experimentation with militia units in industrial areas.
It was this view that Danilov on behalf of the MK put 
forward on the militia question at the V Moscow guberniya party
conference (19-21 February 1921). The transition should be
143 
'cautious and gradual', he insisted. Against this Podvoiskii
called for the rapid transformation of the Red Army into a 
militia army. The conference and the MPO decisively rejected any 
extension of militarisation by voting 249 to Podvoiskii's 14
{with 65 abstentions) against the militia system as an immediate
144 priority. This is how the X party congress formulated the
question, and the limited experimentation allowed was not taken
145 
up by Moscow and only Petrograd availed itself of the chance.
Only in 1923 was a militia-based system introduced for the Red
146 Army.
143. He rehearsed the usual arguments against the militia 
system: that hostilities might once again break out with the 
Entente powers; that territorial units had performed much worse 
than regular units in the war; meant that the Red Army should 
increasingly act as a school for young workers and peasants; and 
that Vseobuch should only act as a preparatory course for the 
army, V MoskT gubpartkonf., pp.3-4.
144. ibid., pp.3-4.
145. Erickson 1962, p.125.
146. For a full discussion of the militia versus regular army 
debate see John Erickson, 'Some Military and Political Aspects of 
the "Militia Army" Controversy 1919-1920', in Essays in Honour of 
E.H. Carr, Macmillan 1974, pp.204-28.
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7. 'Revolutionary justice 1 in Moscow
The civil war was fought both at the fronts and in rear. The 
economic offensive against the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a 
re-evaluation of the concept of justice in which class principles 
became the measure of innocence and guilt. Powerful punitive 
organisations developed to lead the struggle against the residues 
of capitalism in both the economic and political spheres. It was 
only under NEP that the system of revolutionary tribunals and 
popular courts gave way to a more ordered system of civil courts, 
while the Cheka emerged as a powerful element in the post war 
Soviet state.
a. The people's courts
The liquidation of the old judicial apparatus took place in 
Moscow in December 1917, a month after Petrograd. It was 
replaced by a system of what were called local courts (mestnye 
sudy), envisaged by the SNK decree of 24 November 1917. By July
1918 they had received the appellation of people's courts 
(narodnyi sud) and a VTsIK decree of 30 November 1918 finally 
formed a single national people's court organisation. A court in 
Moscow usually consisted of one permanent judge and 2-6 temporary
judges, at first elected by Soviets and workers, and from mid-
1481919 by the raion Soviets alone.
The people's courts were devoted mainly to regulating 
relations between citizens, and not with political offences which 
were the preserve of the revolutionary tribunals. In 1918 these
147. Izmeneniya sots, struktury, p.312.
148. VIMS, 18 July 1919.
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courts heard 4700 cases: in the first half of the year a third of
the cases were civil and the rest criminal, and in the second
149 half of the year criminal cases rose sharply to four-fifths.
b. The revolutionary tribunals
The Moscow revolutionary tribunal was formed on 21 December 
1917 with an investigation department with three sub-departments: 
criminal and crimes at work; speculation; and a political 
department. In mid-1918 a fourth department for specially 
important cases was formed. In May 1918 a collegium of three 
prosecutors was established. In its first case the Moscow 
tribunal sentenced the editor of the 'bourgeois' paper 
Utro Rossii to two months in gaol. Up to the end of July 1918 
a total of 2022 cases had been started by the four departments: 
453 involving speculation, 907 criminal, 430 political, and 132
special. 740 cases had been transferred to other
152 institutions. By the end of 1918 most of the political cases
originated with the Cheka.
The revolutionary tribunals were given more powers to deal
154 
with counter-revolution in April 1919 in an attempt to curb
the Cheka. However, as Peters, the chairman of the Moscow
149. VIMS , 1 May 1919. The most common punishment was a fine, 
applied in 57% of the cases. Prison sentences were imposed in 
21.5% of the cases, followed by partial deprivation of liberty in 
14%, and then by the confiscation of property, VIMS, 17 April 
1919.
150. VIMS, 29 July 1918. 151. Bol'shevik, 22 January 1918
152. VIMS, 29 July 1918. 153. VIMS, 30 November 1918.
154. VIMS, 11 April 1919.
- 274 -
tribunal at the time, told the Moscow soviet EC on 31 May 1919, 
the Vecheka was reluctant to transfer its cases from its own
investigation department to the tribunal. The session called for
155 
a speed-up in the investigation of those arrested. The
tribunal judged 154 cases between 10 April and 10 May 1919: 18 
were sentenced to be shot, and other sentences ranged from public 
warnings to 15 years hard labour with deprivation of civil rights 
(17 people). Its increased political role was reflected in 
the numbers sentenced to death. In the period between 10 March 
and 15 September 1919 a total of 638 people in 243 cases were 
dealt with. There were 33 cases involving counter-revolution 
involving 69 people, of whom 4 were shot. The largest number of 
people sentenced to death was for theft on the railways (16) 
which was the single largest category of offences (108 people). 
A total of 80 people were shot in this period, and another 189
1 tr p
were shot on its orders in 1920. The revolutionary tribunals 
were under the jurisdiction of the Moscow soviet (and the 
Commissariat of Justice) and hence a degree of supervision 
was possible. The same could not be said of the Cheka.
c. The Cheka
According to M.N. Pokrovskii the formation of the Vecheka on 
20 December 1917 'flowed out of the very nature of the October
155. VIMS, 2 June 1919.
156. Stenotchety MS, 17, 1919, pp.262-4.
157. Stenotchety MS, 21, 1919, p.326.
158. G.P. Maximoff, The Guillotine at Work, vol.1, The Leninist 
Counter-Revolution, Cienfuegos Press, Orkney 1979, p.142.
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159 
revolution 1 . However, as Pokrovskii admitted, there was a
difference between this body and the revolutionary tribunals of 
popular justice mooted by party activists in the heat of victory 
in November 1917, and demanded in March-April 1918, which were to 
be courts elected by workers of a given raion. The same 
principle of revolutionary justice took very different 
organisational forms in terms of control and accountability. It 
was this contradiction between the idea of revolutionary justice, 
to which few communists objected, and the Cheka as an armed force 
largely beyond accountability, which from the first proved 
unpopular in Moscow.
In early March 1918 a Moscow Cheka was formed by the Moscow 
soviet EC, and in principle it carried out the police tasks 
previously carried out by the Moscow Military Revolutionary 
Committee. With the removal of the central government to Moscow 
on 10 March 1918, and with it the Vecheka, the two bodies were 
united on 19 March, and the staff of the MChK joined the larger
body. In principle the Vecheka was now subordinate not only to
l ft") 
the SNK but also to the Moscow soviet EC. A party fraction
(and not cell as it should have been) was formed in the Vecheka 
at the end of April 1918 which united 250 communists out of the 
reported 750 Vecheka employees of the time, an indication of 
the high proportion of communists on its staff.
159. M.N. Pokrovskii, Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya, M. 1929, 
p.399, from £, 18 December 1927.
160. ibid., p.399.
161. MChK - iz istorii Moskovskoi cherezvychainnoi kommissii 
1918-1921gg.; dokumenty, M. 1978, p.5.
162. loc.cit. 163. P, 7 July 1918.
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The first major act of the unified Cheka was the assault on 
the anarchists on the night of 11-12 April 1918. The incident 
revealed the disparity between the attitude of the party 
activists newly arrived from Petrograd and the Muscovites. As 
Peters wrote in 1924: 'In Moscow in general at that time there 
was a peaceful mood, and the Moscow military commissariat even
issued arms to the anarchist headquarters', and further: 'The
164 Muscovites basically did not welcome the Cheka'. The position
was worsened by the fact that the Vecheka shot many of the 
anarchists without consulting the Moscow soviet. As Latsis 
commented later:
Nowadays this seems amazing, but at that time there were 
not a few comrades... for whom the principle of the 
inviolability of the individual was fi placed higher than 
the interests of the revolution...
While giving a report to the Moscow soviet in early summer 1918 
Peters was greeted by shouts of okhrannik (an employee of the 
Tsarist police).
Following the LSR uprising in July 1918 the mood became less 
compromising. The assassinations of Volodarskii, Uritskii, and 
Zalevskii, and the attempted assassination of Lenin by the SR 
Dora Kaplan outside the Mikhel'son plant on 30 August 1918 led to 
widespread calls for a red terror. Militant resolutions were 
passed by the majority of the RPOs, and the city conference on 31 
August called for the mass suppression of the bourgeoisie and its
164. Ya. Kh. Peters, "Vospominaniya o rabote VChK v pervyi god 
revolyutsii', PR, 10(33), 1924, pp.8-9. On the Moscow anarchists 
see Avrich, Russian Anarchists, p.184.
165. M. Latsis, 'Tov. Dzerzhinskii i VChK', PR, 9(56), 1926, 
p.86.
166. Peters, p.11.
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agents. The MK tried to restrain some of the more violent 
proposals, and argued that the specific measures proposed by a 
general meeting in Basmannyi raion on 5 September should be 
adopted. These argued that action should be taken against 
bourgeois property, that the bourgeoisie should be expelled from 
Moscow, that concentration camps should be formed, and so on, 
stopping short of physical liquidation. These proposals were
I /- O
acted on. An inter-raion party meeting on 9 September 1918 
heard that the clearing of Moscow of non-labouring elements was 
proceeding successfully with few 'excesses'. Houses were being 
'purged' of the bourgeoisie and workers and their families were 
moving into them.
However, the initiative in the red terror moved from the 
party and soviet organisations to the raion Chekas and took on a 
more bloody aspect. The formation of the local Chekas had begun 
in August 1918, but now the process was accelerated. A 
special raion Cheka supervisory body was set up after the 
assassinations headed by Ya.M. Yurovskii. By November 1918 the 
Moscow soviet felt that the city needed its own Cheka if only to 
maintain control over the local Chekas, and in early December 
1918 a city Cheka (MChK) began its work headed by Dzerzhinskii 
and a collegium with B.A. Breslav, Yurovskii, V.N. Mantsev (the 
deputy head of the Vecheka) and S.A. Messing. A guberniya Cheka
167. p_, 1 September 1918. 168. P_, 13 September 1918.
169. P_ f 13 September 1918. There is a description of the 
resettTement in Boris Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago.
170. P, 14 September 1918.
- 278 -
was also formed. The Vecheka became a controlling body over 
the local Chekas, though it still handled the most important 
cases.
Concern over the lack of party direction over the raion 
Chekas was voiced by the general meeting of Gorodskoi RPO on 19 
September 1918. The meeting urged that more party members should
join the Cheka to ensure control, and that the local Chekas
172 
should give frequent reports to party meetings. The raion
Chekas, on the other hand, were keen for communists to join them 
but only in an auxiliary capacity, as the Zamoskvorech'e raion
Cheka implied when it asked the RK to form communist detachments
173 to help in raids and searches. The MK session on 5 October
insisted that the raion Chekas were to be strictly controlled by
the RKs. Every RK was to form a control commission to ensure
174 that arrests were carried out correctly. In Moscow the red
terror had been envisaged as a further stage in the economic 
expropriation of the bourgeoisie, but under the direction of the 
raion Chekas it had turned into a campaign for their physical 
liquidation as well. By the end of the year this had stimulated 
a growing movement aimed at restraining the Cheka. In the pages 
of Moscow's evening paper the Cheka was lambasted for the 
enthusiasm with which it imposed the death penalty.
171. MChK, p.5; P_, 4 December 1918. With Dzerzhinskii 
frequently absent from the city his responsibilities devolved to 
such Moscow communist Chekists as Breslav (to April 1919), 
Mantsev (April-December 1919), Messing (the head of the MChK from 
mid-1920 to November 1921), and I.S. Unshlikht (head of MChK from 
November 1921).
172. P_, 22 September 1918. 173. P_, 27 September 1918.
174. P, 6 October 1918. 175. VIMS, 10, 11 October 1918.
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The Cheka was criticised for attempting to put itself above 
the local Soviets and state organs, especially the NKVD and the
Commissariat of Justice. The NKVD insisted that the Cheka was
176
not an autonomous organisation. In response to an article
praising violence in the Vecheka journal, censured by the VTsIK 
on 25 October 1918, a commission was formed of Kurskii, Kamenev 
and Stalin to investigate the role of the Cheka. A second 
commission consisting of representatives of the Moscow soviet, 
the Commissariat of Justice, the NKVD, and the Cheka under the 
chairmanship of Sverdlov was established to regulate the
relations between the Vecheka (central and local) and state
177 
organs.
Many party members had profound misgivings over the practice 
of the Cheka, and they were expressed by Bukharin and Ol'minskii 
in Pravda in late 1918. They sought to restrain the Cheka and to
restore some forms of legality under the party and the 
178Soviets. In Moscow one of the first results was the abolition
of the raion Chekas, which had distinguished themselves by the 
ferocity with which they had prosecuted the red terror, in
January 1919. 179 Some of their functions were transferred to the
raion militias which were militarised by a VTsIK decree of 3 
180April 1919. At times of emergency political bureaux (troiki)
were formed in the raions, as mentioned above, to strengthen the
181 Chekist apparatus in the city.
The MK and Kamenev personally were in the forefront of the
176. VIMS, 14 October 1918
178. Leggett, pp.117-8.
180. Leggett, p.152.
177. VIMS, 26 October 1918
179. Leggett, p.137.
181. MChK, p.6.
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campaign to bind the Cheka in some forms of legality by giving 
greater powers to the revolutionary tribunals. At a meeting on 
23 January 1919 of the Moscow revolutionary tribunal, whose
chairman at the time was D'yakonov, with representatives of the
182 
MK and Cheka (Peters, Latsis) proposed a series of measures
which were codified by an MK resolution of 27 January, forwarded 
to the TsK. It called for sentencing to be removed from the 
Cheka and transferred to the tribunals (under the Commissariat of 
Justice). They were to be strengthened by inducting more party 
members into them, and the Cheka was to be left with criminal
TOO
investigation alone. On 21 February 1919 the critics of the 
Cheka achieved a victory by the publication of a decree, 
prefigured by a similar resolution passed by the Moscow soviet EC 
on 17 February, which implemented the MK's recommendations and
transferred sentencing rights to the tribunals and generally
184 
restricted the rights of the Cheka. A few days later Peters
explained the changes to the Moscow Soviet plenum. He claimed 
that in the 15 months of its existence the Cheka nationally had 
shot 3200 people for all offences. Now, he argued, the drive 
against counter-revolution would be led by the revolutionary 
tribunals, while the Cheka would move to tackle the main problem
facing soviet power - the battle against banditry and enemies in
185 institutions, bribery and other economic crimes.
For a brief period this division of responsibilities held 
and the MChK concentrated on criminal offences (the VChK dealt 
with the major political cases), though as mentioned the city
182. Leggett, p.141. 183. P_, 30 January 1919. 
184. Leggett, p.145. 185. P_, 26 February 1919.
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Cheka was still reluctant to transfer cases to the revolutionary
tribunal. However, the intensification of the civil war in mid-
1919, and with increased disturbances and 'plots' in the city, the
I o C.
MChK's involvement in political cases increased. This was 
confirmed by the formation at the end of May 1919 of a general 
coordinating body to integrate the work of the VChK, MChK, MK 
RKP, and the NKVD. Party control was to be exerted by the MK's
representation on this body, and by the wide network of cells in
187 the Cheka. The MPO was a major source of personnel for the
MChK and donated its most committed and uncompromising members.
At a time of particularly acute crisis in May 1920, for example,
1 8 ft 
a draft of party workers was sent to help the MChK.
Between 1 December 1918 and 1 November 1920 59 'counter- 
revolutionary' plots were allegedly discovered in Moscow. Of
the 5140 people arrested in connection with these 52 were
189 
officially announced as having been shot. Over the same
186. There appears to have been a broad amount of overlap in 
personnel between the MChK and the revolutionary tribunal, the 
notable case being Peters, therefore the division between the two 
organisations should not be exaggerated. The shift in the 
political work of the MChK can be seen from the following 
figures. In the first 4 months of its existence (January-April 
1919) the MChK dealt with 429 political (anti-counter- 
revolutionary) cases, 18% of its total; by May-July this had 
risen to 35% of its work (1139 cases); August-October 1689 (30%); 
and November-December 1919 1027 (32%). Between May-July 1919 
1151 (38%) of its cases were criminal, which fell to 14% of its 
work between August-November 1919. KM, cols.629-30.
187. MChK, p.10. The relationship between the party and Cheka 
is discussed in Leggett, Ch.VIII.
188. KT, 9 May 1920.
189. KM, col.631. In the first 6 months of 1920 alone Messing, 
the chairman of the MChK, reported that 5 major 'counter- 
revolutionary' organisations had been discovered, including an 
anarchist underground, the 'Union of Polish Engineers' accused of 
sending secrets and Polish officers to Poland, the Italian group
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period 2644 were arrested for criminal offences, above all for
190 
'banditry' and of the 369 shot 338 fell in this category.
The Cheka during the civil war became an important factor in 
the labour process and in general an important actor in the 
political life of the city. The MK pointed out one aspect of 
this at its meeting of 11 January 1919 when it called on the
Cheka to establish supervision over the specialists both at the
191 front and in the rear. A note from Lenin on 27 January 1920
called on the MChK to provide 'a responsible, experienced party 
investigator to look into the completely unsatisfactory state of
labour duty in Moscow, both in regards to workers and
, 192 
employees ' .
By far the largest effort of the MChK went into the battle 
against speculation and job-associated crimes (cf. Chapter 2). A
decree of 21 October 1919 formed a special commission under the
193 Cheka to fight speculation and the Sukharevka. Out of the
39,721 people arrested between 1 December 1918 and 1 November 
1920 in the city 26,692 (67.2%) were accused of speculation
(17,870 had been arrested by the Sukharevka department alone) and
194 53 were shot for this. Over the same period 5249 (13.2%) were
arrested for labour crimes, of whom 104 were shot {47 for taking
of Maketti involved in spying, and an international group of 
'stock exchange speculators', KT, 10 October 1920.
190. KM, col.633. The Cheka often used the term banditry to 
cover political offences, but to what extent cannot be 
quantified.
191. £, 18 January 1919. 192. Lenin PSS, vol.54, pp.424-5 
193. Dekrety, vol.6, pp.217-8. 194. KM, col.631.
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bribes and related offences, 47 for labour desertion, and 8 for 
theft), 195
According to the above figures the MChK shot 578 people over 
the given period and arrested 39,721, 5.8% of the population 
over 20 years old. In the first 7 months of 1919 234 people had 
been shot by the MChK, and according to Messing 131 were shot 
in the first 9 months of 1920, 87 alone since the beginning of
military action against Poland and the introduction of martial
197 law in Moscow. Of those arrested about two-thirds were
released. For instance, out of 17,426 arrested in the first 6
198 
months of 1920 11,344 (65.1%) were released. In the first 9
months of 1920 1401 people were admitted to have been 
incarcerated in concentration camps, 19 in gaol, 755 sent for
public work, 2976 sent to enterprises accused of labour
199 desertion, and 1399 to juvenile commissions.
195. KM, col.632. Between 16 February and 1 March 1920 alone 
the MChK arrested 182 people for speculation and labour crimes, 
of whom 108 were subsequently released. The main offences were 
theft of ration coupons and pilfering from supply stores, 
KT, 20 March 1920.
196. Maximoff, p.111.
197. KT, 10 October 1920. With the onset of what turned out to 
be only a brief lull in the war the government on 17 January 1920 
passed a decree abolishing the death penalty. However, on the 
eve of this coming into effect, on 18 or 19 January, the Cheka in 
Moscow and elsewhere summarily executed large numbers of 
prisoners thus presenting the government with a fait accompli. 
In Moscow 2-300 were shot and are not included in the above 
figures (Serge, p.99). The tragedy is described by Maximoff, 
pp.113, 119-22.
198. KT, 10 October 1920.
199. KT, 10 October 1920. The treatment of juveniles in 
Moscow's gaols was the subject of a special survey, it is not 
stated by whom, in February 1920, despite the opposition of the 
Vecheka. It revealed a picture of overcrowding among the 305 
youngsters incarcerated at that time, with several to each bed
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The Cheka was particularly active during the disturbances 
from the end of 1920 and was a potent factor in the terms of 
debates. In November 1920, for instance, the MChK sent 3 people 
to prison for five years apiece for 'spreading provocative 
rumours subverting the authority of Soviet power'. The MChK 
vowed that it would 'deal mercilessly' with all counter- 
revolutionaries who spread panic and rumours which could be used 
by enemies of the republic. At the same time as a 
prophylactic measure in view of the widespread rumours of an 
impending uprising in the city, the MChK called for all privately
held arms in the city to be handed in, and allowed an amnesty if
201 this was done before 15 January 1921 (in December 1918
the holding of arms at home had been made illegal).
With the end of the war a campaign began to restore control
and with nothing to occupy them except, as the report stated, to 
learn criminal mores from their seniors. Many were detained on 
suspicion alone. Others had been given two or three-year 
sentences for stealing a belt or 1.5 funta (615 gms) of sugar, 
while some had been sentenced to 15 years hard labour. Instead 
of a preponderance of bourgeois children, as claimed by the 
Cheka, only 2% were from this category, while the majority came 
from poor worker homes. The decree stating that juveniles were 
not to be treated as criminals was at this time due to be 
suspended (£, 12 February 1920).
Speaking to Emma Goldman after the publication of this 
report Lunacharskii denied Soviet responsibility for the 
imprisonment of children: 'Of course, it is all barbarous and 
antiquated and I am fighting it tooth and nail. The sponsors of 
prison for children are old criminal jurists still imbued with 
Tsarist methods...Of course, these children must not be punished 
(Goldman, Disillusionment, p.41).
The sole inspection by Rabkrin of 38 places of detention in 
Moscow in April 1920 recommended the release of 3074 prisoners, 
42% of the total number incarcerated (7312 people's cases had 
been checked, 43% of whom had been committed to gaol by the 
Cheka) (Leggett, p.156).
200. KT. 9 November 1920. 201. KT, 17 December 1920.
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over the Cheka. An article in April 1921 argued that while 
terror had required strong centralisation run by the hardest of 
men this had led to lack of control and bureaucratism: 'The 
negative aspects appeared particuarly strong in periods when the 
civil war quietened and with the lack of military work the
steadfastness [of Cheka workers] weakened 1 . The article called
202 for the extension of the Narsud system. In the event, the
Cheka, despite reorganisations, escaped significant reforms.
Emma Goldman gives a vivid portrait of the outward 
manifestations of militarisation in Moscow. On her arrival in 
the city in early 1920 she noted that there were soldiers and 
Chekists everywhere. No less an observer than John Reed 
described the atmosphere in the city to her at the time:
Moscow is a military encampment: spies everywhere, the 
bureaucracy most autocratic. I always feel relieved 
when I get out of Moscow. But then, Petrograd is a 
proletarian city and is permeated with the spirit of the 
revolution. Moscow^always was more hierarchical. It is 
much more so now.
The decision to fight the war in 1918 using traditional 
authoritarian structures, despite the urging of the Left 
Communists to fight, if not a people's war, a revolutionary one,
202. The article was signed by a group of Muscovites: Anikst, 
Bergman, Belarusov, D'yakonov, Ovsyannikov, Vasil'ev, and others, 
KT, 13 April 1921.
203. Goldman, Disillusionment, p.32. Esther Corey, an American 
communist, arrived in Moscow in 1919: 'Military men in motor cars 
were dashing recklessly through the streets. Limousines bearing 
soviet dignitaries and rickety carriages pulled by boney horses 
raised a clattering symphony on the cobbles...There was a certain 
amount of barter on the Sukharevka market, but this was a 
dangerous undertaking. Many a Russian lost his life after a 
Cheka raid on the market', Esther Corey, 'Passage to Russia 1 , 
Survey, 53, October 1964, pp.28, 31.
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inevitably influenced the future course of communist 
construction. The elimination of discussion and dissent in the 
army was extended to the rest of society through the Cheka and 
other punitive organisations. Responsibility for the beginning 
of the war lies beyond the scope of this work, but once launched 
'The Bolsheviks could only tailor their organisational structures 
to the demands of survival (i.e., rigid, authoritarian
centralisation) rather than to popular attitudes and
204 
aspirations'. A powerful political-military machine came into
being during the war but no corresponding effective mechanisms to 
ensure control over it.
204. John Ellis, Armies in Revolution, Groom Helm, London 1973, 
p.199.
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CHAPTER 7 
Agitprop and Mass Organisations
One of the most important aspects of the work of the party 
committees during the civil war was agitation and propaganda 
among various sections of Moscow's population. There were two 
main forms of this activity. The first consisted of general 
agitprop through meetings and the press designed to popularise 
the party's policies. The second form was the creation of 
special bodies, such as the Komsomol, national minorities' 
organisation, and women's departments, to instil the party spirit 
(partiinost') in the target group.
1. Organisation and functions of agitprop
a. Agitprop departments and general agitprop work 
The MK formed an agitation bureau on 7 May 1918 and called 
on all the raion party organisations to refer to it for agitators 
and lecturers. This was the first step in the creation of a 
powerful apparatus designed not only to propagandise 
Bolshevik policies but also to ensure a degree of mobilisation of 
the city's population through attendance at agitational meetings. 
Gradually each RK formed its own agitprop department. In 
Butyrskii raion, for example, one was established on 14 September 
1918. 2
The most important form of agitation was the meeting of 
various sorts. It was during the civil war that ideological work 
began to be measured in crude statistical terms. Party reports
1. P, 11 May 1918. 2. P_, 5 January 1919.
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were often dominated by lists of meetings held and the number of 
people attending. By any scale, however, these results by 1919 
were statistically impressive. Between 3-19 October 1919 alone, 
for instance, 1235 meetings were held in the city attended by 
over a quarter of a million people. Admittedly, this was the
period of the party weeks, but throughout dozens of meetings were
4 held each week. Many of these meetings were held in working
time and were thus assured of an audience. When the hooter 
sounded in the middle of a meeting of 2000 workers in the Kursk 
railway workshops on 28 May 1920, for example, over half of the 
audience melted away. The sheer scale of the MPO ' s agitprop 
effort reflects the 'heroic' nature of the period as one major 
event followed another, but it was clearly difficult to maintain 
a high level of mobilisation for months on end. To compensate 
for this much of the agitprop work took the form of shock 
campaigns organised in the form of 'weeks' over issues or for 
sections of the population. In December 1919 there was a 'week 
of red youth', in August 1920 a 'week of the female peasant' and 
a 'week of pre-conscription training', in September 1920 a 'week
3. £, 26 October 1919.
4. The scale of the agitprop work of the MK military department 
has already been mentioned. 440 meetings and lectures, for 
instance, were held in Sokol'nicheskii raion in the first half of 
1919 alone (_P, 26 July 1919). The mass scale of agitation in the 
city can be s~een from the figures for July 1920. The 2060 
meetings were attended by nearly three quarters of a million 
people. On average in that month there were 76 meetings a day 
ranging from small ones of about 50 to mass meetings in the open 
air. The topics reflected current concerns: the Polish war, 
economic objectives and especially the campaign to bring in 
firewood, and the II Comintern congress held in that month, 
Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g., p.14.
5. KT, 2 June 1920
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of strengthening the party', and so on, not to mention the party 
weeks themselves.
A more permanent form of agitprop was the factory and raion 
clubs organised by RKs, TLJs, and factory committees. They were 
designed to be primarily educative as opposed to recreational, 
and as such were often criticised by those attending. By July 
1920 193 clubs had been registered as involved in this sort of 
agitprop work. With the increased emphasis on economic 
reconstruction at the end of the civil war a special campaign of 
'production propaganda 1 was developed and in September 1920 a 
special MK sub-department was formed for this under the agitprop 
department. Production propaganda groups were formed in the 
largest factories, and by the end of 1920, for example, there
o
were 31 such groups in Sokol'nicheskii raion. As part of the 
campaign production conferences of workers and managers were
were held to discuss economic guestions. Six of these had
9 been held in the above raion by the end of 1920. This brief
survey of the MPO's agitprop work would not be complete without a 
mention of the party press, which in Lenin's conception acted as 
'a collective agitator and propagandist 1 .
6. Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g., p.11.
7. Otchet MK za oktyabr 1 1920g., p.4.
8. Desyat' let: Sbornik materialov Yu.O.K. Sokol'nicheskogo 
raiona k 10-letiyu oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii, M. 1927, p.6.
9. KT, 19, 21 December 1920.
10. The major Moscow paper was the TsK Pravda. In 1917 and
early 1918 the main local Moscow paper was Sotsial-demokrat. In
March 1918 with the government's move to Moscow this was merged
with the central Pravda and the paper became the organ of both
the TsK and the MK and was briefly known as Moskovskaya pravda,
and then simply as Pravda. The Moscow Soviet's morning Izvestiya had
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While the MPO's ideological work was impressive in statistical 
terms, its effectiveness is less convincing. At the VIII party 
congress Sosnovskii berated the abstract nature of the MK's 
propaganda effort: 'Today Wilson, tomorrow Wilson, the day after 
tomorrow Wilson, while the Menshevik's talk about supplies, 
internal disorders within factories, etc., 1 . The Lefortovo 
RK' s report for April 1919 complained about the limited influence 
of their agitprop: 'Our work does not so much encompass new
layers of the proletariat as regulates, directs, and broadens the
12 
work of already established organisations'. Increasingly the
accent was placed on the agitational functions of the cells, as 
mentioned. In May 1919 the Sushchevsko-Mar'inskii RK stated the 
problem. They were dealing with 'raw human material, Red Army 
soldiers arriving straight from the countryside into the 
towns...unhappy with requisitioning... and backward workers who 
have had little taste of political life'. The RK insisted that 
more cells had to be formed to supplement the 42 that existed, 18 
of which were in factories and 16 in the Red Army with 773 
members, in order to overcome this 'cultural backwardness'. To 
conduct this work the raion had only 3-4 agitators at its 
disposal. At the IX party congress Kamenev was still calling
become a weekly by mid-1918 and was discontinued on the grounds 
of the paper shortage by an SNK decree of 28 April 1919 (Dekrety 
Sovetskoi vlasti, vol.5, p.549). General information in Moscow 
was provided by the Soviet's evening paper. In March 1920 it was 
decided that Moscow should have its own morning paper and so 
Kommunisticheskii trud was launched.
11. VIII s"ezd RKP, p.174. 12. P, 5 May 1919 
13. P, 18 May 1919.
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14 for agitprop to become less theoretical, though he could have
called for it to become more efficient. There were frequent 
cases when speakers arrived late at meetings, or failed to turn
4. i n 15up at all.
The question of 'cultural backwardness 1 was particularly 
acute in respect to religious observance. Despite the attempts 
to inculcate the materialist view of history and politics the 
widespread persistence of religious faith in the city is well- 
documented, and was even influential within the party. An 
incident that aroused particularly severe censure took place in 
the giant Danilovskii mill. As we have seen the party cell here 
was only formed in December 1918 to serve the 7000 workers, 
mainly women. During the winter of 1919-20 the factory 
committee, composed largely of communists, repeatedly asked for 
the water supply to be overhauled but no action had been taken. 
When in April 1920 up to 50 people a week were dying of dysentery 
a priest was called in and over 3000 of the workers attended. 
As the propaganda increasingly spoke of the imminence of 
communism, in the factories socialism receded as the workers 
entered the illegal economy to survive and lacked a 'conscious 
approach to labour'. Under the pressure of the collapse of 
effective public life apart from through bureaucratic channels 
workers were returning to earlier forms of solidarity such as
14. IX s"ezd RKP, p.309.
15. Eg., a speaker assigned by the MK agitprop department 
failed to show up at a meeting in Sokol'nicheskii raion in 
November 1920, KT, 6 November 1920.
16. p, 16 January 1919; KT, 24 April 1920.
17. KT, 22 April 1920.
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mutual self-help organisations (kassy vzaimopomoshchi).
The strength of religious adherence in Moscow is confirmed 
by Marguerite Harrison, who reported packed churches and generous
material support for priests, who no longer received obligatory
19 tithes. The freguent debates over religion held in the city
attracted large audiences. At these, leading communists, often 
Lunacharskii, took the floor against church luminaries. At one 
of these 'disputes' in mid-September 1920 Lunacharskii was
confronted by Bishop Antonin before a packed audience in the
20 Polytechnical Museum. The audience split evenly in the vote.
In the party the MGK in mid-1919 had resolved that 'a 
religious world view is totally incompatible with the materialist 
tendency endowed to us by the founders of scientific socialism 1 .
Any communist observing religious practices was threatened with
21 punishment. Despite such warnings a meeting of raion
secretaries and agitprop activists in mid-April 1920 noted that 
communists were still being married in church and their children
baptised. The meeting adopted an uncompromising line on the
2? question: either the party or the church. There was a steady
23 stream of expulsions for infringements of this rule. The
attitude of the communist to religion became yet another test of 
loyalty to the party.
18. KT, 24 April 1920. 19. Harrison, Marooned, p.133.
20. KT, 28 September 1920.
21. Vestnik propagandy, 3, 1919, pp.21-2.
22. KT, 17 April 1920.
23. E.g., 2 were expelled in March 1920 for attending services
(KT, 31 March 1920). 28 were expelled during the August 1920 
reregistration for religious observance.
- 293 -
At the end of 1920 a debate arose over the concentration of 
all agitprop and educational work under Glavpolitprosvet, the
body formed in November 1920 under Narkompros, and nominally
94 
headed by Krupskaya. While Myasnikov at the IX party conference
had argued for the consolidation of all party agitation and
95 
schools in this body this did not take place owing to the fear
that the party's own agitprop effort would be undermined. The 
party agitprop departments retained their autonomy and the party 
schools remained subordinate to them. The discussion over the
respective roles of Glavpolitprosvet and the party agitprop
? 6departments continued into 1921. At the V guberniya party
conference in February 1921 Yakovleva, the MK rapporteur on the 
issue, stated that 'We have not achieved major successes on the 
political education front' or in the 'communisation' of cultural 
and educational institutions. The conference resolved that the 
party ought to keep its own agitprop departments, and accepted 
Preobrazhenskii's guidelines on the question which argued that it
was premature to transfer in its entirety agitprop work from the
27 party to Glavpolitprosvet.
24. On Glavpolitprosvet see Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Commissariat 
of Enlightenment, CUP 1970, Ch.8.
25. IX konf. RKP, p.133.
26. The MK in January 1921 admitted that it had not decided its 
position on the question. At the 11 January 1921 MK plenum 
Litkens, Minkov, Boguslavskii, and Burovtsev for the Ignatovtsy 
were commissioned to work out a set of theses on the issue(KT, 15 
January 1921). Work nevertheless went ahead on the consolidation 
of the guberniya's political education authorities into 
Glavpolitprosvet, KT, 18 February 1921.
27. V Mosk. gubpartkonf., p.18.
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b. Non-party conferences
The non-party conferences were first organised at the end of 
1918, and were widely practiced from early 1919. About a dozen 
were held every month in Moscow aimed at target groups in the
population such as workers, women, or soldiers. Between April -
2 8 October 1919 there were 75 of these conferences, in March 1920
29 11, and in October, including the guberniya, 18. Overall in
autumn 1920 the frequency of the conferences decreased since they 
provided a ready forum for criticism of Bolshevik policies. 
The non-party conference was designed mainly as a specific 
instrument of agitprop and recruitment to the party. 
Workplaces or army units would elect delegates to them, and these 
would then report back to their electors. Some of the 
conferences were very large, such as one of the first organised 
by Presnenskii RK on 14-16 December 1918. About 1400 
participated and heard Lenin give the keynote speech on the 
war. Other conferences restricted themselves to a specific
group, such as one in February 1919 which was designed to attract
32 
'new layers of workers'.
The conferences often became the scene of bitter struggles 
for dominance. The very name 'non-party' laid the Bolsheviks 
open to the charge that their party's role in them infringed 
the very basis of the conferences. At the non-party conference 
in Zamoskvorech'e raion (18-23 September 1919), for instance, the 
Bolsheviks barely retained control. The call for only genuinely
28. Myasnikov, izb.proiz., p.233. 29. KM, col.661.
30. IX s"ezd RKP, p.37.
31. Lenin PSS, vol.37, pp.370-83. 32. P, 23 April 1919.
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non-party people to be elected to the presidium met with strong
33 
support. Myasnikov both at the time and in late 1920 admitted
that the conferences often began in a mood of some hostility to 
the Bolsheviks, but insisted that by careful organisation and if 
the agenda was restricted to one or two carefully prepared topics 
majorities could be achieved: 'Step by step the conference is 
disciplined, pulled up, pricks up its ears, and finally, a 
complete turnaround takes place and ends with the complete
victory of our party 1 . But still, one had to be careful because
34 
'The slightest organisational slip-up spoils the whole thing 1 .
He recommended that the words 'non-party 1 be dropped from 
the title, and this began to be done from late 1920. During the 
disturbances from late 1920 they provided an effective platform for 
criticism of Bolshevik policies, and they were discredited as a 
form of agitprop work. Soon after they were discontinued.
c. Subbotniks
The communist subbotniks (unpaid Saturday work) were a more 
general form of agitation which linked the idea of labour and the 
communist system. In September 1919 the MK issued the following 
proclamation appraising the subbotniks:
The basic condition of any system of production is 
labour...Capitalist production with us has now been
33. Myasnikov, Izb.proiz., p.243. 34. KM, cols.659-60.
35. Maximoff, pp.154-5. Lenin admitted the breach between the 
party and the non-party workers at the X party congress: 'When 
non-party meetings were held in Moscow it was clear that out of 
democracy and freedom they forged a slogan leading to the 
overthrow of Soviet power' (Lenin PSS, vol.43, p.31), and in the 
draft of his pamphlet on the tax in kind he wrote that the 
conferences were used by counter-revolution -'Caveant consules!' 
(Let the consuls be vigilant), Lenin PSS, vol.43, p.384.
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superseded. We must now create a new production system. 
For this we require work, labour, but not the old 
capitalist labour which is not suitable for the new 
relations, but a higher, more conscious, more 
productive labour. The organisation of communist 
production needs communist labour.
Communist labour, the proclamation stated, has its own 
'revolutionary discipline 1 :
Under communism the results of labour and its rewards 
become anonymous, and therefore it does not require 
individual recompense.
The proclamation went on to compare the subbotniks to the 
departure of the workers in Thomas Campanella's City of the Sun, 
accompanied by music and dancing and imbued with the life-giving 
properties of the joy of labour.
Lenin's view of the subbotnik movement shared some of this 
idealism but also insisted on their practical functions. In his
pamphlet issued soon after the first subbotnik he called them the
37 
'beginning of communism', and at the 20 December 1919 Moscow
city party conference he argued that they were the first sign of
communism '...when unpaid work for the general good becomes a
3 8 
universal phenomenon 1 . On the more practical side, at the VIII
party conference in November 1919 Lenin stressed the agitprop 
functions of the subbotniks and not the glimpse that they gave of 
the future society. They were to be used as schools, he argued,
to attract workers and reliable elements of other classes to the
39 party. At the same time, they were, as Lenin put it in his
40 
earlier pamphlet, a means of 'purging the party'. Bubnov took
36. KM, cols.661-2.
37. 'Velikii pochin', Lenin PSS, vol.39, p.25.
38. Lenin PSS, vol.40, p.34. 39. VIII konf. RKP, p.24.
40. Lenin PSS, vol.39.
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up this theme when he argued that they were 'one of the most 
genuine means of continuously increasing the discipline,
strength, steadfastness, and indissolubility of the party
i 41 
ranks. The subbotniks, in other words, were a crucial means
42 
of educating and disciplining the party members themselves.
The first subbotnik took place at the Sortirovochnaya 
station on the Moscow-Kazan line on 12 April 1919 at the 
instigation of the chairman of the communist cell. Thirteen 
communists and 2 sympathisers continued to work without wages after 
the end of the normal Saturday shift into the night. On 10 May 
there was a special communist subbotnik when 102 communists from 
the MPO's railway raion took part. The work was largely confined
to transport, essential factory maintenance, and to cleaning up
43 the city after the winter snows. Between May-December 1919 402
subbotniks were organised in the city in which 50,121 people
44 participated, 63.7% of whom were communists. In May 1919 all
the 724 people participating in subbotniks were communists, but 
by December of that year their presence represented less than 
half (46% or 7623) of the 16,673 participants. 45 On average a 
little under 2000 communists participated in each, about 10% of
41. P_, 28 August 1919.
42. The voskresniks (unpaid Sunday work) had the added 
significance of acting as an anti-religious demonstration. This 
aspect was underlined by the organisation of a voskresnik on 
Easter Sunday 1920 in Basmannyi raion, the seat of the 
Patriarchate of the Orthodox church, P_, 16 April 1920.
43. Kommunisticheskie subbotniki v Moskve i Moskovskoi gubernii 
v 1919-1920gg.: dokumenty i materialy, M. 1950, p.7.
44. ibid., p.341; KM, cols.663, 693-4; Tri goda diktatury 
proletariata, M. 192T, p.28.
45. p. 24 December 1919.
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total party membership.
In 1920 the subbotniks developed as a mass phenomenon. Over 
a million people took part in over 3000 subbotniks (2748 to 
August), a quarter of whom were communists, an average of 21,400 
communists a month. The percentage of women participating 
steadily increased to reach about a quarter in late 1920. About 
a third of the participants in each subbotnik were soldiers. 
Average participation in each subbotnik in 1919 was 45 non-party
people and 79 communists (64% communists), and in the first 8
46 
months of 1920 272 non-party and 93 communists (25%).
The subbotniks were not allowed to develop as an autonomous 
movement. The party soon issued organisational guidelines, and 
in May 1919 the MK formed a subbotnik bureau under the MK 
secretary Zagorskii. At the end of August 1919 the bureau was
consolidated with the brief to organise and to keep statistics on
4 7 them. The MK instruction on the subbotniks of September 1919
48 insisted that it was obligatory for communists to take part.
Factories wishing to draw on the supply of unpaid labour had to 
notify the bureau about the type of work envisaged and the 
numbers required, and the workers were then distributed through
the RKs. A factory could only organise a subbotnik with the
49 permission of the RK subbotnik bureau. At the end of November
46. As in note 44, plus KT, 4, 8, 9 May, 8 July, 12 August, 7 
September, 9 October, 12 November, 5 December 1920; Qtchet MK za 
iyul 1 1920g. p.15; Otchet MK za oktyabr 1 1920g., pp.30-1.The 
figures exclude the 1 May 1920 mass subbotnik in which 425,769 
Muscovites took part, 4.3% of whom were communists, 38% women, 
and 8.2% Red Army, j?, 9, 20 May 1920.
47. KM, col.662. 48. £, 12 September 1919. 
49. KM, col.689.
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1919 the MK and RK subbotnik bureaux were reorganised into 
departments, each led by an experienced activist, and detailed 
instructions on their work were issued in December 1919. Every 
party cell was to appoint a subbotnik organiser to ensure by 
their personal example that non-party workers would be drawn into 
the movement. Communists were to take part in at least two
subbotniks a month, and failure to comply was threatened with
52punishment up to expulsion from the party.
The subbotniks were cited as solid evidence of the party's 
links with the working class and that communists were not a 
privileged class shut away in offices. Hence the emphasis that 
there were to be no exceptions to participation, however important 
a post the communist might hold. They were therefore an element 
in the struggle against bureaucratism and a lever for the party 
committees to exert over those of their members working in state 
posts. An example of this was the refusal of the railway RK to 
grant exemptions to some administrators in the Vecheka's 
transport department who asked to be relieved of subbotnik duty 
in July 1919. The RK argued that the whole point of the 
subbotniks was to involve party members working in administrative 
posts and to ensure that they did not lose contact with the 
working class. Only a minute number of the 15% of the raion's 
membership who were employed in responsible posts had been 
excused, and any more, the RK argued, would lead to 
demoralisation and accusations of privileges. Absence from 
subbotniks, it warned, would be treated as a breach of party
50. £, 25 November 1919. 51. £, 27 December 1919. 
52. KM. col.690.
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disciple. The coercive aspect of subbotnik
participation, especially as far as party members were concerned, 
increasingly negated their inspirational character, and over 
this, as we shall see, a debate developed at the end of 1920.
2. The Communist Youth League (Komsomol)
The organisation of the youth league illustrates the 
development of the party's relationship with mass bodies and 
shows how theoretical positions were given organisational 
expression. The final form that this achieved, as a single party- 
dominated exclusive youth organisation, became the model for later 
communist youth organisations. On the practical level the importance 
of an organisation of youth for the Bolsheviks stemmed from the large 
numbers employed in industry, and the need to prepare reserves 
for the party. The value of the organisation increased as mature 
workers were drafted elsewhere and were replaced by youths and 
women. Already in April 1918, when the demobilisation had led to 
the return of some of the mature workers to industry, the census 
had shown that in Moscow 52,237 youths under 25 were employed in
factory industry, 33.2% of the industrial proletariat in the
54 
city. 17% of all workers were between 15 and 19 years old.
The first youth groups began to be organised in Moscow in 
spring 1917 by all the socialist parties. They were a 
continuation of the tradition of various kinds of circles 
(kruzhki) that ante-dated the February revolution. One
53. Perepiska, vol.VIII, pp.618-9.
54. Statistika truda, 11-12, 1918, pp.23-4; Yunyi kommunar, 46, 
4 June 1921 , p.10.
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of the most active was the Bolshevik-inspired internationalist 
group in Zamoskvorech'e called 'III International 1 . It aimed to 
be a broad body with an appeal for all of working class youth and 
was not affiliated to any one party. By the summer similar 
groups had been formed in all of Moscow's raions.
A debate developed in the MPO about its relationship to 
these groups. At the end of May 1917 the MK twice discussed 
the gyestion, and against Krupskaya's advice decided to 
form an organisation consisting solely of young Bolsheviks under 
the MK, as opposed to concentrating on working within the existing 
broad organisations. At the VI party congress in August 1917, 
however, the MK approach was rejected and it was resolved that 
Bolshevik influence among youth would be better advanced if the 
party and youth groups were to remain organisationally 
separate.
The MK youth group was nevertheless formed but was 
overshadowed by the 'III International 1 organisation. By 
autumn 1917 the latter had become dominant in the city, and on 8 
October 1917 at the I Moscow city youth conference the MK youth 
union dissolved itself into the larger body, now called the Union 
of Young Workers, which lasted in name up to November 1918. 
In practice this body largely disintegrated during the period of 
the Brest peace, losing a large part of its membership to the
voluntary military detachments formed to fight the Germans.
5 8 Others resigned in opposition to the peace. The MK of this
55. £, 30 May 1917. 56. VI s"ezd RKP, p.267.
57. Za chetyre goda, M. 1922, p.17.
58. Efim Tseitlin in, Pyat' let. Iz istorii Moskovskoi 
organizatsii RKSM, M. 1922, pp.23-5.
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union dissolved and the remnants of the organisation were
59 
absorbed by Proletkult.
The nature of the party's relationship with the youth 
organisation and the influence of Proletkult ideas were the 
dominant themes during the civil war. The founding congress of 
the Russian Communist League of Youth (RKSM) (29 October - 4 
November 1918) was the scene of heated exchanges over these 
questions. The influence of the Proletkult movement was 
reflected in the key congress resolution insisting on the 
independence of the league from the RKP, though allowed that it 
should work under its 'guidance 1 . Opposed interpretations of 
this resolution were to lie at the centre of a debate in the 
Moscow youth and party organisations which continued into 1920.
While the party stressed that the union, though independent, was
ft ? 
a school where 'new conscious communists are formed 1 and a
59. ibid. , p.30; P_, 30 July 1918. Proletkult was organised 
by A.A. Bogdanov and P.I. Lebedev-Polyanskii in September 1917, and 
was formed in Moscow at a conference held on 23-8 February 
1918. The conference passed a resolution calling for the 
formation of a 'special, purely mass organisation 1 (i.e., indep- 
pendent of the party). A long struggle ensued to ensure party 
control over Moscow Proletkult which was not fully successful 
until the abolition of Proletkult autonomy by its fusion with 
Narkompros in December 1920, Aleshchenko (1976), pp.209-12.
60. The congress was attended by 176 delegates, 30 of whom were 
from Moscow, ostensibly representing 22,100 members. 88 were 
communists, 45 called themselves non-party and were not 
sympathetic to the RKP, 35 were Soviet sympathisers, and 3 were 
Social-Democrats, 2 were SRs, and 1 an anarchist, Ocherki 
istorii Moskovskoi organizatsii VLKSM, M. 1976, p.75; Za chetyre 
goda, p.21.
61. I s"ezd RKSM, 29 oktyabr' - 4 noyabr' 1918: protokoly, 
M. 1934, p.5.
62. TsK circular letter, November 1918, Perepiska, vol.V, p.34.
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reserve for the party, a group in the RKSM based in Moscow 
stressed the internal autonomy and mass nature of Komsomol. 
Their views were incorporated in the programme adopted by the I
congress, insisting that youth was 'the most revolutionary part
64 
of the working class'.
Following the congress the Moscow Komsomol organisation began 
to reorganise itself. The 17 November 1918 city youth conference 
decided that the MK RKSM would consist of three representatives 
from each raion, a system similar to that of the MK RKP. Hitherto 
affairs had been run on a very informal democratic basis by
/- C
simple meetings of the activists in each raion. Nevertheless, 
the union's close ties with Proletkult played havoc with these 
attempts at tightening organisation: 'Proletkult in practice
c c
dominated the league and killed its internal life 1 In early 
1919 a group of Komsomol workers in the MK and TsK RKSM, 
including V. Dunaevskii, Polifem, and Yakovlev, emerged who 
argued that the youth league could not fulfil the objective set 
out in the programme and become a mass organisation of working 
youth while it was closely tied to the RKP.
For the time being debate was shelved as attention was 
concentrated on the war. It was of this period in 1919 that N. 
Ostrovsky, author of How the Steel was Tempered, wrote that 'with 
the Komsomol card we received a rifle and 200 rounds of
63. VIII s"ezd RKP, pp.435-6.
64. S.S. Khromov, (ed), Grazhdanskaya voina i voennaya 
interventsiya v SSSR: entsiklopediya, M. 1983, p.509.
65. £, 21 November 1918. 66. Tseitlin, p.30. 
67. ibid., pp.30-1.
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c Q
ammunition'. Throughout the civil war the Moscow RKSM 
organisation, united with the guberniya in June 1920, remained 
fairly small. In October 1918 membership in the city was 2500, 
and a year later barely 200 more. In October 1919 a 'week of 
red youth', the eguivalent of the party weeks, led to a doubling 
of the Moscow RKSM organisation to 5250 members. By October
1921 city membership was just over 9000, with another 7745 in the
71 guberniya.
By mid-1921 the age of the average Komsomol member had 
fallen from 18-20 at the beginning of the war, to 17, 16, and in 
some places to 15. The main reason was the mobilisation of 
members in which not only individuals but whole factory cells
were drafted. The social composition of the RKSM was therefore
72 distorted as well as the age profile. The fall in the average
68. Molodoi kommunist, 11, 1957, p.73. There were three all- 
Russian mobilisations of youth, and several local ones. In the 
first, in May 1919, the Moscow RKSM organisation sent 800 (20% of 
its total membership) against Kolchak on the Eastern front 
(Ocherki MPO, vol.2, p.124), including the chairman of the MK 
RKSM G.G. Tolmachev. In October 1919 the Moscow organisation 
sent 1000 to the Denikin front (ibid., p.331). The third youth 
mobilisation took place in 1920 for the Polish front. In all, 
about 24,847 Komsomoltsy were mobilised nationally during the 
war, Bor'ba klassov, 7-8, 1934, pp.179-80.
69. In October 1918 the guberniya organisation had 5000 members, 
and a year later 6500, Moskovskaya gorodskaya, p.182. 
By September 1919 the largest groups were in Basmannyi raion with 
375 members in 23 cells, and 300 members in Lefortovo in 18 
cells, P_, 3 October 1919.
70. II vserossiiskii s"ezd RKSM: stenograficheskii otchet, 
M/L. 1924, p.174; Izvestiya TsK RKSM, 1, 26 March 1920.' 
Membership of the RKSM nationally was as follows: 1918 22,000; 
1919 90,000; 1920 400,000; 1921 400,000; 1922 247,000, Bolshaya 
Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1st ed, vol.11, M. 1930, p.647.
71. Moskovskaya gorodskaya, p.182.
72. Yunyi kommunar, 46, 4 June 1921, p.8.
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age, with membership open to all those over 14, affected the role 
of the RKSM and had an impact on the psychology of some of the 
active youth workers. The organisation tended to become an 
agency working among youth instead of an active organisation of 
youth. It would take a struggle, however, before the concept of 
the youth organisation as a 'transmission belt 1 dominated over 
the concept of it as a group of activists.
The activities of the RKSM in the city centred on the clubs 
in the factories and educational establishments. Here courses, 
discussions, and cultural events were organised 'to provide new 
cadres of conscious revolutionary workers' by breaking the tie of 
youth with their homes. The league was particularly active
among school pupils from late 1919 and organised several
74 
conferences to extend its influence. A major aspect of the
league's work was the struggle conducted against the many non- 
party, and even party groups organised beyond the aegis of the 
RKSM. In its own field the RKSM tended to act as the RKP writ 
small. One of these groups was the All-Russian Federation of 
Communist Youth formed in mid-1919, and several others were 
organised by the anarchists. These groups enjoyed extensive 
popularity. They stressed the need to raise the cultural level of 
youth by means of shows, dances and sport, and hence did not 
consider the Bolshevik party as the unique organisation for the 
victory of the socialist revolution. They were clearly part of 
the general effervescence of the Proletkult movement and were 
vigorously attacked by the party and the Moscow RKSM for
73. Yunyi kommunar, 2, 1 January 1919.
74. ibid., 3, 15 April 1920.
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deflecting youth from the class struggle. The groups were 
dissolved by fiat and by force: the former predominating where 
workers were in the majority, and by force where they were 
dominated by the 'bourgeoisie'.
The links between the Moscow RKSM and the party organisation 
took various forms. Above all the party insisted that its 
members under 20 (sometimes 21 or even 23 is stated) were to join 
the RKSM, though judging by the frequency with which this 
injunction was repeated it was observed more in the breach. By 
October 1919 11.1% of the RKSM nationally were communists. By 
March 1921 4% of the RKP were aged between 15-18, even though the
minimum age of party membership was 18, and 15% were aged between
7 8 19-20. The direct link between the two organisations was
mutual representation. On 8 February 1919 the MK sent a 
representative onto the MK RKSM, and the RKs did the same. The 
party representatives had voting rights in the RKSM and were to 
supervise, as the MK put it later, the 'ideological and
75. Tseitlin, pp.31-2; Yunyi kommunar, 3, 15 April 1920; L.V. 
Lyutsareva, 'O nekotorykh formakh rukovodstva Moskovskoi 
partiinoi organizatsii deyatel'nost'yu komsomola v gody 
grazhdanskoi voiny (1919-1920)', Uch. zap. MGPI im. Potemkina. 
vol.56, 1959, p.42.
76. Soon after the I RKSM congress the TsK urged that all party 
members under 20 join Komsomol. It was reinforced by the MK's 
call on 11 January 1919 to the same effect (P_, 18 January 1919). 
It took on mandatory force by decision of the VIII party 
congress, but still the MK repeated the call on 29 December 1919 
(Lyutsareva, p.34). Failure to comply was finally threatened 
with expulsion from the party, KT, 6 August, 19 December 1920. 
In the last case the age stated was 21.
77. VLKSM za 10 let v tsifrakh, M. 1928, p.20.
78. X-s"ezd RKP, p.544.
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79 
organisational work 1 of Komsomol. On the other hand, the youth
representatives were only given voting rights on the MK RKP in
Q A
June 1920.
A joint TsK RKP and RKSM instruction in August 1919 firmly 
swung the compromise definition of party-Komsomol relations of 
the founding congress in favour of the party by insisting that
the RKSM TsK and city committees were under the 'direct
81 
subordination 1 of the corresponding party committees. This was
clearly a rebuff to Dunaevskii's critique of the inadequate mass
nature of Komsomol. Since early 1919 he had been arguing that
special mass organisations, alongside the RKSM, of
Soviets of working youth and youth sections under the trade
unions were to be formed to defend the interests of the 'toiling
youth of Russia'. In a critique which went far beyond that of
the Democratic Centralists, and which in many ways prefigured
that of the Workers' Opposition, he argued that the 'guiding
role 1 of the RKP had formed an elite within the party. He
criticised the development of 'thinking kernels'
(myslyashchie yadra) in general which stifled the self-activity of
the masses. The RKSM should develop as an organising centre
8 2 
allied to but independent of the RKP, he argued.
Party cells or fractions were not usually formed in the 
RKSM, but now the August 1919 instruction allowed their formation 
if necessary. The MK bureau on 29 December 1919 discussed the
79. Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g., p.15. 80. Lyutsareva, p.38.
81. £, 24 August 1919.
82. Ocherki MO VLKSM, p.125; A. Avtorkhanov, Soviet Youth - 
Twelve Komsomol Histories, Institute for the Study of the USSR, 
Munich, Series 1, 51, July 1959, pp.9-10.
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 crisis' in the Moscow Komsomol organisation. It was criticised 
for having concentrated too much on cultural work at the expense 
of political work. In other words, it had been too involved in 
Proletkult. Measures were outlined to turn the Komsomol 'into a 
genuine preparatory stage for entry into the RKP'. Various 
measures were adopted to increase party influence in the
organisation, but the proposal to form a party fraction in it was
8 3 
referred to a full MK meeting. This took place on 21 January
1920 and Lyudvinskaya, who had been an MK representative on the 
MK RKSM, insisted that a fraction be formed in the Moscow youth 
organisation, that a communist be delegated to every Komsomol 
cell, and various other measures in the same authoritarian 
spririt. While the MK meeting agreed with her general 
conclusions, the majority rejected the idea of forming a fraction
on the grounds that the RKSM was sufficiently under the control of
84 the party as it was. In March 1920 the TsK confirmed that
fractions were not to be formed in Komsomol organisations, as had 
become common, and neither were youth departments to be formed
under party committees, since this led to 'misunderstandings' and
85 
substitutionalism.
In mid-1920 Dunaevskii, now a member of the TsK RKSM, once 
again raised his earlier ideas. The TsK in September 1920 issued
83. P_, 3 January 1920. 84. P_, 28 January 1920.
85. KPSS v rez. i resh., vol.1, p.462; Izvestiya TsK RKP, 
15, 24 March 1920. In the first part of 1920 the MK and its bureau 
several times took measures to 'strengthen' the Moscow Komsomol 
organisation. The MK bureau on 4 June 1920 (_P, 8 June 1920), and 
a TsK circular of July 1920 called for more attention to be 
devoted to the youth organisation, but once again rejected the 
idea of forming youth departments under party committees, _P, 27 
July 1920.
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a circular attacking the 'secret factional grouping 1 in the TsK 
RKSM and insisted that 'youth syndicalism...counterposed not the 
proletariat as a class to the bourgeois class, but young
o C
proletariat to adult proletariat'. Dunaevskii was suspended 
from the party for six months, and his case was an augury for the 
fate of future oppositionists. In Moscow the debate over 
autonomy for the youth organisation reached fever pitch. The 
majority of the MK RKSM supported Dunaevskii, and now the Moscow 
youth organisation 'broke its links with the party 1 . 87 The 
crucial test was to be the II united guberniya youth conference, 
which met on the eve of the III RKSM congress (2-10 October 
1920). Already suggestions had been made at the IX party 
conference (22-25 September 1920) for the RKSM to be disbanded 
and for its functions to be carried out by party youth 
departments. Instead, Krestinskii's proposals for tighter party
o g
control over Komsomol were adopted. The decision was taken at 
the MK bureau meeting of 27 September 1920 to form a party 
fraction at the guberniya conference to direct its work. The 
tactic proved effective and despite rowdy sessions the party 
fraction carried the day and a new MK RKSM was selected more
O Q
amenable to party control.
As we shall see (part III) this was the period of debate in 
the party over democracy, the split between the verkhi and the 
nizy, and the problem of privileges. As Bukharin pointed out
86. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 21, 18 September 1920.
87. Tseitlin, p.36. 88. IX konf. RKP, pp.119, 127, 132
89. Ocherki MO VLKSM, pp.126-7; Otchet MK za sentyabr' 1920g., 
p.4 .
- 310 -
at the III RKSM congress on 2 October, the RKSM suffered
90 from many of the same problems as the party. The defeat of the
supporters of the independence of the youth organisation, 
confirmed at the III congress, now led to widespread 
demoralisation in the youth organisation. The new MK RKSM 
admitted in December 1920 that there was a lack of interest in 
the league both among rank and file members and the activists.
Appointed tasks were not being carried out and meetings were very
91 poorly attended. By early 1921 the membership of the RKSM
stood at nearly half a million. But as the TsK RKSM pointed out,
this included a large 'hooligan 1 element, and the majority took
92 
no part in league life. A reregistration was announced for
early 1921, and this together with people who left for one reason 
or another led to the great fall noted in the national membership 
figures (footnote 70).
In the early 1920s the Komsomol organisation was marked by 
its radicalism. Moscow Komsomol gave overwhelming support to 
Trotsky's oppositional platform in 1923, it participated 
enthusiastically in the Yeseninshchina (the peasantist cultural 
movement associated with the poet Yesenin), and it played a vigorous
part in the atheism campaigns. This would indicate that the
9 3 reason for the organisation being 'seized by passivity 1 in
90. £,3 October 1920.
91. For example, out of 800 members in Gorodskoi raion, 
organised in 30 cells largely based in factories, only 30 
appeared at general meetings, Yunyi kommunar, 1, 11 December 
1920.
92. Byulleten 1 TsK RKSM, 22 January 1921.
93. Byulleten 1 TsK RKSM, 1 March 1921.
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early 1921 was a response to the defeats suffered by the 
supporters of greater autonomy for the union, and that only in 
the NEP did the organisation recover its enthusiasm. The history 
of the Komsomol movement during the civil war illustrates that 
while the war and economic dislocation provided the background to 
centralisation and increased authoritarianism, the well-spring of
Bolshevik domination of a mass organisation such as the
94 Komsomol sprang from deeper sources.
3. Students
Before going on to look at the party's relationship with 
other major groups in Moscow society a word should be said about 
the students. This case provides a vivid illustration of how the 
MPO extended its influence over a group in society. The city had 
a great concentration of educational establishments and with the 
extension of educational opportunities after the revolution, 
accompanied by an extraordinary surge of interest in higher 
education among both men and women, student numbers grew rapidly. 
Already by mid-1919 the number in higher education had doubled 
from the 32,871 in 1913 to 68,238 in August of that year. Over 
the same period, however, the number of secondary pupils had 
fallen from 41,355 to 21,343. 95
Party influence over Moscow's students was asserted in 1920. 
In late April 1920 the MK bureau decided to form a special bureau
94. As Lenin wrote in December 1916: 'For the full independence 
of the youth union, but also for the complete freedom of 
comradely criticism of their mistakes. We must not flatter 
youth', Lenin PSS, vol.30, p.226.
95. VIMS, 3 September 1919.
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of communist students with direct links to the MK on the grounds 
that the students lacked sufficient political leadership. The 
move was probably associated with the attempts at that time to 
bring Komsomol under tighter control. At the beginning of 
September 1920 the MK bureau changed the status of the student 
bureau and decided that it would have the extensive controlling 
functions of a party fraction with the right to settle academic
questions. A bureau was formed in the fraction to which the MK
97 sent three responsible party workers.
The first step of this bureau was to convene a major 
conference of all the higher educational establishments (VUZy) 
in the city. The meeting called for the complete reform of all 
VUZy and the creation of proletarian universities, and the key 
resolution argued that this could only be achieved by intensified 
party control. On the crucial question of relations with the 
many revolutionary associations of students the conference 
rejected them as both a form of work among the non-party student 
mass and as a form of representation from these organisations to 
the administrative bodies of VUZy. The principle of the
conference was 'no intermediaries between communists and non-
9 8 party people 1 . It can therefore be seen that the reform of
higher education was not only designed to counteract bourgeois 
influence but also to undermine any interest aggregation 
between the party and the mass of the students unless they 
were dominated by the party.
96. KT, 27 April 1920.
97. Otchet MK za sentyabr' 1920g., p.4; KT, 5 September 1920.
98. KT, 28 September 1920.
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The application of the principle clearly encountered some 
opposition from non-party students. For example, on 1 October 
1920 all the students of the I Moscow University, about 2000 in 
all, met to elect two representatives to the presidium (the 
controlling body) of the university. Before the meeting the 
bureau of the communist fraction had sought to reach agreement 
with the non-party people on the choice of candidates. No 
agreement could be reached because of what was described as
1 Menshevik-SR demagogy 1 . The group accused of this refused to
99 participate in the elections and left the meeting.
A conference of communist students in the city in mid- 
November 1920 again condemned the 'revolutionary unions' and 
'revolutionary associations' as a form of political organisation 
for students, and communists were ordered not to participate in 
them. The RKP, the conference resolution stated, must work in 
the usual way among the non-party masses 'without any 
intermediary associations'. The associations were not to have 
the right to represent students in the management boards of VUZy. 
These bodies were to be equally divided between student 
representatives and the teaching staff, with representatives of 
all proletarian bodies with an interest in education. The same 
conference adopted a statute for the MK student bureau which 
emphasised the role of the party cells in education. The 
struggle for control over higher education did not end here, but 
the strategy had been marked out.
99. KT, 14 October 1920.
100. KT, 17 November 1920. The struggle for control over Moscow 
UniversTty is described in Fitzpatrick, Commissariat, pp.83ff.
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4. National minorities
In addition to the large number of foreigners, many of whom 
were ex-prisoners of war, Moscow in this period became the 
natural centre for various expatriate communists, above all from 
Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. In March 1918 a section of 
foreign groups was established under the party TsK, which in May 
1918 was formed into a federation, and in early 1920 
dissolved. Up to mid-1919 the communists in the federation
were simultaneously members of the local RKP organisation. Under
102 the MK from November 1919 there was a department of national
minorities uniting the bureaux of the various expatriate 
communist groups, the Polish, Latvian, Hungarian and Yugoslav 
groups being the largest. The bureaux were responsible under the 
MK department to conduct agitprop work among the non-party 
members of their nationalities.
The work of the national minority groups was consolidated 
in early 1920. The TsK resolved that they were to restrict 
themselves to agitprop and not to form themselves into extra- 
territorial national communist parties. The MK adopted a set 
of instructions on them in mid-March 1920. A department of 
national minorities was to be formed under the MK composed of the 
bureaux of the Polish, Latvian, and other groups, and they lost the 
right to exist as separately constituted bodies. The department 
was to be governed by the MPO statute and the programme of the 
RKP. It was to be strictly subordinate to the MK and a member
101. VIII s"ezd RKP, pp.520-1, n!2.
102. £, 25 November 1919.
103. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 13, 2 March 1920; IX s"ezd RKP, p.506.
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of the MK was placed at its head, and similarly the raion
104 departments were to be headed by an RK member. By January
1921 they were grouped into a national minority sub-department of
105 the MK agitprop department with 11 national sections. The V
Moscow guberniya party conference called for further restrictions 
to be placed on the national groups, and urged that they were to 
be stripped of all general organisational functions. Once 
again, the party was careful to ensure that it retained an 
organisational monopoly over an important group in Moscow 
society.
5. Female workers (Zhenotdel)
An important field of party work was that concerned with the 
female labour force. Both the first world war and the civil war 
had drawn more and more women into production (Chapter 2). By 
spring 1921 women were a majority in several Moscow trade unions: 
in the textile industry there were 103,794, 70% of the Moscow 
guberniya textile union; in the sewing industry 14,168 (75%); 
in the tobacco industry 3144 (79%); among foodworkers 17,930 (35%); 
and 18,245 (33%) printworkers. Nearly 200,000 of the members 
covered by the MGSPS were women, nearly half of all the 
workers. Male labour in soviet institutions was also 
gradually replaced by women.
104. P_, 16 March 1920.
105. Otchet MK za yanvar' 1921g., p.38.
106. V Mosk. gubpartkonf., p.15.
107. Tri goda proletariata: itogi raboty sredi zhenshchin 
Moskovskoi organizatsi RKP, M. 1921, p.26.
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Female workers are usually characterised as being chiefly 
concerned with the problem of supplies, as being closer to the 
land, and as less organised than their male counterparts. Such a 
view is lent credence by the low level of female participation in 
party and soviet bodies. In the giant Zhaho mill, for instance,
out of 7000 women employed in early 1919 only 40 of them were
108 
members of the cell of 47 communists. In November 1920 women
occupied only about 1% of the seats in the Moscow soviet, and
109 
comprised 9% of the joint party organisation. The relatively
low level of female participation in political life was obviously 
largely due to the traditional patterns of authority which tended 
to reserve political activity for men. At the same time, the 
type of work where women predominated and the emphasis on their 
domestic role both ensured that attempts to involve them 
in political and social life would require a long period of 
change and could not be achieved by a single act of political 
revolution. For whatever reason, no political or ideological 
movement for political or organisational autonomy comparable to 
that in the youth movement arose among the female labour force or 
in its organisations.
From the outset female worker political organisation was 
focused on the party. The post-revolutionary history of the 
women's movement in Moscow at first centred around the journal 
Zhizn' rabotnitsy, issued from autumn 1917 but based on a journal 
of the same name put out by MOB from June 1917. In early October
108. VIMS, 23 January 1919.
109. KT, 6 November 1920. Table 18 shows that women constituted 
13% of~the joint MPO in September 1920, but this probably 
represents the peak of female membership.
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1917 the MK and MOB organised a special commission to conduct 
agitprop among women with a representative from these two 
organisations plus one from the raion TUs. A women's conference 
was held on 15 October 1917 with 600 attending. The aim of 
the commission was primarily to mobilise support for the 
Bolsheviks, and it appears to have disappeared after October. 
After the October revolution the MOK, with Inessa Armand a 
frequent member, was more active in this field than the city 
committee. In November 1917 it formed a 'commission for 
agitation and propaganda among female workers' to organise this 
work. It was this body which provided the inspiration for the
I guberniya female worker conference, held in early November
1 L ? 1918. In turn, the conference provided the organisational
centre for the I ail-Russian congress of female workers and 
female peasants which met at the end of the month. The 
delegation from Moscow was by far the largest, with 35 delegates 
from Basmannyi raion alone. At the congress Lenin and Sverdlov 
restricted their speeches to general comments on the need to draw 
women into soviet and communist construction. The congress 
called for the formation of female worker agitprop commissions
under party committees, and this was advertised in a TsK circular
114 following -the congress. Their formation was coordinated by a
110. E. Levi, 'Moskovskaya bol'shevistskaya organizatsiya s 
fevralya do iyul'skikh dnei', in Ocherki po istorii oktyabr'skoi 
revolyutsii v Moskve, M. 1927, p-59.
111. Aleksandra Kollontai in Tri goda, p.16.
112. A. Unksova, in Tri goda, p.19.
113. Kollontai, op.cit., p.16.
114. Perepiska, vol.V, pp.65-8; £, 20 December 1918.
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female worker commission under the TsK in which Armand, until her 
death in 1920, and Kollontai were active.
Even before the congress several raions had begun to form 
these commissions, and towards the end of December one was 
formed under the MK. However, it was only on 2 February 1919 
that the MK commission set to work and took over the general
management of the raion commissions. They were then formed in
118 the remaining raions. Both the central and raion commissions
in 1919 usually consisted of no more than a secretary and a couple 
of agitators each and were mainly concerned with soviet work and 
aimed to involve women in the soviet departments. As could be 
expected, the development of the female worker commissions 
encountered at best a lack of interest and at worst hostility. 
Not all the RKs were convinced of the necessity of this work, an
opinion shared by the heads of the soviet departments, rank and
119 file workers, and even communists.
The lack of party commitment to the commissions led to calls 
by the MK commission in May 1919 for it to be reorganised into a 
party department with greater help from the MK itself.
For unspecified reasons the MK refused the reguest at the
120 time, though it probably considered that the war and other
tasks had a higher priority than supporting the female worker 
movement, which in any case posed no political threat to party
115. Gorodskoi raion led the way, followed by Alekseevo- 
Rostokinskii and Zamoskvorech'e (Unksova, op.cit., p.19).
116. It consisted of Barinova, Kurinova, Lizhina, Madestova, and 
Torno-Pol'skaya, £, 22 December 1918.
117. Unksova, op.cit., p.19. 118. £, 18 May, 11 July 1919. 
119. Unksova, op.cit., p.19. 120. Unksova, op.cit., p.20.
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hegemony. By August 1919, however, the MK had changed its
position and decided to form a female worker department
(zhenotdel) headed by a member of the MK, and called on the RKs
to do the same, and for the cells to appoint a person to be
121 
responsible for this work. In September of that year the TsK
also reorganised its commission into a department, headed 
initially by Armand. It had taken a long campaign by the female 
worker commission activists to convince the party committees of 
the necessity of this change. On the other hand, there are 
indications that the conversion of the commissions into party 
departments was a measure designed not only to improve their 
effectiveness but also to ensure adequate party supervision over 
the organised women's movement. As Minkov put it at the November 
1919 Moscow guberniya party conference, there had been a gulf 
between the commissions and the party committees, and the 
majority of the commission members had been 'very young party 
members or sympathisers who did not know how to carry out active
and correct work'. Hence he called for one or two committee
122 
members to join the zhenotdely.
The appointment of cell members responsible for female 
worker organisation took place only slowly in circumstances of a 
multitude of other demands being placed on them. Only 87 cells
had complied by January 1920, but by September 1920 the figure
123 had risen to 275, and by mid-1921 628. Raion unification in
spring 1920 consolidated zhenotdel reserves in the raions, and 
the unification of the city and guberniya in May 1920 led to
121. p_ f 16 August 1919. 122. XVI Mosk. gubpartkonf. , p.6. 
123. Unksova, op.cit., p.21.
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increased agitation among female peasants. The zhenotdely called 
delegate meetings of female workers. The delegates were usually 
elected not for one meeting but for a certain term (usually three 
months, with one delegate representing 50 female workers) and
represented their electorate at all meetings held in that period,
124 
a system unique to this organisation. By the end of the civil
war five all-city female worker delegate conferences had been
125 held. By November 1920 there were about 2500 permanent
delegates in the city and guberniya. As S.N. Smidovich, head of 
the MK zhenotdel since 1919, stated, they tended to be involved 
in the practical work of the Soviets, especially the supply 
departments, education and social security. She estimated that 
the female worker organisation was active, through the system of
1 J £
delegates, in about 5% of the enterprises in the city.
From the above account it can be seen that the Moscow female 
worker movement was from the first closely allied to the party 
organisation and took its inspiration from the objectives set by 
the party. As we have seen, the history of the youth movement 
followed a different course. Several reasons can be suggested
124. In the raions delegate meetings for women were held fairly 
frequently. In Sushchevsko-Mar'inskii raion, for instance, 5 
delegate meetings and one conference with 300 delegates had met 
in the three months from the formation of the commission in March 
1919, P_, 18 May 1919.
125. The first had been attended by 200 delegates (November- 
December 1918); the second by 300 (January 1919); the third by 
over 900 (June 1919) (P_, 12 June 1919); the fourth by 3000 (March 
1920); and the fifth (meeting for the first time with the 
guberniya) was attended by 3771 delegates (July 1920) (Unksova, 
op.cit., p.22; Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g., p.9; Moskovskaya 
gubernskaya konferentsiya rabotnits i krest'yanok (rezolyutsii i 
stat'i), M. 1920, p.8.
126. KT. 6 November 1920.
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for this difference. Whereas the youth movement from 1917 took 
on a mass character distinct from the party's youth organisation, 
and was only later brought under party control, no such powerful 
independent movement developed among female workers. They 
traditionally laboured under a two-fold oppression: as workers, 
they shared the deprivations of the working class as a whole; and 
as women, they suffered from the whole gamut of cultural 
prejudices typical of the society. Even to achieve party support 
in the formation of the female worker commissions and departments 
in Moscow and elsewhere they had to wage a determined 
struggle. But the price of party support during the 
civil war, necessary because the female worker movement lacked 
sufficiently powerful historical traditions to enable it to 
develop on its own strength alone, was that a compromise had to 
be made between the more general aims of the movement, aimed at 
changing fundamental social relations, and the more limited 
function of the female worker movement, as a way of mobilising 
support for the Bolsheviks. While during the 1920s the 
compromise was for a time somewhat broadened to include the whole 
range of social conditions of life known as byt, the legacy of 
the civil war prevented the development of a women's movement 
solely committed to its own liberation.
8 . The peasantry
Towards the end of the civil war in Moscow, and emphasised 
by the unification of the city and guberniya party and soviet 
organisations in early 1920, the problem of agitation among the 
peasantry became a direct concern of the city organisation. We 
have already noted the miniscule number of communists in the
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guberniya. Added to the previous resistance to party 
penetration in the countryside at the end of 1920 economic 
factors made the difficulties worse. In Moscow guberniya in 1920 
the sown area in comparison with 1917, at a conservative
estimate, had decreased by 15%, slightly lower than the national
127 
average of 16%. Added to this the guberniya 1 s 230,000
peasant households in 1920 were faced with drought and the
128 
consequent harvest loss.
The nature of agitprop work in the guberniya is illustrated 
by Minkov's report at the XVI guberniya party conference in 
November 1919. The main topic discussed at peasant meetings was 
the situation at the fronts since, as Minkov stated, the state of 
the fronts depended on the peasantry. Hence work among the 
peasantry, 'among the deserters', was largely agitational:
The peasantry is that layer of the population which is 
the most difficult for us to bend to the side of 
communism owing to its petty-bourgeois egotistic 
psychology, caused by its landlordish petty-proprietor 
position in capitalist society, its isolation from 
large-scale industry, and,the backwardness in which it 
has been kept for years.
The lack of response to the party by the peasantry was not 
only a result of the factors listed by Minkov but also by the 
lack of sensitivity displayed by party agitators in the 
countryside. A speaker at the conference even argued that during 
a recent peasant week in the guberniya party agitators had done 
more harm than good because of their 'complete lack of 
understanding of the countryside'.
127. Posevnaya kampaniya v Moskovskoi gubernii, M. 1921, p-4.
128. ibid., p.12. 129. XVI gubpartkonf, pp.4-5.
130. ibid., p.15.
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Under the old guberniya committee the department for work in 
the countryside had been neglected. The new joint organisation 
incorporated the department and increased its staff. Its main 
campaign was the organisation of a 'peasant week' from 20 August
1920 in which 400 experienced and 500 inexperienced party workers
132 
were sent from the city. At the end of the year the
department participated in the organisation of the sowing 
campaign in the guberniya, and teams of Moscow party workers were 
sent out to intensify agitation in the villages. Moscow 
guberniya avoided some of the worst peasant uprisings, but it 
would appear from the above figures that the 'peasants' strike 1 
was one response to the reguisitioning demands of the state.
While the policies adopted by the party in relationship to 
non-party people were effective in achieving the immediate aim of 
winning the war, they inevitably accented the dominance of 
administrative methods. 'Iron discipline 1 within the party 
stimulated military methods in relation to non-party groups, 
which in turn reinforced dictatorial methods within the party. 
Myasnikov gives a vivid description of the cycle when for a short 
time at the end of 1920 and early 1921 the party and trade union 
debates forced the issue into the open:
The times created a long chain of repeated recurrence 
of party pressure (nazhim) and the dictatorship of the 
committees. We must not forget that pressure was 
brought to bear not only by the ail-Russian centre but
131. Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g., p.4; KT, 1 August 1920.
132. Otchet MK za avgust 1920g., p.16.
133. The decline in sown area was partially due, of course, to 
the lack of manpower, tools, horsepower, and seed.
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by every given or local centre in relation to its 
periphery: the gubkom, uezd committee, and even the cell 
bureau. We can recall (and indeed it is probably still 
being practiced) how many of our comrades, rank and file 
worker communists, at a factory or plant meeting put 
pressure on the non-party masses. I remember how at a 
meeting of one of Moscow's enterprises (Mars) I asked 
why the factory committee, composed of communists, 
conducted the general meeting on elections to the Moscow 
soviet in such a dictatorial way. The leading comrade 
(he is a member of the opposition now) answered me in 
these precise words: one cannot deal with the 
masses in any other way(italicsin original). And do 
not comrades remember the multitude of incidents in our 
agitational practice: the barring of factory gates-.so 
that workers could not leave meetings, and so on.
At the time such methods were considered necessary and justified 
by the military emergency, but they left a legacy which outlasted 
the war.
134. Myasnikov, Izb.proiz., pp.319-20.
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CHAPTER 8 
The Soviets, Bureaucracy, and Popular Control
One of the major changes influencing the party was its 
transformation into the organising force in the localities as a 
territorial entity controlling the social organisations at every 
level. The development of the relations between the party and 
the state was the subject of continuing debate during the civil 
war. Above all, the question centred on the relationship between 
the party and the Soviets; the powers of the localities; the 
prevention of bureaucratism; and the relationship between the 
party members working in the soviet apparatus and the party 
organisations.
1. The Moscow Soviets
a. The Moscow soviet
i. Organisation and elections
The Moscow workers' and soldiers' Soviets had been united 
immediately following the October revolution. At the first 
plenary session of the joint soviet on 14 November 1917 an 
executive committee (EC) had been elected with 60 representatives 
from the workers' soviet and 30 from the soldiers', each acting 
as a section of the soviet. A presidium of 15 was also elected. 
Both the EC and the presidium were elected by the full plenum of
1. The EC consisted of 63 Bolsheviks, 10 Mensheviks, 3 LSRs, and 
4 United. The presidium consisted of 11 Bolsheviks (Budzinskii, 
Lomov, Malinovskii, Pokrovskii, Rozengol'ts, Rykov, Smidovich, 
Smirnov, Usievich, Yaroslavskii), 3 LSRs (Bitsenko, Sablin, 
Zitta),'and 1 United (Volgin), KM, col.33.
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2both sections. M.N. Pokrovskii was chosen by the MK to replace
the coalition supporter V.P. Nogin as chairman of the soviet.
The Mensheviks refused to join the presidium on the grounds 
that it would take power away from the plenum. Their fears were 
almost immediately realised as the presidium took on the 
extraordinary powers of the Military Revolutionary Committee, 
which restricted itself to security matters and at some unknown 
date in late 1917 disappeared. The new joint soviet used the 
existing structure of the workers' soviet, but the departments 
and committees were now subordinate to the presidium and required 
its signature before taking even the most minor of decisions. 
The presidium was in almost continuous session, meeting 123 times
between November 1917 and March 1918, and 30 times alone in the
4 last two weeks of November 1917. At the EC session of 27
November 1917 an attempt was made to restrict the presidium's 
functions, with political questions to be decided by the EC which 
was to meet twice a week. The same meeting restructured the 
work of the soviet by forming collegia and commissions at the 
head of each department controlled by a commissar. Democratic 
forms were therefore introduced in parallel with a centralised 
practice, and they coexisted until the civil war undermined the 
collegia system. From the first the forms in which Bolshevik 
power was achieved, by a military operation, were 
institutionalised in the structure of the soviet in the form of 
the presidium.
2. SD, 15 November 1917; Podgotovka i pobeda oktyabr'skoi 
revolyutsii y Moskve: dokumenty i materialy, M. 1957, p.474.
3. KM, col.32. 4. Aleshchenko (1968), p.27. 
5 . loc.cit.
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Elections to the Moscow soviet in April 1918, held in an 
atmosphere of bitter recriminations between the various parties, 
nevertheless saw significant Bolshevik gains (Table 22). At the 
first meeting of the newly elected soviet on 23 April 1918 the 
soviet was restructured, in line with MK recommendations, to 
relieve the presidium of some of its everyday duties and to give 
greater powers to the departments. Each of the 17 departments 
was to be headed by a collegium led by a member of the presidium. 
The soldiers' section had already been abolished on 19 March 1918 
with direct representation from the army envisaged.
With the onset of the civil war the Moscow soviet plenum 
entered a period of increasing ineffectiveness. The majority of 
its 42 sessions in 1918 were held in the first half of the year.
The plenum met 28 times in 1919, and in the first 8 months of
7 1920 15 times. It increasingly only met for triumphal occasions
and to hear reports from one or another Soviet leader. On 8 
October 1918 the powers of the presidium were once again 
substantially increased and its membership was drastically
6. A new EC of 71 was elected: 55 Bolsheviks, 9 Mensheviks, 4 
LSRs, and 3 Centre SRs. A new presidium was elected on 26 April 
of 24 members and 4 candidates, 22 Bolsheviks and 2 LSRs, and the 
Mensheviks still refused to participate. The presidium members 
were Smidovich (chairman), Akulov, Bukharin, Burovtsev, 
Goncharov, Ignatov, Lomov, Maksimov, Mostovenko, Nazarov, Obukh, 
Orekhov, Osinskii, Piskarev, Radzivillov, Ratekhin, Rogov, 
Semashko, Serebryakov, Sokol'nikov, Vladimirskii, Znamenskii, and 
the 2 LSRs Bitsenko and Dobrokhotova (KM, cols.34-5). Following 
the LSR uprising of 5-7 July 1918 and the Menshevik-influenced 
worker disturbances of early summer 1918 new elections were held 
to the Soviet's executive bodies on 23 July 1918, which left only 
1 LSR on an EC of 41 and 11 Bolsheviks on a reduced presidium. 
The 11 were Smidovich (chairman), Burovtsev, Goncharov, Ignatov, 
Kuraev, Maksimov, Orekhov, Rogov, Serebryakov, Vladimirskii, 
Znamenskii, KM, col.35.
7. KM, col.5.
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reduced to 5. At the same time it was no longer to be elected by
a
the plenum but by the EC. These moves were ostensibly balanced 
by the plenum decision of 16 October 1918 to make the EC more 
responsible to itself by demanding more frequent reports on its
activities. Nevertheless, the powers of the EC were enhanced and
g it was now allowed to issue orders in its own name.
No general elections were held to the soviet between April 
1918 and February 1920 , and instead the principle of recall was 
operated whereby factories and institutions could at any time 
change their deputy. In practice this often turned into a 
manoeuvre to eliminate non-Bolshevik deputies. Between May and 
December 1918 423 deputies were recalled, an average of 53 a 
month. In 1919 411 were recalled, about 34 a month. In the two 
years a total of 834 deputies were changed, and about 99% of 
their replacements were communists. Kamenev, speaking to 
Bertrand Russell in 1920, stated that the main reasons for recall 
were drunkenness, departure for the front, a change of politics
on the part of the electorate, and failure to make reports to the
12 electorate once a fortnight, obligatory for all deputies.
8 . loc.cit.
9. The 16 October session elected a presidium of 5: Rogov, 
Romanov, Smidovich, Vladimirskii, Znamenskii. Kamenev,elected 
soviet chairman in August 1918, and Serebryakov as the Soviet's 
business manager were automatically included, VIMS, 17 October 1918.    
10. On 27 May 1919 the presidium was expanded to 10 members and 
the EC was renewed as part of an attempt to rejuvenate the 
soviet. The 10 were Kamenev (chairman), Likhachev, Maksimov, 
Rogov, Rusakov, Smidovich, Tsivtsivadze, Vladimirskii, Zelenskii, 
Znamenskii, Stenotchety MS, 15, 1919, p.225; £, 29 May 1919.
11. VIMS, 14 February 1920.
12. Bertrand Russell, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, 
London 1920, p.75.
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A reregistration of the plenum in December 1918 discovered that 
the number of Menshevik deputies had already fallen from 86 to 19 
through recall since April 1918. The total number of deputies 
had fallen from 869 to 662, indicating that a quarter of the 
deputies had left for one reason or another, and a survey of 
Moscow's enterprises in February 1919 found that about 300, or 
two-fifths of the total census enterprises, lacked a 
representative in the soviet.
Concurrent with the decline in the plenum the work of the 
soviet was streamlined. At the height of the civil war Kamenev 
argued that all resources should be concentrated on the military, 
supply and social security tasks. In July 1919 the soviet 
reorganised its work to concentrate personnel on these tasks by 
reducing the numbers in its 20 collegia, and the collegia were 
abolished altogether in some departments and in most raion 
Soviets. The non-party conferences and not the Soviets were now
to play the role of intermediaries between the soviet state and
14 the population. Further centralisation in the Moscow Soviets
was implemented in November 1919. Current work in the Moscow 
soviet was to be conducted by a rather shadowy general management 
committee responsible only to the presidium, which still retained 
ultimate political responsibility. Collegia were to be further 
reduced and departments centralised. All current work in the 
raions was to be conducted by the chairmen of the raion soviet 
ECs responsible to the presidia on matters of principle, and the
13. Stenotchety MS, 3, 1919, p.33.
14. P, 15 July 1919; VIMS, 14 July, 1 August 1919.
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ECs themselves were to be reduced to a maximum of ten members. 
The lull in the civil war in early 1920 permitted general 
elections to be held to the Moscow soviet. The elections ended 
on 29 February 1920 after 15 days of voting and saw the 
Bolsheviks returned with an increased majority (Table 22). Out
of a total of about 1,200,000 people in the city 606,000 were
17 
unable to vote for various reasons. According to official
figures 569,803 people were eligible to vote, though from these 
figures 594,000 had the right. Out of the former figure 236,682
people voted, 42% of those eligible and 20% of the total
18 population. Clearly, whatever the exact figures, the turnout
was low and indicates a reluctance to participate in the 
elections.
At the first plenary session of the soviet on 6 March 1920
Kamenev, opposed only by Martov who received 31 votes, was
19 
elected chairman. Myasnikov's proposed list of Bolsheviks for
the EC was opposed by both the Mensheviks and the non-party group 
on the grounds that they deserved representation. In the event
15. VIMS, 13 November 1919.
16. Various figures have been given for the results, but the 
following are probably the most accurate: Communists 1316 
deputies (84.3%), Communist sympathisers 52 (3.3%), non-party 145 
(9.3%), Mensheviks 46 (2.9%), Anarchist-Maximalists 1, and the 
Jewish Socialist Party 1, to give a total of 1561 deputies (VIMS, 
8 March 1920; £, 3 March 1920; KM, col.673). Support for non^ 
party candidates often represented an anti-Bolshevik vote.
17. 468,000 (39%) were under 18; 90,000 (7.5%) were old, ill, or 
criminals, and 30,000 (2.5%) were deprived of voting rights by 
the terms of the July 1918 Soviet constitution since they hired 
labour.
18. Stenotchety MS, 1, 1920, p.l; VIMS, 8 March 1920.
19. Stenotchety MS, 1, 1920, p.2.
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their protests were ignored and a pure Bolshevik list of 40
20 
members and 12 candidates was adopted. The minority groupings
were thereby deprived of any representation on the Soviet's 
executive bodies.
At that session Dan on behalf of the Mensheviks insisted that 
the election results did not reflect the true situation in the 
city. He catalogued a whole series of factors inhibiting the 
Mensheviks: lack of newspapers, no meeting halls, freedom of 
speech curtailed, and the use of direct violence against them. 
Electoral privileges had been abused by the Bolsheviks, he 
claimed, as instanced by the 300 members of the MGSPS having the 
right to nominate 148 soviet deputies. Electoral geography had 
been gerrymandered in order to under-represent the Menshevik- 
inclined employees, and because of the fusion of the electoral 
apparatus with the Communist Party fair elections were ruled out. 
Despite this, he stated, wherever Mensheviks had stood they had 
been elected. He insisted that the Mensheviks would help in the 
struggle against counter-revolution, but called for the full
democratisation of the soviet system so that the 'voice of the
22 
workers could once again be heard 1 . There is a mass of
20. Stenotchety MS, 1, 1920, p.13; KM, col.37. The meeting of 
the EC on 9 March 1920 selected a presidium of 7: Kamenev, 
Likhachev, Lisitsyn, Mel'nichanskii, Myasnikov, Rogov, and 
Smidovich, and 2 candidates: Rusakov and Serebryakov, KT, 1 
March 1920.
21. The rationale for excluding non-party representatives from 
soviet executive bodies was explained by the communist fraction 
of the newly united Krasnopresnenskii raion soviet in March 1920 
it had been discovered, they stated, that non-partyness had been 
used as a mask to cover undesirable party affiliations. There 
was nothing to prevent non-party people from joining a party, 
they argued, KT, 31 March 1920.
22. Stenotchety MS, 1, 1920, pp.12-13.
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23 
evidence to support the Menshevik accusations. When the
British Labour Party delegation met the Moscow printworkers on 23 
May 1920 both Chernov, leader of the SRs and sought by the 
Bolsheviks, and Dan inveighed against the restrictions on their 
activities:
You think we have freedom, workers' power. Nothing of 
the sort. Our newspapers are closed, meetings are not 
allowed. Tell the proletariat of the West that.it is 
now no better than it was under the autocracy.
Bertrand Russell, in Moscow from 11 May - 16 June 1920, commented 
on his return that although the Bolsheviks claimed a greater 
democracy in the soviet, with recall and occupational 
constituencies, 'no conceivable system of free elections would
23. The American journalist Marguerite Harrison states that the 
voting by acclamation in factories inhibited the raising of 
dissident voices. She reports the method of uniting places where 
the Bolsheviks were weak with Bolshevik strongholds to ensure a 
majority for the latter. An example of this was the joining of 
the Moscow food administration with the staff of the Cheka for 
voting purposes (Harrison, Marooned, p.67). Emma Goldman reports 
the case of an unnamed Moscow factory which elected an anarchist 
to the Moscow soviet in the February 1920 elections. Three times 
the soviet refused to register him as a deputy and instead the 
Bolshevik candidate Semashko, commissar for health, was forced on 
them after the arrest of several workers. Chekists attended 
other election meetings and insisted, by the use of arms, that 
communists were elected. Despite this the bakers elected their 
own candidates (Goldman, Disillusionment, pp.139-40). Indirect 
evidence of Bolshevik manipulation in elections comes from the 
activities of N. Osinskii in Tula in March 1920. After a long 
period of 'no discussion 1 (bez prenii) the party organisation had 
decided to make the elections free: 'Our party organisation in 
this campaign set itself completely different aims than those in 
Moscow. We decided that a communist soviet was not 
obligatory... We set mass agitation as the highest priority even 
if this would be at the expense of several dozen mandates'. In 
the elections voting was secret and the party list included some 
non-party people (Vestnik Propagandy, MK RKP(b), 8, 12 July 1920, 
p.76). In the event 50 Mensheviks were elected, Liebman, p.250.
24. KT, 25 May 1920. There were ten people in the delegation, 
includTng Ben Turner, Ethel Snowden, Robert Williams, Purcell, 
and Russell as a representative of the press. After the meeting 
Chernov managed to slip away, but Dan was less fortunate and was 
detained by the Cheka, Goldman, Disillusionment, p.135.
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give majorities to the communists, either in the town or in the
<- . 25 
country'.
The end of the worst phase of the civil war saw attempts to 
redress the balance of power away from the presidium and its 
general management body. An instruction issued by the EC meeting 
of 15 April 1920 stressed that the presidium was responsible to
the EC, which coordinated the work of the whole soviet, while the
? 6 presidium was only to deal with practical current affairs. It
was only with the unification of the city and guberniya Soviets 
in May 1920 that the city soviet became responsible to a general 
gathering other than the national soviet congresses and VTsIK. 
Up to that time the Moscow Soviet's executive bodies were only 
responsible to the soviet plenum itself and the NKVD, a situation 
created by the abolition of the oblast soviet organisation in 
early 1919.
The idea of unification had been mooted several times in
1919 but had come to nothing, possibly owing to the city Soviet's 
fear of losing its independence. In 1920 however, with pressure 
from the TsK to form a single system of party organisations, the 
unification of the Soviets inevitably followed. At the 21 May
1920 guberniya party conference Zelenskii argued that once the 
party organisations had been united the soviet organisations 
would have to follow suit. At the same time economic 
considerations also demanded the ending of artificial barriers
between the city and its hinterland in respect to supplies,
2 7 labour and economic planning. A unification commission decided
25. Russell, pp.72-3. 26. KT, 20 April 1920. 
27. KM, col.674.
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that there was to be a joint EC for the city and the guberniya:
? 830 members from the city and 20 from the guberniya. The
highest organ was to be the guberniya conference of Soviets 
elected on the basis of one deputy from every 2000 workers and
one from 10,000 peasants to ensure a proletarian majority in the
29 
united soviet. On 11 June 1920 the first session of the joint
EC, consisting of 51 members and 23 candidates, elected a 
presidium of 11 nominated by the MK. The old 23 departments 
and 7 commissions under the city soviet, and 20 departments under 
the guberniya soviet, were merged to form 18 new departments. 
Further elections took place at the II guberniya soviet
conference on 16 December 1920 to an EC of 50 and 26
32 
candidates. Following the disturbances of early 1921 the
elections to the Moscow soviet in April 1921 reduced the 
Bolshevik majority by 10% to 72.9%, while the 533 (25.2%) non- 
party deputies clearly represented a protest vote (Table 22).
28. KT, 16 May 1920. 29. KT, 22 May 1920.
30. Kamenev (chairman), Badaev, Lavrov, Likhachev, Lisitsyn, 
Mel'nichanskii, Minkov, Polidorov, Rogov, Smidovich, Zelenskii, 
with Kirov and Rusakov as candidates, KT, 15 June 1920.
31. KT, 2 June 1920.
32. KT, 18 December 1920. At the 3 January 1921 EC session a 
new presidium was elected of Kamenev, Badaev, Boguslavskii, 
Drozhzhin, Lavrov, Likhachev, Rogov, Tarasov, Uryvaev, 
Zelenskii,and Zheltov, with Minkov and Orekhov as candidates (KT, 
4 January 1921). Between 14 November 1917 and 3 January 1921 1~ 
total of 53 people served on the Moscow soviet presidium in its 8 
compositions, only 4 of whom were LSRs and 1 United, none of 
whom served after July 1918. Smidovich served in every presidium 
save the last, and Rogov in all except the first, i.e., each was 
elected 7 times. Kamenev sat in every presidium after August 
1918. A significant feature of the 3 January 1921 elections was 
the large proportion who joined for the first time, 5 out of 11 
members, and included figures such as Uryvaev and Zheltov who 
were to figure prominently in the 1920s. A new generation of 
Moscow soviet leaders was emerging.
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ii. Composition
Table 22 
The composition of the Moscow soviet plenum, J917-1921
Jun 1917 May 1918 Dec 1918 Feb 1920 Apr 1921 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Total 700 100 869 100 662 100 1532 100 2115 100
Sex
Male 677 96.7 830 95.5 634 95.8 1399 91.3 2031 96.0
Female 23 3.3 39 4.5 28 4.2 133 8.7 84 4.0
Party
Bolshevik 230 32.8 491 56.5 430 64.9 1270 82.9 1543 72.9
Bol.symp. - - 114 13.1 96 14.5 50 3.3
Menshevik 221 31.6 86 9.9 19 2.9 40 2.6 12 0.6
(L)SR 132 18.9 31 3.6 8 1.2 - - 6 0.3
Others 63 9.0 65 7.5 11 1.7 6 0.4 10 0.5
Non-party 54 7.7 73 8.4 42 6.3 166 10.8 533 25.2
Not known - 9 1.0 56 8.5 11 0.5
Profession
Manual worker 670 71.3 437 66.0 1146 74.8
Employee 63 7.3 51 7.7 250 16.3
Brain worker 142 16.3 97 14.6 136 8.9
Red Army 2 0.2 - - 149 9.7
Not known 44 5.1 77 11.6 - - -
Occupation
Manual worker 356 40.8 218 32.9 488 31.8
Employee 35 4.0 23 3.5 - -
Brain worker 364 41.9 316 47.7 895 58.4
Red Army - - 149 9.7
Not known 114 13.1 105 15.9 - -
Sources: Moskovskii sovet za desyat' let raboty, M.1927, pp.78- 
9; KM, cols.39-48.
The percentage of Bolsheviks in the soviet increased 
steadily throughout the civil war as they tightened their hold on 
the city: from just over half in April 1918 to over four-fifths 
in February 1920. At the same time the proportion of non- 
communist or communist sympathiser deputies fell from nearly a 
third in 1918 to less than 15% in 1920. The fall in the 
percentage of sympathisers in February 1920 is probably due to
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their induction into the party during the party week of October 
1919. The SR vote collapsed rapidly from mid-1917, while the 
Mensheviks were able to retain a significant presence up to 1920. 
With the beginning of the NEP the percentage of communist 
deputies fell, but at the same time the proportion of non- 
Bolshevik deputies fell to a miniscule 1.4% though the true level 
of support for them is probably revealed by the high proportion 
of non-party deputies elected.
From Table 22 we can see the tendency for the number of 
deputies in some sort of management job to rise. The massive 
agitation campaign of February 1920 to bring in 'fresh 1 workers 
was successful in raising their numbers, but the proportion 
actually involved in labour continued to fall. The largest non- 
worker occupational groups in the soviet were members and 
chairmen of soviet collegia and committees, followed by the heads 
of institutions and enterprises, and finally members of 
commissions of one form or another. An indication of the growing 
1 intellectualisation' of the soviet was the rise in the general 
educational level. Those with higher education rose from 6.5% in 
April 1918 to 9.5% in 1920, and those with secondary education 
from 14 to 18%, respectively. The great majority, however, had 
only gained elementary education. By 1920 the single largest 
union represented in the soviet was that of soviet employees (140 
deputies, or 9.1%) of the total), with the metal workers second 
with 121 (7.9%) deputies, railway workers third with 116 (7.6%), 
and then the textile workers with 72 deputies (4.7%). In 1918 
the textile and metal unions had shared first place, and the
33. KM, cols.42, 46, 48.
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change reflects the decline in industry and the increased 
importance of bureaucratic workers.
One measure of the difference between the soviet of 1917 and 
that of 1920 was the disappearance of the rank and file soldier 
from the soviet. Of the 149 Red Army deputies in March 1920 93 
were instructors, 8 were in officer training, and of the other 18 
a large proportion were militiamen. The abolition of the 
soldiers' soviet in November 1917 and of the soldiers' section in 
March 1918 deprived the soldiery, and hence the peasantry, of any 
organised participation in Moscow's political life.
During the civil war the Moscow soviet became an even younger 
body than it had been in 1918. The median age fell from 33 in 
1918 to just under 30 in 1920, and the single largest age group 
was no longer the 31-35 year olds (34% in 1918 to 25% in 1920) 
but those aged between 26-30 (24% in 1918 to 33% in 1920). 36 The 
percentage of women remained low at the 4% mark, with the 
exception of the rise to 9% in March 1920, a sign of the buoyant 
state of the MK female worker department at the time. The 
proportion of those who had undergone repression before February 
1917 fell from 64% in 1918 to 54% in 1920. 37
b. The raion Soviets
By October 1917 the majority of the raion Soviets were
dominated by the Bolsheviks, and their hold was consolidated by
3 8 
elections held soon after the revolution. Further elections in
34. KM, cols. 40-2, 44-6, 50. 35. KM, col.48.
36. KM, cols. 39-41, 47. 37. KM, cols.39, 46, 49.
38. No overall figures are available but the Bolshevik dominance
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April 1918, held in conjunction with those to the city soviet,
gave the Bolsheviks 72.4% of the seats. By July 1920 1209
40 (67%) of the 1800 raion soviet deputies were Bolsheviks. The
fall in the percentage indicates that non-Bolsheviks found it 
easier to get elected to the raion Soviets than to the carefully 
controlled city soviet.
The peculiarity of Moscow's raion Soviets was that up to 
mid-1918 they acted as the factory committee councils in lieu of 
a city-wide council of the type that existed in Petrograd. This 
was consistent with the general pattern of decentralised politics 
typical of Moscow. The raion Soviets retained a fluidity in 
their practice that reflected their origins. For instance, when 
elections were held to the Basmannyi raion soviet EC towards the 
end of July 1918 its 15 members (all communists) were not elected
by a simple plenary session of the soviet but by a joint meeting
41 of the party RK, various activists, and the old EC.
With the absorption of the factory committees into the trade 
union structure from early 1918, and the raion soviet control 
commissions into the economic councils from mid-1918, they lost 
their main role, though retained certain popular control
can be illustrated by the election to the Presnenskii raion 
soviet on 23 November 1917. Out of 94 deputies 83 were 
Bolsheviks, 8 Mensheviks, and 3 SRs. The EC was comprised of 27 
Bolsheviks, 3 Mensheviks, and 1 SR, Moskovskii sovet za 10 let, 
pp.73-4.
39. A total of 467 deputies were elected: 338 Bolsheviks, 42 
Mensheviks, 28 LSRs, and 59 others, D.A. Tolstikh, Deyatel'nost' 
Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii po sozdaniyu organov Sovetskoi 
ylasti v Moskve (oktyabr'1917 - iyun'1918g.), M. 1958, p.407.
40. Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g., p.3. 41. P, 20 July 1918.
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(see below) and administrative functions. During the civil war 
the raion Soviets entered into a long decline, and were 
increasingly restricted to acting as the local agents of the city 
soviet. The Moscow soviet EC meeting of 16 October 1918
formalised the relationship by decreeing that the raion Soviets
42 
were directly subordinate to the city EC. Their political
weakness was exacerbated by the fact that the majority of their 
deputies were simultaneously members of the central soviet and 
therefore could not devote themselves, or indeed their loyalties, 
to the raions. In effect, the raion Soviets were simply the 
local departments of the city soviet.
The raion Soviets undertook a range of municipal functions 
in their districts, and acted as yet another reservoir of cadres 
to be sent into state posts. According to Zelenskii many of the 
EC members in the Soviets, and he cited the 15 elected in 
Basmannyi raion, were taken straight from the shopfloor and set
to organisational work. Their inexperience, he argued, rendered
43 their first efforts ineffective. The staffs of the raion
Soviets expanded in line with the general expansion of
administrative offices of the time. By mid-1919, for example,
44 the soviet for the small Butyrskii raion employed 700 people.
From mid-1919 strenuous efforts were made to decrease staff
45 
numbers, but the attempts met with little success. At the end
of 1919 certain departments under the raion Soviets were 
abolished, others curtailed (such as their economic departments),
42. VIMS, 17 October 1918. 43. VIMS, 23 July 1918. 
44. VIMS, 14 June 1919. 45. VIMS, 21 June 1919.
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46 
or transferred to the central soviet (e.g., statistics). as
part of the attempts to reduce duplication and to cut down on 
staff levels.
The raion Soviets as much as the city soviet saw the centre 
of power shift from the plena to the executive bodies. Between 
February and September 1919, for instance, the Butyrskii raion
soviet met in plenary session only 10 times (about once a month),
4 7 
while the EC had met 18 times and the presidium 44 times. The
raion Soviets joined in the general chorus complaing about the 
lack of activists at their disposal. By all accounts they were 
poorly organised and by 1920 politically moribund. Ignatov 
described the condition of the Gorodskoi raion soviet on the eve 
of new elections in July 1920. In February 1920 out of the 306
members of the raion soviet 229 (three-quarters) were also
48 
members of the city soviet. The 229 represented the larger
plants and institutions in the raion, while the other 77 
represented the smaller places, of which there were many in the 
raion, leaving the majority unrepresented. The last elections to 
the raion soviet had taken place at the end of 1918 and since 
then the majority of deputies had lost contact with their 
constituencies. The 229 devoted themselves to the city soviet,
and therefore the raion soviet met only rarely. Only 40 deputies
49 had attended its last session.
46. VIMS, 15 November 1919. 47. VIMS, 12 September 1919.
48. Out of 113,021 eligible only 48.3% had voted, KM, cols.49- 
50; KT, 17 July 1920.
49. KT, 2 July 1920. In the July elections 304 deputies were 
returned from 121 enterprises by 49,702 voters (less than 50% of 
those eligible): 238 communists, 63 non-party, and 3 anarchists. 
The 15 Mensheviks failed to be returned, KT, 1 August 1920.
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During the civil war the raion Soviets were undermined as 
political centres as part of the general pattern of the decline 
in raion-based democracy. They lost their economic and workers' 
control functions, power was concentrated in their executive 
bodies, and their links with the local working class became 
tenuous. They became the local administrative agencies for 
the city soviet.
The absence of a Bolshevik municipal programme independent of 
the general aims of the Bolshevik movement provided the context 
for the rapid undermining of municipal politics after October 
1917. As we have seen, the Moscow Soviet's economic functions 
were weakened with the development of the centralised economic 
system. At the same time, in place of the hectic municipal 
politics of 1917 in which the Moscow soviet and the raion 
Soviets, the city duma and the raion dumas, participated, after 
the revolution the Soviets became the unique form of municipal 
political expression. Limited by the Commissariat of Internal 
Affairs (NKVD) and by centralised decision-making in general, as 
in supply policy, the Moscow soviet and the raion Soviets became 
integrated into the general state system which allowed them 
little autonomy. Within the Soviets the Bolsheviks organised as 
a caucus and in effect decision-making was removed from the plena 
as the party committees directed soviet work through their 
dominance in soviet executive bodies. By the end of war 
communism the Moscow Soviets had become moribund as far as mass 
participatory democracy was concerned. As we shall see below, 
however, there were attempts at reviving them within the context 
of war communism.
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2 . The one-party state
Following the demonstration against the dissolution of the 
Constituent Assembly on 5 January 1918 the Moscow soviet EC on 29 
January 1918 deprived the SRs of the right to participate in the 
Soviet's executive bodies. The 14 June 1918 VTsIK session 
decided to exclude the Mensheviks and SRs from the central 
Soviets, and recommended that local Soviets followed suit. The 
MK on 17 June condemned both parties and resolved on their
expulsion from the soviet, a move confirmed by the city party
52 
conference on 22 June. At this time the Menshevik organisation
in the city consisted of no more than 600 members. Now the 
soviet plenum on 25 June deprived the Menshevik fraction, led by 
I.A. Isuv and B. Kibrik, and the SRs of the rights of 'soviet 
parties' and expelled their representatives from the executive
bodies of the soviet, and the Right and Centre SRs were expelled
54 from the soviet altogether. They were also expelled from the
raion Soviets. The LSRs had resigned from the government 
following the Brest peace in March 1918, and following their 
abortive uprising in Moscow in early July the Moscow soviet 
plenum on 23 July expelled the majority from the soviet and 
in new elections all the other parties (except one LSR) were 
eliminated from its executive bodies (see above). From this
50. KM, col.20.
51. The same decree ordered the dissolution of the workers' 
conferences in which the Mensheviks played an active part.
52. Uprochenie, pp.46-7.
53. L.M. Spirin, Klassy i partii v grazhdanskoi voine v Rossii 
(1917-1920gg.) , M. 1968, pp.157-8.
54. KM, col.7; Uprochenie, pp.49-51.
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point the SRs of whatever colour played no significant part in 
the soviet. The beginning of the civil war therefore saw the 
overwhelming hegemony of the Bolsheviks established over the 
representative institutions in Moscow.
In the factories the Mensheviks continued their struggle for 
the independence of the trade unions and to preserve workers' 
living standards even though they had lost their voice in the 
proceedings of the Moscow Soviet's executive bodies. The further 
history of Menshevik participation in the soviet went through 
several phases but was marked by bitter splits within the 
Menshevik party itself. On the right wing were defensists such 
as Liber, who at a session of the Moscow oblast committee of 
Mensheviks on 23 July 1918 proposed a successful resolution which 
recognised that the anti-Bolshevik movement was very wide and 
contained pogromists. Nevertheless, the resolution argued, 'in 
the interests of the working class and democracy' the Mensheviks 
should continue to participate in it. The left wing was 
represented by internationalists like O-A. Ermanskii, who fought 
for dialogue with the Bolsheviks from the point of view of 
'Marxist realism 1 . A gradual leftening of the Menshevik TsK 
and Dan personally took place over the summer of 1918. Martov's 
internationalist view influenced the 14 November 1918 Menshevik 
decision to withdraw support from the anti-Bolshevik struggle 
and to agitate 'within the framework of soviet forms and the 
constitution 1 for the democratisation and softening of the
55. VIMS, 13 August 1918.
56. O.A. Ermanskii, Iz perezhitogo, M/L. 1927, p.188.
57. p, 19 November 1918.
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5 8 harshest features of war communism. The decision was
influenced by the German revolution which, the resolution stated,
'made possible a link between the revolutionary Russian
59 proletariat and the proletariat of Germany 1 .
Despite heated discussion in the MK over the readmittance of 
the Mensheviks to the Moscow soviet the opponents gathered only 5
60 
votes and in early December welcomed the lifting of
restrictions on the Mensheviks (and LSRs) on 30 November 1918. 
In the raions , however, the change was greeted with less 
enthusiasm, which was not surprising considering the passion 
unleashed by the red terror at the time. It was only after three
meetings of the Sokol ' nicheskii party organisation that a
6 2 
majority could be coaxed in favour of the change. As the
Bolshevik victories in the civil war multiplied the Mensheviks 
in Moscow leftened further. A party conference in April 1920 
adopted a set of 'April Theses' which rather contradictorily 
accepted the necessity for a dictatorship of the proletariat but 
did not go so far as to acquiesce to the 'terrorist minority'
58. Ermanskii, p. 186.
59. VIMS , 22 November 1918. For Martov's views see Israel 
Getzler, Martov: A Political Biography, CUP 1967, pp.!73ff.
60. Rudolf Schlesinger, History of the Communist Party of the 
USSR Past and Present, Orient Longman 1977, p. 145.
61. P_, 11 December 1918. Both this resolution and Lenin argued 
that "the petty bourgeois intelligentsia could be readmitted to 
the Soviets if they were prepared to defend the country (Lenin 
PSS , vol.37, pp. 188-97). It was over the question of 
'revolutionary defensism' and the nature of democracy in the 
Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat that Lenin wrote his 
strong attack on Kautsky at this time in 'The Proletarian Rev- 
olution and the Renegade Kautsky', Lenin PSS , vol.37, pp. 237-338.
62. £, 12 December 1918. Resolutions against readmitting the 
Mensheviks were also passed in the Presnenskii and Basmannyi 
RPOs, P, 28 December 1918.
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(i.e., the Bolsheviks) within that dictatorship. On 20 April
1920 Martov announced to the Moscow soviet that the Mensheviks
64 had decided to break off all links with the II International.
Gimpel'son has argued that the one-party state was finally 
introduced in 1920-21 with the break up of the Menshevik and SR
parties, and that it was only introduced as a result of the
6 6 implacable behaviour of the other parties during the civil war.
On both counts his argument is dubious. On the first, one would 
have to look to 1922-3 for the consolidation of the one-party 
system, if one accepts his argument, with the final destruction 
of the non-Bolshevik parties and the elimination of their 
representation in the Soviets. The mere presence of non- 
Bolshevik deputies in the Moscow soviet, which lingered on up to 
1923, does not indicate the existence of a multi-party system 
since they in no way threatened the dominating role of the 
Bolsheviks, and had not done so since mid-1918. On the second 
point, the Mensheviks had rallied to the defence of the Soviet 
state, if not regime, in November 1918. This had been explicitly 
welcomed by Lenin, when few friends could be found, for the 
limited tactical objective of winning the war and did not signify 
that non-Bolshevik groups had any role to play other than a 
supporting one in the Soviet system of government. In parallel 
with the etiolation of non-Bolshevik opposition in the Moscow 
soviet during the civil war, the end of the war saw the
63. Ermanskii, pp.191-4. 64. KT, 21 April 1920.
65. E.G. Gimpel'son, 'Iz istorii obrazovaniya odnopartiinoi 
sistemy v SSSR' , VI KPSS, 11, 1965, p.30.
66. E.G. Gimpel'son, 'Kak slozhilas' sovetskaya forma 
proletarskogo gosudarstva 1 , VI KPSS, 9, 1967, pp.14-15.
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elimination of the vestiges of non-Bolshevik influence in
6 7 
Moscow's factories. The creation of the Soviet model of the
one-party state required the elimination of organised opposition 
both in the Soviets and in the working class, and the attempts to 
achieve this during the civil war were crowned with success on 
the return of peace.
3. The party and the Soviets
a. Theory
By arguing for the destruction of the bourgeois state and 
for its replacement by a system based on Soviets, Lenin, notably 
in 'Letters from Afar' and 'State and Revolution', was able to 
maintain a theoretical distinction between the workers' state and 
the revolutionary party. The working class would participate in 
the everyday running of the state through the Soviets, while the 
party's role was to act as the advanced minority guiding the 
development of the workers' state. The party in this theory was 
not intended to become the embryo of the new state but its 
guiding conscious head.
While this position was maintained in theory after October 
1917, in practice the party, by taking the majority of the most 
important posts in the state/soviet apparatus, became prey to the 
danger of absorption in the new state machinery. As mentioned,
67. Bellis argued that in Lenin's thinking it was axiomatic that 
there was 'an organic relationship between the Bolshevik party 
and the Soviet working class', (Paul Bellis, Marxism and the USSR 
The Theory of Proletarian Dictatorship and the Marxist Analysis 
of Soviet Society, Macmillan 1979, p.43). By definition this 
discounted any role for the non-Bolshevik parties, and even as a 
'loyal opposition' they were rendered superfluous by the 
victory in the civil war.
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after October it was the party, and not the state, that was in 
danger of withering away. With the development of the 'May 
programme 1 the problem of the relationship between the party and 
the Soviets, and between the party organisations and the soviet 
fractions, was once again starkly posed. By the end of the civil 
war the balance had turned and the leading role of the party was 
established.
The problematical nature of the party's relations with the 
Soviets was partly a reflection of the smallness of the 
proletariat in a vast peasant country. As Sorin put it in 
1918:
...The party is always and everywhere superior to the 
Soviets...The Soviets represent labouring democracy in 
general, and its interests, and in particular the 
interests of the petty-bourgeois peasantry, do not ,.  
always coincide with the interests of the proletariat.
Therefore, according to the Left Communists, the party was the 
guardian of an interest higher than that of the Soviets and hence 
was justified in maintaining a dominance over them. The 
dispensability of the Soviets for the Bolsheviks had been 
illustrated by the abandonment of the slogan of all power to the 
Soviets following the July events in 1917. With the development 
of a massive bureaucratic apparatus in 1918 a further reason was 
adduced for party dominance over the Soviets. As a MOB letter of 
September 1918 put it:
The party must be placed as the controlling, leading, 
and guiding force over the Soviets to avoid a breach 
(razlozhenie) between Pg£ty workers and the helplessness 
of the state apparatus.
68. Kommunist, 4, June 1918, p.7
69. Perepiska, vol.IV, p.256.
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Both the absence of working class hegemony in society and the 
development of a vast bureaucracy propelled the party to play a 
tutelary role over the Soviets.
The attempt to maintain the vitality of the soviet plenum 
while at the same time controlling the soviet through the party 
fraction, itself controlled by the party committee outside the 
soviet, proved irreconcilable. The Bolshevik fractions became 
the de facto kernel of the Soviets and this split was accentuated 
during the civil war as the ECs and presidia, as we have seen in 
the case of the Moscow Soviets, replaced the functions of the 
soviet as a whole. In his polemic against Kautsky Lenin wrote:
The Soviets are the direct organisation of the toiling 
and exploited masses themselves, which helps them to 
organise and administer their own state in every 
possible way.
The work however failed to analyse the forms that the guiding 
role of the party would take, which was Kautsky's central 
argument:
Despite the pretensions of being the dictatorship of 
the proletariat it has become from the very beginning.,, 
the dictatorship of one party within the proletariat.
As Bellis has pointed out, the fundamental lacuna in Lenin's 
thinking of this period is the lack of an analysis of the
relationship between the party and the Soviets as the organs of
72 popular power. This deficiency is not restricted to Lenin
alone. In their ABC of Communism Bukharin and Preobrazhenskii in
70. Lenin PSS, vol.37, p.257.
71. Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Ann Arbor 
1964, p.46.
72, Bellis, p.39, who states that Lenin's only detailed 
reference to the question is in 'Will the Bolsheviks Retain State 
Power 1 , Lenin PSS, vol.34, pp.287-339.
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1919 barely mention the communist party at all. Everything is 
left to the working class organised in the Soviets and its state, 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, while the party is only 
discussed in relation to the seizure of power and as one of the 
institutions at the base of the soviet system. It is perhaps 
in this that the utopianism of the work, described by E.H. Carr 
in his introduction, is most marked rather than in the novel 
economic relationships described so enthusiastically.
With the formation of the III International the Soviet 
experience was projected onto the world stage and to countries 
where the proletariat was more hegemonic. The rationale for 
party control over social institutions was codified by the II 
congress of the III International in July 1920:
As the organised advance guard of the working class the 
Communist Party answers egually for the economic, 
political, and spiritual needs of the working class. It 
must be the soul of the trade unions, the Soviets, and 
all other proletarian organisations...For the Soviets to 
fulfil their historic mission there must be a Communist 
Party strong enough not to 'adapt' itself to the Soviets 
but to exercise on them a decisive influence, to force 
them not to adapt themselve5 7 to the bourgeoisie and 
official social democracy...
The Soviets therefore could not be left to express the interests 
of the working class on their own, but required a body external 
to them to ensure that they carried out the policies deemed 
correct. The reality of these propositions was tested during the 
civil war.
73. N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhenskii, The ABC of Communism, 
Penguin 1969, pp.129, 231, 236-7.
74. II kongress kommunisticheskogo internatsionala: 
stenograficheskii otchet, M. 1920, p.574.
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b. Practice
The principle of party control permitted conflicting 
interpretations. The initial problem after October 1917 was the 
relationship to be established between the party fractions in the 
Soviets and the party committees. From the first the caucus 
nature of the Bolshevik group in the Moscow soviet was stressed. 
A resolution adopted by them and published on 22 March 1917 
argued that the Bolshevik fraction should act as a group and not 
as a collection of individuals. This was repeated by the MOB 
on 17 May 1917 which called for the formation of Bolshevik 
fractions in Soviets to ensure that the party line was carried 
out in them. However, the latent rivalry between the fractions 
and the party committees had already surfaced in 1917. A MOB 
resolution of summer 1917, for example, gave the fractions equal 
status with the committees, and proposed mutual representation as 
the link between them, with the fraction establishing itself as a
separate organisation with its own executive bodies, secretary
x, *• 77 
and finances.
A few days after the October revolution the MK decreed that 
the Moscow soviet EC had to give it a copy of the agenda of its 
meetings, and that all major questions to be discussed by the
75 . Velikaya oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya. 
Dokumenty i materialy. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii posle 
sverzheniya samoderzhaviya, M. 1957, p.108.
76. Pod.i Fob., p.130. The fractions elected an executive 
bureau^and the work of both was governed by a statute. That 
adopted by the Bolshevik fraction of the Moscow soldiers ' soviet 
in mid-September 1917 specified that the bureau would consist of 
3 people, would meet twice a week, and would be elected for a 
term of 3 months, O.G. Obichkin, Ustavy mestnykh organizatsii 
RSDRP, M. 1976, p.132.
77. Pod.i pob., p.130.
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plenum were to be considered first by the EC meeting with an MK
78 
representative. By mid-1918 the problem was no longer one of
ensuring party direction over the Soviets, but one of regulating 
the relations between the local party organisation and the party 
fractions themselves, and above all to ensure party control over 
party members working in soviet institutions. The July 1918 MPO 
statute insisted that all MK decisions were obligatory for 
fraction members, that all responsible postings in the central or 
raion Soviets were to be made with the agreement of the
corresponding party committee, and that agendas were to be shown
79 in good time to the committees. At the end of July 1918 Boris
Volin (Fradkin), one of the key figures in framing Bolshevik 
municipal policy, raised the question in the light of the 
resurgence of the party. It was absolutely inadmissible, he 
argued, for a party member to speak in a soviet as a soviet 
deputy rather than a party member: 'Every party member must above 
all be a party member, and only then a member of the fraction of 
one or another soviet institution 1 .
In practice many party members did not find it easy to 
choose between the Soviets and the party. The torn loyalties
often engendered bitter conflicts on a personal level and led to
81 
expulsions from the party. The increasing conflicts between
the soviet fractions and the party committees in Moscow over the
78. M.S. Koloditskii, 'Bor'ba Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii 
za prevrashchenie sovetov v organy vosstaniya i diktatury 
proletariata (iyul'-sentyabr' 1917g.)', Avtoref. diss., M. 1967, 
p.14.
79. Ustav MPO 1918, p.7. 80. P_, 27 July 1918. 
81. P, 18 September 1918.
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summer of 1918, a result of the resurgence of the party, led to 
the convocation of a general meeting of communists working in 
soviet institutions in the city on 13 November 1918. The 
latter's interests had been articulated by an all-city fraction 
bureau, acting not only as a centralised form of Bolshevik 
supervision over the general work of the Soviets and 
institutions, but also clearly developing 'interests' of its 
own. The meeting decided to dissolve the bureau, ostensibly 
because of a shortage of activists, and its functions were 
transferred to the MK in the centre and the RKs in the
localities, who were urged to guide the work of the raion
8 2 Soviets. Its abolition was consonant with the increasingly
restricted definition of the role of the cells. The bureau had 
stood as an intermediary between the Soviets and the party 
committees and during the civil war it was precisely this sort of 
body that was swept away as lines of command were shortened.
The party's enhanced tutelary role over the Soviets in the 
raions was decribed by the Butyrskii RK's report for late 1918:
[The RK's] enactments are now carried out by the soviet 
without any dispute, whereas at first, after the October 
revolution, there was much friction between the raion 
[soviet] EC and the party committee. After the 
reorganisation of the soviet, and its unification ftwith 
the raion duma, conflicts were gradually reduced.
The report for the Blagushe-Lefortovo RK for May 1919 stressed 
the control of the party committee over the raion soviet. 
The committee had intervened in the affairs of the Soviet's 
education department on the grounds that its work had
82. £ ( 22 August, 10 September, 19 November 1918.
83. p, 5 January 1919.
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'suffered from a lack of competent party workers and insufficient
84 ideological leadership 1 . By the end of 1919 the Basmannyi RK
could claim complete control over the raion soviet:
Not a single appointment, not a single transfer, in the 
work of the departments, not a single question, passed  _ 
by the raion committee without its sanction and approval.
The MK was also proud of the degree of control it exercised over 
the Moscow soviet. In July 1920, for instance, four MK members 
were on the Soviet's presidium, and a fifth, Kamenev, was chairman 
of the soviet, and there were in addition frequent joint meetings of
o e
the MK and the presidium. Nevertheless, the great prestige of 
the Moscow soviet and the calibre of its leaders to some extent 
shielded it from the type of minute supervision exercised by the 
RKs over the raion Soviets. This was commented on at the end of 
1920: 'In the raions full monolithic unity of work, but in the
centre the Moscow Committee and the Moscow Soviet with an unclear
8 7 definition of their relationship 1 . There still remained a
residual sense that the Soviets and the party were to work in 
tandem, not in 'monolithic unity', each with their own sphere of 
responsibilities. Kamenev, for example, had been chairman of the 
Moscow soviet since August 1918 but he joined the MK only in 
May 1920. By the end of 1920, with the creation of a single MK 
elected at a conference for a fixed term, the dominance of the 
party as the supreme political body in the city was clearly 
outlined.
84. p, 11 July 1919. 85. VIMS, 18 November 1920
86. Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g. t p.4.
87. KM, col.658.
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c. The Democratic Centralists
By the end of 1918 criticism of the trends in the relations 
between party committees and fractions, between the centre and 
the localities, and the general problem of bureaucratism, 
developed into a wide debate. The criticism was led by the
Democratic Centralists (DCs), based largely in the Moscow
8 8 guberniya party and soviet organisations. Their leading figure
was T.V. Sapronov, the chairman of the guberniya soviet EC from 
October 1917 to the end of 1919 and member of the guberniya party 
committee (MGK), together with Minkov, secretary of the MGK, 
Ivanov, and other members of these organisations. In 1917 the 
Bolsheviks here had enjoyed overwhelming support both among the 
workers and peasantry, and since then the party and soviet 
organisations had worked in particularly close harmony. It was 
the model of relationships established in the guberniya that this 
group sought to generalise to the rest of the country, and in 
particular to the city of Moscow.
A joint session of the MGK and the guberniya soviet EC on 26 
December 1918, chaired by Sapronov, continued the attack launched 
at the XI Moscow guberniya party conference (18-19 December 
1918). A motion was passed criticising the 'bureaucratic 
centralism 1 and 'petty tutelage 1 of the centre in interfering in
88. It is difficult to talk of a single Democratic Centralist 
group. In early 1921 Myasnikov identified five main tendencies: 
the general party opposition dissatisfied with the party centre 
over a range of issues, represented by Osinskii; a soviet 
opposition focusing on the question of the relationship between 
the 'centre' and the 'localities', represented by Sapronov; a 
group which claimed that the party committees had usurped the 
rights of the soviet fractions, represented above all by a group 
of Muscovites led by Ignatov; the Ukrainian 'independence 1 group; 
and various others dissatisfied with the party TsK, Myasnikov, 
Izb.proiz., p.294.
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the current affairs of the local Soviets, and called for the
8 9 
rights of the localities to be respected. A specially convened
city party conference on 18 January 1919 was the scene of bitter 
debate over the relationship between central and local soviet 
institutions, and between the party committees and fractions in 
the Soviets. Ignatov introduced a motion demanding changes to 
the Soviet Constitution, and in particular the liguidation of SNK 
in order to increase the authority of VTsIK, and for the 
increased autonomy of soviet fractions. He was supported by
several members of the Moscow soviet EC and by a group of
90 
'dissatisfied comrades from the raions'. Since October 1918
Ignatov had no longer been a member of the Soviet's presidium, 
but remained a member of the EC. He was also active in the Gorodskoi 
raion party and soviet structures. The theme of his long 
oppositional career was the defence of the localities, which in 
Moscow meant above all the raions, and it was from this point of 
view that he now supported the DCs. Their argument insisted that 
the Soviets were to be preserved as responsible political 
centres, and hence can be seen as a reaction against the changes 
inaugurated by the May programme.
I.V. Tsivtsivadze at the conference tried to mollify the 
opposition by admitting that some problems existed but blamed 
them only on certain 'inadequacies of the mechanism 1 . He 
insisted that the fractions were party cells, but put forward 
some mild reform proposals aimed at rejuvenating the soviet 
plenum and at giving the raion Soviets more scope in decision-
89. VIII s"ezd RKP, p.543 nil. 90. P, 28 January 1919.
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91 
making. In his contribution Lenin argued .that only centralism
could overcome the two great evils of bureaucracy and
speculation. He accused the opposition of having discarded
92 
centralism in favour of localism (mestnichestvo). The MK's
conciliatory resolution was adopted, but its reform proposals 
remained a dead letter.
The weeks preceding the VIII party congress, as we have seen 
in Chapters 4 and 5, were marked by a series of conferences in 
which the condition of the party and other issues on the congress 
agenda were discussed. A TsK circular letter of 8 February 1919 
developed Lenin's idea of centralism as the antidote to 
bureaucratism. Party control over its members in the state 
apparatus and periodic redistributions of members between party 
and state posts, and from region to region, would overcome both 
bureaucratism and localism, it was argued. The circular called
for an influx of fresh cadres from the ranks of the party into
93 the apparatus. This was the line taken by the MK speakers on
the eve of the conference. Although the MK position was adopted
everywhere, advocates of a reform of soviet institutions gained
94 
significant support. The 15 February MK resolution, as noted,
took a moderate line but insisted on fraction subordination to 
party committees.
At the VIII congress in March 1919 the DCs continued their
91. p_, 28 January 1919. 92. Lenin PSS, vol.37, pp.428-9
93. Perepiska, vol.VI, p.58.
94. For example, at the 13 February 1919 Presnenskii delegate 
conference (P, 18 February 1919). The Lefortovskii RK supported 
the DC call f~or a reform of soviet institutions, P_, 30 January 
1919.
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attack. Osinskii argued that the great problem was that instead 
of authority being clearly delineated decisions were being
taken by, for instance, Lenin and Sverdlov in personal talks, and
95 
not by the full TsK. This confusion prevailed at all levels of
the state and party hierarchy, they argued. Osinskii insisted 
that a Soviet government, as such, did not exist, and Ignatov
warned that the party should not take on the functions of the
97 Soviets. The final resolution on this guestion insisted on the
undisputed political dominance of the party over the Soviets and
that the fractions were to be absolutely subordinate to the party
9 8 
committees. The caveat that the party was to 'guide' and not
to 'substitute' for the Soviets was given no institutional 
expression and thus remained a pious expression of principle. In 
practice the resolution tackled none of the substantive issues 
raised by the opposition, and indeed exacerbated them.
The DC call for a revision to the constitution to incorporate 
the experience of running the country since mid-1918 was an 
attempt to provide a legal framework for the rights of all parts 
of the Soviet governmental machinery both in the centre and the 
locality. Their 'localism 1 reflected attempts not so much to 
limit the powers of central authority as to define them. The 
existing confusion above all worked to the disadvantage of the 
localities and to the benefit of the centre. To this day Soviet 
governmental practice is ruled more by convention than any legal 
definition of powers.
Throughout 1919 the DCs, ensconced in the guberniya party and
95. VIII s"ezd RKP, pp.166-7. 96. ibid., p.192. 
97. ibid., p.199. 98. ibid., p.429.
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soviet organisations, continued their demands for effective 
central leadership combined with competent local Soviets. At the 
XVI guberniya conference (November 1919) Sapronov called for the 
rights and duties of all organisations to be clearly delineated 
in a revised national constitution." The new party statute 
adopted by the VIII party conference in December 1919, however, 
rejected the guberniya conference's draft amendment clearly 
stating that local party committees were not to interfere in the 
current work of local Soviets and their party fractions. 100 
According to the final draft the territorial form of democratic 
centralism was to be the only one: all party activists in an area 
were to be subordinate to the party committee serving that 
area. 101
At the VIII conference Sapronov defended not so much the 
rights of the* local Soviets as those of their ECs (ispolkomy) :
In the war years I personally was in favour of the 
temporary suspension of ispolkom department collegia, 
but considered it only a temporary expedient. There'is 
now a tendency to make this measure permanent.
The ispolkomy in his view were to be the horizontal linkage at 
the local level (VTsIK was to perform this function in the 
centre) to prevent soviet power becoming 'a thousand separate
pillars'. Collegiate management in the Soviets and the economy
104 was to act as the link with the masses. As we have seen the
collegia in the Moscow Soviets had been undermined during the 
civil war. But still Sapronov did not analyse the reasons for
99. XVI Mosk. gubpartkonf., p.23. 100. ibid., p.21.
101. VIII konf. RKP, pp.191-9. 102. VIII konf.RKP, p.67.
103. ibid., p.130. 104. ibid., pp.68-9.
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the decline in the effectiveness of the soviet plena. As 
Mgeladze, one of the advocates of moderate reform in early 1919 
in the MK and now in Saratov, put it, the republic was becoming 
one of ispolkomy and not of Soviets.
By the IX party congress Sapronov and the Democratic 
Centralists as a whole had become more critical of the whole 
trend of civil war developments. Sapronov warned that a 
dictatorship of the party chinovnichestvo was being established 
as elections were replaced by appointments and transfers, and he 
went further:'There is no need to talk about the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, about the self-activity of the worker masses. 
There is no self-activity'. The machine would not save the 
revolution, he argued. The DC critique had now advanced 
beyond their earlier proposals on the eve of the VIII congress, 
where the 'strict 1 centralists could have agreed with the 
substance of their criticisms of the shortcomings of party 
organisation, to a position which viewed the development of the 
party machine with increasing alarm. The DCs had initially 
attempted to combat bureaucracy by bureaucratic means by arguing 
that improving the mechanism would ensure an improved democratic 
centralism. By 1920 the debate on the soviet system had to begin 
with a debate on reform within the party, and this debate took 
place from mid-1920 (Part III).
105. ibid., pp.116-7.
106. IX s"ezd RKP, pp.52-3, 139.
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4. Bureaucracy
a. General characteristics
On the eve of the VIII party congress Lenin had argued that 
centralisation was the only way to combat bureaucratism. The 
congress itself resolved that party supervision over the state 
and its members working in soviet structures could act as a check 
against its development. Hence the general awareness of the 
dangers of bureaucratism reinforced the party's claim to 
supremacy. The term itself during the civil war took on several 
meanings, but at the centre of interpretations of bureaucracy in 
this period lay the questions of the desired relationship between 
the centre and the localities, between the Soviets and the 
working class, and the relationships between all levels of the 
party and state apparatuses. The bureaucratism of the party 
itself signified the use of administrative methods and the 
increasingly formal nature of inner-party democracy.
The Left Communists in 1918 provided the inspiration for a 
series of later critiques of the type of state that the 
dictatorship of the proletariat was becoming. The respite period 
was to combine concessions to capitalists under the supervision 
of a strong socialist state apparatus, but the apparatus designed 
for this purpose was transferred to the succeeding period of war 
communism. Already the result of the first period, as the left 
saw it, was the stifling of the self-activity of the working 
class as a whole in the management of the state. One aspect of 
this was the use of so-called bourgeois specialists in the 
civilian, economic and military spheres. Another was 
centralisation and bureaucratisation, in the sense of power
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moving away from the floor of popular assemblies. As the left 
put it:
Giving wide autonomy to local Soviets and no longer 
diminishing their authority by commissars sent by 
central power, Soviet power and the party of the 
proletariat must find their support in the class self- 
activity of the wide masses,,on whose development every 
effort must be concentrated.
Instead, the Bolsheviks smashed the old state but rapidly 
created their own bureaucratic and centralised apparatus to wage 
the political, and from mid-1918, the economic offensive against 
the bourgeoisie. Already on arriving in Moscow in March 1918 the 
government had looked at ways of reducing the state apparatus, 
above all by shedding staff. In fact, most departments on 
arrival from Petrograd immediately began to expand. One
important factor in this was the unification of the newly arrived
109 commissariats with the Moscow oblast commissariats. As the
functions of the state expanded so did the bureaucracy, swollen 
above all by the state's involvement in running industry.
The great expansion in the number of office workers took 
place before August 1918, and thereafter, despite the many 
campaigns to reduce their number, their specific weight in the 
falling population remained remarkably constant. In August 1918
107. Marc Ferro suggests that the bureaucratisation of the 
Soviets began in 1917, 'The Birth of the Soviet Bureaucratic 
System 1 , in Reconsiderations on the Russian Revolution, Banff 
1976, pp.
108. Kommunist, 1, p. 9.
109. A.M. Anikst, Vospominaniya o Lenine, M. 1933, p. 8. In 
February 1918 a Moscow oblast sovnarkom (MOSNK) had been formed 
which duplicated the central ones right down to having its own 
foreign affairs commissariat. After a bitter struggle, in which 
the Moscow soviet, jealous of its own prerogatives, sided with 
the central authorities, MOSNK was dissolved in May 1918.
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231,000 people in the city were employed in offices, representing 
13.7% of the total population and 29.6% of all those employed. 
By May 1919 some reductions in the staff of central institutions 
were compensated by an increase in the numbers employed by local 
offices, the latter rising from 83,866 in 1918 to 98,000. l l 
Office workers at that time represented 16% of total population, 
and 31% of the independent population. By 1920 local 
institutions employed 80,000, and the general number of office 
workers had decreased by about 15-20% over 1918, but they still
represented about a third of the total independent population in
112 the city. At the same time, as mentioned, the proportion of
white collar workers to manual workers in industry increased. 
During the civil war, therefore, Moscow became dominated by a 
bureaucratic apparatus which served both the city and the whole 
country.
In the first phase of Soviet power there was a tendency to 
regard the participation of the working class in state structures 
as sufficient evidence of the absence of bureaucratism. In other 
words, class composition was considered the main criterion for 
determining the level of bureaucratism. According to the 
industrial census of 31 August 1918, in Moscow out of 123,578 
workers 4191 (3.4%) were involved in management or some sort of 
public organisation, 4112 of whom had been elected and 71 
appointed. With both the greatest concentration of
110. Lenin PSS, vol.45, p.250.
111. Dva goda diktatury proletariata, p.15; Stat. ezhegodnik, 
pp.46-7.
112. Lenin PSS, vol.42, pp.43, 47. 113. Chugaev, doc. no.52
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workers and the largest amount of offices Moscow's working class 
naturally provided the largest contingent for the new state 
apparatus. By mid-October 1918 out of 1800 workers in the 
Mikhel'son plant only 350 remained. The majority of the others
were either in the countryside on political work or employed in
114 
soviet institutions. Noting that the presidium of the
Rogozhskii raion soviet was overwhelmed with work, a meeting of 
factory committees in the raion decided to send members to 
help. 115 A report of 10 October 1918 claimed that out of the 900 
workers in the AMO car plant in the same raion 100 were involved 
in some sort of public work, in the trade union, the factory 
committee or control commission. This was cited as a disclaimer 
to Menshevik claims that 'we have a bureaucratic (chinovnik) 
state'. 116
However, the initial enthusiasm was soon tempered by a 
growing awareness that the class content approach to the question 
of bureaucratism was insufficient. Nearly every issue of 
Moscow's evening paper from late 1918 carried examples of the 
bureaucratism affecting every aspect of the city's life. Among 
the multitude of examples was the problem of movement in and out 
of the city. A worker, for instance, going on a health cure 
would have to wait two or three days in endless queues to obtain 
the necessary documents from the various departments of the 
commission for the evacuation of Moscow, by which time his or her 
health would no doubt have been further impaired. Ironic 
references were frequently made to the official explanation that
114. Kommunar, 18 October 1918. 115. Kommunar, 9 October 1918. 
116. Chugaev, p.60. 117. VIMS, 3 January 1919
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118 these were only 'small defects in our mechanism 1 . Victor
Serge described his impression of the bureaucracy in Moscow in 
early 1919:
Here committees were piled on top of Councils, and 
Managements on top of Commissions. Of this apparatus, 
which seemed to me to function largely in a void, 
wasting three-guarters of its time on unrealisable 
projects, I-i^k once formed the worst possible 
impression.
The prevalence of bureaucracy, of committees and commissions 
whose value decreased as their acronyms lengthened, permitted, 
and indeed encouraged, endless permutations of corrupt practices 
which we can no more than mention. The phenomenon of 
sovmestitel'stvo (carrying on several jobs at the same time) 
reached epidemic proportions, especially among the bourgeois 
specialists in institutions. Some, it was alleged, worked in up
to four places and in each they were paid more than workers and
120 
received rations at each place. The accusations of corruption
ranged from the style of living of communist functionaries to
121 bribe-taking by minor officials.
Even before engaging in his 'last struggle' Lenin wrote on 2 
February 1921 that 'The population of Moscow is being bloated by
employees' and urged that strict measures be taken to prevent
122 further expansion. In November 1920 a plan had been drafted
to transfer 10,000 out of Moscow's 200,000 employees to
118. E.g., VIMS , 28 January 1919. 119. Serge, p.74.
120. VIMS, 6 March 1919.
121. Berkman, for instance, mentions the corrupt practices of 
the Moscow Soviet's housing department in 1920, Berkman, The 
Bolshevik Myth, p.308.
122. Lenin PSS, vol.52, p.65.
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Petrograd in order to ease the
123 housing crisis and to dilute the concentration of 'Moscow
124 bureaucrats'. These measures proved futile and by July 1921
their numbers had swollen to 228,000, and by October 1922 to 
243,000. 126
In his political report to the XI party congress in March 
1922 Lenin emphasised the battle between the two cultures, 
socialist and bureaucratic petty-bourgeois, represented 
respectively by the active party workers and the state 
bureaucracy:
If we take Moscow with its 4700 communists in 
responsible positions, and if we take that huge 
bureaucratic machine, that gigantic heap, we must ask: 
who is directing whom? I doubt very much whether it can 
truthfully be said that the communists are directing 
that heap. To tell the truth, they are not directing, 
they are being directed.
From Table 17 it can be seen that in August 1920 of the 2629 
responsible party workers in soviet institutions only 18% were 
from the working class. If we compare the total number of party 
activists with the number of employees they represented only 
about 1.3% of the total. Communists in soviet offices (8164) 
represented barely 5% of the total but constituted 27.4% of 
party membership in the city. While Lenin in his denunciation of 
Kautsky had extolled the mass participatory character of the 
soviet system the central question inevitably became one of
123. Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.43.
124. ibid., p.49. 125. KT, 2 July 1921.
126. Perepis' sluzhashchikh sovetskikh uchrezhdenii g. Moskvy 
1922g., M. 1922, p.79.
127. Lenin PSS, vol.45, p.95.
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trying to understand the roots of the bureaucratic phenomenon 
and to devise measures to reduce it.
During the civil war at least eight aspects can be discerned 
in contemporary analyses of the problem. The first, stressed by 
the Mensheviks but later used by the Bolsheviks, insisted that 
bureaucracy arose because of the attempt to impose an advanced 
structure onto a backward society:
Where socialism is not on a prepared soil, with an 
unprepared mechanism, it hinders the development of 
industry: the conditions are lacking. Bureaucratism 
springs from the desire to regulate as more and more 
commissions sprout...There is no proletariat, only 
dictatorship remains, and that not proletarian but an 
enormous bureaucratic mechanism that holds in its hands 
dead factories and plants.
A second aspect, highlighted above all by the Left Communists, was 
the emphasis on the isolation of the Russian revolution from the 
culturally advanced proletariat of the West. Kritsman later 
theorised a third aspect, and indeed argued that the main 
degeneration of the proletarian-natural economy was precisely its 
bureaucratisation. This economy tried to rationalise social 
life, to destroy fetishism and the anarchic chaos of commodity 
relations. The drive for rationality led to a massive burgeoning 
of tasks which crystallised in the formation of countless
commissions that all too frequently only established paper
129 
relationships between themselves. In other words, he argued,
the revolution had gone beyond what was economically expedient 
before economic, or even political, restructuring was
128. Dalin at the II SNKh congress in December 1918, Trudy II 
s"ezda SNKh, p.25.
129. Kritsman, p.152.
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, 4.complete .
A fourth and central theme of contemporary analyses of 
bureaucracy was to argue that it had been contrabanded into the 
soviet apparatus by carriers of the old Tsarist capitalist 
ideology - the old intelligentsia and specialists. For Kritsman 
the attempt to move too fast necessitated the massive absorption 
of the old technical intelligentsia leading to a contradiction 
between their role and their ideology. Lenin, in particular, 
was fond of this interpretation. At the VIII congress, for 
instance, he argued that the source of the bureaucracy was the 
induction of the old Tsarist bureaucrats into the state
machinery, sometimes using party membership to advance their
132 
careers. The scale of the use of the specialists has already
been noted (chapter 2), and in particular the expansion in staff 
numbers of the Moscow SNKh .
A related, and fifth, aspect of the problem was the 
bureaucratisation of the personnel in the structures themselves, 
the emergence of a Soviet chinovnichestvo which included workers 
and party members in addition to the traditional bureaucrats. 
Towards the end of 1918 Ol'minskii, noting the above-mentioned 
growth of the VSNKh apparatus from 300 employees to 6000,
130. Moshe Lewin suggests that war communism was the 
'nationalisation 1 of communism: the state became the carrier of 
socialism and the bureaucracy became the social basis of the 
regime (Moshe Lewin, 'The Social Background of Stalinism 1 in R.C 
Tucker (ed), Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation, New 
York 1977, p.114).Elsewhere he quotes the warning uttered by 
Bukharin on the eve of the 'socialist offensive 1 : 'If it (the 
state) takes too much upon itself, it is forced to create a 
colossal administrative apparatus', in Lewin, Political 
Undercurrents, p.63.
131. Kritsman, pp.147-8. 132. VIII s"ezd RKP, pp.21-2.
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concluded that devoted communists, successful in the field of 
party work, were out of their element when faced with 
administration on a national level. The result had been a
massive growth of the chinovnichestvo where the old bureaucrats
134 
were joined by the new.
The last three analyses of bureaucracy centred on the 
working class and its failure to imbue the apparatus with the 
'proletarian 1 spirit. Following Lenin's comments in early 1921 
on the declassing of the proletariat it became popular to 
consider this as the main reason for bureaucratisation, although 
during the civil war the connection between the dispersion of the 
proletariat and bureaucracy had never figured as a major element 
in analyses. Trotsky, in particular, later argued that the 
bureaucracy arose out of the exhaustion and wastage of the
working class as a result of the cumulative trials of the
135 
wars.
In Moscow, where a significant working class remained, albeit 
with a changed composition, a seventh aspect of the problem was 
emphasised: the gulf between the soviet apparatus and those in 
the factories. There are three aspects to this point. The first 
was identified by Mgeladze at the VIII party congress: the 
workers advanced by the revolution were becoming isolated from 
their own class. The masses were no longer being drawn into
 I -5 C
communist construction. N. Ovsyannikov made the point 
explicit soon after when he talked of a divorce between factory
133. Sorin, Kommunist, 4, p.7. 134. VIMS , 7 October 1918.
135. See, for example, Revolution Betrayed, p.292.
136. VIII s"ezd RKP, p.212.
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workers and their representatives to the Moscow soviet:
Occupied by tasks of state construction working class 
communists have become isolated from the masses while 
working in ispolkomy^and commissariats and involved in 
bureaucratic tasks.
Both Mgeladze and Ovsyannikov pointed out the consequences of 
this. The former reported that in Moscow there were cases when 
the authorities did not dare to talk about supplies openly, that 
there was a tendency to ignore difficult questions at meetings 
(hence the diet of 'Wilson today, Wilson tomorrow 1 in agitprop 
meetings noted in Chapter 7), and because of this the masses were 
losing their faith in the party. In the Moscow factories, he 
stated, workers would listen to anybody except communists. There 
was a danger of communist power turning into a bureaucracy.
Ovsyannikov reported that 'provocateurs' now had free rein in the
139 plants. In other words, a large part of the working class
that remained in the factories was becoming alienated from 
Bolshevik power.
The second aspect of this point was stressed by Lenin at the 
VIII congress: the low cultural level of the working class, which
prevented the mass involvement of workers in management and thus
140 led to bureaucratism. Both Lenin and Osinskii tied this in
with point 4. As Osinskii put it, the new state could only rely 
on a miniscule layer of able workers while the rest were backward 
because of the low cultural level of the country. Therefore, the
old chinovnichestvo introduced bureaucratic methods into the
141 Soviet state apparatus.
137. VIMS, 17 April 1919. 138. VIII s"ezd RKP, pp.212-3.
139. VIMS, 17 April 1919. 140. VIII s"ezd RKP, pp.21-2.
141. ibid., p.188.
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The third aspect of the breach between the working class and 
the apparatus was admitted by Boguslavskii later: the fear that 
applying frequent elections and genuine participatory democracy 
would take away experienced workers and replace them with novices 
who would take time to 'master the apparatus':
It must be said that this perfectly justified fear 
deprived us of the possibility of widely applying 
methods of shift (smeny) and significantly stimulated 
the formation,of a layer of so-called 'soviet 
bureaucracy'.
There was a fear that spontaneity and mass participation would 
reduce the efficiency of the apparatus, a classic bureaucratic 
response. It was over these three points that the Workers' 
Opposition developed their critigue of bureaucratism and put 
forward reform plans. The Democratic Centralists, on the other 
hand, while agreeing with several of the points mentioned above, 
tended towards a more structural critique, our eigth point.
In Moscow the radical aspect of their views was advanced by 
Ignatov. He argued that the 'small defects' had grown into major 
ones not only because of sabotage or the vestiges of the past, 
but because of the inadequacies of the mechanisms themselves. 
Power had moved from the local Soviets to the centre, he argued,
and this centralism often appeared in a degenerated form
143 provoking conflict between commissars and Soviets. He argued
that the Soviets were losing contact with the masses, and gave 
the explanation, as mentioned, that this was due to insufficient
initiative being allowed to the Soviets as the party, through
144 democratic centralism, tended to substitute for the Soviets.
142. Moskovskii pechatnik, 1, 15 January 1921, p.4.
143. VIMS, 11 February 1919. 144. VIII s"ezd RKP, pp.198-9
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The response to the bureaucratisation of soviet power took a 
variety of forms. There were attempts to improve participation 
in the Moscow soviet; mass popular inspection was developed to 
check on the bureaucracy; but most important of all the theory 
became established that increased party control itself inured 
against bureaucratic degeneration. The problem of bureaucratism 
necessitated an understanding of the nature of bureaucracy 
itself, and while the analyses above made some attempts to do so, 
the development of a sui generis new model party-state 
bureaucracy was not grasped. The collective authors of a recent 
work have argued that on several grounds, including, as regards 
the Soviets, the disappearance of the distinction between 
appointed and elected bodies, the Soviet-type apparatus, in the 
strictly Weberian sense, cannot be considered a bureaucracy at
all. It lacked 'the executive-expert character of bureaucratic
145 power applying formal rationality to implement pre-set goals'.
Their conclusion, however, is in keeping with the civil war
analyses of bureaucracy: it is the party which brings about an
146 integrated power structure. Hence the relationship between
the party and the bureaucracy becomes the key one.
b. The Moscow soviet and the battle against bureaucracy
In the city the Moscow soviet was often accused of being
14 7 
over-bureaucratic and distant from the population. The old
145. Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller, Gyorgy Markus, Dictatorship 
over Needs, Blackwell, Oxford 1983, p.107.
146. ibid., p.108.
147. Ransome in early 1919 reported that the public no longer
flocked to the gallery during meetings of the soviet: the
excitement of 1917 had ebbed, Ransome, Six Weeks, p.46.
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city uprava (council) had employed about 40,000 people before
October 1917. By May 1920 the same institution employed about
148 80,000 serving a smaller population. From the end of 1918
steps were taken to conduct a survey of communists in Moscow's
149 institutions in order to understand the scale of the problem,
and shortly afterwards Ol'minskii and Meshcheryakov called for a 
purge of soviet employees. They pointed out that in offices, as 
mentioned, recommendations for party membership often turned into 
a protection racket. There was a justified fear that the 
bureaucracy was subverting the party. Following the VIII party 
congress the MK formed a special commission to combat bureaucracy 
in offices, the forerunner of many such institutions.
The soviet was not only bureaucratic in terms of its 
inflated staff but also in the way that it worked. In Marxist 
theory the soviet represented the transcending of
parliamentarianism by 'the conversion of representative
152 institutions from talking shops into "working bodies". In
practice, as we have seen, power moved away from the plenum to ever 
smaller groups at the apex of the Soviet's structure. Medvedev 
has commented on this in the following terms:
...The combination of legislative and executive powers 
within one institution leads over a period of time to 
the disproportionate growth of the executive, thus 
turning representative bodies into empty appendages, 
providing an opening for a regime of personal 
dictatorship, and creating a favourable atmosphere,for 
the development of bureaucracy and abuse of power.
148. KT, 5 May 1920. 149. Kommunar, 17 December 1918.
150. VIMS, 13 February 1919. 151. Dumova, p.108.
152. 'State and Revolution', Lenin PSS, vol.33, p.46.
153. Roy Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, Spokesman Books, 
London 1975, pp.140-1.
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While Medvedev was concerned with developments after Lenin's 
death, his analysis is apposite for the development of 
bureaucracy in the soviet during the civil war. The plenary 
session of 13 January 1919, for example, highlighted some of the 
problems. There were complaints from the floor that the soviet 
met very rarely in plenary session. The chairman of the session, 
Vladimirskii, stated that in offices in the centre and in the 
raions bureaucracy and chinovnichestvo were rampant. During 
sessions, he stated, deputies showed their lack of respect by 
leaving in the middle of proceedings, and many of those elected 
to responsible positions, including EC members, failed to attend 
at all. He called for more frequent reports to the plenum by 
officials, and on the basis of his proposals a resolution was
passed making attendance at plenary sessions obligatory for all
154 
members of the EC and presidium.
The party programme adopted by the VIII party congress 
tackled the problem of bureaucracy by insisting that all soviet 
members were to participate in some administrative work, and
called for all offices to be rotated and for more people to be
155 drawn into administration. The congress resolution called for
measures against the development of a bureaucratic caste and for 
increased 'links with the masses'. The only specific response 
of the Moscow soviet was to hold new elections to the executive 
bodies on 27 May 1919 (see above). The EC was slightly increased 
in size from the 41 elected on 23 July 1918 to 44 members, but
154. Stenotchety MS, 1, 1919, p.14.
155. KPSS v rez. i resh., p.45.
156. VIII s"ezd RKP, pp.423-4; P_, 6 May 1919.
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more significantly over half of its composition was changed as 26 
new members now joined. The presidium was doubled from the 5 
elected on 16 October 1918 to 10 members. Such measures were 
little more than palliatives and were more than balanced by the 
countervailing centralising tendency.
Following the congress the idea had been raised of dividing 
the plenum into sections, or standing committees, corresponding 
to the Soviet's departments as a way of increasing the 
involvement of all deputies. With the breathing spell of early 
1920 Tsivtsivadze, general manager of the soviet, once again 
raised the idea on the following grounds:
It is a secret to no-one that the plenum of the Moscow 
soviet is a purely formal organ, juridicial, ratifying 
or rejecting decisions of the ispolkom, occasionally 
listening to,-informational reports from one department 
or another.
With over 1500 deputies the plenum could not discuss all 
questions in detail and had therefore become a purely voting 
body. Tsivtsivadze argued that the sections would act as link 
between the factories and the executive bodies. However, while 
his proposals allowed the sections to look into the work of the 
departments and to consider all proposals, they were not given 
the power to amend decisions or to interfere in the work of the
departments. He was at pains to ensure that no hint of mass
159 
collegiality was permitted. The plenary session of 23 March
1920 made membership of the sections obligatory. Their ability 
to criticise the departments was limited by making department or
157. KM, col.35.
158. KT. 20 March 1920
159. KT, 20 March 1920
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collegia heads the leaders of the sections.
The restrictions imposed on the sections meant that the 
hope that they would enliven the soviet was not fulfilled. At 
the meeting of the transport department section on 21 April 1920, 
among many examples, only 60 out of the 141 deputies attended. 
By the end of 1920 only 12 out of the 19 departments and 5 
commissions in the soviet had a section attached to it. The 
gulf between the Moscow soviet and the working class was an 
important factor in the disturbances from the end of 1920. 
Against the background of a climate of reform at the end of 1920 
Kamenev admitted, in a set of theses presented to the II Moscow 
guberniya conference of Soviets (15-17 December 1920), that the 
Soviets were moribund, bureaucratic, and that the plena were only 
involved in technical details while political discussion had 
died. General management was left to a small group of 15-20 
people who, he argued, against their will become bureaucratic 
however much they inveighed against bureaucratism.
Kamenev's theses proposed a range of radical reforms which 
went beyond the conventional denunciations of the evils of 
bureaucratism by the proponents of 'workers' democracy' (e.g., 
Zinoviev). The measures included extending the powers of the 
sections, rejuvenating plenary sessions. Establishing closer 
links between deputies and factories, and open sessions of the
160. KT, 24 March 1920; Stenotchety MS, 2, 1920, p.24.
161. KT, 22 April 1920. 162. KM, col.5.
163. Nove has recently argued the same point: 'One eliminates 
bureaucracy not by incantations, not by denunciations, but by 
eliminating the functions which bureaucracy performs, Nove, 
op.cit., p.90.
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soviet. Above all, he insisted, the Soviets should once again
stand at the centre of political life by guaranteeing their
164 
rights and those of their executive bodies. With the
transition from military to economic tasks, the theses went on, 
the powers of the local Soviets should be extended and they 
should act as the agents of the centre in the localities and not 
be by-passed by the commissariats, as had happened all too 
frequently during the war. Local Soviets, through guberniya 
SNKh, should have greater economic powers. At the same time he 
called for an extension of VTsIK's powers and urged that no acts
1 ft S
could be passed without its approval. These proposals 
represented a major victory for the Democratic Centralists, who 
had been arguing for these things since late 1918, and indicated 
the extent of support that the reform movement could mobilise at
this time.
166 
The conference met in an optimistic mood.
Representatives of the oppositions such as Sapronov, Ignatov and 
Drozhzhin sat on the conference presidium together with 
mainstream representatives such as Kamenev, Lisitsyn, and 
Uryvaev. Once again Kamenev outlined the causes of bureaucracy 
in presenting his theses. In response to opposition concerns he 
argued that even if all the bourgeois specialists were sacked, 
bureaucracy would still not disappear. Instead of such a 
superficial view, he insisted, the real reasons for bureaucracy 
were to be sought in the poverty and backwardness of the country
164. KT, 14 December 1920. 165. KT, 15 December 1920.
166. 496 voting delegates attended and 85 with consultative 
status. There were 488 communist delegates and 113 non-party, 
KT, 18 December 1920.
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and the creation of an extremely complex system of state 
management without the basic elements available to support such a
structure. The time was ripe, he argued, for the working
168 
class itself to learn state management and for the drift of
169 power to the centre to be reversed. Kamenev's speech included
several of the points mentioned in contemporary analyses of 
bureaucracy. A reform resolution was passed on the basis of his 
theses, and even Trotsky no longer argued for more centralisation 
but restricted his comments to noting that the debate was between 
centralisers and decentralisers.
In his speech to the VIII congress of Soviets (22-29 
December 1920) Kamenev's tone changed and he no longer 
spoke about reform and instead concentrated on the programme 
of economic reconstruction, the key theme of the congress. The 
measures adopted to revive the Soviets were little more than 
cosmetic, including the recommendation that ECs were to meet as 
often as possible in factories. The momentum for soviet 
reform was lost, and on 4 March 1921 an instruction on the 
working of the Moscow soviet was adopted which stressed only the 
need to make the soviet a more efficient instrument, and to this 
end an inner EC and an inner presidium were created. In July of
that year the Soviet's collegia were 'workerised' in which the
172 percentage of workers 'from the bench' rose from 10-15 to 60.
Now formal workerisation was to substitute for genuine reform.
167. KT, 18 December 1920. 168. KT, 19 December 1920.
169. KT, 21 December 1920. 170. KT, 18 December 1920.
171. KT, 31 December 1920; Iz ist. grazh. voiny, p.639.
172. Aleshchenko (1976), pp.227, 231.
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c. Moscow workers' inspection (Rabkrin)
To oppose the bureaucratisation and corruption of the
state, party and Cheka control were supplemented with attempts at
introducing mass popular control:
By extending direct control over almost every facet of 
Soviet society, the Bolsheviks vastly increased the 
government's administrative responsibilities while 
attempting to centralise the direction of this enormous 
empire in Moscow. By constructing a single party 
monolith, they eliminated, and thereby deprived 
themselves of the potential assistance of, all those 
nonbureaucratic elements of control found in pluralistic 
societies, such as an alert and watchful political 
oppositition, an independent judiciary and press, and a 
climate of intellectual freedom in which ordinary 
citizens are not afraid to speak out. The whole 
intolerable burden of control thus came to rest sguarely 
upon the party-state machinery.
An office of State Control had existed under the autocracy, and 
was extended by the creation of a new Central Control Board in 
January 1918. In May of that year it was restructured and 
renamed the People's Commissariat of State Control (Goskontrol'). 
The Moscow city department of state control was formed on 5 
August 1918 by the presidium of the Moscow soviet. There was 
also a Moscow workers' inspection restricted to auditing 
enterprise management through the control commissions. 
In Moscow the raion Soviets were the basis of the
inspection system, reflecting their traditionally close links with 
factory committees. Even before the reforms of April 1919 the
raion soviet labour inspection departments conducted mass
174 investigations of enterprises. They were mainly concerned
173. Jan S. Adams, Citizen Inspectors in the Soviet-Union, 
Praeger, New York 1977, p.14.
174. E.g., a workers' inspection department was formed under 
Basmannyi raion soviet in November 1918. In an investigation of 
the supply apparatus it found widespread theft of bread and other
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with checking the supply apparatus and to a lesser extent 
institutions and factories. In this early phase inspections 
were usually initiated in factories by the factory committees and 
trade unions after an accident, an epidemic, or complaints about 
poor safety standards, and so on, and developed into general 
investigations into conditions in the enterprise. Zamoskvorech'e 
raion soviet, for instance, in the month to 17 December 1918 
carried out 14 preliminary investigations and 4 more detailed 
ones, including an investigation into the Bromlei plant with its 
1000 workers. 176
The organisation of workers' inspection was a way of 
combatting the pervading bureaucratism of soviet institutions. 
However, this initial form of organisation was criticised in 
Moscow's evening paper on the grounds that there still remained a 
gulf between the soviet departments and workers' inspection. In
January 1919 the paper called for inspection bodies to be elected
177 directly by workers. The Gorodskoi soviet plenum in April
1919 called for the reorganisation of Goskontrol' by basing it on
178 
elections from Soviets and trade unions. Other raions
insisted that inspection should be based purely on the factories
to prevent a breach between state inspection and workers'
179 
control. Lenin criticised the Goskontrol' ministry at a
supplies. By May 1919 the Blagushe-Lefortovo inspection group,
formed in January 1919, had conducted over 150 inspections, VIMS,30 May 1919. '    '
175. VIMS, 1 July 1919. 176. VIMS, 17 December 1918
177. VIMS, 11 January 1919. 178. VIMS, 4 April 1919.
179. VIMS, 5 April 1919.
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special session of the Moscow soviet on 3 April 1919, and
180 
specifically noted the large number of chinovniki in it.
plans for reform were drawn up and Stalin, the new commissar of 
Goskontrol', presented them in a decree of 6 April 1919 which
envisaged, inter alia, a bureau of complaints and public
181 participation. The central Moscow workers' inspection was
formed by reorganising the Moscow Soviet's revisions and 
instructions department. In the raions the workers' inspection 
of the new type with broader representation was first organised
in Blagushe-Lefortovo raion in May and lastly in Butyrskii raion
182 in August 1919. They were usually elected from the factory
committees, the raion soviet economic departments, and the
inspection collegia. There were no direct elections from the
183 
workplace. The Moscow soviet presidium in a decree insisted
that the inspection groups had the right to free access to all
184 institutions and departments of the soviet.
The formation of workers' inspection put the continued 
existence of control commissions in enterprises in further doubt. 
While most of the factory committee's functions, such as the 
hiring and firing of labour, had been transferred to management 
bodies their trade union functions allowed their continued 
existence. On the other hand, the control commissions duplicated
much of the work of the state inspectorate, at least in theory,
185 
and were therefore gradually phased out.
The first plenum of the Moscow workers' inspection met on 20
180. Lenin PSS, vol.38, p.256. 181. Adams, pp.24-5.
182. VIMS, 2 December 1919. 183. VIMS, 9 July 1919.
184. VIMS, 3 July 1919. 185. VIMS, 1 October 1919
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September 1919. Fedenev, its chairman, argued that the aim was
to attract as broad a layer as possible of Moscow workers in the
1 R 6 battle against 'inadequacies of the mechanism 1 . At the VIII
party conference in December 1919 he reported on the rapid growth 
of workers' inspection in Moscow. In the space of a few months 
they had grown massively, and inspection cells had been formed in
261 of Moscow's factories (about a third of the total active
187 at the time) encompassing over 60,000 workers. The expansion
of the inspection movement, however, was not looked upon as an 
unmitigated blessing. Fedenev warned that the growth of such a
mass movement involving so many non-party people could form the
188 basis of an oppositional movement in future soviet elections.
Popular inspection was reorganised by VTsIK on 7 February 1920, 
and the existing control organs were transformed into a single 
People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection 
(Rabkrin - RKI). The base of the system was still the workers' 
inspection groups formed by the 9 April 1919 decree, but now they 
were to be integrated into the unified structure of the
commissariat and elected by all those with soviet voting
189 
rights. In a sense this can be seen as a response to
Fedenev's warnings on the dangers of the development of a mass
190 non-party workers' inspection movement.
186. VIMS, 22 September 1919.
187. VIII konf. RKP, p.121; VIMS, 2 December 1919.
188. VIII konf. RKP, p.121.
189. £, 8 February 1920.
190. The 7 February 1920 decree allowed the TUs to remove 
candidates unacceptable to them from Rabkrin work, and TU 
participation was further strengthened by the III TU congress
- 382 -
On the basis of the decree the 9 March 1920 Moscow soviet 
EC meeting decided to unite the Moscow workers' inspection with 
the Moscow section of Goskontrol' to form the Moscow RKI as a
department of the Moscow soviet. Its brief was to investigate
191 
all organs of local administration and the economy. It did
192 
not have the general right to inspect the Cheka. Local RKIs
were to be formed under the raion Soviets with the rights of
departments, but at the same time subordinate to the central
193 
collegia under the Moscow soviet.
In its new guise workers' inspection very much enhanced the 
role of the delegated inspectors as the core of the RKI groups, 
and the cells were reduced to auxiliary status as assistance
(sodeistvie) cells. Group investigations were still used to
194 
check on enterprises and other organisations, but clearly the
reform of February 1920 tended towards a centralisation away from 
mass working class participation. In March 1920 there were 207 
RKI inspectors in Moscow, 73 of whom were specialists
(accountants, representatives of the Vecheka and MChK), and the
195 
organisation was headed by Koletov in the Moscow soviet. The
majority of the inspectors were therefore workers, and RKI turned 
out to be an effective way of winkling out yet more capable
(April 1920) decision to involve themselves actively in Rabkrin 
(Carr, 1, p.232). TU involvement was a way of ensuring a certain 
level of control over them to prevent any autonomist 
developments.
191. KT, 24 March 1920. 192. Leggett, p.157.
193. KT, 24 March 1920. 194. KT, 18 March 1920
195. KT, 20 March 1920.
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people from the factories. These were then poached by the MSNKh
196 
and the MPO leading to a weakening of the RKI. Once again,
the battle against bureaucracy took second place to staffing that 
very bureaucracy. At the same time Fedenev's warnings about the 
danger of such a mass movement was heeded. An MK resolution of 3 
May 1920, passed with RK secretaries, stated in no uncertain 
terms that:
...The RKI can become one of the most powerful 
weapons of the working class in its struggle against 
bureaucracy only if all of its work is conducted in 
close contact with the general tasks of the party, which 
is the highest body expressing the interests of the 
working class at every single individual moment.
Elections were held to the Moscow RKI in the raions in 
October 1920. The period of delegation to the RKI was set at
only a few months in order to maximise the numbers participating
] 9 8 
and to ensure that members were not torn away from production.
By December 1920 there were 673 RKI cells in the city, and over
199 20,000 were involved in the assistance cells. By January 1921
the number of elected representatives to the Moscow RKI exceeded 
800. 20 °
In his address to the I all-Russian RKI conference on 15 
October 1920 Stalin, typically, posed the rhetorical guestion of 
why the RKI was required when the state belonged to the workers 
and peasants. He gave three reasons: the inexperience of the 
working class in running the state inevitably led to some 
mistakes; some bureaucratic chinovniki remained in their posts;
196. KT, 18 March 1920. 197. KT, 5 May 1920.
198. KT, 12 October 1920. 199. KT, 8 December 1920
200. KT, 26 January 1921.
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201 
and the conditions of a ruined economy. He failed to mention
the reason given so often in Moscow; that the RKI was a way of 
involving the working class in running the state apparatus. This 
omission reflected the new style of the RKI as a bureaucratic 
apparatus in its own right and contributed to its declining 
effectiveness so bitterly condemned by Lenin in his last article 
'Better Fewer, But Better 1 .
During the civil war the Soviets as mass participatory 
organisations etiolated, and party control was asserted both 
for ideological reasons and as a way of keeping a check on the 
development of bureaucratism. Lenin's thoughts in this period 
oscillated, on the one hand, between organisation as the panacea 
to bureaucratism and the solution to the task of building 
socialism, and, on the other hand, the alternative of mass 
involvement. At the Zamoskvorech'e party general meeting on 
29 November 1920 Lenin argued that the RKI had done little to 
prove itself as a school for the management of the state. 
Instead, 'The bureaucratism of the soviet apparatus could not but
permeate the party apparatus, since these apparatuses are
202 intimately bound together 1 . As Lenin recognised, the creation
of a party-state apparatus increasingly rendered both impervious 
to popular control, and even the party's control over the state 
bureaucracy was not assured.
201. KT, 17 October 1920.
202. Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.49. On mass involvement, e.g., on 28 
June 1918 Lenin argued that the revolution reguired a 'sufficien- 
tly strong organisation' (Lenin PSS, vol.36, pp.470-1). He also 
insisted that 'socialism can only be built when 10 or a 100 times 
more of the masses than earlier begin themselves to build the state 
and the new economic life 1 , Lenin PSS, vol.37, pp.425-6.
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PART III 
The Crisis of War Communism
In 1920 and early 1921 two major debates racked the Moscow 
party organisation and the party as a whole. The first, which 
can be called the party debate, centred on the structure of the 
relationships between various levels of the organisation and the 
role of the individual party member. The second, known as the 
trade union debate, focused on the party's relationship with the 
trade unions and by extension on the nature of the links between 
the soviet state and the working class. Neither guestion was 
original and both had been discussed for many years prior to 1920-1, 
but it was precisely as a result of the debates in this period 
that certain answers were formulated and given organisational
expression which, despite renewed discussion in the 1920s and*
later, survive to the present day as the basis of Soviet-type 
systems.
The dual nature of the crisis in 1920 was characterised by a 
historian of the twenties as
Not only one of the breach (otryv) of the party nizy 
from the party verkhi, but it was also one of the 
isolation of the party from the working class, of the 
isolation of the working class from the peasantry.
As Shlyapnikov put it at the X party congress, not only was the
party split, but the party itself represented a verkh in
2 
regard to the non-party nizy. The problem of the nizy had
1. N.N. Popov, Ocherk istorii rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii 
(bol'shevikov), M/L. 1926, p.248. The breach between the Soviet 
state and the peasantry was an essential part of the background to 
the debates but will not be discussed directly.
2. X s"ezd RKP, pp.71-2.
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surfaced at several points during the civil war, as mentioned, 
and the Workers' Opposition can be seen as the legatee of the nizy 
movement and the closest it came to organised expression. The 
Workers' Opposition can be seen as an expression of the anti- 
authoritarian radicalism of October 1917, and its defeat marked 
the victory and consolidation of the emergent party-state 
bureaucracy.
The party debate centred on a cluster of issues around the 
split between a passive membership and the party and state 
activists: the problem of privileges and inequality in the party, 
the role of the cells, the rights of party members and general 
party democracy, and the effectiveness of party committees. The 
trade union debate, as the MK put it in its TU resolution of 18 
January 1921, involved 'the relationship between the leading
elements of the proletariat organised in the RKP and all the
>3 
rest of the broad mass of the proletariat. The fundamental
question was whether the party should play an absolute tutelary 
role in society or whether its guiding role, which no communist 
denied, could be carried out in tandem with the working class 
organised in trade unions.
Both debates were attempts to find a way out of the 
economic, social and political crises engendered by the policies 
of war communism and both offered alternatives to the war 
communist system. Discussion was restricted to party members, 
but the non-party masses increasingly made their presence felt on 
the streets of Moscow, the villages of Tambov, and the 
battlements of Kronstadt. The two debates - democracy within the
3. P, 19 January 1921.
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party and the party's relations with mass social organisations - 
allowed of separate solution but by the end of 1920 the issues of 
the party debate had become lost in those of the trade unions. 
The attempts to reform the party became lost in the TU debate and 
only re-emerged on the eve of the X party congress, by which time 
the very bitterness of the debates themselves and events such as 
the Kronstadt rising militated against a reform solution to the 
party's problems. This Part will look at the issues in the 
debates in Moscow, their course, the extent of support for 
reform, and finally look at some of the reasons for their 
failure.
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CHAPTER 9 
The Rise of the Reform Movements
The background to the debates in the city was the problem of 
militarisation in both the wide and narrow senses. 
Militarisation signified the extension of state administrative 
methods over all other bodies, and authoritarian patterns of 
organisation with them. By 1920 militarisation was well advanced 
in the economy and the labour process, and in that year the party 
itself was threatened by the direct assertion of state military 
methods.
1. Militarisation
a. The economic crisis and the trade unions 
In December 1919 Trotsky proposed a series of measures,
hinted at already at the 24 September Moscow city party
4 
conference, aimed at the militarisation of labour. The
distinction between the military and civilian spheres was to be 
obliterated through universal labour duty and the militia system, 
and the comparatively efficient machinery of the Red Army was to 
be harnessed for economic purposes (Chapter 6). We have already 
discussed the work of the Moscow commission on labour duty. 
Labour was to come under military discipline enforced by an array 
of punitive organs to punish 'labour desertion 1 and other 
offences. It was Trotsky who forged the link between the general 
economic crisis and the role of the trade unions, as the 
organisers of labour. As he informed the MK on 6 January 1920,
4. P. 17 December 1919.
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ith Russia cut off from foreign aid and with a stock of worn-outwi
machines, labour would have to be substituted for capital. As
Day writes:
The civil war brought with it a steadily widening gap 
between traditional socialist ideals and economic 
necessity. Within little more than two years a pattern 
of organisation emerged which in many ways provided a 
prototype for Stalin's five-year plans of the 1930s. 
Ironically the main architect of this system was 
Trotsky.
Trotsky provided not only the organisational model for Stalin but 
also the theory. A 'production ideology 1 developed in which the 
various humanistic aims of Marxism were replaced by the idea of 
production as the goal of the revolution and not the means to 
achieve socialism. With Lenin's support Trotsky's proposals, 
with modifications giving slightly more scope to the trade 
unions, were adopted by the TsK on 22 January 1920.
General discussion over the respective roles of the trade 
unions, Soviets, and the party in the soviet state developed in 
the period leading up to the IX party congress. In autumn 1919 
Shlyapnikov formulated a division of tasks between the party, to 
be concerned with political management, the Soviets, to be the 
unique form of political power, and the trade unions, to whom
o
economic power was to be transferred. In March 1920 he 
developed these ideas to include greater autonomy for the
5. Richard B. Day, Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic 
Isolation, CUP 1973, p.25.
6. ibid., p.17.
7. £, 5 February 1920.
8. M.S. Zorkii (ed), Rabochaya oppozitsiya: materialy i 
dokumenty, M. 1926, p.16.
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9 
communist fractions in the TUs and thus reopened the VIII party
congress controversy over the issue. The focus of the 
controversy was now established: was the working class to be 
treated in the same way as the peasantry and what was to be the 
role of the TUs, as a working class organisation, in this 
militarised system?
At the 17-18 March 1920 city party conference Bukharin 
defended the MK's theses on 'The party, Soviets, and trade 
unions' which proposed what was becoming the orthodox 
interpretation of the role of the TUs as educators and organisers 
of the proletariat but not the direct managers of the economy. 
This view came to lie at the centre of the Platform of the Ten's 
position. While rejecting Shlyapnikov's syndicalism and trade 
union encroachment on the rights of the Soviets and the party by 
arguing for the subordination of communist TU fractions and TUs 
themselves to the party, the MK theses were influenced by 
Tomskii's theses, defended by him at the conference, that one- 
man management in industry should be introduced only with great 
reservations and collegiality preferred where possible. An 
indication of the growing opposition to militarisation in the MPO
was revealed by the heated discussion at the conference and by
12 the slim majority of ten by which the MK theses were adopted.
9. P_, 12 March 1920.
10. This view was proposed by Zinoviev in Izvestiya TsK-RKP, 
13, 2 March 1920, and in the TsK theses towards the IX party 
congress, Izvestiya TsK RKP, 17, 30 March 1920; IX s"ezd RKP, 
pp.558-561.
11. Ekonomicheskaya zhizn', 54, 1920.
12. KT, 20, 21 March 1920.
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A second city party conference on 25 March 1920 turned its 
attention to general economic policy. Trotsky once again 
put forward the rationale behind his plans:
Under the conditions of the capitalist epoch only free 
labour could be the most productive... but under 
socialist society the widespread application of social- 
compulsory labour can give extremely good results, since 
this forced labour has nothing in common with forced 
labour in bourgeois economies.
The application of this new sort of labour was being delayed, he 
argued, by the spiritual (dukhovnyi) backwardness of the 
population. He called for management of the economy to be in the 
hands of economic organs, while the TUs should be restricted to 
organising labour: 'We must put an end to the interference of 
the trade unions in the economy 1 . To militarise industry and 
raise the productivity of labour emergency bodies such as 
Glavpolitput' were to be formed. His plans combined the 
idealism of the subbotnik movement with the ruthlessness of the 
army high command. The conference unanimously supported the TsK 
line, but revealed its uneasiness by once again expressing 
reservations over one-man management.
Opposition to the extension of military methods to the
14 
economy was expressed by Osinskii at the end of 1919. By the
IX party congress, with the threat of militarisation being 
extended not only to the economy but to soviet and party life, 
his warnings against extending military culture to other spheres 
became sharper, and above all warned against the indiscriminate 
application of one-man management to civil and party
13. KT, 26 March 1920; £, 26 March 1920.
14. P, 30 December 1919.
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apparatuses. Lenin, however, supported Trotsky's plans on the 
grounds that compulsion was the only source of unity and 
discipline left with the disappearance of capital, and the army 
was the source of this discipline. The congress adopted the 
militarisation programme which was to be coordinated by a Council 
of Labour and Defence (STO). A few days later the III trade 
union congress supported labour duty and the IX congress 
decisions, and thereby rejected the use of the TUs to perform 
direct economic functions. The way was now clear for the 
application of militarisation.
b. Militarisation and the MPO: the railway RPO
The conflicts between the military departments and the MPO 
have been mentioned, and with Trotsky's militarisation plans for 
the economy and labour they were now extended to the civilian 
sphere. At the 25 March 1920 city party conference Trotsky had 
stated:
We must militarise the party in the same way that we 
have militarised the economy. We require an internal 
psychological revolution and the heroic application of 
effort... not being afraid of extraordinary actions and 
exceptional measures.
15. IX s"ezd RKP, pp.105-6, 155-7.
16. ibid., pp-15, 21-2. 17. KT, 14 April 1920.
18. KT, 26 March 1920. At the conference he argued that the 
centralism of glavki and economic organisations should be 
reproduced in the localities by oblast economic organs, and that 
this centralism should be reflected in the party by TsK oblast 
party organisations. In this spirit at the IX party congress he 
turned Preobrazhenskii's proposal for a more decentralised party, 
by forming party oblast bureaux, on its head: instead of oblast 
bureaux elected from local committees, which he argued would be 
prey to the old sin of oblastnichestvo, he called for them to be 
constituted as direct TsK committees by appointment.
- 393 -
At the IX party congress the applicability of militarisation to 
the party was a source of contention. We have noted Osinskii's 
reservations, and he was joined by Sapronov who argued that the
existence of the political departments signified nothing else but
19 the militarisation of party life. On the other hand,
20 Vladimirskii called for the militarisation of the party,
whereas Kamenev diplomatically argued that while militarisation wa 
to be supported in general, it was not to be applied to the party.
It was over the prerogatives of railway party organisations 
that the issue of party militarisation came to a head in Moscow. 
In his capacity as Commissar of Transport Trotsky was able to 
implement his plans first through Glavpolitput', then from August 
1920 Tsektran (TsK of rail and water TU), which undermined not 
only the independence of transport trade unions but also the 
party organisations in transport.
There had been a long history of conflict between 
Glavpolitput' (a central political department under the 
Commissariat of Transport - NKPS), formed in mid-January 1919 as
part of the militarisation of the railways, and the Moscow railway
22 (Zheleznodorozhnyi) party organisation. It had interfered in
the work of the RK and its cells on the railways, organised 
parallel clubs, libraries, and so on, and had convened party
19. IX s"ezd RKP, pp.122, 155. 20. ibid., p.322.
21. ibid., p.356.
22. The headguarters of Moscow's railway RPO was in 
Sokol'nicheskii raion where 4 out of the 8 lines had their 
offices. The special raion had been formed at the first meeting 
of the MK after the February revolution with its authority 
formally limited to the bounds of the city's circular (okruzhnoi) 
railway, but in practice its influence stretched far up the lines, 
V. Boborynin et al (eds), Sokol'niki, M. 1967, p.44.
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meetings without consulting either the cells or the RK. Above
23 all, it had been accused of 'overbearing behaviour 1 .
Resentment at the militarisation of party life on the railways 
through Glavpolitput' surfaced at a delegate meeting of 23 
communists on 21-23 May 1919, organised by the political 
department of the Moscow-Kazan line. While agreeing that 
extraordinary measures were necessary, they insisted that the
departments were to work in close contact with party and trade
24 
union organisations. The meeting of the railway raion RK in
June 1919 rejected by 10-2 the proposal, argued by Zimin, Vompe 
and others, that the parallelism between the political department 
and the RPO could be eliminated by merging the railway RPO with 
the city organisation. Instead, the majority led by Pyatnitskii, 
Amosov and others insisted that the political departments
required political guidance from the party which could be best
25 affected by a special railway RPO.
With the reorganisation in February 1920 of Glavpolitput',
now headed by Rozengol'ts, whereby its party functions were
? fi 
extended, the continued existence of the railway raion was once
23. Zheleznodorozhniki i revolyutsiya, M. 1923, p.48.
24. P_, 31 May 1919.
25. £, 15 June 1919. The VIII party congress had called for the 
abolition of extra-territorial party organisations such as the 
railway, military, post and telegraph, and print raions on the 
grounds that they infringed the principles of democratic 
centralism (VIII s"ezd RKP, p.425). In his report Zinoviev 
singled out the railway raions of Moscow and Petrograd as 
superfluous (ibid., p.162), though no time limit was set on their 
abolition. The TsK itself shelved proposals for their abolition 
in June 1919 on the grounds that there were special problems on 
the railways, Izvestiya TsK RKP, 2, 7 June 1919, p.4.
26. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 13, 2 March 1920.
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again put in doubt. Glavpolitput' pushed strongly for the
abolition of railway party raions throughout the network,
2 7 including Moscow. While the TsK's own position was
2 8 
ambiguous, the MK several times rejected abolition. At the
meeting on 29 March 1920, however, despite Pyatnitskii ' s 
rearguard action which argued that the political departments were
in no position to undertake the work of party organisations, a
29 
commission was appointed to report on the question.
On the eve of the IX party congress the MK now gave the 
railway RK its full backing against the extension of 
politotdel'chestva on the railways and to other industries. 
Together with the railway trade union TsK they protested against 
the Glavpolitput' proposals to give administrative personnel the 
right to fine and in general to punish workers and employees. 
The MK now called for political departments to be deprived of all 
political functions. At the congress itself Myasnikov 
questioned the dual role of Glavpolitput' as a state and party 
organisation. On the key issue of appointments and distribution 
of party members he called for consultation between political 
departments and local party organisations, while Kamenev went
further and argued that primacy in this field should lie with the
32LPO, though in consultation with the political departments.
27. KT, 18 March 1920. 28. KT, 4 April 1920.
29. KT, 4 April 1920. Its members were Pyatnitskii, Myasnikov, 
and Bubnov. Earlier MK decisions to retain the railway raion 
were supported by general meetings in other raions, VIMS, 18 
February 1920.
30. Zhel. i rev., p.48. 31. IX s"ezd RKP, pp.207-8. 
32. ibid., p.311.
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The IX party congress decided that the political departments 
were to have the dominant say in party work in transport on the 
grounds that the TUs were too weak on the railways to transmit 
party influence. In the light of this the railway organisation 
was dissolved in May 1920 and Glavpolitput' became the unique 
organiser of party cells on the railways. The victory of the 
militarisers left a legacy of bitterness in the city organisation 
and led to many disputes between communists on the railways and 
7 the new political department leaders. The attempts to apply 
militarisation to the party were not so much a function of the 
war as part of the strategy to deal with the country's economic 
problems. It was against this background that the debate over 
party democracy developed in the city.
2 . The party debate
a. The terms of debate
The party debate can be schematically presented as a 
conflict between the party and state party workers (APWs and 
SPWs), on the one hand, and the rank and file party members 
(RFPM), on the other. With the changes in the composition of the 
party during the war and the party weeks, mentioned above, the 
RFPMs tended to have more in common with the ordinary non-party
worker than with the verkhi, as the TsK admitted in the report on
35 its work on the eve of the X party congress. At the same time
the TsK argued that the 'ideological temper 1 of the party had 
changed because of a large intake of ex-members of other parties,
33. KPSS v rez. i resh., p.178. 34. Zhel. i rev., p.49. 
35. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 29, 7 March 1920, p.5.
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and thereby was able to devalue the specific arguments put 
forward by the oppositions. While agreeing that a breach had 
developed between leading party centres, especially those in 
soviet work, and the working class, which manifested itself in 
privileges and inequality, the TsK ingenuously argued that a 
reduction in this bureaucratism was a solution to the debate. In 
fact the issues ran far deeper than the TsK chose to assume.
In the spring and summer of 1920 in Moscow the conflict over 
the organisation of the Moscow party led to a series of tortuous 
organisational contests for dominance over the various party 
committees in the city (and guberniya). The first incident in 
this growing crystallisation of positions took place in Gorodskoi 
raion. We have seen that throughout 1919 and above all at the 
January 1920 conference of active party workers the existing 
committees had been criticised for their ineffectiveness and were 
held responsible for the gulf between the verkhi and nizy. The
Gorodskoi RK itself had long been criticised for not devoting
37 
enough attention to work in the raion. At a delegate meeting
on 27 April 1920 the critics of the old RK, including Ignatov,
Medvedev and Berezin, surged to power and took four out of the
3 8 five places on the RK bureau. They now launched into a flurry
of organisational work which they claimed would overcome the 
defects of the old committee. The RK apparatus was restructured, 
the raion divided into seven uchastki, each headed by an
organiser appointed by the RK, thirty organisers were sent to
39 
weaker cells, and so on.
36. loc.cit. 37. KT, 3 April 1920. 
38. KT, 5 May 1920. 39. KT, 3 July 1920.
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The new Gorodskoi RK was trying to break down the divisions 
within the party by improving educational work and by involving eel. 
members in party work, and at the same time it was attempting to 
improve the party's standing with the non-party workers. However, 
the resistance to measures aimed at involving a larger segment of 
party members was revealed by the following incident. At a 
meeting of RK secretaries called by the MK on 3 May 1920, 
Zaslavskii proposed that the role of delegate meetings should be 
enhanced by inviting two or three cell members to them, including 
the youngest and most backward individuals, to encourage them to 
play a more active role. His proposal aroused a storm of protest 
on the part of the RK secretaries who argued that the measure 
would destroy the delovoi (businesslike) atmosphere of the 
delegate meetings.
A specific apparat ideology of brisk executive action 
had developed in the party at the expense of debate and 
participation. Nevertheless, opposition was growing based on the 
division between an active and passive membership. It was now 
becoming unusual for the verkh/nizy controversy not to be raised 
at party meetings. Kotov, for example, commented that the 30 
August 1920 Sokol'nicheskii raion delegate meeting had not been 
dominated by the 'usual demagogy' on the split. Instead, it had 
been a delovoi meeting at which a new RK had been elected and 'an
atmosphere of mutual respect and trust had been established
41 between the RK and the cells'.
While the tensions in the MPO accumulated the party 
organisation was distracted by the chimera of the Polish war. At
40. KT, 5 May 1920. 41. KT, 3 September 1920.
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the emergency (III) Moscow guberniya party conference (21-22 
August 1920) the 259 delegates were inspired by Bukharin's and 
Sorin's reports on the prospects for international revolution 
opened up by the advance on Warsaw. The resolution called for
Moscow to make yet more sacrifices to ensure success at the
42 front. The Polish war, and Soviet victories in the civil war,
therefore, encouraged the continuation of wartime policies at 
a time when pressure for change was reaching a dangerous level. 
At the conference itself Zelenskii's report on the work of the MK 
was followed by speeches once again criticising the shortcomings 
of the MK. No decisions were taken, though a commission was
entrusted with drafting a resolution incorporating the proposals
43for reforming the MK. The work of the commission was pre- 
empted, however, by the crisis in the MPO.
b. The Baumanskii incident
The signal for a major revolt against the party process as 
it had developed during the civil war, against militarised forms 
of party organisation and work, was given in the heavily 
proletarian Baumanskii party organisation. In spring 1920 the 
Baumanskii revisional commission, the majority of whose members 
were later to join the Workers' Opposition, prepared a report on 
the work of the RK for 1919 and early 1920. It accused the RK of 
exceeding its authority, deciding questions that should have been 
settled by the organisation as a whole, of not handing over 
questions to be discussed by the cells, all of which had led to
42. KT, 22 August 1920. 43. KT, 24 August 1920.
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44 the 'death of living thought'. At the IX congress Kiselev, a
key figure in the Workers' Opposition, had already complained
that the party centre had a tendency to suffocate thought in the
45 localities. The report continued that those bold enough to
have their own opinions, including senior and long-time party 
members, had been removed from party work, and that the cells
(whose diminished role has been discussed above) had been
46 
suborned by pressure from the apparatus. These were to
become standard opposition complaints.
The criticisms of the RK ended with a call for 'the 
necessary conclusions to be drawn 1 . The report prompted an 
unsuccessful 'coup' against the old RK at a meeting on 28 August 
1920. The participants of the meeting, who included Demidov, 
G. Kuranova, Kryukov, and N. Tulyakov, drew up a list of new 
members for the RK and elected a troika for the further 
coordination of actions and to find accomodation for further 
meetings. The meeting expressed a lack of confidence in some 
leading party workers, called for the replacement of the verkhi,
and discussed the organisation of an opposition presence at the
47 forthcoming national party conference and congress.
A special commission was appointed, first by the MK bureau, 
and then by the full MK, to look into the state of affairs in the 
Baumanskii party organisation. Its conclusions, presented to the
44. Manievich, p.174. 45. IX s"ezd RKP, p.60
46. Manievich , p.174.
47. V.F. Kochegarov, 'K voprosu o bor'be Moskovskoi organizatsii 
RKP(b) s antipartiinymi gruppirovkami nakanune diskussii o 
profsoyuzakh', Uch. zap. Mos. Gos. Zaochnyi Fed. In-t., issue 27, 
1969, p.152.
- 401 -
MK plenum on 20 September 1920, stated that the 28 August meeting 
had been conspiratorial by dint of the creation of a ' leading 
organ 1 in the form of the troika to form a 'separate 
organisation 1 . The commission warned all the participants of the 
meeting that a repetition of the incident might mean expulsion 
from the party, and meanwhile severely reprimanded them,
transferred some to other raions, and suspended the initiators of
48 the meeting from the party for six months.
The MK itself, however, was split on its attitude to the 
oppositionists. Some felt that the criticisms of party work had 
been justified, and at an MK meeting on the eve of the IX 
conference some of the opposition were allowed to defend 
themselves. Their claim that the 28 August meeting had only 
tried to 'identify the party's ailments', and had been an attempt 
to improve work in the cells and 'to refresh party work 1 , 
satisfied the majority of the MK. The plenum now limited itself
to issuing a 'severe censure 1 to the meeting's organisers and
49 forbade them to hold a responsible post for three months.
Peace, however, did not break out in the Baumanskii 
organisation. The opposition now called for the full 
rehabilitation of those punished. At the same time they 
continued their criticisms of the RK, which was accused of 
stifling criticism and of being isolated from the workers, and 
they insisted on new elections to the committee. The 
opposition's efforts were crowned with success when at the 11 
October 1920 raion delegate meeting they obtained a majority on
48. ibid., p.152. 49. ibid., p.153. 
50. ibid., p.155.
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the RK, and on 12 October at the first session of the new soviet 
plenum obtained a majority on the ispolkom. In this way the 
opposition had gained control of the party and soviet apparatus 
in one of Moscow's largest raions.
On the eve of the IX party conference the demands for 
change on the part of the Workers' Opposition intensified in 
other raions. Under pressure from the opposition the 
Khamovnicheskii raion delegate meeting on 14 September 1920, for 
example, elected a new RK which was enlarged to include
representatives of the cells in the largest factories in the
52 
raion. The RFPMs were asserting themselves in the MPO.
c. The MK and the IX party conference
In a circular letter to party committees of 4 September 1920 
the TsK suggested that the gulf between the verkhi and nizy, 
between the rank and file communists and certain party and soviet 
leaders, had arisen because of 'incorrect relations' between 
them, the abuse of power and the development of privileges. To 
investigate the complaints of communists gubkomy were to form 
commissions. On the eve of the party conference a commission 
consisting of some TsK members, representatives of the Moscow and 
Petrograd organisations, and Ignatov and Sapronov as opposition 
representatives, looked into the problem of the verkhi. It 
recommended not only control commissions in the centre and the 
localities, but also insisted that all party members were to be
51. Manievich, p.174. 52. KT, 19 September 1920 
53. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 21, 1920, p.2
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54 involved in party work by being assigned to a cell.
In its report for September 1920 the MK acknowledged the
depth of feeling over the split between the verkhi and nizy in
55 the Moscow organisation. At the same time the MK issued two
important documents summarising its postion on the questions 
being debated at the time, and provided an analysis of the whole 
course of party developments during the civil war.
The first document was issued in preparation for a 'week of 
strengthening the party 1 , which was held in response to the TsK 
letter of 16 September 1920 and involved the organisation of 
800 party meetings in an intensive campaign. A key aspect of the 
week was to ensure that all party members, irrespective of their 
posts, were attached to a cell, and thus served as an attempt 
to overcome the divisions in the party. In its theses on the 
week the MK argued that the division between the party, on the 
one hand, and other class organisations such as the trade unions, 
on the other, was inevitable up to the time that the proletariat 
established its hegemony. Therefore, the party, uniting only a 
minority of the proletariat, was the guarantor of the success of 
the revolution, and this required iron discipline and trust in 
the party centre. In this way the justification for party 
dominance was outlined. The theses identified the cells as the 
key link in the party and included detailed instructions on their 
organisation. The emphasis on the cells had been developing 
gradually during the war, as opposed to regarding delegate
54. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 29, 7 March 1921, p.6.
55. Otchet MK za sentyabr' 1920g., M. 1920, p.4.
56. KT, 19 September 1920; Otchet, pp.3, 56.
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meetings or the raions as the centre of party life, 
but as we have seen they were no longer seen in terms of actively 
running enterprises or institutions but as the organisers of party 
members themselves.
On 17 September 1920 the MK published its theses on 'the 
current tasks of the party 1 as part of the continuing response to 
the verkhi/nizy question. They argued that the 'centralised 
military-proletarian forms of dictatorship 1 both of the state and 
the party were forced by the civil war and intervention and could 
only be relaxed with the final victory of the international 
proletariat. The application of these forms in a backward 
country, they went on, led to a constant danger of the formation 
of a bureaucratic layer isolated from the masses, and above all 
the separation of responsible communists from party duties and 
the development of a bureaucratic approach. The theses 
recognised that party meetings often became formal occasions and 
that the intellectual life of party organisations was often 
moribund. Once again they stressed that privileges should be 
eliminated, intra-party work revived, and that the fulfilment of 
party duties by all party members, above all in the ChON and the 
subbotniks, was compulsory. The problems were recognised, 
but by holding the war responsible for the development of the 
bureaucracy the MK failed to admit the deeper causes of the crisis
Many of the MK's points were reiterated by Myasnikov, the 
secretary of the MK, in a series of articles on the eve of the 
conference. He rejected the Workers' Opposition identification of 
the verkhi with the intelligentsia, and the nizy with the
57. KT, 17 September 1920. 58. KT, 19 September 1920.
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proletariat on the justified grounds that many of the former,
especially in the raions, were proletarian themselves, and were
5 8 
as much as any isolated from the workers. He conceded that
the mass of workers had lost their enthusiasm and were deeply 
critical of the privileges of the verkhi. The non-party
conferences, he admitted, had turned into banal meetings to which
59 the masses were indifferent. He called for more open meetings
of soviet bodies in factories, with more reports and
60 discussions.
The majority of the concrete recommendations of these 
documents were implemented by the IX party conference (22-25 
September 1920). The conference marked the high point of the 
reform movement in the Russian Communist Party and was therefore 
in marked contrast to the X party congress held in March of the 
following year. The improved military situation by the end of 
1920 and the pressure for reform in party organisations such as 
Moscow's encouraged hopes that some of the rigours of the war 
period could be relaxed within the party. Zinoviev was the main 
rapporteur on party guestions at the conference and he admitted 
that 'proletarian centralism 1 had been replaced by 
' glavkocentrism' ; that military departments and military work 
dominated local party organisations; and that privileges had 
developed through bureaucracy, the principle of udarnost', the 
use of specialists, and had resulted in a split between the 
verkhi and nizy. His calls for wide discussion in the 
party, the decreased use of appointments in favour of elections, 
the reduction of inequalities in the party, the use of
59. KT, 21 September 1920. 60. KT, 23 September 1920.
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reregistrations to monitor the social composition of the party, 
and so on, were tempered by the admission that the full 
implementation of these reforms had to wait for more propitious 
circumstances. His conclusion therefore stressed the need for 
iron discipline in the party. l The resolution on party 
construction recommended a range of democratising measures, 
including frequent report-backs by responsible party leaders,
C o
more elections of posts, and free criticism by party members.
Reform within the party, however, both at the conference and 
in the MK's theses was considered in isolation from economic 
reform. Within the context of war communism the arguments 
centred on improvements in the working of the party organisations 
and failed to come to grips with the structural crisis of the 
economy and therefore with the sources of the split in the party. 
The recommendations for control commissions in the centre and 
localities was adopted by the conference. Their aim was to 
overcome fractionalism in the party by clearing it of 'petty- 
bourgeois elements'. A special MK commission had been 
established prior to the conference following the TsK circular 
letter entrusted with the task of investigating the way of life 
of responsible soviet and party workers with the aim of 
eliminating komissarstvo and bureaucratism, but the commiss- 
ions' functions were now changed by allowing them not only to 
investigate misdemeanours on the part of communists but also to
61. IX konf. RKP, pp.139-55.
62. ibid., pp.278-82.
63. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 25, 1920, p.2.
64. Otchet MK za sentyabr' 1920g., p.4.
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combat the so-called unhealthy tendencies in party 
organisations. In this way the oppositions themselves became 
the object of scrutiny. These commissions were elected in the 
raions in October and November 1920, often at the same meetings 
which elected delegates to the November guberniya party 
conference, and at the conference the Moscow guberniya control 
commission (MKK) was elected. The control commissions were the 
eguivalent to the workers' inspection movement but failed to 
develop a mass base. Instead, they tended to fuse with the party 
hierarchy and were thus rendered ineffective. 66
An extended session of the MK meeting with party activists 
on 26 October 1920 adopted a wide-ranging instruction on 
democratising party life in the light of the IX conference. The 
aim was to 'attract the masses into active participation in the 
most important questions of party and soviet life'. To this end 
all meetings from the MK down were to be open to the next tier of 
the party hierarchy, reports were to be heard from all party, 
economic, and soviet centres, and at these extended sessions co- 
rapporteurs were to be allowed. Full discussion was to be 
permitted on all the most important questions until decisions at 
a higher level had been taken, though criticism was to be 
'healthy' and not 'demagogic'. Material inequalities were to be 
abolished by introducing a uniform wage and standard rations for 
all responsible party workers. This instruction acted as a 
charter for the debate that now unfolded over party democracy, 
and allowed extended discussion in the trade union debate.
65. Izvestiya TsK RKP, 26, 1920, p.17. 66. Adams, p.27. 
67. Otchet MK za oktyabr 1 1920g., pp.64-6.
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d. Towards the guberniya party conference (20-22 November 
1920)
The period between the IX party conference and the November 
guberniya party conference was marked by the full emergence of 
the oppositions into, as Myasnikov put it, 'a significant and
C O
11 threatening" force 1 . From early November the trade union 
issue ripened into a vigorous controversy. It was at this time 
that a group of party workers based in Gorodskoi raion emerged 
with their own critique of the party and the inadequacies of the 
MK. The leading figure of this 'group of active workers of the 
raions of Moscow' was E.N. Ignatov, who had long been a critic of 
various aspects of party life, notably in the period preceding 
the VIII party congress. The group now split away from the 
Democratic Centralists and in their emphasis on the need to 
revive inner-party democracy in the raions they gradually came to 
share the views of the Workers' Opposition. They proposed a 
radical critique of the 'lifeless 1 forms that party work took in 
Moscow. Up to February 1921 they supported Lenin's trade union 
platform, as the lesser evil compared to Trotsky's militarisation 
plans, and caused a mild shock when they switched their support 
to the Workers' Opposition.
Gorodskoi raion, as mentioned, had become the main base of 
the Ignatovtsy and it had been here that Ignatov had long played 
a leading role in the raion soviet. Here they had attempted to 
put their ideas into practice from April 1920, and after the IX 
conference went even further. A delegate meeting on 9 November 
1920 adopted Burovtsev's proposal to use re-elections to the RK
68. Myasnikov, p.284.
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as a way of extending party democracy. Time was to be allowed 
for the cells to draw up their own lists for the RK, and the 
election was to act as a mandate and vote of confidence in the 
Ignatov group's management of the raion. Similar provisions for 
cell participation were made for the elections to the forthcoming 
guberniya conference.
The MK came under increasing criticism after the IX 
conference from the Workers' Opposition and the Ignatovtsy. The 
Baumanskii group argued that in the six months since its election 
the MK had lacked a 'single, firm, general organisational line 1 . 
They claimed to represent 'the most conscious and active segment' 
of the Moscow working class amongst whom, they claimed, there was 
growing 'a healthy discontent with the policies of the MK'. On 
16 October 1920 the Baumanskii RK demanded an emergency guberniya 
conference at which the MK could be reelected. A section of the 
Gorodskoi RK put forward a similar demand, while others 
considered that this constituted a vote of no confidence in the 
MK, which was due for reelection soon anyway. General agreement 
was reached when the demand was rephrased: 'in view of the end of 
the reregistration and the necessity to renew the party 
organisation from top to bottom it is necessary to reelect the 
MK'. 70
At stake was control over the largest party organisation in 
the country, which now seemed to be within the grasp of a 
coalition of oppositions. In the MK itself they gained 
increasing support. In mid-October 1920 a group on the committee 
sympathetic to the Workers' Opposition called for a review of the
69. KT, 12 November 1920. 70. Kochegarov (1969), p.155.
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punishment of the leaders of the Workers' Opposition in 
Baumanskii raion, considering that 'it had not been necessary to 
transfer anyone... from the raion 1 and that 'the MK made a 
mistake in its initial approach to the raion'. Under pressure 
the MK acceded to opposition demands for an emergency guberniya 
conference, to be convened on 20 November. There was to be a 
city-wide discussion on the activities of the MK in preparation
for the conference. MK members were given the right to defend
72 their own positions. The 26 October instruction, discussed
above, allowed any communist, and not only MK members, to speak as 
co-rapporteurs at meetings, and thus gave the oppositions a 
platform to advance their views.
There now developed a bitter struggle for advantage in 
preparation for the conference. Both the MK supporters and the 
oppositionists accused each other of insisting on proportionality 
in sending delegates when they were in a minority, and of taking 
all the seats when in a majority. In principle, proportionality 
was the rule in these elections and therefore the conference 
accurately reflected the relative strength of the positions.
Opposition motions of no confidence in the MK were passed at 
delegate meetings in Zamoskvoretskii, Baumanskii and Gorodskoi 
raions, and also at the XII Moscow uezd (the area in the 
immediate vicinity of the city) party conference (5-7 November 
1920). A delegate meeting in Khamovnicheskii raion on 10 
November, chaired by Drozhzhin (a future signatory to the 
Trotsky-Bukharin trade union platform), called for reelections to
71. Kochegarov (1969), p.158. 72. loc.cit. 
74. KT. 14 November 1920.
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the MK and accused it of providing 'insufficient leadership in 
soviet construction 1 , especially in regard to the Moscow soviet. 
This meeting, attended by 56 delegates and 20 active party 
workers, adopted the RK's work for September and October 
delivered by Kotov, and elected the raion party control 
commission. At a delegate meeting in Rogozhsko-Simonovskii 
raion on 12 November, with 70 delegates, Minkov gave the MK 
report, Lisitsyn the RK's, and Ignatov the opposition's 
resolution, which was passed after a heated discussion. A raion 
control commission was elected. The resolutions expressing a 
lack of confidence in the MK, together with the results of the 
voting, were immediately printed by the oppositions in the form 
of leaflets and distributed in the raions. There was only very 
rarely a mention of their victories in the official Moscow party 
paper Kommunisticheskii trud.
Five out of the seven RPO's were therefore to varying 
degrees and from differing viewpoints critical of the MK. In the 
other two the MK tried to rally support. A delegate meeting in 
Sokol'nicheskii raion on 1 November 1920 strongly endorsed 'the 
political activity of the MK' and urged that it took a strong 
line against the oppositionists 'who could weaken party members 
with low consciousness 1 . While supporting the MK in the 
party debate this raion after November was to become a stronghold 
of Trotsky's trade union position. The debates cut across 
the conventional label of 'opposition' depending on the
75. KT, 13 November 1920. 76. KT, 14 November 1920 
77. KT, 3 November 1920; Kochegarov 1969, p.159.
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78 issue. In Krasnopresnenskii raion at the end of October
Minkov's and Lisitsyn's resolution supporting the MK was passed, 
but the motion called on the MK to strengthen its control over the
Moscow soviet and the trade union as part of the battle against
79 bureaucracy and glavkocracy.
The situation in the MPO led to increasing concern in the 
TsK. After preliminary discussion in the Orgburo and Politburo 
in early November, the TsK plenum on 9 November decided to 
reinforce the MK by sending two TsK members onto the committee to
be elected at the November conference, and sent others to speak
80 in the raions on behalf of the MK. Lenin himself became
increasingly concerned. At the delegate meeting in Baumanskii 
raion on 18 November he criticised not so much the views as the 
activities of the Workers' Opposition. In the lively discussion 
following Bukharin's and Ignatov's speeches Lenin called for more 
attention to be devoted to practical economic issues rather than
78. Kotov in Sokol'nicheskii raion, for example, was the 
scourge of the Workers' Opposition up to November 1920. Long an 
exponent of militarised forms in the party, at the 10 September 
1920 Sokol'nicheskii raion delegate meeting he once again called 
for the 'RK apparatus to be turned into a state of the military 
type 1 (£, 10 September 1920). The basic logic of his position 
rested o~n the awareness of the lack of party activists, and at 
this meeting he called for the MK and TsK to send more to the 
raion. At that time the whole burden of party work in the raion 
of about 2000 members fell on 208 party activists, 160 of whom 
were organisers in cells and factories without cells, while 48 
were agitators and propagandists (Desyat' let Yu.O.K., p.14). He 
threw in his lot with Trotsky's TU platform which drove him into 
'opposition' but did not change his views on the way that the 
party was to be organised or his hostility to the Workers' 
Opposition. In the later stages of the TU debate, therefore, 
when Trotsky's TU platform had changed and de facto voting 
alliances were made with the Workers' Opposition against the MK, 
Kotov's presence in the opposition was anomalous.
79. KT, 28 October 1920.
80. Kochegarov (1969), p.160.
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81 
to debate. An increasingly important factor in the debates was
the return of communists from the fronts. At an extended meeting 
of cell secretaries and other activists in Rogozhsko-Simonovskii 
raion on 18 November Myasnikov's attack on the oppositions was 
vigorously supported by a group who had recently returned from 
the fronts. They argued that 'the party and party workers
require the old party discipline, the hardness (zakalennost') of
8 2 the army... 1 . No vote was taken but clearly the official line
was bolstered by their support.
e. The IV Moscow guberniya party conference (20-23 
November 1920)
8 3 The conference was marked by the acrimony of debate. It
heard a major report from Lenin, looked at the economic situation 
of the country (Rykov), the tasks of production propaganda 
(Bukharin), considered the work of the outgoing MK and elected a 
new one, the topic which engendered the sharpest debate, and 
elected a control commission for the guberniya and a revisional 
commission. In his main address to the conference on 21 November 
Lenin stressed that economic reconstruction was the main task 
following victory in the war. His speech was remarkable, however,
81. There is no stenogram of this speech. Quoted by P. 
Zaslavskii, Vospominaniya o V.I. Lenine, vol.3, M. 1960, pp.182- 
4, and Kochegarov 1969, p.160. No vote was taken and the 
meeting ended with elections to the conference, KT, 20 November 
1920.
82. KT, 20 November 1920.
83. On the first day 289 delegates with voting rights attended, 
though 320 were due to attend, and 89 with consultative status. 
The conference presidium consisted of representatives of all the 
main positions: Alekseev, Boguslavskii, Bubnov, Ignatov, Kamenev, 
Minkov, and Pyatnitskii. Pyatnitskii and Kamenev chaired the 
sessions, KT, 21 November 1920.
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in that for the first time it was declared publicly that the 
party was suffering a crisis, and that it contained opposition 
groupings. On the party debate he offered no initiative and
instead called for 'the most rapid liguidation of the so-called
84 
opposition line 1 .
The report on the work of the MK over the past six months 
aroused the greatest controversy, and discussion ranged over the 
whole question of party organisation in general. Minkov 
presented the MK's case, with Bubnov as the co-rapporteur (20 
November) and discussion was opened the next morning over two
resolutions proposed by Kamenev and Ignatov. In the voting
8 5 Kamenev's motion was passed by 154 votes to Ignatov's 124. The
majority resolution admitted that the war had resulted in the 
curtailment of inner-party democracy, but insisted that victory 
1 . ..would create the possibility and necessity to move to a new 
stage in the internal organisational life of the party... 1 . The 
basic premise for reforms, it argued, was the 'merciless 
elimination 1 of all intrigues and 'unprincipled little groups'
O f.
and for party work to be conducted in a delovoi way. Several
concrete proposals were adopted to improve the work of the MK and
8 7 to 'revive' the communist fractions in the trade unions.
Ignatov's resolution contained a wide-ranging critique of 
the work of the MK over the last half year: poor organisational 
and political leadership, as shown in the decrepitude of the MK's
84. Lenin PSS, vol.42, pp.33, 35.
85. Otchet o rabote Moskovskoi obshchepartiinoi konferentsii, 
20-22 noyabr' 1920g., (materialy dlya dokladchikov) , W. 1920, p. 6 
KT, 23 November 1920 reports that the vote was 163 to 115.
86. Otchet, p.5. 87. KT, 23 November 1920.
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organisation-instruction department, so that every attempt to 
guide the raions showed a 'lack of faith' in the abilities of the 
raions themselves through 'pettyfogging supervision 1 : poor 
links and lack of planned leadership over the trade unions and 
Soviets which isolated the MK from fresh reserves of the working 
class; all this had encouraged the development of various groups 
and conflicts which the MK could only deal with through 'surgical 
operations' which encouraged passivity in the party out of fear 
of punishment: reform was blocked by a group on the MK who had 
hindered the application of the IX conference resolutions. 
Finally, the resolution claimed continuity over two and a half
years in its opposition on the basis of its demand for the
8 8 
application of democratic centralism.
Following the defeat of their proposals the oppositions 
twice met in separate conclave and declared that they absolved 
themselves of further responsibility for the work of the MK. On 
22 November voting took place for the new MK. There had
initially been two lists but the majority at the conference
8 9 
withdrew its own in favour of one drawn up by the TsK at a
90 
meeting of the Politburo with Lenin present on 19 November.
The Politburo decided to enlarge the MK from 31 to 39 members in 
order to give greater representation to lower levels of the party 
and to workers. The idea was to renew at least half of the MK to 
the benefit of worker communists still on the shopfloor, to 
include some party workers from other organisations, and for the 
list to include some members of the opposition and thus to avoid
88. Otchet, pp.4-5. 89. Otchet, p.6. 
90. Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.556.
- 416 -
an overt split. The expansion and 'workerising' of the MK 
prefigured the TsK's own expansion, on Lenin's insistence, in 
1923, as part of the attempt to prevent the consolidation of the 
central party bureaucracy. However, the oppostion demand for 
proportionality put forward by Bogulavskii and others was
rejected by the congress, and scorned by Lenin as rendering the
91 92 MK nedelovoi. The TsK list was adopted with 164 votes.
Following the conference the party debate continued, with,
for example, a strong attack on bureaucratism by the Workers'
93 Opposition at a general party meeting in Zamoskvorech'e, but
in general attention was increasingly concentrated on the trade 
union debate. For a time the issue of party reform was lost in 
the welter of conflicting positions and manouevring associated 
with the second debate, and by the time the party debate once 
again emerged the very premises on which the calls for party 
democracy had been founded had changed owing to the bitterness 
and length of the trade union debate and because of the tide of 
popular protest.
91. Lenin PSS, vol.42, pp.39-40.
92. KT, 23 November 1920. For the full list, see Appendix 14. 
It included: F.A. Sergeev (Artem) sent to work in the MK by the 
TsK and elected MK secretary; N.P. Rastopchin, party member since 
1903 and one of the leaders of the workers' movement in Nizhni 
Novgorod and Kostroma; I.A. Zelenskii, party member since 1906, 
1920-21 on the presidium of the Moscow soviet, 1920-25 secretary 
of the MK, then secretary of the Central Asia Bureau of the TsK; 
Ya.V. Dorofeev, party member since 1907, worker, elected to MK 
secretariat; A.I. Krinitskii, headed MK organisation and 
instruction department, his deputy for work in the countryside 
was Rastopchin; T.G. Zamorenov; member of MK Shkiryatov. The 
list included some members of the oppositions: T.V. Sapronov, 
E.N. Ignatov (party member since 1912, worker), V.A. Kotov, R.B. 
Rafail, Boguslavskii, E.V. Uryvaev, Korzinov (party member since 
1904, worker), V.N. Yakovleva.
93. P, 30 November 1920; Zorkii, p.17; Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.49.
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3. Organisational reform
Following the November conference the party organisation as 
a whole concentrated on improving the work of the party 
departments and cells, and on combatting the increasing 
discontent in the city by intensified agitprop work. Reforms 
were also instituted in this period, as mentioned, in the MGSPS 
and the Moscow soviet. The situation at the fronts had improved 
dramatically: for the first time in three years no major armies 
confronted the Soviet state, and the allied blockade had been 
lifted on 16 November.
The MK session of 1 December 1920 heard Artem, the MK 
secretary, give details of the camf>ij ign to implement the November 
conference decisions on democratising party life, which included 
the organisation of general party meetings and the involvement of
cell secretaries in party work. Responsibilities were allocated
94 
amongst the MK members. Members of the opposition were given
posts and indeed, it should be borne in mind that participants in 
the debates were usually burdened by administrative and political 
tasks (such as Ignatov in the Komsomol). For the first time 
since the beginning of the civil war the MK had at its disposal a 
reserve of experienced cadres and could devote itself to 
organising the party itself. At this stage the centralistic
94. Minkov was appointed head of the agitation and instruction 
department, with Boguslavskii and Zaslavskii members of its 
collegium; Sorin was appointed head of agitprop; Rastopchin headed 
work in the countryside; Korzinov was head of the subbotnik 
department while a commission was to consider their future; 
Breslav was head of the military department; S.N. Smidovich head 
of the female worker department; Artem the head of the communist 
fraction in the Moscow soviet (note that this post was not elected 
by the fraction itself); Shkiryatov and Boguslavskii were to be 
responsible for the trade unions; and Ignatov was to be the MK 
representative on the MK RKSM, KT, 2 December 1920.
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practices of the war period were tempered by the reform 
programmes of the September and November party conferences.
In January 1921 the MK set itself an ambitious programme to 
improve the workings of the party organisation. Relations within 
and between departments were to be defined to avoid parallelism, 
cells were to be drawn closer to their higher party instance, and 
the content of their work improved. A uniform system of party 
committees was to be instituted at all levels, and the 
relationships between the party committees and party fractions
of the Soviets, ispolkomy, trade unions, and Komsomol were to be
95 defined. While much had been made of these points during the
civil war little had been achieved, and indeed the importance of 
the war period and its enduring legacy was that it had seen the 
formulation of the tasks for the succeeding period. During the 
war the 'shock' approach to mobilisations and party work in 
general through special 'weeks' had disrupted progress towards 
the effective integration of all party members into a uniform 
party system. As the November conference had illustrated, the 
premium was now on effective and detailed guidance from the 
centre balanced by competent lower involvement, and on this all 
the oppositions were agreed.
An important aspect of this period was the consolidation of 
the MK's claim to be the supreme arbiter on the disposition of 
party members. As part of the reform programme the political 
departments in transport had been abolished in September 1920, 
restoring normal trade union practices and allowing the
95. Otchet MK za yanvar' 1921g., p.47.
- 419 -
prerogatives of the MK in this area to be consolidated. It was 
in January 1921, as mentioned, that the army cells were directly 
integrated into the RPO's by the abolition of the MK military 
department. The introduction of a uniform party ticket and more 
accurate registration of members enabled the MK to plan the 
disposition of communists more effectively. The MK was now 
redistributing party members from soviet institutions to 
strengthen factory cells, moving members from the city to the 
countryside, and concentrating resources in the udarnyi 
enterprises. At the same time the MK systematised the selection
g "7
of party members from cells for more 'responsible 1 work. The 
MK jealously defended its prerogatives in this field, and warned 
that punitive measures would be taken against institutions that
used communists demobilised from the army without first going
9 8 through the MK. In January 1921 Yakovleva insisted that all
appointments had to go through the MK and warned against raion
99 organisations 'seizing 1 demobilised communists.
The general right of the TsK and the MK to deploy party 
forces wherever they saw fit was a factor in the debates, 
with widespread mobilisations continuing even after the 
war for various economic and organisational tasks. The 
Baumanskii oppositionists had accused the MK of abusing the 
right, and Kollontai at the IX conference protested against the 
practice of sending inconvenient people 'to eat peaches' far away 
from Moscow for too frank criticism. On the eve of the
96. Otchet MK za yanvar', p.47. 97. ibid., p.48.
98. KT, 14 August 1920; Otchet MK za yanvar 1 1920g., p.48.
99. KT, 4 February 1921. 100. IX konf. RKP, p.188.
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November conference, indeed, Bukharin had argued that 'we must 
heal the Moscow organisation 1 by getting rid of the most 
quarrelsome elements and replacing them by new people from 
outside of Moscow, though he argued that even the most extreme 
elements were not to be expelled from the party. 101
One issue which became an important test case of the MK's 
ability to organise the mass of membership was participation in
subbotniks. There had long been criticism over the irregular
102 
attendance of communists and it was considered an infringement
of party discipline not to take part. 103 An MK circular of 
September 1920 stated that the overwhelming majority of Moscow's 
communists avoided participation, at about 85-90% of the 
organisation, including almost all responsible workers and most 
middle-level party workers. In the light of the IX conference 
decisions against privileges, the MK stated, this massive 
avoidance of party duties would be countered by a range of 
punitive measures up to demotion to candidate status for members 
and expulsion for candidates. The subbotnik departments would be 
strengthened by the addition of full-time competent activists. 104
With the ending of the war the subbotniks came under 
increasing criticism by communists as an irrational use of 
labour. Ignatov at the X congress called them a 'burden 1 and
101. £, 16 November 1920. Both the Komsomol and Baumanskii 
oppositionists had only been suspended from the party.
102. KT, 17 August 1920.
103. Otchet MK za iyul' 1920g., p.15.
104. Otchet MK za sentyabr' 1920g., p.51.
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declared that they had become a purely formal exercise. 
Rafail argued that the soul of the 'great beginning' (velikii 
pochin) had been destroyed by the payment of rations as a reward 
for attendance, the obligatory nature of participation twice a 
month, and punishment for non-attendance. Nevertheless, their 
defenders, such as Korzinov at the head of the MK subbotnik 
department, argued that they made up for the shortfall of labour 
and insisted that they still acted as a model of revolutionary 
labour. Disenchantment with the subbotniks was reflected in 
the decline in attendance of subbotniks at the end of 1920 and
early 1921 on the part of communists and non-party people
, ., 108 
alike.
Despite the opposition to them the commission on the 
subbotniks reported its findings to the MK on 25 January 1921 and 
insisted that the active participation of communists could 
transform them from 'barracks type compulsion 1 similar to 'forced
labour 1 to 'schools of communist labour 1 once again. Attendance
109 
was reduced to once a month and the general provisions of the
report were adopted by the February 1921 guberniya conference. 
With the introduction of NEP the subbotniks continued as an 
inspirational movement but were organised more rarely. The 
unlimited right of the party committees to deploy party members
105. X s"ezd RKP, p.242.
106. KT, 23 December 1920. 107. KT, 11, 21 December 1920.
108. KT, 21 December 1920, 30 January 1921; Otchet MK za yanvar' 
1921g.~ p.14.
109. KT, 2 February 1921.
110. V Moskovskaya gubernskaya konferentsiya RKP(b): kratkii 
ocherk i rezolyutsii, M. 1921, p.15.
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as they saw fit was an important element in the consolidation of 
party committee power.
A foretaste of the type of changes that would take place 
with the transition to NEP can be seen from the work of the 
Sokol'nicheskii RK in the last four months of 1920. In this 
raion, as we have seen the reform movement gained little support, 
and indeed, it was opposed by the militarisers such as Kotov. 
In its report the RK argued that the 'organisational crisis' in 
the party, associated with the transition from military to 
economic priorities, could only be overcome if the self-activity 
of the party masses was channelled into an organisational course:
...We must always remember that the struggle on the 
economic front demands no less a centralised party 
apparatus no less discipline, than the military 
front.
Hence even before Lenin's argument at the XI party congress that 
a retreat required greater discipline than an advance this raion 
had formulated a programme which justified the increased power of
the party apparatus in a time of peace because of the nature of
112 the economic tasks facing the country. Amongst the concrete
uses to which the RK's ability to dispose of its membershisp was 
put was the system of transferring (peremeshchenie) some of those 
who had held responsible party or soviet positions for over a 
year to the shopfloor, and replacing them by a draft of 3% from
111. Otchet Sok. RK-ta, p.3.
112. A rough indication of the increased activity of the bureau, 
the heart of the party apparatus, can be seen from the fact that 
in the last four months of 1920 the RK met only ten times in 
plenary session, while the bureau met 33 times (ibid., pp.5-6). 
Figures are lacking for the frequency of meetings earlier, but 
clearly the increased activity of the bureau, meeting on average 
twice a week, is marked.
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the cells. There is no indication of to what extent this 
system was employed.
A strategy had been developed in which reform came to 
signify only the improvement in the effectiveness of the 
committees themselves, and the democratic demands of the 
opposition were lost in the process. The end of the war saw 
the consolidation of the powers of the committees over their 
own organisations and as the general controlling bodies in the 
localities. Before this strategy could be implemented the MPO 
was to witness a yet more bitter round in the debates as the 
party prepared itself for the X congress.
113. Otchet Sok. RK, p.8.
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CHAPTER 10 
The Defeat of the Reform Movements
The improved international and military circumstances had 
stimulated hopes at the IX party conference and the November 
party conference amongst both the majority and the oppositions 
that the worst aspects of militarisation in the party, state and 
economy could be dispensed with. Instead, at the end of 1920 
Trotsky outlined a programme for the intensification of 
war communist policies, no longer as a temporary expedient 
necessitated by the war, but as a general strategy for 
development predicated on Russia's continued isolation and the 
need for continued internal coercion. Flying in the face of the 
prospects of peace and increased purchases from the West, 
ignoring the growing demand for democracy in the party and an 
end to the split between activists and rank and file members, 
under-rating the strikes and disturbances among the working class 
and peasantry, Trotsky now launched a programme and debate whose 
enduring result was the paralysis of continued reform in the 
party. The party debate, and the trade union debate from the end o 
1920 provoked by Trotsky's intervention took place against a 
background of increasing unrest in the city.
1. The crisis of the regime
From the summer of 1920 the economic crisis gradually 
developed into a political crisis of the regime. Strife within 
the party was paralleled by peasant uprisings and worker protest 
culminating in the Kronstadt events in March 1921. It was at this 
time that Russell observed that free elections would have swept
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the Bolsheviks from power. Supply shortages were compounded by 
disorganisation on the railways, and a drought in summer 1920 
made drinking water unsafe in Moscow. Fires in the peat workings 
and forests reduced fuel supplies and sent a pall of smoke for 
several weeks over the city, to the inconvenience of the 
delegates to the II congress of the III International in July. 
Cold weather set in earlier than usual in September. To add to 
the difficulties there were rumours that the government was 
planning to close the markets and stamp out the vestiges of free
trade. In short, the period was marked by the collapse of
2 the 'proletarian-natural economy 1 . The new factors in the
disturbances were that the immediate threat of a White 
restoration had been lifted, confidence in an imminent socialist 
revolution on a world scale had declined and with it hope for 
large-scale aid, and industry was in an all too obvious spiral of 
decline despite the application of compulsory labour duty. 
Protests against supply shortages were now joined by demands for 
free trade, free labour and the easing of repression.
Disturbances in the city were stimulated by supply and other 
shortages, which themselves were exacerbated by the concentration 
on supplying the needs of the army at the expense of the 
population and workers (Part I). For example, a 'mutiny', took 
place in the Moscow barracks in August 1920 when bast shoes 
(lapti) were issued instead of boots. In order to meet the 
material needs of the soldiers a meeting on 9 October 1920 of the
1. Harrison, Marooned, p.223. According to Farbman, Bolshevism 
in Retreat, p.261, the markets were indeed closed in 
Moscowand Petrograd at the end of 1920.
2. Kritsman, p.225. 3. Harrison, Marooned, p.185.
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MK and party activists, with Lenin and Rykov in attendance, 
instructed the MK to ensure that the working day was increased to
10 hours. Priority was to be given to the clothing and leather
4 industries in order to supply the army. Concern over the
political atmosphere in the barracks was expressed at the 14 
October 1920 meeting of the MK military department with 
commissars and cell representatives. Measures were taken to 
increase agitprop in the barracks and to alleviate some of the 
worst hardships of the soldiers. By concentrating the meagre 
resources of supply and materials to pacify the army the urban 
population was subjected to intensified labour discipline and 
increased shortages.
The worsening supply situation was discussed by the MK and 
party activists on 29-30 September 1920. The situation 
deteriorated and from 21 January 1921, instead of the minimum of 
44 wagons a day of grain reguired to feed the city, only 33 were 
arriving daily. On 22 January the bread issue in Moscow, 
Petrograd, Kronstadt, and Ivanovo-Voznesensk was cut by a third. 
Rations were further cut on 30 January for office staff and those 
not involved in physical labour. From this point sporadic 
disturbances developed into a general assault on the war 
communist system.
There are few details on the disturbances in Moscow and 
therefore it is impossible to analyse the structure of the 
protest movement, its leadership and organisation, except to
4. Otchet MK za oktyabr 1 1920g., p.3.
5. KT, 20 October 1920. 6. £, 3 October 1920.
7. KT, 1 February 1921.
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comment that the Mensheviks and SRs did play some part in them, 
but at the same time they were supported by a broad stratum of 
workers disillusioned with current policies. As Liebman put it, 
the Mensheviks became 'the political voice of a working-class
o
reality 1 . The pattern of the movement is fairly clear. 
Meetings in factories and plants gathered and criticised 
government policies, beginning with supply and developing into 
general political criticism. There are only very general 
indications of inter-plant contacts, usually confined to 
synchronising street demonstrations, and even less of attempts to 
form a national movement comparable to the workers' conferences 
of 1918.
By insisting that the disturbances were no more than supply 
riots, manipulated by Menshevik and SR counter-revolutionaries, 
the government imputed to the participants a pre-industrial level 
of consciousness. When, however, communists at meetings
suggested that the discontent was associated purely with
9 
'stomachs' the comment usually aroused a storm of protest. Food
shortages were the catalyst that brought out the underlying 
dissatisfaction of workers. With the deurbanisation and partial 
deindustrialisation of the city, the changes in the size and 
composition of the working class, and the development of a new 
type of state, society and labour were no longer governed by 
industrial capitalist but by coercive state socialist social 
relations. The protest movement can be seen as an inversion of
8. Liebman, p.267.
9. S.S. Maslov, Rossiya posle chetyrekh let revolyutsii, Paris 
1922, p.155.
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the Marxian idea of the development of class consciousness: the 
class may no longer have been a class in itself, but it remained 
a class for itself. While the authorities ascribed to the 
movement no more than what Leninists called a trade union 
consciousness, even the best party thinkers of the time could put 
forward no general analysis of the relationship between the 
working class and the new state, and hence the movement could 
only articulate the first demands, often couched in traditional 
language, of the depoliticised socialist labour system.
With an increasing number of factories going on strike, the 
MK held a series of emergency meetings with the MGSPS, the Moscow 
soviet, and party activists from the raions. They tried to work 
out a unified response to what was called 'the supply crisis and 
wage misunderstandings'. One of the issues was the closure of 
factories because of the economic crisis. The MGSPS presidium, 
now in a more assertive mood, met on 27 January 1921. The 
guberniya metalworkers' union was censured for not having kept 
the MGSPS informed on the situation developing in the metal 
plants. The MGSPS decided to insist to the MSNKh that no 
economic body in Moscow had the right to close factories without 
consulting the MGSPS. Lozovskii was assigned urgently to form a 
commission to look into the 'abnormalities' at certain plants and 
to take the necessary measures. One result of the crisis 
atmosphere was the proposal to hold meetings in factories and
10. Otchet MK za yanvar' 1921g., p.4. A commission to improve 
the byt (living conditions) of workers had existed since November 
1920 with party and TU representatives. In early 1921 the Cheka 
played the key role in it, Berkman, Myth, p.307.
11. Protokoly MGSPS, 41, 1921, p.12.
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the other measures mentioned in chapter 3. At the same time the
MGSPS urged the MChK not to take further repressive measures and
12 for the announcement of factory closures to be suspended.
Supply, the economic crisis and the decline of industry, and 
Cheka repression therefore appear to have been the key issues.
As in 1917 it was the metalworkers who led the way. Against 
the crisis background the I Moscow guberniya metalworkers' union 
conference met in Moscow from 2-4 February 1921. The first 
speakers called for the personal inviolability of delegates to 
be respected, a demand accepted by the conference chairman, 
Smidovich. There then followed, according to one emigre source, 
a flood of passionate denunciations of Bolshevik power in which 
crimes against the country and workers were listed and individual 
communists singled out as criminals and liars. A resolution was
passed calling for the introduction of free trade and the
14 
replacement of forced requisitioning by a fixed natural tax.
As the report in Pravda noted: 'A complete break between the 
party and the masses, between the masses and the trade unions, 
was felt'.
Lenin's contribution on the last day of the conference 
admitted that relations between the working class and the 
peasantry could now be reviewed. In other words, his thoughts 
were turning to the idea that requisitioning might be replaced by 
a tax in kind, and indeed he reported that in 13 gubernii
12. loc.cit.
13. About a thousand delegates attended but apparently no 
registration took place so it is impossible to establish how many 
were communists, P_, 8 February 1921.
14. Maslov, pp.152-3. 15. P_, 8 February 1921.
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requisitioning had been halted. A few days after this meeting 
(8 February 1921) Lenin penned his draft theses on replacing 
requisitioning by the tax.
The conference passed a resolution against 'privileged' 
rations (spetsstavki), including those for the SNK and for
scholars, and against the issue of goods of own production,
18 
especially in the food industry. In his speech Kamenev was
19 justified to claim that they were being reduced. Aware of the
unpopularity of these privileges the MGSPS since September 1920,
20 
as mentioned, had tried to reduce the numbers receiving them.
Opposition to them was a reflection of a powerful anti-specialist
current, noted by the chairman of the MSNKh Likhachev at the II
21 guberniya soviet congress in December 1920, and tapped by the
Workers' Oppositionists and Ignatovtsy at this time. This mood 
combined traditional hostility to the intelligentsia and the 
egalitarianism of socialist first principles (both dominant in 
1917) and were fanned by the general scarcity. Kamenev told the 
Moscow soviet plenum on 15 February 1921 that he had proposed the 
abolition of privileged rations to the TsK because of the
metalworkers' resolution, and he called for a campaign against
22 the issuing of goods of own production.
16. Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.308. 17. Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.333
18. KT, 5 February 1921; P_, 8 February 1921.
19. KT, 8 February 1921.
20. Obzor deyatel'nosti MGSPS, p.47.
21. KT, 17 December 1920.
22. The SNK rations had been issued to 10,000 responsible 
people; academic ones to 1900 in Moscow and another 4449 in the 
country; and about 50,000 in rear army institutions received 
them, KT, 16 February 1921.
- 431 -
The disturbances came to a head in February 1921. The month 
was marked by severe frosts in the city and in several factories 
a white flag had once again been run up in the traditional sign 
of protest. At some unspecified date in early February 1921 a 
resolution was delivered to the chairman of VTsIK (Kalinin) by a 
special delegation of workers from Khamovnicheskii raion with 
three demands: the restoration of free trade; the convocation of a
legislative assembly; and an immediate change in economic policy
23 
'which would stop provoking the hostility of other powers'.
The Moscow street disturbances began, significantly enough 
in the light of Krestinskii's comments on the money printing 
press as the 'machine gun' against the capitalist financial system, 
with a strike at the Vtorov money printing works in Khamovniki on 
20 or 21 February. The military units called in refused to open 
fire, and they were replaced by armed communist detachments (ChON) 
who fired at the striking workers, killing and injuring several of 
them. That evening mass protest meetings were held at the 
university, on the railways, and at the higher women's course. 
The following days several factories struck. A demonstration was 
organised in Khamovniki attended by about 1500 people who tried 
to call out the soldiers. The units in the raion garrison, 
however, were disarmed and locked in the barracks as a 
precaution. All of Moscow's communists were now mobilised and 
organised in armed detachments. There was sporadic shooting as 
these detachments came across groups of protesters in the 
streets.
23. Maslov, p.155.
24. SV, 5, 5 April 1921, p.14; Maslov, p.156; Maximoff, p.160.
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The climax of the movement came on 23 February 1921 with a 
major street demonstration in which about 10,000 workers 
participated. The Bolsheviks and their policies were severely 
criticised by the speakers. On that day Moscow was placed under 
martial law with a 24-hour watch on factories by the communist 
detachments and trustworthy army units. On following days the 
leading Soviet personalities such as Kalinin, Kuibyshev and 
Krupskaya were mobilised by the MK to speak in the raions, and
on 1 March 1921 the Moscow soviet issued a proclamation calling
25 for calm, for workers not to go on strike, and for soldiers
not to give in to 'provocation, which in the guise of solidarity
J C
with working people in fact weakens unity'. Kamenev later
admitted that the disturbances were accompanied by a wide-spread
2 7 go-slow (volynka, or zaderzhka).
In the plants a movement developed to recall Bolshevik 
deputies from the Moscow and raion Soviets and to replace them, 
one report claimed, by Mensheviks standing as non-party candidates.
Other plants, instead of recalling their Bolshevik deputies, passed
2 8 Menshevik or anarchist mandates (nakaz) to instruct them. At
the same time wide-scale arrests, especially of Mensheviks, 
deprived the movement of its leadership. On 25 February 1921, 
for example, 160 people were arrested at a meeting and held in 
Butyrskii gaol (the infamous Butyrka), though after the Kronstadt
25. £, 1 March 1921; SV, 5, 5 April 1921, p.15.
26. KT, 1 March 1921. 27. KT, 18 January 1922.
28. In Baumanskii raion 83% of the deputies were Bolshevik, many 
of whom sympathised with the Workers' Opposition. The Sal'mson 
plant elected a 'non-party' Menshevik; the Avtoremont plant 
adopted a Menshevik nakaz; and the Manometr plant elected a 
Menshevik, all in February 1921, Manievich, p.175.
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29 
events and the passing of the crisis the majority were released.
Sporadic disturbances continued into March. There were 
disturbances at the Menshevik-dominated Bromlei works on 5 March, 
the fifth of the year, resulting in the usual arrests of 
workers. A general meeting of the Bromlei plant on 25 March 
called for new elections to the Moscow soviet. The management 
dispersed the meeting but the workers called on other plants to 
support the calls for new elections. The ringleaders were as 
usual arrested. The Moscow soviet itself had called for new 
elections but they had been postponed by order of the TsK so that 
the situation could calm down. After a delay of several weeks 
the elections were in fact held in April 1921 accompanied by a
bitter campaign and the usual claims by the Mensheviks of
32 
electoral malpractice. The results were remarkable in that the
protest vote returned over a guarter of the total as non-party 
deputies (Table 22). On a turn-out of 50.6%, many factories,
including some of the largest, did not return communist
* 4.   33 deputies .
The demands of the Moscow protest movement for the three 
freedoms - labour, trade and political - with an unlinking of the
29. SV, 5, 5 April 1921, p.15.
30. Maximoff, p.185.
31. SV, 6, 20 April 1921, p.15.
32. SV, 7, 4 May 1921.
33. KT, 13, 14 May 1921. Worker hostility appears to have 
contTnued into 1922. The declaration of the 22 (signed by 
Shlyapnikov, Kollontai, et.al.) to the Comintern EC of 26 
February 1922 claimed that 'The last elections to the Moscow 
soviet [January 1922] were in effect boycotted by workers. Even 
those workers who voted for communists did so out of fear of 
repression... 1 , XI s"ezd RKP, p.754.
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Soviets from party tutelage were echoed in other conferences and
34 
cities. But in Kronstadt on 28 February 1921, on the eve of
the X party congress, the demands took the form of insurrection. 
The Moscow movement gradually ebbed because of the lack of 
practical support from the soldiers, faced by armed communists 
and the Cheka, the unity of the authorities in opposing the 
protesters, a blanket on press coverage, and timely concessions 
in the form of emergency food supplies and goods. While even 
anti-Bolshevik observers conceded that the movement was not 
opposed to socialism (i.e., did not propose the restoration of 
private ownership in industry) it lacked any coherent expression 
While the February 1917 days had a long tradition of struggle and 
social self-defence organisations to call on and were 
institutionalised by the Soviets, trade unions, and parties, the 
novel experience of opposition under a communist regime, 
culminating in Moscow in the February 1921 days, found these 
forms of organisational practice colonised by its adversary.
The communist party as a whole remained united in the face 
of the disturbances, a unity symbolised by the participation of 
the Workers' Opposition in suppressing the Kronstadt movement. 
Workers' Oppositionists were included in the list of TsK 
activists sent to calm workers in the raions. Kiselev and 
Kollontai, for instance, were dispatched with Lunacharskii, Nogin 
and Rykunov to pacify Baumanskii raion. The views of the party 
rank and file are less clear. In Kronstadt many communists
34. SV, 4, 18 March 1921, p.6.
35. E.g., SV, 4, 18 March 1921, p.6; Maslov, pp.157-8.
36. KT, 1 March 1921.
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joined the insurgents, but in Moscow little information is 
available. There are indications that some party members in the 
factories sympathised with the calls for a change in economic 
policy. Letters from the 'Aviapribor' plant cell, for example, in 
the first instance to the Krasnopresnenskii RK and then to the 
MK, complained of the burdens put on the plant by Soviet power 
and of the near starvation there. The second letter, signed by 
the cell secretary who called himself a member of the 'workers' 
communist party, claimed that it expressed the anger of all 
communists. Essentially though, the party presented a single 
front against the disturbances, and the debates remained confined 
to the party. Nevertheless, Lenin waged an increasingly vigorous 
struggle against the continuation of the debates. Meeting with 
Moscow activists on 24 February 1921 he asserted that 'Moscow has
broken all records in the discussion 1 and warned that 'we can no
3 8 longer tolerate such things'.
2. The trade union debate
a. The platforms
While the party debate tackled issues that allowed concrete 
reform proposals to emerge which commanded substantial support, as 
at the IX party conference and in the MK, the trade union debate
was bitterly divisive and appeared 'artificial and almost
3 9 
unreal'. At a time of the collapse of the state-run
proletarian-natural economy on the one hand, and of worker unrest 
on the other, Trotsky proposed transferring yet more functions to
37. KT, 19 February 1921. 38. Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.350. 
39. Liebman, p.299.
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the state, and the Workers' Opposition called for the economy to 
be transferred to the management of a congress of producers. 
Both demands reguired an almost revolutionary alteration in the 
patterns of authority established since October 1917, and this at 
a time not of revolutionary elan but after nearly 3 years of 
exhausting civil war. Hence the powerful attraction to the party 
membership of Lenin's moderate position on the TU guestion, but 
the price to pay was the end of democratic reforms in the party.
As we have seen Trotsky envisaged radical changes both in 
the party and the trade unions, but it was to the unions that he 
turned first. Militarisation of the economy had already been 
developing but at the end of 1920 Trotsky tried to reverse the 
basic programme outlined at the VIII party congress for the 
ultimate transfer of the management of the economy to the trade 
unions, and instead called for the merger of the unions with the 
state. His motion presented to, and rejected by, the communist 
fraction of the V ail-Russian TU conference on 3 November 1920 
argued that the trade unions were suffering from a 'profound 
internal crisis' and that the only way to revive them was through
a 'shake-up' (peretryakhivanie) and their 'statification'.
40 The screws of war communism were to be tightened.
He presented his ideas in the form of theses to the TsK 
plenum of 8-9 November, which also discussed the situation in the
MPO. Trade unions were to be replaced by organisers on the
41 Tsektran model, labour was to be militarised, and so on. The
plenum split several ways, and although Lenin's resolution 
40. Lenin PSS, vol.42, p,235. 41. loc. cit.
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a greater role in managing the economy to be carried out by
rejecting Trotsky's plans was carried (10-4) ten TsK members
remained neutral and later formed the so-called buffer group
(Bukharin, Preobrazhenskii, et al.). A five-man commission under
Zinoviev was appointed to look into the question in an attempt to
42 limit discussion. The interdiction on public debate was
ineffective and was repealed by the TsK plenum on 24 December 
1920, and the questions on the agenda for the X party congress 
were declared open to debate. That day Trotsky aired his views 
at a wide discussion meeting at the ex-Zimin theatre, and the 
next day his brochure 'The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions' 
was published. The trade union debate was open.
The Workers' Opposition's main demands centred on giving the 
TUs
an all-Russian congress of producers. While the party was to 
remain the political head of the working class, the economic role 
of the state would be transferred to the working class itself. 
They criticised centralisation, the use of the specialist 
intelligentsia and the resulting bureaucratisation of the soviet 
state, and were wary of the union between the working class and 
the peasantry, all of which were considered distortions of the 
worker state. In other words their position reflected a profound 
distrust of 'intellectuals' and, therefore, they insisted on the 
1 workerisation' of the state and the party and an increase in
42. By now Zinoviev's indifference to party reform, which had a 
pedigree dating back to the VIII party congress in March 1919 and 
had only recently been expressed at the IX party conference in 
September 1920, had changed into enthusiastic support for more 
power to the nizy and he had become, in Myasnikov's words, 'a 
fantastic prophet of "workers' democracy"'. Myasnikov, for one, 
was not taken in, and in his article of early 1921 'Za partiyu 1 
launched a virulent attack on Zinoviev's opportunism, Myasnikov, 
Izb. proiz., pp.284-7, 304.
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trade union power. The unions themselves, in their view, were 
to elect their own officers, and thus the party's monopoly over 
appointments was threatened. The programme of the Workers' 
Opposition represented a major breach in the whole structure of 
the party process as it had developed during war communism, and 
hence aroused Lenin's ire. On the other hand, the TU movement 
itself as it had developed during war communism was hardly a 
paragon of proletarian solidarity, as illustrated by the approach 
of the MGSPS to non-Bolshevik trade unionism, and in particular to 
the print union. Just as the trade unions themselves only 
remained potential managers of the economy, so the Workers' 
Opposition critigue contained too many unresolved theoretical and 
practical guestions to mount an effective challenge to the war 
communist labour system, let alone its economic system.
A central demand of the DCs was for the VSNKh presidium, 
the collegia of its departments and glavki to be proposed by the 
trade unions. The demand for obligatory candidature was supported 
by the buffer group. While arguing for a revision of war 
communist policies as they affected the party and the working 
class, none of the main opposition groups envisaged a relaxation 
in the countryside. At the end of 1920, for example, Osinskii
argued against a tax in kind and in favour of greater proletarian
44 influence in the countryside through sowing committees.
The Ignatov group largely shared the analysis of the 
Workers' Opposition and agreed that the unions, through some form
43. The Workers' Opposition theses are in £, 25 January 1921 and 
X s"ezd RKP, pp.685-91. Their ideas were developed in Aleksandra 
Kollontai's Rabochaya Oppozitsiya, M. 1921.
44. Avrich, Kronstadt, p.17.
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of national congress, were to manage the economy, but they were 
more realistic in insisting that this elected body was to be
confirmed by VTsIK and thus ultimate responsibility would still
45 lie with the party and state. Up to the February 1921
guberniya party conference, as mentioned, they spoke on a TU 
platform of their own which shared many of the DC ideas, though 
they tended to vote with the Ten on TU issues, but at the 
conference they joined with the Workers' Opposition. The group 
placed their main emphasis on the unions not only as tools to 
inculcate communism in the working class, as in Lenin's position, 
but stressed that the unions themselves were the crucial aspect 
of the hegemony of the proletariat. Therefore the unions were to 
be strengthened and made genuinely democratic, and given greater 
powers in running the economy, broadly supervised by the party. 
No economic or union cadre was to be transferred without the 
agreement of the unions, a point conceded at this time (Part I). 
The buffer group argued in favour of the gradual merging of
the state and the unions, though the unions were still to mediate
46 betwen the party and the masses as schools for communism. By
arguing for obligatory candidature by TUs to economic bodies the 
group also threatened the party's prerogatives in this crucial 
field. At the same time the communist fraction of VTsSPS on 4
45. The Ignatov TU theses were published in P_, 19 January 1921. 
They were signed by E.N. Ignatov, A. Orekhov, G. Korzinov, M. 
Burovtsev, I. Maslov, Fonchenko, E. Kuranova, Lidak, and S. 
Smirnov. Schapiro is incorrect in stating that Ignatov 
represented only his personal opinion, Origin, p.284.
46. The buffer group's theses are in Partiya i soyuzy, Petrograd 
1921, pp.371-7. They were signed by Bukharin, Larin, 
Preobrazhenskii, Serebryakov, Sokol'nikov, and Yakovleva, the 
secretary of the MK.
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October 1920 argued that communist fractions could act 
independently of guberniya TU councils. 47 The whole edifice of 
democratic centralism as it had developed over the civil war was 
now under threat. All the opposition positions united in 
objecting to the 'petty supervision 1 of the party over the trade 
unions and, as Shlyapnikov put it, insisted that the party should 
have more faith in the collective experience of the unions. 48 
Even Trotsky by January 1921 was no longer calling for a shake-up 
of the unions from above but called for greater economic powers 
to be transferred to them as they stood. As Kamenev pointed out, 
all the oppositions were promising more for the unions than 
Lenin's Platform of the Ten, and therefore an unofficial bloc
A Q
began to form against Lenin's group.
Lenin's initial encouragement of Trotsky's views on the 
intensified militarisation of the labour process had by November 
1920 given way to deep misgivings. The September 1920 party 
conference had been a clear signal that a struggle similar to the 
one over the Brest peace would have to be waged once again to 
implement them. His doubts were deepened by the course of the 
party debate in Moscow, culminating in the 'two rooms' at the 
November Moscow conference. Once again the spectre of a split in 
the party was raised. Lenin now emerged in the unusual guise of 
the arch-conciliator: against the harshness of Trotsky's 
position; and opposed to the radical change envisaged by the 
Workers' Opposition and later the buffer group for the trade 
unions to control appointments to economic posts.
47. Profsoyuzy Moskvy, M. 1975, pp.141-2.
48. Partiya i soyuzy, p.295. 49. KT, 21 January 1921.
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As distinct from Trotsky's and Bukharin's view that the 
working class no longer needed to defend itself against its own 
state Lenin insisted that in a workers's state (a term which he 
regarded as 'an abstraction') such as the RSFSR, established with 
a peasant majority and ensnared in bureaucratic distortions, the 
workers' interest required separate representation, and this was 
the task of the trade unions. At the 30 December meeting of 
communist trade unionists and the MGSPS Lenin stressed the 
vanguard role of the party, with the unions acting as the link 
between the vanguard and the masses. This was the basis for
Lenin's famous definition of the unions as transmission belts and
52 
as schools of communism, the basis of the Platform of the Ten.
More and more the emphasis of Lenin's arguments stressed the 
danger of a split in the party, and the actual content of the 
debates were relegated to the background. On several occasions 
in late 1920 and the first weeks of January 1921 he had 
recognised the legitimacy of group struggle and ideological 
debate in the run-up to a party congress or conference, but as 
the debates continued and, perhaps, as the position of his own 
group became the dominant one, a dramatic change took place. The 
issue increasingly became the debate itself and not the various 
arguments, which he insisted had a tendency towards the
50. Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.239. 51. ibid., pp.203-4.
52. ibid., p.244. The Platform of the Ten based its position in 
the trade union debate on a draft decree submitted to the X party 
congress and signed by Lenin, Artem (Sergeev), Kalinin, Kamenev, 
Lozovskii, Petrovskii, Rudzutak, Stalin, Tomskii and Zinoviev, 
published in P_, 18 February 1921; X s"ezd RKP, pp.663-74.
53. Liebman, pp.297-8.
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54 demagogic. By the end of January the theme of the dangers of
factional struggle had become dominant: 'Any disagreement, even 
the most petty, can become politically dangerous if there is a 
chance of it growing into a split'.
b. The debate in Moscow
At the February 1921 guberniya party conference Minkov 
characterised the MK in this period as composed of 'several small 
groups, and over every question we were forced to do more talking 
than acting 1 . The MK first fractured on the shoals of the 
trade union debate at its meeting of 1 January 1921 when the
Ten emerged with a clear majority over the combined
5 8 
oppositions. On the basis of this vote the MK hoped to direct
the course of debate in Moscow. At its 3 January meeting the MK 
discussed the forms that the pre- X congress discussion should 
take in the city. The Ignatovtsy supported Sapronov's argument 
that 'there is no need to shield the party member' and insisted
on unlimited debate. The Ignatov group also opposed limits to
59 the number of co-rapporteurs. Despite these objections the MK
54. 'KriziS partii', 19 January 1921, Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.242.
55. 'Eshche raz o profsoyuzakh', 25 January 1921, Lenin PSS, 
vol. 42, p.269. '
56. Moskovskie bol'sheviki v bor'be s pravym i 'levym' 
opportunizmom , M~! 1969 , p. 28 .
57. At the end of December 1920 Artem, MK secretary, had ben 
transferred to other work and his place taken by V.N. Yakovleva, 
a supporter of the buffer group.
58. In the first vote Lenin received 19 votes, Trotsky 7, 
Bukharin 4, the DCs 4, Ignatov 3, Shlyapnikov 1; in the second 
ballot Lenin's position was adopted by 22 votes to 14, Otchet 
MK za yanvar' 1921g., p.3. For the sake of brevity the various 
positions will be cited by the name of their leading figure.
59. V.F. Kochegarov, 'Bor'ba bol'shevikov Moskovskoi gubernii za
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adopted a plan whereby debate would open after a city conference 
on 10 January of activists. The speakers at the meeting would be 
appointed by the MK and their theses checked beforehand. After 
the conference the MK would announce its view and debate would 
then open in the raions.
The hopes for such an ordered debate were shattered by the 
Petrograd party organisation's 'address to the party'. The 
Petrograd organisation was one of the first to support Lenin's TU 
position, reflecting Zinoviev's hostility to Trotsky, and on 2 
January, ratified by a city conference on 6 Janaury, the PK 
decided to send an address to the party on the question. It 
condemned Trotsky's 'mistaken theses' which 'could lead to a 
split between the party and the trade unions' and called for
proportional representation in the elections to the X congress
fi p 
according to the strength of each view. The address aroused a
storm of protest in Moscow and at the 10 January MK session the 
oppositions united to condemn it, and succeeded in having a
.ssue. 
The 10 January meeing with 15 MK members absent, decided to
. 
special MK session convened on 11 January to discuss the i;
forbid the printing of the address in the Moscow press and 
Pravda as it would pre-empt the discussion in Moscow.
That same evening (10 January) the special meeting of party
pobedu leninskoi platformy vo vremya profsyuznoi diskussii v 
partii (1920-1921gg.)', MGPI im. V.I. Lenina, 1967, p.137.
60. ibid., p.138. 61. £, 13 January 1921.
62. KT, 13 January 1921; Petrogradskaya pravda, 5-6 January 
1921.
63. Kochegarov (1967), p.139.
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activists called earlier by the MK took place. Trotsky 
criticised the Leninist position and defended his own, while 
Bukharin presented his own theses. The chairman of the MGSPS, 
Lozovskii, defended the Leninist position in his capacity of co- 
rapporteur. He stressed the need for unions as the educators of 
masses so that, as he put it shortly afterwards, 'even the most 
backward worker... would implement communist slogans'.
At the 11 January meeting of the MK bureau and at the MK 
plenum that followed, the oppositions joined forces to censure the 
Petrograd address. Trotsky and Zinoviev took part in the lively 
discussion, and the bureau by a majority of one accepted the 
Leninist proposal to postpone discussion of the address until the 
MK had discussed the trade union guestion, the essence of the 
address. At the MK meeting the DCs insisted that the debate 
should not be restricted to the MK but should begin with the raions 
and in every cell and only then move to the MK. The majority on 
the MK rejected this idea and were keen to hide the depth of the 
disagreements from the population and abroad, and were unwilling 
to unleash an uncontrolled debate which could threaten the party's 
ability to act. The resolution called on the TsK to take control 
of the pre-congress discussion and to make available all the 
materials. Only in this way, the resolution argued, would the 
Petrograd address be deprived of its 'extremely dangerous aspect, 
the tendency of the Petrograd party organisation to transform 
itself into a special centre for preparing the party congress 1 . 66 
The Petrograd organisation had indeed hoped to circumvent the
64. Kochegarov (1967), p.140.
65. A. Lozovskii, Zadachi prfessional'nykh soyuzov, M. 1921, p.9.
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paralysed TsK and to impose its views on the party. Such an 
attempt was bound to arouse Moscow's anger in which political 
considerations were reinforced by the traditional jealousy between 
the two cities.
The oppostions registered their greatest success at the MK 
plenum meeting in the evening of 11 January. The issue was not 
so much the trade union question as the address itself. A bloc 
formed, with the exception of Ignatov's group which argued, 
independent as usual, that the Petrograd organisation had a 
perfect right to put forward proposals for the conduct of the 
debate, and a motion was passed by a majority of one vote 
censuring the Petrograd address. It had taken the address to 
forge such an alliance since, for example, Sapronov had 
explicitly condemned the rise to dominance of the trade union 
question when, he insisted, party and soviet construction were 
the key issues.
The TsK plenum the next day (12 January) sharply criticised 
the MK for its decision. On his return to Moscow on 13 January 
Artem wrote a letter absolving himself of all responsibility for 
the position adopted and accused the majority of having 
steamrollered the resolution through without waiting to consult
66. KT, 13 January 1921; X s"ezd RKP, pp. 832-4.
67. Out of the 28 attending, 18 spoke, and Trotsky three times.
In the first round of voting neither the DCs or the buffer group
could obtain a majority for motions censuring the Petrograd
address:
Sapronov 3 votes for, 18 against, 4 abstentions
Yakovleva 8 " 13 " 6
Ignatov 3 " 21 " 2
Trotsky 16 " 10 " 1
In the second round Trotsky's motion, a combination of the first
two, was passed by 14 votes to 13, with one crucial abstention,
KT/15 January 1921; Lenin PSS, vol.42, pp.239-40.
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6 Q 
the 11 missing members of the MK. The TsK resolution called
the MK decision an 'unprincipled and brazen bureaucratic
69 perversion of democratic centralism 1 . Trotsky and the buffer
group by one vote succeeded in defeating a motion in the MK
70 bureau meeting of 13 January to support the TsK resolution.
The response of the TsK to the MK's resolution aggravated the 
already tense relations in the bureau and provoked the MK to 
yet another bout of in-fighting.
The MK finally determined its position on the trade union 
guestion at an extended session, meeting with representatives of 
the raions and uezdy, on 17-18 January 1921. The debate in 
Moscow can be seen as the fulcrum of the discussion in the 
country, and at this meeting eight platforms were represented.
After a two-day debate a series of votes reversed the MK
72 
resolution of 11 January. On that day (18 January) the MK
called on the Moscow party to support the Leninist platform and, 
while allowing free discussion, insisted that the unity of the
68. Artem (F.A. Sergeev), Stat'i, rechi, pis'ma. M. 1983, 
pp.287-8.
69. Rodionova, p.19. 70. Kochegarov, 1967, p.144.
71. Otchet MK za yanvar' 1920g., p.3.
72. At the end of the debate the MK bureau insisted on three- 
fold voting: first, voting of MK members on each of the 8 
platforms; then MK members to vote by name for the two platforms 
gaining the most votes in the previous round; and finally, secret 
voting of all present on all platforms. In the first round the 
following picture emerged out of the 37 votes cast: Lenin 19, 
Trotsky 7, Bukharin 4, Sapronov 4, Ignatov 3, and Shlyapnikov, 
Nogin and Ryazanov with no votes. In the second round of open 
voting out of 31 votes cast for the two leading platforms Lenin's 
received 22 and Trotsky's 9. In the third round with all 91 
activists voting Lenin received 57, Trotsky 20, Sapronov 7, 
Shlyapnikov 4, Ignatov 2, Bukharin 1, and none for Nogin and 
Ryazanov. A general vote for the two main platforms gave Lenin 
62 and Trotsky 18, KT, 19 January 1921; £, 19 January 1921.
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party was to remain 'inviolable'. To ensure a clear Leninist 
majority the MK bureau was re-elected at the MK plenum of 25 
January 1921.
Discussion in the raions over the trade unions took place 
concurrently with the debates in the MK. The Workers' Opposition 
retained their support in Baumanskii raion, as did Ignatov in 
Gorodskoi raion, and this summed up the extent of their dominance 
over the raion party organisations. Trotsky's platform was 
supported in Sokol'nicheskii and Zamoskvoretskii raions. By the 
time of the February guberniya conference, however, the Leninists 
had achieved victories on the trade union issue in all raions. 
In Baumanskii raion the Leninists tried to use the TU issue
to wrest control from the Workers' Opposition majority on the
75 RK. On the eve of a delegate meeting of 13 January 1921 the
old RK held a meeting to coordinate its assault, and therefore 
committed precisely the same offence as the Workers' Opposition 
had done in August 1920, though on this occasion no action was
7 fi
taken against the fractionalists. The delegate meeting 
discussed the trade unions, with the key speeches by Lozovskii, 
Trotsky, and Medvedev, followed by a lively discussion but no
73. KT, 19 January 1921.
74. Dorofeev, Minkov and Sorin lost their seats, and Krinitskii, 
Uryvaev and Zelenskii, loyal Leninists, and Yakovleva, a Trotsky- 
Bukharin supporter, joined (Appendix 14).
75. At the time the RPO consisted of 1740 members and 465 
candidates, with the largest cells among the students at the 
various colleges in the raion (£, 18 January 1921). At this time 
Shlyapnikov, chairman of the metalworkers' TU, and I.I. Kutuzov, 
chairman of the textileworkers' TU, were active in the raion but 
are not reported as having addressed meetings.
76. Manievich, p.176.
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voting. The opposition narrowly fought off a motion of no 
confidence in the RK at a delegate meeting on 5 February by 47
votes to 43. After this failure the Leninists demonstratively
78 
stormed out of the meeting. A delegate meeting on 18 February
finally voted on the basic issues of the TU debate. The Leninist 
platform received 73 votes, Trotsky 10, and Shlyapnikov only 3. 
The RK, however, was able to resist the demands for new elections
to the RK on the justified grounds that elections had only
79 
recently taken place.
The Gorodskoi raion on 11 January 1921 unanimously adopted 
Ignatov's TU position. A further resolution accepted the
substance of the Petrograd address, and called for elections to
8 0 the forthcoming party congress to be based on proportionality.
Sokol'nicheskii raion, with over 3000 party members, was the 
main stronghold of Trotsky's position. The transport workers in 
the wagon repair plant, the huge tram park, and the railway 
workshops had become familiar with Trotsky's presence through the 
Tsektran experiment. Already at the end of November 1920 The RK
had supported Trotsky's TU platform with only one dissenter
81 (Lyudvinskaya). Trotsky's support in the raion was confirmed
77. loc.cit. The Workers' Opposition retained control of the RK 
in elections held on 15 January 1921. Its members included 
Baranov, Demidov, Kutuzov, Korzinov, Kuranova, Kryukov, 
Maslennikov, Tulyakov, and Sovetov.
78. The Leninists were led by Kulikov, later a member of the TsK 
VKP(b) and secretary of Zamoskvoretskii RK, Manievich, p.177.
79. Manievich, p.111. The opposition retained control of the 
raion until 27 November 1921, and the raion became a centre of 
opposition to the NEP.
80. KT, 15 January 1921.
81. Sokol'niki, p.129. The victory of the Trotskyists was
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8 2 by a vote of the RK on 15 January 1921. The Leninists now
launched a vigorous counter-attack by sending in such speakers as 
Artem and Skvortsov-Stepanov, and Lenin personally called in the
leading oppositionists to the Kremlin to convince them of the
8 3 
correctness of his position. Under such pressure the 22
January delegate meeting, despite Trotsky's oratory, finally voted 
in favour of Lenin's platform. This defeat, coming on the heels 
of the general city discussion meeting on 21 January which saw
Trotsky's platform receive a bare fifth of the total votes
84 
cast, may well have prompted Trotsky to reconsider his
position.
At an extended session of the Zamoskvoretskii RK on 23 
January, with about 200 activists present, Trotsky attended as 
the main speaker, with Zinoviev and Kamenev as co-rapporteurs, 
and Medvedev and Bubnov defending their respective positions for 
the Workers' Opposition and the DCs. Trotsky withdrew his own 
platform and declared a merger with the buffer group on the basis 
of a platform promising workers' democracy; communist influence 
to be assured in the unions by educational methods and not by 
appointment; for the unions to concentrate on production tasks by 
merging with economic bodies, though each to retain their
confirmed by elections to the RK where they obtained a majority 
led by Kotov. After the X congress he became a staunch supporter 
of Lenin and continued to head the raion to 1925, Yu.O.K, p.20.
82. Mosk. bol'sheviki v bor'be, p.24.
83. T.F. Lyudvinskaya, Nas Leninskaya partiya vela, M. 1976, 
p.188.
84. Izvestiya VTsIK, 29 January 1921.
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identity; and a healthy internal life in the unions to be 
guaranteed by sending competent party workers to them. The 
voting gave Trotsky's new platform a majority in the RK, but not
Q C
among the activists. After this meeting the TU question was 
opened to general party debate in the raion. Support for the 
Leninist platform was confirmed when over a thousand communists
o c
met a few days later at a delegate meeting.
Further defeats followed. A general meeting in 
Krasnopresnenskii raion of all 4000 communists on 24 January gave
Lenin's platform 3847 votes, 50 for Trotsky's platform, and a
8 7 bare few votes for the DCs and Ignatov. A delegate meeting on
17 February in that raion gave Lenin's platform strong support
with 101 votes, while Trotsky only received 7, and the Workers'
8 8 Opposition 5 votes. As in the party debate, this raion proved
to be strongly in favour of the official view. A similar defeat 
took place at the delegate meeting of Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raion 
on 27 January. Sokol'nikov defended Trotsky's platform, while 
Ignatov and Tomskii presented their cases. After a heated 
discussion 232 voted for Lenin, 18 for Trotsky, 5 for Ignatov,
85. Voting was as follows:
Trotsky Kamenev Medvedev Bubnov
RK members 75 00 
Cell delegates 50 82 65
Party members 74 131 5 5
KT, 25 January 1921; £, 26 January 1921.
86. Lozovskii, Andreev, and Shlyapnikov addressed the audience 
of a thousand. 31 delegates and 256 observers voted for Lenin; 
10 delegates and 101 observers for Trotsky; and 10 delegates and 
132 observers for Shlyapnikov, KT, 10 February 1921.
87. P, 26 January 1921. 88. KT, 19 February 1921.
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and 2 for the others. In the RKs as a whole in January 1921
the oppositions together were supported by nearly half of the RK 
members:
Table 23 
Results of the TU discussion in Moscow RKs in January 1921
Raion Votes cast 
committee
Lenin Trotsky Shlyap. Ignatov DCs Abstent. Total
Gor
Zam
Kham
R-Sim
K-Pres
Baum
Sok
1
5
6
11
11
14
2
2
7
3
3
4
1
8
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
14
12
11
14
16
15
11
Total 50 28 3 9 2 1 93 
Source: £, 2 February 1921.
By the eve of the February guberniya conference, therefore, the 
Leninists had achieved victories in all the RPOs on the trade 
union question, but only after a severe struggle.
In other organisations the Leninists also achieved 
majorities. A broad meeting of the MGSPS and other Moscow trade 
union leaders at the end of January 1921 supported Lozovskii's 
Leninist TU platform, but insisted on real reforms within the
terms of this approach in production and management, and to this
90 
end a commission of seven was formed. The communist cells in
the Sverdlov University on 26 January gave the Trotsky-Bukharin
platform 115 votes, the Workers' Opposition 91, and all the rest
91 
of the 1200 votes went to the Platform of the Ten. In the
89. £, 29 January 1921.
90. KT, 2 February 1921. 91. KT, 29 January 1921
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Tsektran cell itself Trotsky lost his support on 27 January when 
Vompe's defence of the Leninist platform received the support of
33 members, while Trotsky's views presented by Bumazhnyi gained
92 
only 4, with 4 abstentions. The vote was closer in the
communist fraction of the food union when 26 supported Ignatov to
93 Lenin's 32. In the uezdy of Moscow guberniya the Leninists
achieved victories, but met with the stiffest resistance in the 
Kolomna and Serpukhov organisations. Support for the oppositions 
in the MPO may have been greater since their victories were not 
always reported in the press, but the general tendency for 
support to shift to the Leninist platform is clear.
The I Moscow metalworkers' conference (2-4 February 1921), 
which as mentioned was the scene of bitter protest, discussed the 
union issue. The discussion following Lozovskii's speech 
characterised the unions as 'worth little', weak, and isolated 
from the masses. Speakers were unanimous that the unions had to 
strengthen themselves and set about the task of organising
production. The Menshevik and SR views, as we have seen, gained
94 
significant support. A wide-ranging resolution was passed
calling for strictly observed democratic elections to all union 
organs, with freedom of speech and meeting; greater elected 
control over factory management and no representative to be sent 
to them by any organisation (including the party) with voting 
powers unless they had been elected by a general meeting of
92. KT, 29 January 1921. 93. KT, 10 February 1921.
94. KT, 8 February 1921. The metalworkers' union (VSRM) TsK met 
at thTs" time and by 11 votes to 9 supported Shlyapnikov's theses, 
Gurevich received 7, while the Leninist platform only 2, KT, 15 
February 1921.
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workers and then confirmed by the union. The resolution insisted
95 
on the free movement of labour from one factory to another.
The mood of the conference was more radical even than 
Shlyapnikov's programme, and reflected the strong current of 
protest amongst the Moscow working class against the policies of 
war communism.
The guberniya party conference (19-21 February 1921) 
reviewed the course of the trade union discussion in Moscow. 
Discussion was curtailed on the grounds that all were aware of 
the main positions. Short speeches were made by Kamenev; 
Bukharin, on behalf of the joint platform with Trotsky, insisted 
that the new position differed significantly from the first 
variants of Trotsky's platform, and obligatory union candidature 
to economic organs remained as part of the new platform; and 
Kiselev for the Workers' Opposition. Ignatov caused the greatest 
shock when he announced that his group, hitherto tending towards 
the Leninist platform now agreed with the main propositions of 
the Workers' Opposition. In the voting out of 367 delegates 217 
voted for the Ten, 52 for the Trotsky-Bukharin platform, 45 for 
the Workers' Opposition, and only 13 for the Democratic 
Centralists. This was to be the last Moscow party conference 
in which the oppositionists were able to muster significant 
support and to argue their cases with impunity.
95. KT, 15, 27 February 1921.
96. V. Mosk. gubpartkonf., p.5; £, 25 February 1921; KT, 19, 21 
February 1921.
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3. The party debate: second phase
Following the November guberniya party conference the party 
debate receded into the background as the Moscow party 
organisation turned its attention to organisational questions and 
the trade union debate. At the beginning of 1921, however, the 
issue of reform in the party re-emerged with full force as the 
various positions presented their platforms and sought support in 
the prelude to the X party congress. All groups realised that 
fundamental decisions would be taken at this congress. In Moscow 
the debate was directed towards achieving the maximum support at 
the guberniya party conference, which was held between 19-21 
February 1921, and where the position of the MPO at the X congress 
would be determined and its delegates chosen.
a. The platforms
At the MK plenum of 11 January 1921, which as we have seen 
was dominated by the union issue, Yakovleva proposed that the 
pre-congress discussion on the party in Moscow should be within 
the terms of a set of theses drafted by the MK bureau. 
Discussion was then to take place in the MK, the cell bureaux, 
and with APWs, and only then would discussion move to the raions.
Kamenev, Sapronov and Yakovleva were entrusted with drafting the
97 theses, and it was clearly hoped that by including these
representatives of three major tendencies, although the Workers' 
Opposition was not represented, the theses would be acceptable to 
a broad range of opinion.
In drafting the theses the three were still working on the
97. KT, 15 January 1921.
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assumption that the basic aspects of war communism were to
continue and the theses were therefore more guarded than the
9 8 
actual resolution adopted at the X congress on party building
in calling for the application of 'workers' democracy', the 
slogan of the moderate reformers. As the MK draft resolution, 
issued on 9 February, stated:
The achievement of a breathing space by the heroic 
military efforts of the party provides the real 
possibility of introducing the elements of workers' 
democracy, but not for a minute forgetting, however, 
that all methods of party work are always_subordinate to 
the demands of revolutionary expediency.
Nevertheless, the MK theses, or draft resolution, remained in the 
spirit of the reforming IX party conference in analysing the 
party's ills and in proposing the remedies. The theses attacked 
the bureaucratisation of the leading strata in the party, the 
lack of effective links between them and the rest of the party 
and hence the division between the verkhi and the nizy, the 
intelligentsia and the workers. On the basis of these divisions, 
they argued, 'syndicalism 1 had developed, (i.e., the lack of 
faith in the party as expressing the interests of the working 
class), above all amongst the new recruits whose education had 
been neglected. The MK now unequivocally argued that the main 
task was to improve the guality and level of those already in the 
party rather than continuing expansion. This theme was accepted 
by the X congress and resulted in the 1921 purge. The MK 
repeated the general measures adopted by the IX conference: 
eguality in the party, wide discussion, extended electability, and 
so on. A key point was the insistence that the cells were to
98. X s"ezd RKP, pp.559-71. 99. KT, 9 February 1921.
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restrict themselves to education and agitation, and not to take 
on the functions of organs of power, which, according to the 
theses, led to a breach between them and the masses. Petty party 
tutelage over TUs and Soviets was to be 'decisively 1 ended, and 
the regular transfer of party members between soviet and party 
work was to ensure a decline in bureaucratism. While 
reforming, these theses allowed little scope for the independence 
of the party member, and by insisting on the limited role for the 
cells once again emphasised the split between an active and 
politically passive membership.
The other groups also formulated their positions in the form 
of theses towards the X party congress. Foremost amongst these 
were those issued by the group of 'active workers of Moscow's 
raions', the Ignatovtsy. Stimulated by their developing alliance 
with the Workers' Opposition their theses provided a powerful 
critique of current practices in the party. The theses 
concentrated on the role of the rank and file party member and 
insisted that with the ending of the war new methods should be 
adopted:
The transfer of military methods of management into the 
daily practice of party-soviet and trade union work 
deprived the party masses of active participation and 
led to the isolation of the party verkhi from its 
proletarian nizy, and provided the basis for the 
increased bureaucratisation of party and state 
apparatuses.
100. KT, 9 February 1921.
101. The theses were signed by E.N. Ignatov, G. Lebedev, M. 
Burovtsev, I. Maslov, A. Orekhov, Denisov, Kh. Semenovich, I. 
Abin, and Berdzin of Gorodskoi raion, G. Korzinov, Kryukov, E. 
Kuranova, and N. Tulyakov of Baumanskii raion, K. Radzevilov and 
S. Smirnov of Rogozhsko-Simonovskii raion, and V. Linkevich, I. 
Stefashkin and I. Vasil'ev of Sokol'nicheskii raion, KT, 12, 13, 
15 February 1921; P, 12 February 1921.
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The party nizy were dissatisfied with the comparatively small 
role that they had been assigned, the theses went on, and the 
growth in their consciousness now demanded changes which had been 
blocked, despite the reforming resolutions of the past few 
months, by the bureaucratic habits of the leading party workers 
in all apparatuses. The party crisis was characterised as 
follows:
The stagnation of the development of the organisatonal 
forms of party building towards their greater 
democratisation has led to what we call the party 
crisis. In essence this is the disparity between 
outmoded party forms with the demands, dictated by class 
instinct and the growing consciousness, of the 
proletariat and the party masses in their desire to 
create new forms of communist society.
While Lenin and his supporters saw only a 'declassed 1 proletariat 
the Ignatovtsy saw a proletariat growing in consciousness and 
able to take hold of its own destiny. In this analysis we
encounter for the first time a phenomenon that Rudolf Bahro was
102 later to call 'surplus consciousness'. This is essentially
the contradiction between frozen organisational forms 
(bureaucratism), and the striving of groups and individuals for a 
more active and responsible participation in the party and 
political processes. This comes up against the opposition of the 
entrenched cadres, the Ignatovtsy stated. They proposed a wide 
range of reforms designed to advance workers, broaden decision- 
making, and above all to increase the role of the cells. In 
these demands they insisted that the principles of 'workers'
102. Rudolf Bahro, The Alternative in Eastern Europe, NLB 1978, 
(trans David Fernbach),pp.256-7,and passim.Bahro defines 
surplus consciousness as 'an energetic mental capacity that is no 
longer absorbed by the immediate necessities and dangers of human 
existence and can thus orient itself to more distant problems', 
p.257.
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democracy 1 were to be applied 'even if the internal or external 
situation worsens 1 , and were thus no longer willing to make
I A -3
reforms dependent on circumstances, as the MK had been.
The Ignatov group had therefore moved from a position 
broadly in line with the Democratic Cenralist critique of party 
structures and with the Platform of the Ten's emphasis on the 
educational role of the unions to one where rank and file party 
members and ordinary workers were to play an active and autonomous 
role in political life. Hence their switch at the February
guberniya party conference in support of the Workers'
104 Opposition. By insisting that the split in the party between
verkhi and nizy was also a social one between workers and 
intelligentsia the Ignatovtsy were open to the charge of 
Makhaevism, and indeed were accused of this in Pravda on the eve 
of the February conference.
Shlyapnikov's own criticisms of the party centres were very
103. Among their specific proposals the Ignatov theses called 
for an end to recruitment to the party of bourgeois people 
(except for those who had been in the underground movement); a 
reregistration of all non-workers or peasants who had joined 
since 1 January 1919; guaranteed free discussion for all opinions 
in the party; two-third worker representation on all party 
committees; and for representatives of all main currents in the 
party to be drafted into the party's leading bodies, KT, 12 
February 1921.
104. Some of the Ignatovtsy continued their radical critique of 
the Leninist party and state structures beyond the X party 
congress and participated in the Panushkin 'Workers' and Peasants' 
Socialist Party 1 , destroyed in summer 1921, G. Myasnikov's 
Workers' Group, inspired by the Workers' Opposition, and the 
Workers' Truth group, inspired by Alexander Bogdanov.
105. _P, 16 February 1921. Waclaw Machajski (A. Vol'skii) had 
argued~in The Intellectual Worker, Geneva 1904, and elsewhere, that 
the intelligentsia was 'a parasitic class exploiting the workers 
through their monopoly of specialised knowledge' (Rigby, p.93), 
and that the October revolution had been 'a counter-revolution of 
the intellectuals', Avrich, Russian Anarchists, p.200.
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similar to those of the Ignatov group, and he acknowledged his 
debt to the raion party workers of Moscow in providing the 
substance for his critique published in the first issue of the 
discussion paper promised by the IX party conference. He 
argued that the IX conference had not tackled tha roots of the 
party crisis but the party had only 'mechanically' tried to gloss 
over difficulties by holding open meetings and so on. To solve 
the crisis, he insisted, every party member should be allowed to 
'find his tongue, as they say in the raions', and participate in 
the debate. Instead, he argued, 'comradely' relations had been 
replaced by 'orders and obedience 1 (prikazanie i poslushanie):
The party, as the managing and creative collective, has 
turned into a sordid bureaucratic machine. The party 
work of the masses has been reduced to the fulfilment of 
a few very basic duties such as subbotniks, guard duty, 
patrols, and so on.
He supported his plea for an end to bureaucratic and mechanical
methods in the party, for the greater activity of the party
masses, by the events in the Moscow party organisation:
The members of the Moscow party organisation expressed a 
lack of confidence in the work of the MK. This... 
encountered a hostile reception... The modest wish of 
the members of the Moscow party organisation to elect a 
new MK, responsive to the demands and needs of the party 
masses, prompted the rebuff and interference of the TsK 
RKP(b).
He was here referring to the Baumanskii incident and the November 
guberniya party conference. He then made his often guoted claim 
of chicanery on the part of the centre:
This interference revealed itself in a whole system of 
pressure and struggle against comrades who were
106. A.Shlyapnikov, 'O nashikh vnutripartiinykh raznoglasiyakh', 
Diskussionnyi listok, TsK RKP(b), 1, yanvar' 1921g., p.13.
107. ibid., p.14.
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dissatisfied with the work of the MK. In those raions 
where the opposition was in a majority they insisted on 
the distribution of delegates proportional to the number 
of votes received. There, where the majority were 
supporters ft of the old MK, proportionality was not 
allowed.
At the November conference itself Lenin had argued that while 
proportionality was necessary in selecting delegates to the 
conference, implying that this unusual procedure had been applied
by the Leninists before the conference, it was absolutely
109 inadmissable in electing a leading body such as the MK.
Shlyapnikov's charges can neither be proved or disproved, but 
they reveal the increasing tendency for both the Workers' 
Opposition and the Leninists to deal with the minutiae of the 
debate itself and not the main issues.
The Democratic Centralists reduced the difficulties in the 
party to the problem of the transition from military to economic 
tasks. They called for strictly defined structures from top to 
bottom on the basis of democratic centralism (i.e., as they put 
it, pyramids instead of pillars). As opposed to the Ignatovtsy, 
they identified a fall in the consciousness of the masses, though 
concurred in noting a decline in internal party democracy, which 
they agreed could be halted by making the cell the locus of party 
life. While Sapronov openly identified himself with the 
Moscow opposition which had emerged since the November 
conference, Osinskii was more hostile. Referring to the
108. ibid., p.14. 109. Lenin PSS, vol. 42, p.39.
110. The Democratic Centralist theses were published in _P, 22 
January 1921, signed by A. Bubnov, T. Boguslavskii, A. Karnenskii, 
V.N. Maksimovskii, V. Osinskii, Rafail, and Sapronov, in 
X s"ezd RKP, pp.656-62.
111. Myasnikov, pp.295-6.
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misquotation of an earlier speech (delivered in Tula in May 1920) 
he made a blunt attack on the Workers' Opposition in February 
1921. All talk of the self-activity of the masses under the 
circumstances, he argued, was nonsense. All that could be done
at present was to involve them in 'active work' under the guidance
112 
of the party. This split between Sapronov and Osinskii marked
the end of the DCs as a coherent tendency. An aura of 
bureaucratic paternalism and not radical worker politics had long 
clung to their reform proposals, and the present debate forced 
them to choose between effective reform or bureaucratic 
consolidation.
b. The debate
On the basis of these platforms on the party question battle 
was now joined in the raions of Moscow. The debate took place 
against a background of strikes and demonstrations in the city 
and peasant uprisings in the countryside, which inevitably tended 
to enhance support for the MK as the party united in the face of 
difficulties. Despite sizeable support the Ignatov platform, now 
carrying the standard for the Workers' Opposition, and the 
Democratic Centralists were defeated in most raions.
At an extended session of the Zamoskvorech'e RK on 11 
February, with about 150 communists attending, Yakovleva, still 
the MK secretary, defended the MK theses, Bubnov those of the 
DCs, and Burovtsev the Ignatov position. A lively discussion was 
followed by victory for the DCs. On the same day a delegate
112. KT, 20 February 1921.
113. 8 RK members and 52 cell representatives voted for the DC
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meeting with raion activists in Sokol'nicheskii raion gave the MK
114 theses 98 votes and Ignatov's 79. In Rogozhsko-Simonovskii
raion a delegate meeting gave the MK theses, defended by 
Yakovleva, 30 votes, while Ignatov defending his own position 
received only two votes. Yakovleva 1 s presence as the defender 
of the MK line in the party debate, while a supporter of the 
Trotsky-Bukharin platform in the TU debate, illustrates the 
highly confused situation facing the party member in voting on 
the various platforms. It does show, however, that the Trotsky- 
Bukharin supporters on the TU guestion were consistent opponents 
of radical reform of the party.
The division between various opposition platforms 
occasionally allowed the MK victory by default. A general 
meeting of two wards in Gorodskoi raion, for example, gave the MK 
280 votes, the DCs 277, and Ignatov 197. A delegate meeting 
on the eve of the guberniya conference in that raion indicated 
that the Ignatovtsy were losing their old predominance when the MK 
theses received 87 votes, Ignatov's 53, and the DCs 13. In 
Baumanskii raion the Workers' Opposition was also losing ground.
A general meeting on 17 February gave the MK theses 64 votes to
1 J 8 Ignatov's 17, while a delegate meeting the next day supported
the MK with 51 votes, 38 supported the Workers' Opposition (RK),
theses; 2 and 31, respectively, for the MK, and 3 and 36 for 
Ignatov, KT, 13 February 1921.
114. KT, 13 February 1921. 115. KT, 18 February 1921
116. KT, 16 February 1921. 117. KT, 19 February 1921
118. loc.cit.
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and 2 for the DCs. This meeting also voted to support Lenin's TU 
platform, but the opposition suceeded by 46 to 45 votes in having
the delegates to the guberniya conference elected proportionately
119 to the more favourable party building vote. As usual, the
greatest support for the MK was mustered in Krasnopresnenskii
120 
raion, while Sokol'nicheskii raion on 18 February saw the MK
121 
crush the Ignatov group by 65 votes to 8. On the same day a
delegate meeting in Zamoskvorech'e saw the MK snatch a victory
with 41 votes against 20 for the Ignatov group and 18 for the
122 DCs. In the majority of raions, delegates to the conference
were elected proportionately to the voting on the TU issue.
c. The Moscow guberniya party conference (19-21 
February 19217
At the conference, attended by 367 delegates, Radek reported 
on the political moment. He was pessimistic about the prospects 
for a prolonged peace or the expansion of the revolution to other 
countries. Therefore, he argued, 'we must temporarily rely on 
our own resources', and the main prospect of this was the 
establishment of 'correct' relations with the 80 million peasants 
in the country:
We have always said that we need the help of the 
international revolution, but the international 
revolution cannot get by without us since we are the 
world bulwark holding back the attack of capital.
119. Manievich, p.177; £, 20 February 1921.
120. A delegate meeting on 16 February gave Kamenev 129 votes, 
Bubnov and Rafail for the DCs 2 votes, and 3 votes for Litvinov 
on behalf of the Workers' Opposition (KT, 19 February 1921). A 
delegate meeting on 13 January 1921 had returned a strongly 
Leninist RK, KT, 15 January 1921.
121. KT, 19 February 1921. 122. loc.cit.
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Securing the revolution in Russia was now the key to world 
revolution, he implied, and on this basis he insisted that a 
massive expansion of the party should take place by attracting 
millions of workers:
We are the only force which can restructure the world, 
and we must have a firm belief that the working class 
will be able to cope with this task.
The failure of the world revolution, the problem of the 
peasantry, and the centrality of the party, these were to be the 
central issues underlying the debate at the conference.
Three reports were presented on the guestion of party 
building. Kamenev on behalf of the MK outlined the programme of 
workers' democracy , which he argued could tackle the three main 
complaints of the masses: the role of the specialists, inner- 
party ineguality, and bureaucratism. He ridiculed Ignatov's 
proposal that the party's leading bodies should consist of two- 
thirds workers, and at the same time he attacked the DC idea of 
introducing 'independent' people into the TsK. 124 The MK 
resolution, discussed above, was put forward as the conference
resolution and called for a blend of reform and organisational
1 ?S improvement to tackle the party's problems.
Ignatov accused the party leadership of having transformed 
itself into a group of specialists and once again insisted that 
the cells should be the focus of party life, and claimed that the 
MK had adopted the idea without acknowledgement to his group. 
Here Ignatov was claiming proprietorship over a fairly basic 
idea. He continued his crusade against the alleged petty-
123. V Mosk. gubpartkonf., p.4; KT, 22 February 1921.
124. V Mosk. gubpartkonf., p.6. 125. ibid., pp.7-17.
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bourgeois infiltration of the party by proposing that all those 
other than workers or peasants who had joined before 1 January 
1919 should be expelled. Ignatov declared that his group was 
dropping the demand for two-thirds worker representation. 
The third report was presented by Bubnov and he once again made 
the DC claim of the continuity of the crisis in the party since 
early 1919, and attacked both the incorrect policies of the TsK 
and the danger represented by the Workers' Opposition. The
1 9 fi
voting gave the MK resolution 251, Ignatov 57, and Bubnov 30.
In the discussion on the MK's report since November 1920 
several speakers deplored the harmful effects of the TU 
discussion on the attempts to implement organisational reform in 
the MPO. Yakovleva, in the main report on the guestion, argued 
that the change of 3 MK secretaries in as many months had been 
particularly aggravating. She stated that there was still no
uniform structure to the RKs nor a single plan of work in the
127 
whole organisation. Uryvaev's resolution accepting the MK
report aroused less controversy than the similar report at the 
November conference, and indeed the idea of a compromise 
composite MK implemented at that conference was attacked. By a 
large majority with 230 votes this resolution was adopted while
Burovtsev's on behalf of the Ignatov group and the Workers'
128 Opposition obtained 46, and Bubnov's only 38.
The most heated discussion took place over the elections to 
the MK. Bubnov argued that they should be delayed until a month
126. ibid., p.7; £, 22 February 1921.
127. P, 22 February 1921; KT, 22 February 1921.
128. V Mosk. gubpartkonf., pp.34-6; KT, 22 February 1921.
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after the X congress to allow sufficient time to introduce 
'workers' democracy'. Burovtsev's resolution agreed with the 
Leninist majority that the MK elected in November had been 
composed of conflicting groups and had therefore failed to 
provide leadership, but also called for a delay in electing a 
new MK. All agreed that it had been a mistake to elect the 
MK on the basis of TU platforms and not over party 
construction. By a majority of 206 to 103 with 18 abstentions 
a motion in favour of electing the MK at the conference was 
accepted. A second named vote gave 216 for, 88 against, and 24 
abstentions. Thereupon the Ignatov group declared that they 
would not participate in the elections. 220 voted for the list
prepared by the MK, 43 abstained, and 42 refused to take part in
129 the voting. Ignatov, Korzinov, and Sapronov lost their seats
on the MK (Appendix 14).
Elections to the X party congress took place on the basis of 
trade union platforms: the Platform of the Ten received 28 
places, the Trotsky-Bukharin group and the Workers' Opposition 6 
each, and the DCs 2. The majority of the MK were once again 
Leninists. The oppositions contested the legality of the 
election and complained to the TsK. Lenin gave their complaints 
short shrift at a meeting with Moscow party activists on 24 
February 1921, arguing that 'the system of two rooms (a reference 
to the November conference) can no longer be tolerated... What 
sort of democracy is it if the conference cannot elect the
129. V Mosk. gubpartkonf., pp.39, 41.
130. ibid., p.41. 131. Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.350.
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MK? 1 . The TsK report at the X congress noted the change in 
the relative strength of the major positions since November 1920.
In the first about two-fifths of the delegates supported the
132 
oppositions, and in February 1921 only about one-sixth. In an
announcement to all party members soon after the new MK gave 
notice of the new style of leadership: 'All hail to the united, 
powerful organisation of Moscow communists under the leadership 
of its renewed centre 1 .
Against the background of the disturbances the MK outlined 
measures to improve its apparatus, and to improve contacts with
local party organisations and over such organisations as
134 Komsomol. All the apparatuses of the MK and the RKs were to
be standardised. During the transition to NEP this programme 
of organisational consolidation was implemented in what was 
called a perestroika, borrowing the term from the shift in the 
economy but tending in precisely the opposite direction; towards 
greater centralisation rather than liberalisation. 
The same issue carried denunciations of 'counter-revoluionary' 
agitation in Kronstadt and elsewhere, and called on all to unite 
around the Soviets. Following the X congress the MK launched a 
campaign for the 'workerising' of soviet organs and under the 
slogan 'to the masses' argued that the 'counter-revolutionary
wavering' of the non-party masses was to be countered by
137 intensifying party unity. This was to be the slogan of the
NEP.
132. X s"ezd RKP, p.803. 133. KT, 24 February 1921
134. KT, 3 March 1921. 135. KT, 4 March 1921.
136. KT, 25 March 1921. 137. KT, 27 March 1921.
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4. The debates in perspective and the X party congress
At the 24 February meeting of party activists Lenin had 
stated that 'Moscow has broken all records in the discussions'. 
He argued that the emigre press was taking advantage of the 
struggles within the party, and against the background of 
disturbances in the streets he issued the stern warning that the 
period of discussion was drawing to a close:
We have given everybody a chance to speak their minds, 
we have carried out a discussion - and the congress will 
decide, and now we are at battle stations. We must 
unite and understand that one more step in ft the 
discussion and we are no longer a party.
The vigour of the debate in the MPO had clearly shown that while 
pluralism might have been undermined in society at large it had 
found a refuge, if only temporarily, within the party 
organisation itself. Participation in the debates was accepted 
as one of the privileges of party membership, and was 
institutionalised, for example, by the practice of having a co- 
rapporteur at meetings. At the same time, however, there was a 
growing body of party legislation designed to enforce party 
discipline and to ensure the ability of delovoi action on the 
part of higher party bodies. The transition from military to 
economic priorities with the end of the civil war was marked 
initially by a flowering of debate, indicating that the war 
per se cannot be held responsible for limiting the discussion 
rights of party members, but the tendency to regard economic 
reconstruction as a military campaign provided the background to 
the undermining of the 'common law' rights of discussion. 
There are several reasons why the discussions were so
138. Lenin PSS, vol.42, p.350.
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intractable in Moscow. Here were concentrated the leading party, 
soviet and trade union activists and hence the debates in Moscow 
acted as a fulcrum for the debate in the country. Support in the 
MPO, the largest and most prestigious in the republic, acted as a 
powerful prop to any group in its attempts to influence party 
policy. The sharp reaction to the attempt by the Petrograd party 
organisation, in its address on the unions, to mobilise party 
organisations as a whole and not individuals in the party over 
specific questions was felt in Moscow by all sides as a threat to 
the very principle of free discussion in party organisations. 
The objective reasons for strength of the oppositions in 
Moscow were based both on conditions in the city and in the MPO 
itself. The working class had decreased in size and its 
composition had changed, but the protest movement in 1920 - early 
1921 made clear that it was not a negligible force and that in an 
inchoate way it retained a vision of socialism which was not 
identified entirely with Bolshevik power. Lenin's arguments on 
the declassing of the proletariat were more a way of avoiding 
this unpleasant truth than a real reflection of what remained, in 
Moscow at least, a substantial class. The economic and social 
conditions in the city were the bases for opposition activity. 
At the same time the political traditions of the MPO, with the 
emphasis on raion initiative and a weak centre, and widespread 
acceptance that discussion was a right and not a privilege, 
allowed the discussion full reign. The peculiarly Moscow 
grouping of Ignatovtsy bridged the two main strands of opposition 
activity, between the party and trade union discussions, and 
linked the demands for democracy in the party with those calling 
for greater initiative to be alowed for the working class. The
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question can then legitimately be raised of what were the 
preconditions for greater worker self-activity? Would it not 
require a fundamental relaxation of party control over all of 
society? This was the logic of their position, as Lenin 
realised, but the oppositionists, no liberals, drew back from 
this conclusion and were thus condemned to the margins of 
history.
The very conditions that gave rise to the oppositions were 
also the cause of their defeat. The near Kronstadt in Moscow in 
February 1921 allowed the Leninist majority to claim that the 
existence of organised opposition allowed the 'petty-bourgeois 1 
parties, above all the Mensheviks, to threaten the very existence 
of Soviet power in its Bolshevik form. Kronstadt itself, and its 
Moscow counterpart, provided the justification for Lenin and his 
supporters to 'put the lid' on the opposition. The X party 
congress made explicit what had become increasingly clear: that 
the real issue in the trade union debate was not the trade unions 
as such, but the leading role of the party in economic and 
political life; and that the issue in the party debate was the 
extent to which the party would become an organisation of a 
military type.
At the X party congress Lenin made clear the political 
consequences of his concept of the declassing of the proletariat.
It encouraged, in his view, the growth of 'petty bourgeois
139 
anarchist tendencies' of the type of the Workers' Opposition.
Referring to the Kronstadt events he argued that
139. Lenin PSS, vol.43, p.42.
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Here there appeared petty bourgeois, anarchist 
movements (stikhiya), with slogans in favour of free 
trade and always directed against the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. This mood has deeply taken hold of the 
proletariat. It has influenced the factories in Moscow, 
it has influenced factories in many places in the 
provinces. This petty bourgeois counter-revolution is 
undoubtedly more dangerous than Denikin, Yudenich and 
Kolchak taken together.
The call for free trade was an assault against the cornerstone of 
war communist economic policy and this, Lenin insisted, had 
developed into a general attack on the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. In other words, in Lenin's view the development of 
independent 'speculationist 1 relations by the general economic 
crisis at the end of war communism was not only an economic 
category but also a political one and together they had provided 
the environment for the various oppositions. In this way the 
content of the opposition criticisms was devalued in favour of 
the emphasis on their witting or unwitting results.
Lenin expressed the conclusion that he drew from this in the 
words of the II congress of the III International: 'The
dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without the
141 
communist party'. From this point of view he ridiculed
Kollontai's and Shlyapnikov's arguments in favour of an all-
Russian congress of producers in which the working class and its
142 
organisations would play the leading role. The
congress resolution on the trade unions emphasised the leading 
role of the party in the trade unions, but allowed that this 
should be of an ideological nature and not the minute regulation
140. Lenin PSS, vol.43, p.24.
141. Lenin PSS, vol.43, p.42.
142. Lenin PSS, vol.43, p.41.
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typical of war communism. The resolution on party building 
provided the true reflection of six months of debate. It 
outlined a broad programme of change in the party, based on the 
development of the organisational practices of the war period, 
which was to provide the basis for a crucial rassemblement of the
party: 'We must once again gather up the party which during the
144 period of the war was broken up into several groups'. The
verkhi and nizy, the military and civilian workers, the old and 
new party members, were to be fused into the greater body of the 
party, controlled by the party centre. The two supplementary 
resolutions 'On the unity of the party' banning factional 
activity on penalty of expulsion, and 'The syndicalist and 
anarchist deviation in our party 1 , which castigated the Workers' 
Opposition, were commentaries on this basic programme.
In contrast to the heated debates on party and trade union 
policy, the adoption of the first measures of what came to be 
known as the New Economic Policy was accepted with little debate. 
As Lenin put it later, 'The change that we made in the spring of 
1921... was necessitated by such extremely powerful and
convincing circumstances that no debates or disagreements arose
145 
among us about it'. It was a short step for Lenin at the
congress to forge a link between economic concessions and 
increased party discipline:
...We require, on the one hand, the maximum unity, 
endurance and discipline within the proletarian party,
143. X s"ezd RKP, p.584. 144. X s"ezd RKP, p.563.
145. Lenin PSS, vol.45, pp.301-2. Speech to the Moscow soviet 
20 November 1922.
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and on the other hand, a whole range of economic... 
concessions.
The introduction of the NEP altered the framework within 
which the debates had been conducted, but the issues raised by 
them remained in the forefront of the debates of the 1920s. The 
oppositions during the civil war were not merely ephemeral 
phenomena doomed to failure. The broad participation in them of 
large numbers of party members at all levels suggests that 
'living thought 1 had not died out in the raions of Moscow either 
in the party or in the working class. The end of the war and the 
return of party members and workers to the factories signalled 
the possibility of a new era in party work. Instead, the 
oppositions were undermined, and their failure heralded a larger 
failure within the party as bureaucracy and administrative 
measures took the place of debate. The party and not the working 
class was henceforth to be the dominant force in the country and 
it was this formulation of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
that was to be the enduring result of the social changes and 
political responses of the period of war communism.
146. Lenin PSS, vol.43, p.31.
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CONCLUSION
The victors of October had come to power with with no 
detailed blueprint for the future communist society. 
Nevertheless, they did have some general principles developed 
over a half century of struggle with capitalism and reformism, 
and these general principles were applied to the practice of 
power during war communism. Many of the victors laid down their 
lives at the various fronts scattered over the vastness of 
Russia, but in Moscow, the heart of Russia and since March 1918 
the heart of the revolution as well, their comrades had the 
unigue opportunity to put their vision into practice. The war 
stimulated the implementation of the maximalist programme and in 
two and a half years of conflict some of the details of the 
future society were worked out in practice. By 1920 the victors 
not only of revolution but also of civil war and foreign 
intervention could survey a country devastated by war, a city 
depopulated, its factories barely working, its working class 
fractured and to a large extent hostile. And yet, capitalism and 
the bourgeoisie had been chased to the margins of economic and 
political life, victory had been achieved in the civil war, and 
the principles of war communism could in the large be claimed to 
have been successful.
By the end of the civil war all political life outside the 
communist party led a harried existence. Within the party not 
only had an organisational transformation taken place, but also 
an intellectual revolution. The relatively democratic internal 
organisation of the early period had by early 1920 given way to 
hierarchical command structures subordinate to committees which
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were increasingly independent of their own party organisations. 
At the same time, while the intellectual life of the party during 
the civil war can be written as the history of oppositions, the 
period closed with the defeat of reform proposals and the 
discrediting of critical thought, if not of independent thought 
itself. How had this come about?
The answer lies in the very nature of war communism. The 
October revolution had been followed by the creation of what was 
intended to be a transitional state apparatus designed to 
eliminate bourgeois political power and to neutralise capitalist 
economic power. Against the background of the developing civil 
war in mid-1918 this state launched a second offensive against 
capital, no longer limited to neutralising its economic power but 
aimed at its elimination. Just as the capitalist state, 
according to Marx, was rooted in the economic system, so the 
socialist state developed both to counter the old economic system 
and to create a new one. In the city and the country as a whole 
a unique system was developed that in many respects survives to 
this day as the basis of Soviet-type systems.
In the economy during war communism capitalism and commodity 
relations were largely extirpated, and in their place a 
centralised system was instated which managed the whole economic 
life of the country through a proliferation of vertically 
organised pillars, the glavki. In this system the Moscow 
authorities lost the direct control over their own major 
industries and the Moscow Soviet's economic management functions 
were undermined. The Moscow economic council became an executive 
body of the central economic apparatus. At the same time, the 
organisation of the economy reveals the limits of the 'party-
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state monolith 1 . On the local level the party organisation and 
the party members working in enterprises were separated from 
economic management. Here the state, in its economic aspect at 
least, retained a certain relative autonomy from the local party 
organisations. In this field the party's functions were reduced 
to providing a favourable climate for the development of the 
economy. The party and its membership fulfilled an auxiliary 
function, and the party itself was threatened with militarisation 
at the height of war communism in 1920. It was this major breach 
in Bolshevik party hegemony that led to the party's decline when 
the state's economic functions expanded massively at the time of 
the 'socialist offensive' of the first five-year plans. The 
tension between the idea of the commune state and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat was not restricted to the 
opposition between the party-state and the working class, but 
also applied to the relationship between the party and state. 
Following October there had been no adequate integration between 
the Bolshevik political revolution and the new state's economic 
functions.
This deficiency was stamped on the new state's labour 
relations. Both the trade unions and the working class as a 
whole had by the end of war communism been reduced to an 
auxiliary role. But here their subalternity was a two-fold one: 
both in relation to the party and the state. The formation of 
state economic councils deprived the trade unions of direct 
economic management functions, and the later restrictions on 
collegiality only confirmed their subordinate role. Instead, the 
unions concentrated on labour and wages policy, and in 
enterprises the factory committees lost their control functions.
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The lack of integration between the socialist democratic 
political revolution and the state socialist economic revolution 
was nowhere more starkly revealed than in the ending, for the 
committed workers organised in party cells, of 'syndicalist 1 
forms of participation in running enterprises. During war 
communism the state and the workers' movement were fused but not 
integrated, as with the party's relationship with the state, and 
party was unable to bring the two together. Indeed, during the 
trade union debate the party's own political dominance prevented 
an integration of the labour movement and the workers' state.
The resurgence of the party after May 1918 as a body 
separate from the state was followed by a period in which the 
party consolidated its own internal organisation and at the same 
time extended its control over the political life of the city. 
The division of responsibilities between the state, concerned 
with the economy, and the party, as the source of supreme 
political authority, was internalised in the debates over 
localism and centralism, democracy and authoritarianism. In this 
system the party became the glavk of the political sphere.
The recruitment policies of the party reinforced the 
division between a group of activists and an increasingly 
malleable rank and file membership. Concern over the social 
pattern of recruitment and the debate over a broad or narrow 
party only emphasised the dominance of the party leadership in 
deciding these crucial questions. The alternating pattern of 
purge and recruitment campaign weakened the solidarity of the 
rank and file membership. The social context in which 
recruitment took place, the declassing of the proletariat and the 
growth of bureaucracy, allowed the traditional Leninist concept
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of the vanguard party in the pre-revolutionary situation to be 
transferred and intensified in the post-revolutionary context.
The actual internal organisational developments in the party 
during war communism were provoked by an amalgam of theoretical 
and practical considerations. Just as Marx had provided only the 
broadest outlines of the future society, so Lenin had established 
only general principles concerning internal party organisation. 
On this question Lenin had little specific to say during the 
civil war other than stressing the need for discipline. The 
practical development of internal organisation took place within 
the general theoretical constraints of the functions of the 
ruling party in the dictatorship of the proletariat.
While Michels and Weber have provided important analyses of 
the internal development of bureaucratic organisations in 
general, the professionalisation of the Bolshevik party during 
the civil war took a hitherto unigue form and developed in 
interaction with its role at that time. The functions of the 
party determined the forms of its bureaucratisation, and hence 
the context must be analysed in conjunction with the study of the 
normal departmentalisation within administrative bodies. A novel 
type of organisation was created by the fusion of the party's 
democratic traditions, the use of elections and accountability, 
and the development of the party's controlling functions.
It is over the role of the civil war in stimulating the 
changes in internal party organisation and in the consolidation 
of the state in general that the debate over the role of ideology 
and pragmatism, of theory and exogenous circumstances, is 
focused. The civil war was an ideological crusade against 
capitalism, but fought by pragmatic means, hence the pragmatism
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was ideologically charged, and the ideology was to some extent 
restricted to what would be useful for prosecuting the war. The 
manner in which the war was fought and the absence of revolution 
on a world scale stimulated the emergence of authoritarian 
patterns. The party was able to retain control over the army, 
and they borrowed from each other certain organisational traits 
as the army was professionalised and the party militarised. But 
over the internal repressive apparatus the party's control was 
less secure. This was the second major area in which the party 
failed to establish its hegemony during the civil war, and for 
this the victors of October suffered during the socialist 
offensive.
In society and over mass bodies the party was more 
successful in establishing its dominance. During war communism 
not only intermediary bodies between the party as a whole and 
society, but between the party committees and society, were 
eliminated or bent to Bolshevik control. Groupings of party 
members beyond the aegis of the committees were discouraged and 
ultimately banned as the practice of democratic centralism in the 
ruling party was defined. The agitprop offensive kept Moscow's 
population and working class in a state of mobilisation, though 
its achievement was more to neutralise opposition than to win 
active support. The esurient party organisation and its 
committees absorbed or destroyed all intermediary aggregations 
between themselves and society.
By the end of the war, party committee control had been 
established not only over the Soviets, but also over the party 
fractions working in them. The penalty for this was the 
etiolation of the Soviets themselves as their mass participatory
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character gave way to bureaucratic routine. The state 
bureaucracy controlled the whole life of the country, but the 
party itself felt threatened by the expanding bureaucratic 
apparatus. Hence once again the party committees insisted on the 
subordination to themselves of all party members working in the 
state apparatuses. During the civil war the party acted as the 
integrating force in the new bureaucracy, but even this role was 
lost for a time at the height of Stalinism.
The civil war saw the basis laid for the organisational 
supremacy of the party centres and of the 'thinking kernels', as 
Dunaevskii and the Workers' Opposition had put it. The dominance 
of the party centre relied on the supremacy of the party 
committees in the localities. A single standardised party was 
developing in which the rank and file party member in the cells 
and in the raions was losing the ability to influence the 
development of party policy. But before this new model party 
could be introduced it encountered the trial of a vigorous 
debate. While most of the oppositionists were willing to allow a 
great degree of centralisation, and even militarisation, during 
the war, and all agreed in Bolshevik supremacy to a greater or 
lesser degree, the approach of peace stimulated challenges to 
both the internal party developments and to the consolidation of 
the economic state which had undermined the labour movement. In 
particular, the oppositions sought to develop a relationship 
between the party committees and the membership which would 
combine effective central leadership without infringing local 
rights, and to establish a relationship between the state and the 
working class which, without denying the party's leading role, 
would allow greater worker participation as an organised class in
- 481 -
the management of the economy.
The oppositions from mid-1920 marked the last flare of a 
significant movement in favour of genuine reform in the party and 
against the bureaucratic consolidation of the state. The 
movements were undermined by internal inconsistencies and by 
mutual feuding, and by the circumstances in which they took 
place: international isolation, economic collapse and internal 
disorders. They threatened not so much the party's leading role 
in the new society, as the forms in which this leading role had 
been established during war communism. Their failure marked the 
wider failure in the transition to NEP. War communist political 
practices were intensified and the economic shift was not 
accompanied by significant changes in the wartime labour process. 
The economic state and the party bureaucracy were confirmed as 
the twin foci of socialist transformation, subordinating the 
social movement itself and even that segment organised in the 
party's lower organisations.
War communism was a combination of economic and political 
practice which saw the emergence of a radically new form of 
party-state. The Russian revolutionary movement's failure to 
provide a detailed concept of the institutional relationships in 
the new society, which could combine political democracy with the 
economic tasks of the revolution, or to provide an analysis of 
the role of the party in the new system, indeed the schematic 
approach to the political culture of the new state, was 
compensated during the civil war by a loyalty to the broader 
vision implemented by pragmatic experimentation. However, given 
the isolation of the socialist revolution in an industrially 
under-developed country, accompanied by civil war and foreign
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intervention, the emerging political system became more suited 
for the negative task of destroying the old society than building 
the new one.
In early 1921 some of the harshest economic features of war 
communism were dismantled as the principle of gradualism, dropped 
in mid-1918, in the socialist economic development of the country 
was restored. The broad aims of the movement were not discarded, 
but only shelved, as the party-state adopted a strategy of seige 
rather than assault. The economic civil war was not over, only 
deferred. But in the political sphere no such concessions were 
made, and indeed the war communist internal party forms and 
relationships with mass bodies were consolidated.
War communism in the political sphere marked the emergence 
of a permanent pattern of political authority. It constituted a 
set of structures basic to communist rule in a country not so 
much backward as unreceptive to or unready for the implementation 
of their programme. How permanent the protagonists in war 
communism thought it would be is a more difficult question. If 
war comm^unism was marked by the political supremacy of the 
party, Lenin during the NEP had no doubts that this should 
continue. As he put it in a speech to the Moscow soviet on 20 
November 1922, 'This little nucleus [the party] has set itself 
the task of remaking everything, and it will do so'. In regard 
to the state apparatus that had come into being since October 
1917, Lenin was more critical. In the same speech, and in many 
others of this period, he stressed the need for the party to 
control the state machinery and not to succumb to what he saw as
1. Lenin PSS, vol.45, p.308.
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its corruption. His distaste for the new state apparatus was 
revealed in his article 'On Cooperation 1 which talked of the need 
for a 'cultural revolution 1 and suggested that some of the 
state's petty economic functions could be better performed by the 
mass of the population organised in cooperatives. But even here
he could not shed his dependency on the state even though he
2 despised its poor performance.
The problem was the long-standing one of analysing the 
nature of the twentieth century state. Already, Bukharin in his 
'Imperialism and the World Economy 1 of 1915 had argued that 
Germany's war economy represented the fusion of national life 
into an all-powerful war machine. The modern state differed from 
previous ones in its colossal economic powers. At the same time, 
according to Bukharin, political and economic functions were 
fused in the modern bourgeois state. Therefore a new social 
formation had come into existence: state capitalism. The 
analysis was apposite, mutatis mutandis, for the new Soviet 
state. From this point of view, the state capitalist periods, as 
Lenin called them, preceding and succeeding war communism, do not 
differ radically from war communism itself. The common feature 
was the consolidation of the party's political power and, to 
varying degrees, the state's economic power. In the NEP Bukharin 
repudiated his war communist exaltation of the state, but Lenin 
was more cautious. Not only the war, but the Bolshevik 
definition of economic tasks, forced the concentration of 
economic power in the state and political power in the party.
The development of the party and the local state in Moscow
2. Lenin PSS, vol.45, p.376.
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were determined by these general factors. The Moscow of 1921 was 
no longer recognisable as the one of 1917. Traditional Moscow 
had disappeared and nearly every institution had been 
transformed. The city was dominated by a pervasive 
bureaucratism. Control of industry had passed to the state, and 
society was organised as branches of the state or the party. 
Political power in the city belonged to the party committees, and 
in place of the multifarious raion-based democracy of 1917-18, 
the city's politics were concentrated in the centre. The 
October revolution had seen the coming to power of a new type of 
party, but it was during war communism that a new system emerged 
with a pattern of relationships that were to remain as the basis 
of the new society.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917 
(Sept)
1918
1919
1920
1921
Source:
Population , births , deaths , and migration
Average No. of 
population births
1,694,
1,754,
1,846,
1,940,
1,882,
1,684,
1,415,
1,120,
1,176,
Statis
gubern
815
900
200
200
400
800
600
000
600
54,
54,
49,
44,
36,
24,
24,
23,
36,
ticheskii
11, 1927g
649
373
736
402
308
900
564
929
111
No. of 
deaths
41
40
44
44
43
50
64
40
30
,945
,741
,313
,576
,924
,360
,316
,633
,055
spravochnik
., M. 1928,
Natural 
change
12
13
5
-7
-25
-39
-16
6
, 704
,632
,425
-174
,616
,460
,754
, 704
,056
g. Moskvy
pp.12 -13.
43
46
85
93
80
-142
-229
-278
50
i Mos
Migration 
Net %
,019
,453
,875
,826
,184
,140
,446
,896
,544
2
2
4
4
4
8
16
24
4
.54
.65
.65
.83
.33
.47
.21
.90
.30
kovskoi
Migration column own calculations.
Appendix 2 
National composition of Moscow city, 1912 and 1920
Nationality
Russian
Jewish
Polish
Latvian
German
Belorussian
Ukrainian
Tatar
Armenian
Others
TOTAL
1912 1920 
No. %
95
0
1
0
1
(in Russi
0
0
0
0
.2
.4
.1
.2
.3
an total)
.2
.6
.2
.8
870,916
28,016
14,577
9,302
6,014
3,276
2,335
2,315
2,048
88,537
84 .8
2.8
1 .4
0.9
0.6
0 .3
0.2
0.2
0.2
8.6
100 1 .027.336 100
Source: Statisticheskii spravochnik, p.29.
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Appendix 3
Moscow city by age in 1917, 1918 and 1920
21 April 1918 
No. per
10 ,000
28 August 1920 
No. per
10.000
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60 +
Unknown
119
144
165
251
212
199
306
223
121
77
32
,998
,067
,233
,826
,698
,853
,406
,018
,513
,234
,580
647
776
981
1358
1147
1077
1652
1202
655
416
175
.1
.9
.0
.0
.0
.0
.3
.6
.2
.5
. 7
110
135
148
210
202
189
295
212
120
78
11
,601
,145
,750
,998
,923
,919
,097
,015
,496
,245
,835
644
787
866
1229
1182
1106
1719
1235
702
456
69
.6
.5
.8
.6
.5
.7
,6
.5
.2
.0
.0
62
84
91
106
124
118
176
130
82
46
3
,473
,135
,707
,152
,150
,714
,637
,814
,231
,408
,915
608.1
819.0
892.6
1033.3
1208.5
1155 .6
1716.4
1273.3
800.4
451.7
38.1
TOTAL 1,854,426 10,000 1,716,022 10,000 1,027,366 10,000
Source: Statisticheskii spravochnik, pp.15, 30-31.
Appendix 4
Sex structure and children
Men
1912 877,688
1917 919,728 
(Sept)
1918 836,694
(May)
1920 498,077
(Aug)
No
740,
934,
877,
529,
Women
%
012 45.74
698 50.40
328 51.13
259 51.51
Tot
1,617
1,854
1,716
1,027
al
,700
,426
,022
,336
Women
per 
1000
men
843
1016
1046
1063
Children 
under 10 
No. per 
1000
255,969 158
264,065 142
245,746 143
146.608 143
Source: Statisticheskii spravochnik, p.24.
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Appendix 5
Active population of Moscow city in 1918 and 1920 
A. Manual workers
1918
No. per 
10,000
Agriculture 
Smelting 
Metal
Wood
Paper 
Printing 
Textiles
Tailoring 
Leather
Food
Chemicals
Glass/porcelain 
Construction
Railways 
Tramways 
Water supply 
Local transport 
Power workers
Other workers
TOTAL
B. Non-industrial
Service workers
Hotels /restaurants 
Hospital staff 
Personal servants
TOTAL
Employees
Admin + law
Technical staff
C'mce, econ admin 
Accountancy 
Fixers
Nurses and health
Teachers
Police
Communications
Other employees
1535 
74 
47694
9685
2531 
11788 
32266
32182 
14260
14869
9868
877 
12696
11091 
5314 
101 
21858 
5686
71486
305861
prof esions
109677 
10837 
7964
128478
14589
15861
43418 
30980 
50959
21844
27033
21156
9260
23327
18 
1 
564
115
30 
139 
381
380 
169
176
117
10 
150
131 
63 
1 
258 
67
845
3615
1297 
128 
94
1519
172
188
513 
366 
602
258
320
250
109
276
No.
2469
55
33407
3515
721
9335
10992
23329
8801
11514
3819
391
10763
18041
1471
131
18500
2185
43959
1920
per
10,000
38
1
513
85
11
143
169
358
135
177
59
6
165
277
23
2
284
33
675
205427
41308
5520
46826
10741
14695
25264
30733
58185
22557
16634
15402
9140
20024
3154
634
85
719
165
226
388
472
893
346
255
237
140
308
TOTAL 258427 3054 223375 3430
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Appendix 5 (continued)
1918
No. per 
10000
1920
No. per 
10000
Liberal professions 
Technicians, doctors 
and senior teachers 
Artists, lawyers 
Religious
TOTAL
577
153
4773
7
2
56
3402
1604
1119
52
25
17
5503 65 6125 94
Bosses
With hired labour
Independent
TOTAL
32157
60816
92973
380
719
1099
713
30776
31489
11
473
484
Family helps
a. on the land
b. in industry
c. in commerce
no info 2259
745
168
35
11
3
TOTAL 3172 49
Other professions 
Rentiers
Declassed groups 
Pensioned (state/admin) 
Self-employment unknown 
others
TOTAL
8067
1416
10678
1308
33384
95
17
126
15
395
1769
422
35202
10367
87105
27
7
540
159
1337
54853 648 134865 2070
TOTAL EMPLOYED 846095 10000 651281 10000
UNEMPLOYED 89003
Source: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik g. Moskvy i Moskovskoi
gubernii, issue 2, 1914-1925 M 1927, pp.52-53
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Appendix 7
Industrial workers in active enterprises
Textiles 
Metal 
Printing 
Wood
Glass/
porcelain
Chemicals
Food 
Leather
Power/ 
water 
Applied 
art/s'nee 
Clothing/ 
t'letries
TOTAL
(A = city
1913
A 252
B 55
A 42
B 22
A 13
B 12
A 2
B 1
A 17
B 2
A 13
B 12
A 22
B 22
A 3
B 3
A 2
B 1
A 1
B 1
A 12
B 11
A 383
B 148
,316
,757
,555
,693
,558
,887
,051
,786
,393
,373
,757
,388
,783
,714
,669
,157
,244
,444
,501
,413
,037
,610
,844
,212
and guberniy
1917
242
49
87
56
15
14
2
1
9
1
29
24
22
22
5
3
4
1
2
2
27
26
448
205
,815
,385
,441
,927
,407
,349
,249
,964
,088
,690
,096
,220
,972
,856
,191
,807
,154
,514
,578
,462
,752
,745
,743
,919
a, B
1918
249
46
55
31
15
14
1
1
5
22
18
18
18
3
2
4
1
1
1
18
17
396
155
,469
,167
,246
,354
,634
,656
,887
,677
,814
526
,024
,832
,817
,585
,489
,422
,114
,514
,897
,761
,464
,532
,855
,026
= Cl ty alone)
1919
173
30
31
21
12
11
2
1
3
17
16
13
13
3
2
1
1
16
16
275
115
,876
,771
,253
,085
,609
,953
,160
,981
,275
243
,657
,473
,175
,110
,252
,488
,250
956
,088
811
,338
,021
,933
,962
1920
112
17
28
18
12
12
1
1
1
7
7
12
11
2
2
1
1
1
15
14
197
87
, 746
,046
,553
,804
, 707
,139
,386
,229
,755
243
,720
,002
,065
,984
,638
,052
, 799
,003
,040
805
,287
,784
,696
,091
1
104
13
28
16
14
13
1
1
9
6
6
10
10
3
2
2
1
17
17
199
84
921
,601
,337
,282
,252
,338
,855
,466
,194
,499
430
,886
,732
,449
,397
,755
,999
,188
,404
895
756
,470
,052
,829
,408
Source: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik, p.171.
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Appendix 8
The energy
1. Fuel supply to
Done
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
2.
Done
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
Fuel
ts co
54,
57,
31,
27,
23,
6,
1,
2,
54
57
31
27
23
6
1
2
ts coal
,336
,439
,500
, 700
,400
,200
,500
,500
cri sis in Moscow, 1913-
Moscow (inc. railways, in
Moscow
1
3
5
2
2
4
energy consumpt
al
300
400
000
700
400
200
500
500
eguival
(42.5)
(44.5)
(29)
(24)
(20)
(9.6)
(0.3)
(3.5)
ent t
100
200
600
1,800
3,400
1,100
1,240
1,800
150
350
,000
,000
,700
,451
,750
,000
ion
aken
(-)
(-)
(0.5
(2)
(3)
(2.4
(3)
(2.9
coal Oil
22, 732
25,361
22,000
22,800
23,200
12,000
4,000
6, 736
in Moscow ( inc .
at 7000 cal/kg,
34,000(27) 2
38,000(27.5) 2
) 33,000(30.5) 1
34,000(30) 2
35,000(29.5) 2
) 18,000(27.8) 1
6,000(11.6)
) 10,000(13.9)
1920
1000 poods) :
4
5
2
4
4
2
1
1
Peat
,442
,257
,800
,900
,800
,295
,180
,451
railways ,
% i
,100
,500
,300
,300
,300
,000
550
670
Firewood
in
n bracke
(1.5)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(2)
(1.5)
(1)
(0.9)
37
40
42
47
54
38
43
58
84,
90,
96,
106,
122,
84,
94,
127,
1000
ts)
,000(
,000(
,500(
,000(
,000(
,000(
,000(
,000(
380
611
048
811
564
000
000
000
poods
29)
29)
39)
42)
45.5)
58.7)
84.1)
78.8)
Source: Byulleten 1 MSNKh, 9, 15 June 1921, p.9.
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Appendix 9
Value of gross production for 1913-1921 in 1000s gold rubles on
average prices for 1913
Minerals
Metal
Wood
Chemicals
Food
Leather
Textiles
Clothes/ 
toiletry
Paper/ 
p ' graphy
Applied 
art/ s ' nee
Power/ 
water
TOTAL 
TOTAL
(City
1913
18784 
3555
115898 
57982
5457 
5047
100954 
93558
188141 
187619
14375 
12921
563599 
143208
18353 
17,802
24962 
23614
2739 
2446
14380 
8990
1067642 
556742
and gubern
1916
9894 
2395
256431 
171485
3885 
3615
152531 
131399
140533 
140080
19928 
16872
467302 
115921
43314 
41259
21714 
20471
2495 
2117
27872 
10508
1145899 
656122
iya above, city
1917
6689 
1519
178675 
124090
2902 
2688
134723 
115506
92094 
91953
13184 
10267
319642 
76264
44026 
42169
22130 
20727
2129 
2069
26512 
8935
842706 
496207
1918
2279 
238
56266 
35121
1683 
1529
80301 
70306
55968 
55840
6433 
3696
214507 
49855
21512 
20418
16574 
15491
1549 
1417
14207 
4825
471279 
258736
alone
1919
1087 
73
19132 
13723
1808 
1655
39407 
37463
33145 
33008
4977 
3808
113138 
21638
16913 
16567
7684 
7281
964 
781
2396 
1833
240651 
137830
below)
1920
459 
61
11960 
8722
1021 
882
11569 
10755
32894 
32595
3149 
2449
61359 
10621
14782 
14284
2864 
2723
1034 
865
3096 
1726
144187 
85683
1921
2973 
238
14502 
9292
1293 
891
12881 
12682
41951 
41534
4490 
3631
58023 
18473
15307 
14559
3790 
3712
1104 
964
9701 
5610
166C15 
111586
Source: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik, p.172.
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Appendix 10
Membership of Moscow city and guberniya trade unions,1918-1921
Union
Health
Water transport
Agriculture
Railways
Wood
Municipal workers
Leather workers
Metal a
Public feeding
Communications
Print workers
Culture/educ'n
Art
Food processing
Soviet workers
Construction
Glass/porcelain
Tobacco
Local transport
Textiles
Chemicals
Tailors
TOTAL
Other unions
and unknown
TOTAL
Mid-, 
1918
Early 
1919
Sept 
1919d
Aug 
1920
1 Jan 
1921
41
25
26
48
7
28
4
4
17
1
61
41
38
,280
,000
,542
,830
,285
,549
,860
,888
,747
,448
,840
,712
,525
15,
9,
21,
3,
32,
11,
44,
12,
17,
14,
3,
3,
22,
3,
1,
4,
10,
145,
24,
19,
r 730
,195
,866
,280
,299
,292
,820
,699
,000
,460
,637
,321
,022
,154
,100
,000
,400
,173
,600
,028
33,
6,
30,
118,
2,
34,
14,
30,
13,
20,
10,
10,
10,
15,
79,
10,
8,
3,
17,
171,
25,
20,
000
100
000
000
800
000
800
000
850
000
000
000
000
000
000
500
000
700
000
600
000
000
50
6
13
118
3
31
15
50
15
17
18
25
12
15
99
29
15
3
17
101
15
14
,721
,230
,000
,000
,528
,298
,963
,000
,093
,849
,454
,765
,000
,930
,461
,000
,620
,003
,348
,682
,664
,158
53
5
20
110
5
30
14
59
16
17
18
31
15
19
133
49
10
3
30
88
19
33
,608
,216
,000
,837
,078
,480
,184
,745
, 780
,881
,845
,000
,000
,119
,782
,012
,089
,152
,026
,995
,564
,007
342,328 419,076 682,350 689,763 786,950
213,336 220.602
552,664 639,678
Notes: (a) Excludes Kolomna. (b) The figures for the metal TLJ 
are for 1 out of 2 unions, for print 3 out of 4, and 
culture/education 3 of 5. The first total is for 44 unions, the 
second includes another 17 unions with a membership of 143,336 
and about 67,000 in the unions for which information is lacking, 
(c) The first total is for 22 unions (2 unions each for 
agriculture and culture/education), and the print total excludes 
poligraphy. The second total is for 32 unions. (d) There were 
2 unions apiece for health, art, and soviet workers, and 3 for 
the municipal workers. (e) Water and railway workers were in 1 
union, as were the chemical, glass and porcelain workers until 
February 1921.
Sources: 1918 Statistika truda, 8-9, 1918, pp.19-21; Ignat'ev, 
p.367. Early 1919 Dva goda diktatury proletariata, pp.16, 22-3. 
September 1919 Obzor deyatel'nosti MGSPS, p.74. August 1920 KM, 
col.680. January 1921 Obzor deyatel'nosti MGSPS, p.69.
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
11
1
9
1
3
1
9
1
4
1
9
1
5
19
16
1
9
1
7
1
9
1
8
1
9
1
8
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
1
1
9
2
1
19
21
(I
-
(X
I
(I
)
(X
)
(X
I
(X
I
(I
)
(I
I
(X
)
(X
I
(X
I
(I
)
(I
I
(I
I
S
o
u
r
c
e
 :
Av
e 
fo
r
al
l 
in
ds 28 28 33 50
15
3
IV
) 
30
6
I)
 
54
8
50
4
24
51
) 
21
74
I)
 
23
48
2
1
9
7
) 
26
21
92
56
) 
94
54
I)
 
1
1
0
7
3
79
12
) 
99
14
I)
 
1
1
2
3
0
B
y
u
l
l
e
t
e
n
 '
19
13 1
00 10
0
10
0
11
8
17
9
54
6
10
93
1
9
5
7
18
00
87
54
77
64
83
86
78
46
93
61
3
3
0
5
7
33
76
4
39
54
6
1 
s
t
a
t
as
36 36 38 57
14
3
33
2
60
8
44
2
24
26
23
13
25
56
22
72
29
53
1
0
9
0
2
1
0
9
0
2
1
3
8
3
7
M
e
t
a
l 10
0
10
0
10
6
15
8
39
7
82
2
1
6
8
9
12
28
67
32
64
25
71
00
63
11
82
03
30
28
3
3
0
3
1
1
38
43
6
T
e
x
t
i
l
e
s
27 35 26 48
15
7
24
6
50
2 —
19
55
12
13
19
66
17
05
20
77
87
56
67
22
1
0
4
6
2
i
s
t
i
k
i
 
t
r
u
d
a
 
M
o
s
k
o
v
s
k
o
i
10
0 93
13
3
17
8
58
1
91
1
1
8
5
9 —
72
45
44
93
72
81
63
15
76
93
32
43
0
3
6
0
0
7
38
74
8
g
u
b
e
r
n
i
i
 ,
22 23 32 47
16
9
33
5
50
6 — — — —
20
18
20
85
50
96
45
04
62
34 MG
S
F
o
o
d
10
0
10
5
14
5
21
4
76
8
15
23
23
00 — — — —
91
73
94
77
23
16
4
2
0
4
7
3
2
8
3
3
6
PS
, 
5-
6,
C
h
e
m
22 22 27 47
13
7
37
8
59
2 — — — —
20
11
23
46
1
4
5
6
4
1
4
6
8
0
1
7
4
7
3
i
c
a
l
s 10
0
10
0
12
3
21
4
62
3
1
7
1
8
2
6
9
1 — — — —
90
41
1
0
6
6
4
6
6
2
0
0
6
6
7
2
7
79
42
3
M
a
r
c
h
-
A
p
r
i
l
 
19
2
Pr
in
t
35 36 39 47
15
3
35
4
60
6
65
0
36
17
34
06
8
7
4
3
1
0
3
7
6
1
0
5
5
9
10
0
10
3
11
1
13
4
43
7
1
0
1
1
1
7
3
1
1
8
5
7
1
0
3
3
4
97
31
2
4
9
8
0
2
9
6
4
6
3
0
1
6
9
7-
8,
 
M
a
y
-
J
u
n
e
 
19
21
, 
p.
l
p
p
.
4
-
5
 ;
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
12
a
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
in
 
M
o
s
c
o
w
 
ci
ty
, 
1
9
1
3
-
1
9
2
0
 
(i
n 
r
u
b
l
e
s
)
R
y
e
 
b
r
e
a
d
 
(p
oo
d)
F
l
o
u
r
 
(p
oo
d)
1
9
1
3
1
9
1
4
1
9
1
5
1
9
1
6
1
9
1
6
1
9
1
7
1
9
1
7
1
9
1
8
1
9
1
8
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
19
20
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
19
20
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
(I
-I
II
)
(V
I-
IX
)
(I
)
(V
II
)
(I
)
(V
II
)
(I
)
(V
II
)
(I
)
(I
I)
(I
II
)
(I
V)
(V
)
(V
I)
(V
II
)
(
V
I
I
I
)
(I
))
()
)
()
I)
()
II
)
1
.
0
5
1
.
0
7
1
.
4
3
1
.
6
5
1
.
6
5
2.
50
4.
80
8
0
.
0
0
3
4
0
.
0
0
54
0
18
85
71
20
8
0
0
0
1
1
6
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
4
0
0
1
6
0
0
0
1
9
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
8
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
6
0
0
0
1
6
0
0
0
0.
98
1.
14
1.
80
2.
02
2.
00
3.
12
5 
.6
0
6
0
.
0
0
3
5
0
.
0
0
64
0
20
00
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
4
0
0
1
4
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
1
4
0
0
0
1
9
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
8
0
0
0
25
00
0
20
50
0
24
00
0
2
8
0
0
0
P
o
t
a
t
o
e
s
 
(p
oo
d)
0.
40
0.
45
0.
45
0
.
4
7
0.
58
2.
04
7.
32
2
4
.
0
0
8
3
.
2
0
20
0
72
0
24
00
2
8
8
0
32
80
35
00
50
00
48
00
72
00
80
00
75
00
76
00
81
00
82
00
C
a
b
b
a
g
e
 
S
u
g
a
r
( p
o
o
d
1 1 1 1 4 3
16 10 32
16
0
56
0
15
60
22
00
22
80
22
80
20
00
18
00
22
00
48
00
55
00
45
00
68
00
62
40
.0
4
.4
0
.8
3
.3
6
.2
4
.8
4
.9
0
.8
0
.4
0
B
u
tt
er
 
Be
ef
) 
(p
oo
d)
 
(p
oo
d
5 5 6 7 8 7 7
16
0
71
0
24
00
80
00
5
4
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
62
00
0
8
4
0
0
0
1
0
8
0
0
0
1
8
0
0
0
0
1
8
0
0
0
0
1
6
0
0
0
0
1
8
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
5
0
0
0
0
2
7
0
0
0
0
.1
2
.1
2
.7
5
.4
0
.0
5
.8
0
.8
0
.0
0
.0
0
18 18 20 33 42
11
0
12
6
40
0
75
8
36
00
89
20
65
00
0
79
00
0
1
0
8
0
0
0
8
4
0
0
0
82
00
0
1
0
8
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
1
8
8
0
0
0
1
8
0
0
0
0
2
3
0
0
0
0
2
5
0
0
0
0
2
9
0
0
0
0
.0
0
.4
0
.8
6
.6
0
.8
0
.4
0
.1
2
.0
0
.8
0
H
e
r
r
i
n
g
) 
(p
oo
d)
 
(
7 7 8
11 18 26 42
11
4
31
6
10
80
28
28
13
32
0
1
9
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
4
8
0
0
4
6
0
0
0
4
4
0
0
0
5
1
2
0
0
4
8
0
0
0
6
4
0
0
0
4
4
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
.5
6
.5
6
.7
6
.2
0
.4
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.8
0
5 5 7
11 21 22 32 73
17
4
12
50
45
00
30
00
0
5
1
0
0
0
70
00
0
70
00
0
8
0
0
0
0
9
5
0
0
0
95
00
0
6
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
8
5
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
5
0
0
0
10
0)
.9
6
.4
0
.7
0
.3
0
.1
0
.2
3
.7
0
.0
0
.0
0
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 3
E
g
g
s
 
(1
00
)
S
a
l
t
 
(p
oo
d)
2.
91
 
0
.
3
0
2.
71
 
0
.
2
9
2
.
8
7
 
0.
66
2
.
7
0
 
0
.
9
0
5.
00
 
0.
90
9.
50
 
1.
20
1
6
.
1
4
 
1
.
2
0
2
9
.
0
0
 
0
.
8
0
1
0
4
.
3
0
 
4.
80
35
0 
40
0
1
3
7
0
 
1
8
0
0
70
00
 
2
0
0
0
0
1
2
5
0
0
 
2
4
0
0
0
1
2
5
0
0
 
2
6
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
 
3
4
0
0
0
1
3
0
0
0
 
3
4
0
0
0
1
6
0
0
0
 
4
2
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
 
4
8
0
0
0
2
1
5
0
0
 
4
9
0
0
0
1
9
0
0
0
 
4
5
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
 
4
8
0
0
0
2
6
0
0
0
 
5
2
0
0
0
3
9
0
0
0
 
5
2
0
0
0
5-
6,
 
M
a
r
c
h
-
A
p
r
i
l
 
19
21
, 
p
p
.
1
0
-
1
1
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
B
y
u
l
l
e
t
e
n
'
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
k
i
 
t
r
u
d
a
 
M
o
s
k
o
v
s
k
o
i
 
g
u
b
e
r
n
i
i
,
 
M
G
S
P
S
F
o
r
 
1
9
1
3
-
1
9
1
5
 , 
an
d 
s
o
m
e
t
i
m
e
s
 
la
te
r,
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
ar
e 
g
i
v
e
n
 
fo
r 
th
e 
l
o
w
e
r
 
or
 
m
e
d
i
u
m
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
g
o
o
d
s
 
as
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
w
e
r
e
 
th
e 
m
o
s
t
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
l
y
 
u
s
e
d
 
by
 
M
o
s
c
o
w
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
in
 
1
9
1
8
-
2
0
 
v
a
r
y
 
g
r
e
a
t
l
y
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
on
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
us
ed
. 
T
h
e
 
l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
on
 
f
r
e
e
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
le
d 
to
 
w
i
l
d
 
v
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
e
v
e
n
 
s
u
c
h
 
a 
c
o
m
p
a
r
i
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
a
r
e
a
 
as
 
M
o
s
c
o
w
.
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
12
b
C
o
m
p
a
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
in
 
M
o
s
c
o
w
 
ci
ty
, 
1
9
1
3
-
1
9
2
0
 
(1
91
3 
= 
10
0)
R
y
e
 
b
r
e
a
d
 
F
l
o
u
r
 
(p
oo
d)
 
(p
oo
d
1
9
1
3
1
9
1
4
1
9
1
5
19
16
1
9
1
6
1
9
1
7
1
9
1
7
1
9
1
8
1
9
1
8
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
0
(I
-I
II
)
(V
I-
IX
)
(I
)
(V
II
)
(I
)
(V
II
)
(I
)
(V
II
)
(I
)
(V
II
)
(X
)
(X
I)
(X
II
)
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
B
y
u
l
l
10
0
10
1.
13
6.
15
7.
15
7.
23
8.
45
7.
76
19
3
2
3
8
1
5
1
4
2
7
1
7
9
5
4
3
6
7
8
0
0
0
1
8
2
9
0
0
0
1
9
0
5
0
0
0
1
5
2
4
0
0
0
1
5
2
4
0
0
0
e
t
e
n
1 
s
t
a
t
10
0
9 
11
6
2 
18
3
1 
20
6
1 
20
4
1 
31
9
1 
57
2
61
35
3
5
7
8
7
65
30
6
2
0
4
0
8
2
1
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
2
4
9
0
0
0
2
0
9
6
0
0
0
2
4
5
4
0
0
0
2
8
6
3
0
0
0
P
o
t
a
t
o
e
s
 
) 
(p
oo
d)
10
0
.3
 
11
2.
5
.7
 
1
1
2
.
5
.5
 
1
2
9
.
0
.5
 
1
4
3
.
9
.0
 
5
0
6
.
2
.6
 
1
8
1
6
.
4
59
55
20
64
5
4
9
6
2
8
1
7
8
6
6
6
5
9
5
0
0
0
1
7
8
7
0
0
1
8
8
6
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
3
5
0
0
0
C
a
b
b
a
g
e
 
S
u
g
a
r
 
B
u
t
t
e
r
 
(p
oo
d)
 
(p
oo
d)
 
(p
oo
d)
10
0
13
4
17
6
13
0
40
7
36
9
16
25
10
38
31
15
1
5
3
8
5
5
3
8
4
6
1
5
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
0
0
0
4
3
2
0
0
0
6
5
4
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
10
0
.6
 
10
0
.0
 
13
1
.8
 
14
6
.7
 
15
7
.2
 
15
2
.0
 
15
2
31
3
1
3
8
8
1
4
6
9
2
1
1
5
6
4
0
3
1
0
5
6
0
0
0
3
5
1
9
0
0
0
3
9
1
0
0
0
0
4
8
8
8
0
0
0
5
2
7
9
0
0
0
10
0
.0
 
10
2
.8
 
11
6
.4
 
18
6
.4
 
23
9
.5
 
61
7
.5
 
70
5
22
38
42
46
2
0
1
4
5
4
9
9
1
6
3
6
4
0
0
0
6
7
2
0
0
0
1
2
8
7
0
0
0
1
3
9
9
0
0
0
1
6
2
3
0
0
0
.2 .0 .7 .5 .8 .8
i
s
t
i
k
i
 
t
r
u
d
a
 
M
o
s
k
o
v
s
k
o
i
 
g
u
b
e
r
n
i
i
,
 
M
G
S
P
S
 , 
5-
6,
B
e
e
f
 
(p
oo
d
10
0
10
0
11
5
14
8
24
3
34
3
55
5
1
5
1
8
41
95
1
4
0
2
1
3
7
4
0
7
5
1
7
6
0
0
0
5
8
2
0
0
0
8
4
7
0
0
0
5
8
2
0
0
0
1
4
3
5
0
0
0
H
e
r
r
i
 
) 
(1
00
10
0
.0
 
90
.8
 
12
9
.2
 
16
1
.4
 
30
0
.0
 
31
8
.6
 
46
7
10
45
2
4
9
0
2
0
9
7
3
6
4
3
9
6
4
2
9
0
0
0
1
3
5
9
0
0
0
1
2
1
6
0
0
0
1
4
3
1
0
0
0
3
2
2
0
0
0
0
M
a
r
c
h
-
A
p
r
i
l
 
19
21
ng
 
E
g
g
s
 
) 
(1
00
)
10
0
.6
 
93
.1
.2
 
9
8
.
7
.7
 
92
.8
.5
 
1
7
1
.
8
.4
 
3
2
6
.
5
.9
 
5
5
4
.
6
99
7
35
84
1
2
0
2
7
4
7
0
7
9
2
4
1
0
0
0
5
1
5
0
0
0
 
1
6
8
7
0
0
0
 
1
8
9
3
0
0
0
 
1
1
3
4
0
0
0
0
 
1
, 
pp
. 
4-
5.
S
a
l
t
 
(p
oo
d)
10
0 96
.6
2
2
0
.
0
30
5.
0
3
0
5
.
0
4
0
6
.
8
27
1
1
6
0
0
6
1
0
1
6
9
6
7
8
0
0
0
0
1
6
2
7
1
0
0
0
1
6
2
7
1
0
0
0
1
7
6
2
7
0
0
0
1
7
6
2
7
0
0
0
1
9
1
8
-
1
9
 
f
i
g
u
r
e
s
 
r
o
u
n
d
e
d
 
to
 
n
e
a
r
e
s
t
 
u
n
i
t
19
20
 
f
i
g
u
r
e
s
 
r
o
u
n
d
e
d
 
to
 
n
e
a
r
e
s
t
 
10
00
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
13
 
T
h
e
 
G
u
z
h
o
n
 
pl
an
t,
 
1
9
1
3
-
1
9
2
1
O
U
T
P
U
T
 
P
R
O
D
U
C
T
I
V
I
T
Y
 
P
E
R
 
W
O
R
K
E
R
W
e
i
g
h
t
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
Av
e.
 
c
o
s
t
 
T
o
n
n
e
s
 
pe
r 
t
o
n
n
e
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
By
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
By
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
c
o
n
v
'
l
 
% 
of
 
P
r
e
-
w
a
r
 
% 
of
 
% 
of
 
no
 
of
 
% 
of
 
% 
of
 
e
q
u
i
v
 
T
o
n
n
e
s
 
1
3
-
1
4
 
r
u
b
l
e
s
 
1
3
-
1
4
 
R
u
b
l
e
s
 
1
3
-
1
4
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
T
o
n
n
e
s
 
1
3
-
1
4
 
R
u
b
l
e
s
 
1
3
-
1
4
 
t
o
n
n
e
 
o
1
9
1
3
-
1
4
1
9
1
6
-
1
7
1
9
1
7
-
1
8
1
9
1
9
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
1
7
9
2
3
7
 
10
0 
1
2
9
3
3
0
0
0
 
10
0 
16
3 
10
0 
36
83
 
21
.0
 
10
0 
35
06
 
10
0
3
1
9
2
1
 
40
.3
 
6
0
2
1
1
0
0
 
46
.6
 
18
9 
1
1
5
.
9
 
31
53
 
10
.0
 
47
.5
 
19
10
 
5
4
.
4
2
1
5
3
9
 
27
.2
 
4
4
0
7
6
0
0
 
34
.1
 
20
5 
1
2
5
.
8
 
26
85
 
8.
0 
38
.1
 
16
43
 
46
.8
39
65
 
5.
0 
8
6
3
6
0
0
 
5.
3 
17
2 
1
0
5
.
5
 
16
11
 
2.
5 
1
1
.
9
 
42
4 
1
2
.
0
1
6
2
9
 
2.
0 
2
4
5
7
0
0
 
2.
0 
15
1 
92
.6
 
87
5 
2.
0 
9.
5 
28
1 
8.
0
32
29
 
4.
0 
4
9
7
0
0
0
 
3.
8 
15
4 
94
.5
 
11
04
 
3.
0 
14
.3
 
46
0 
1
2
.
8
0
.
7
7
1.
51
1.
05
1.
62
1.
83
2
.
7
9
p
e
r
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
T
s
G
A
O
R
,
 
7
9
5
2
/
3
/
2
1
0
/
3
7
.
- 498 -
Appendix 14
Membership of Moscow party committee, 1917-March 1921
1A. Members of the MK elected at the I Moscow city party 
conference (3-4 April 1917): Andreev, Angarskii, Berzin, Bobrov, 
Golenko, Konstantinov (Orekhov), Maksimov, Ol'Minskii, Petin, 
Pyatnitskii, Rostovshchikov, Samoilova (Zemlyachka), Shternberg, 
Sol'ts, Vladimirskii, A. Zakharov, V. Zakharov, Zelenskii, 
Znamenskii, Zubkov, Sotsial-demokrat, 13 April 1917.
IB. On 6 April 1917 the MK elected an executive committee of 
five: Angarskii, Konstantinov, Samoilova, Sol'ts, Znamenskii, 
Sotsial-demokrat, 13 April 1917.
2. The 10 May 1917 city party conference ratified a committee of 
25 members, 2 each from the 9 raions, and with the 7 elected at 
the conference. The 7 were: Inessa Armand, Bukharin, Lukin 
(Antonov), Ol'minskii, Popov, Sol'ts, Samoilova.
3. MK members in mid-1918 (incomplete): Al'perovich, Bogov, 
Bukharin, Il'ya, Fradkin (Boris Volin), Lomov, Lukin, Pokrovskii, 
Pronskii, Samoilova, Steklov, Radek, Skvortsov-Stepanov, Smirnov 
(P_, 13 April, 7, 18, 23 July, 2 August 1918). Six members of the 
MK left for the front in early August 1918: Fradkin, Ivanov, 
Razshchikov, Ribe, Shillert, Znamenskii, (P_, 8 August 1918). 
The MK bureau on 30 August 1918 consisted of Breslav, D.I. 
Efremov, T.F. Lyudvinskaya, A.F. Myasnikov, M.S. Ol'minskii, A.A. 
Sol'ts, V.M. Zagorskii, R.S. Zemlyachka, Dumova, p.97.
4. By late 1918 the MK included the following:
Belen'kii, Chernyak, Dubinin, Dzenis, Efremov, Gerasimov, Godel', 
Kakhiani, Kasatkin, Khmel'nitskii, Kollontai, Kozlov, Kukuev, 
Lipitskii, Lomskii, Lyudvinskaya, Mitskevich, Mosolov, Osipov, 
Petrov, Poznanskii, Radek, Reinbakh, Rivlin, Rutman, Samarin, 
Savel'ev, Shevkov, Solov'ev, Svobodin, Titov, Tsivtsivadze, 
Ukhanov, Vladimirskii, Zagorskii, P_, 1, 5, 15 October 1918.
5. The 25 March 1920 city party conference confirmed the 36 
nominations from 12 raions to the MK: Amosov, Batyshev, 
Bel'yanov, Fidler, Ivanov, Korochkin, Kotov, Kozlov, Latsis, 
Lisitsyn, Moroz, Pyatnitskii, Rivlin, Rusakov, Sadovskii, 
Safronov, Shkirtyanov, Skobeinikov, Smirnov, Sokolov, 
Starosvetskii, Ter, Tsikhon, Ukhanov, Vasil'ev, Yurenev. Zimin. 
Myasnikov and Tsivtsivadze were coopted onto the committee, KT, 
26 March 1920; £, 26 March 1920.
6A. The 21 May 1920 I Moscow guberniya conference elected a 
joint MK of 31 members for the city and guberniya: Alekseev, 
Belen'kii, Bubnov, Bunksh, Drozhzhin, Ivanov, Kamenev, Karpukhin, 
Kotov, Latsis, Lidak, Lisitsyn, Loginov, Minkov, Moroz, Mysnikov, 
Myshkin, Ostrovitinov, Polidorov, Pyatnitskii, Shkiryatov, 
Sokol'nikov, Sokolov, Sorin, Sorokin, Tsivtsivadze, Ukhanov, 
Uryvaev, Vyatkin, Zelenskii, Zimin, KT, 22 May 1920.
6B. The new MK met the same day (21 May) and elected a bureau of
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7: Myasnikov (unanimously elected secretary), Zelenskii (20 
votes), Ivanov (18), Minkov (18), Sorin (18), Pyatnitskii (17), 
Bubnov (13).
6C. Zelenskii acted as secretary during Myasnikov's absence on 
the Polish front, and Belen'kii (12) was an MK member during his 
absence, KT, 27 May 1920.
6D. An emergency session of the MK on 11 August 1920, attended 
by 30 people, considered a replacement for Zelenskii who had been 
appointed by the TsK to work in Narkomprod. Instead of electing 
a single secretary a secretariat of two was created, Minkov and 
Pyatnitskii. Because so many members of the bureau had been sent 
on duties to other parts of the country new elections were held: 
Belen'kii, Bubnov, Ivanov, Minkov, Pyatnitskii, Sorin, Zimin, 
KT, 12 August 1920.
7A. An MK of 39 members and 20 candidates was elected at the IV 
Moscow guberniya party conference (20-23 November 1920): 
Alekseev, Antselovich, Artem (Sergeev), Belen'kii, Boguslavskii, 
Bunksh, Detslenko, Dorofeev, Drozhzhin, Fonshenko, Giber, 
Ignatov, Kamenev, Korzinov, Kol'tsov, Kotov, Krinitskii, Lavrov, 
Loginov, Lyudvinskaya, Marchenko, Markin, Messing, Minkov, 
Novikov, Podbel'skii, Rastopchin, Sadovskii, Sakharov, Sapronov, 
Shkiryatov, Sokolov, Sorin, Sorokin, Uryvaev, Yakovleva, 
Zakharov, Zamorenov, Zelenskii. The candidates included Likhachev, 
S.N. Smidovich, Rafail, KT, 23 November 1920.
7B. The MK met on 24 November 1920 and elected a bureau of nine: 
Artem (secretary), Belen'kii, Dorofeev, Ignatov, Kamenev, 
Minkov, Rastopchin, Sapronov, Sorin, KT, 25 November 1920.
1C. At the end of December 1920 Artem was sent to work in the 
metalworkers' union TsK by the party TsK. V.N. Yakovleva was 
elected secretary to replace him.
7D. New elections were held to the MK on 25 January 1921 to 
reflect the changes over the trade union guestion: Belen'kii, 
Ignatov, Kamenev, Krinitskii, Rastopchin. Sapronov, Uryvaev, 
Yakovleva, Zelenskii, Otchet MK za yanvar' 1921g., M. 1921, p.5.
8A. An MK of 32 members and 10 candidates was elected at the V 
Moscow guberniya party conference (19-21 Februay 1921): Alekseev, 
Belen'kii, Boguslavskii, Bushber, Dorofeev, Kamenev, Kol'tsov, 
Kotov, Krinitskii, Kulikov, Loginov, Lozovskii, Marchenkov, 
Maslov, Messing, Minkov, Rastopchin, Rostovshchikov, Skobeinikov, 
Smirnov, Sokolov, Sorin, Sorokin, Tseitlin, Tsikhon, Tulyakov, 
Uryvaev, Yakovleva, Yudzevich, Zelenskii.
The candidates were: Bessonov, Borisov, Mikhailov, Murav'ev, 
Rozenberg, Safronov, Pashentsev, Sevenov, Zamorenov, Zheltov, 
V Mosk. gubpartkonf, M. 1921, pp.41-2.
8B. The MK session of 22 February 1921 elected a bureau of 9 
members and 3 candidates: Kamenev, Kol'tsov, Krinitskii, 
Lozovskii, Maslov, Smirnov, Sorin, Tulyakov, Yakovleva, and the 
candidates; Rastopchin, Zelenskii, Zheltov, KT, 24 February 
1921.
- 500 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Unpublished Material
a. Archive material 
Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii.
Fond 7952 opis' 2 Istoriya promyshlennosti i rabochii klass
v SSSR.
opis' 3 Guzhon (Serp i Molot) 
b. Dissertations
Bowman, B'ann, The Moscow Bolsheviks, February-November 1917, 
PhD Dissertation^Indiana 1973.
Chase, W.J., Moscow and its Working Class, 1918-1928: A Social 
Analysis, PhD Dissertation, Boston 1979.
Helgesen, M.M., The Origins of the Party-State Monolith in 
Soviet Russia: Relations Between the Soviets and the Party 
Committees in the Central Provinces, October 1917-March 1921, 
PhD Dissertation. State University of New York, Stony Brook 1980
Koenker, Diane, Moscow Workers in 1917, PhD Dissertation, 
University of Michigan,1976.
c. Manuscript and unpublished paper
Malle, Sylvana, The Economic Organisation of War Communism, 1918- 
1921, University of Verona(publication forthcoming by CUP).
Wheatcroft, S.G., 'Famine and Factors Affecting Mortality in the 
USSR: The Demographic Crises of 1914-1922 and 1930-1933', 
unpublished Discussion Papers SIPS 20, CREES, University of 
Birmingham, 1981.
2. Periodical Publications (Newspapers and Journals)
Bol'shevik, (1918-). 
Bor'ba klassov. 
Byulleten 1 MGSPS, (1921-). 
Byulleten' MK RKP, (1921-).
- 501 -
Byulleten' MSNKh, (1920-).
Byulleten 1 statistiki truda Moskovskoi gubernii, (MGSPS 1920-23)
Byulleten 1 TsK RKSM.
Diskussionyi listok, (TsK RKP, early 1921).
Istoricheskie zapiski.
Ekonomicheskaya zhizn'.
Izvestiya MK RKP(b) , (1922-23).
Izvestiya Moskovskogo komiteta po trudovoi povinnosti, (1920).
Izvestiya MOSNKh, (1918).
Izvestiya Moskovskogo soyuza rabochikh i sluzhashchikh po 
vyrabotke pishchevikh produktov, (1918) .
Izvestiya MSNKh, (1920-).
Izvestiya TsK RKP(b), (1919-).
Izvestiya TsK RKSM, (1920-).
Izvestiya VTsIK sovetov KRS i KD i Moskovskogo soveta.
Kommunar, (TsK RKP weekly).
Kommunist, (1918).
Kommunisticheskii trud, (March 1920 - March 1922).
Molodoi kommunist.
Moskovskii pechatnik, (1921-26).
Narodnoe khozyaistvo, (1918-22).
Pechatnik, (1917-19).
Pravda.
Proletarskaya revolyutsiya, (1922-).
Protokoly zasedanii prezidiuma MGSPS, (1920-21).
Sotsial-demokrat, (1917 - March 1918).
Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, (1921-)
Statistika truda, (1918-).
Stenograficheskie otchety Mossoveta, (1919-).
- 502 -
Trudy tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie, (1918-).
Vechernie izvestiya Moskovskogo soveta rabochikh i 
krasnoarmeiskikh deputatov,(July 1918 - March 1920) .
Vechernyaya krasnaya gazeta, (TsK RKP, 1918).
Vestnik propagandy, (MGK, 1919-20).
Vestnik truda.
Voprosy istorii KPSS.
Yunosheskaya pravda, (MK RKSM).
Yunyi kommunar , (MK RKSM).
3. Documentary and Statistical Materials
Bernshtam, M.S. (ed), Issledovaniya noveishei russkoi istorii, 
vol.2, Nezavisimoe rabochee dvizhenie v 1918 godu: dokumenty i 
materialy, YMCA Press, Paris 1981.
IV Moskovskaya gubernskaya konferentsiya profsoyuzov, (14-15 
sentyabr' 1921g.), MGSPS, M. 1921.
Chugaev, D.A. (ed), Rabochii klass sovetskoi rossii v pervyi god 
diktatury proletariata: sbornik dokumentov i materialov, M. 1964
Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti, vol.1, M. 1957; vol.2, M. 1959; vol.3, 
M. 1964; vol.4, M. 1968.
X s"ezd RKP(b), mart-aprel' 1921g.: stenograficheskii otchet, M. 
1963.
IX konferentsiya RKP(b), sentyabr' 1920g.: protokoly, M. 1972. 
IX s"ezd RKP(b), mart-aprel 1 1920g.: protokoly, M. 1960.
Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR: sbornik dokumentov i 
materialov, vol.1, M. 1960; vol.2, M. 1961; vol.3, M. 1961.
Kommunisticheskie subbotniki v Moskve i Moskovskoi gubernii v 
1919 •- 1920gg.: dokumenty i materialy, M. 1950.
KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i 
plenumov TsK, vol.2, M. 1970.
Materialy po statistike lichnogo sostava RKP(b), M. 1921.
MChK - iz istorii Moskovskoi chrezvychainoi komissii: dokumenty, 
M. 1978.
- 503 -
Moskovskaya gorodskaya i Moskovskaya oblastnaya organizatsii KPSS 
v tsifrakh, M. 1972.
Moskovskaya gubernskaya konferentsiya rabotnits i krest'yanok 
(rezolyutsii i stat'i): iyul' 1920g.,M. 1920.
Moskovskaya organizatsiya RKP(b) v tsifrakh, issue 1, M. 1925.
Moskovskii sovet professional'nykh soyuzov v 1917g.: protokoly, 
M. 1927.
Obzor deyatel'nosti MGSPS za period mezhdu II i III gubernskimi 
s"ezdami (sentyabr 1 1920-mai 1921gg.) f M. 1921.
XI s"ezd RKP(b), mart - aprel' 1922g.: stenograficheskii otchet, M 
1961.
O naselenii Moskvy, M. 1980.
Otchet (o deyatel'nosti) MK RKP(b) za iyul' 1920g. f M. 1920.
Otchet MK RKP(b) za sentyabr' 1920g., M. 1920.
Otchet MK RKP(b) za oktyabr' 1920g., M. 1920.
Otchet MK RKP(b) za yanvar' 1921g., M. 1921.
Otchet o deyatel'nosti MK-ta za iyul 1 , avgust i sentyabr' 1921g., 
M. 1921.
Otchet o rabote Moskovskoi obshchepartiinoi konferentsii, 20-22 
noyabr' 1920g.: materialy dlya dokladchikov, W. 1920~
Otchet o rabote voennogo otdela MK-ta RKP za vremya 
sushchestvovaniya s 15-go aprelya 1919g., M.r920.
Otchet Sokol'nicheskogo raionnogo komiteta RKP za vremya s 1/IX 
1920g. po I/I 1921g., M. 1921.
Partiya v period inostrannoi voennoi interventsii i grazhdanskoi 
voiny, (1918-1920gg.): dokumenty i materialy, W. 1962.
Perepiska sekretariata TsK RKP(b) s mestnymi partiinymi
organizatsiyami, vol.2, M. 1957; vol.3, M. 1967; vol.4~ M. 1969;
vol.5, M. 1970; vol.6, M. 1971; vol.7, M. 1972.
Perepis 1 sluzhashchikh sovetskikh uchrezhdenii g. Moskvy, M. 
1922.
I s"ezd RKSK, 29 oktyabrya - 4 noyabrya 1918g.: protokoly, 
M/L. 1934.
I vserossiiskii s"ezd profsoyuzov sluzhashchikh, iyun' 1918g., M. 
1918.
Podgotovka i pobeda oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii v Moskve: dokumenty 
i materialy, M. 1957. ~~
- 504 -
V Moskovskaya gubernskaya konferentsiya RKP(b), 19-21 fevral' 
1921g.: kratkii otchet i rezolyutsii, M. 1921. 
VII (aprel'skaya) vserossiiskaya konferentsiya RSDRP(b): 
protokoly, M. 1958.
VII ekstrennyi s"ezd RKP(b), mart 1918g.: stenograficheskii 
otchet, M. 1962.
XVI Moskovskaya gubernskaya konferentsiya RKP(b), 23 noyabr' 
1919g.: protokoly, M. 1920.
VI Moskovskaya gubernskaya konferentsiya RKP, 25-28 iyunya 1921 
goda: doklady, kratkii otchet MK i rezolyutsii, M. 1921.
VI s"ezd RSDRP(b), avgust 1917g.; protokoly, M. 1958.
Statisticheskii ezhegodnik g. Moskvy i Moskovskoi gubernii, issue 
2, 1914-25, M. 1927.
Statisticheskii spravochnik g. Mosky i Moskovskoi gubernii 1927g., 
M. 1928.
Trudy II vserossiiskogo s"ezda sovetov narodnogo khozyaistva, 19- 
27 dekabrya 1918g.: stenograficheskii otchet, M. 1919.
Uprochenie Sovetskoi vlasti v Moskve i Moskovskoi gubernii: 
dokumenty i materialy, M. 1958.
Ustav Moskovskoi gubernskoi organizatsii RKP, M. 1919.
Ustav Moskovskoi organizatsii RKP (30 iyul' 1918g.), M. 1918.
Ustav Moskovskoi organizatsii RKP(b), M. 1920.
Velikaya oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya. 
Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v aprele 1917g.: aprel'skii 
krizis: dokumenty i materialy, M~. 1958.
VLKSM v tsifrakh, M. 1928.
VIII konferentsiya RKP(b), dekabr' 1919g.; protokoly, M. 1961. 
VIII s"ezd RKP(b), mart 1919g.: protokoly, M. 1959. 
Vserossiiskaya perepis' chlenov RKP 1922g., issue 1, M. 1922.
II kongress kommunisticheskogo internatsionala, iyul' 1920g.: 
stenograficheskii otchet, M. 1920.
II vserossiiskii s"ezd RKSM 5-18 oktyabrya 1919g. 
stenograficheskii otchet, M/L. 1924 .
Vydro, M.Ya., Naselenie Moskvy, M. 1976.
Zorkii, M.S. (ed), Rabochaya oppozitsiya: materialy i dokumenty, 
1920 - 1926gg., M. 1926. ~
- 505 -
4 . Works in Russian
Aleshchenko, N.M., Moskovskii sovet v 1917-1941gg, M. 1976.
Aleshchenko, N.M., Osushchestvlenie leninskikh ukazanii v period 
stanovleniya sovetskoi vlasti v Moskva, M^1968.
Ai'perovich, E, 'Ot rabochego kontrolya k pervym shagam 
promyshlennogo stroitel'stva', in Ocherki po istorii oktyabr'skoi 
revolyutsii v Moskve, M. 1927, pp.140-58.
Al'perovich,S, Chetvertyi s"ezd profsoyuzov i puti Russkogo 
profdvizheniya, M. 1921.
Aluf, A.S., Professional'nye soyuzy v period voennogo kommunizma, 
M. 1925.
Anikeev, V.V., 'Svedeniya o bol'shevistskikh organizatsiyakh s 
marta po dekabr' 1917 goda', Voprosy istorii KPSS , 2, 1958.
Anikst, A.M., Organizatsiya rabochei sily v 1920g., M. 1920.
Anikst, A.M., Vospominaniya o Lenine, M. 1933.
Artem (F.A. Sergeev), Stat'i, rechi, pis'ma, M. 1983.
Avtorkhanov, A., Proiskhozhdenie partokratii, vol. 1, 
TsK i Lenin, Posev Verlag,Frankfurt 1973.
Baganov, Y.I., Moskovskie bol'sheviki v ogne revolyutsionnykh 
boev, M. 1976.
Boborynin, V., et.al., (eds), Sokol'niki, M. 1967.
Bubnov, A.S. (ed), Grazhdanskaya voina 1918-1921gg., M. 1928.
Bukov, K.I., V bitve velikoi, M. 1960.
Bukov, K.I., G.A. Nagapetyan, 'Ideino-organizatsionnoe ukreplenie 
Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii v gody grazhdanskoi voiny 1 , 
Voprosy istorii KPSS, 6, 1959, pp.48-65.
Bychkov, L., Vzryv v Leont'evskom pereulke, M. 1934.
Chernomordik, S. (ed), Oktyabr'skie dni v Moskve i raionakh po 
vospominaniyam uchastnikov, M. 1922.
Desyat 1 let: sbornik materialov Yu.O.K. Sokol'nicheskogo raiona - 
k 10 letiyu oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii, M. 1927.
Dinamo - 25 let revolyutsionnoi bor'by, M. 1923.
Dolgovyazova, M.B., Demokraticheskie preobrazovaniya v khode 
sotsialisticheskoi revolyutsii, oktyabr'1917 - 1918, po materialam 
Moskovskoi gubernii, Avtoref. diss., M. 1971.
- 506 -
Drobizhev, V.Z., 'Obrazovanie sovetov narodnogo khozyaistva v 
Moskovskom promyshlennom raione (1917-1918gg. ) , in Iz__i£toriJ1 
velikoi oktyabr' skoi sotsiaiisticheskoi revolyutsii, M. 19b .
Dumova, N.G., Sekretar 1 MK (povest 1 o V.M. Zagorskom), M. 1966. 
Dva goda diktatury proletariata 1917-1919, VSNKh, M. 1919. 
Ermanskii, O.A., Iz perezhitogo, M/L. 1927. 
Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' (Granat), 1920s.
Gimpel'son, E.G., 'Iz istorii obrazovaniya odnopartiinoi sistemy 
v SSSR', Voprosy istorii KPSS, 11, 1965.
Gimpel'son, E.G., 'Kak slozhilas sovetskaya forma proletarskogo 
gosudarstva', Voprosy istorii KPSS, 9, 1967.
Gimpel'son, E.G., Velikii oktyabr' i stanovlenie sovetskoi 
sistemy upravleniya narodnym khozyaistvom, M. 1977.
Gimpel'son, E.G., "Voennyi kommunizm": politika, praktika, 
ideologiya, M. 1973.
Ignat'ev, G.S., Moskva v pervyi god proletarskoi diktatury, M. 
1975.
Istoriya Moskvy, vol.6, book 1, M. 1957. 
Istoriya rabochikh Moskvy 1917-1945gg., M. 1983. 
Istoriya velikoi oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii, M.1962.
Izmeneniya sotsial'noi struktury sovetskogo obshchestva: 
oktyabr' 1917-1920gg., M. 1976.
Khromov, S.S. (ed), Grazhdanskaya voina i voennaya interventsiya v 
SSSR: entsiklopediya, M. 1983.
Kochegarov, V.F., 'Bor'ba bol'shevikov Moskovskoi gubernii za 
pobedu leninskoi platformy vo vremya profsoyuznoi diskussii v 
partii, (1920-21gg.)', MGPI im. Lenina, 1967.
Kochegarov, V.F., 'K voprosu o bor'be Moskovskoi organizatsii 
RKP(b) s antipartiinymi gruppirovkami nakanune diskussii o 
profsoyuzakh', MGPI im. Lenina, 27, 1969.
Kollontai, A.M., Rabochaya oppozitsiya, M. 1921.
Koloditskii, M.S., Bor'ba Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii za 
prevrashchenie sovetov v organy vosstaniya i diktatury 
proletariata (iyul'-sentyabr' 1917g.),Avtoref.diss., M. 1967.
Krasnaya Moskva: sbornik statei, M. 1920. 
Kratov, V.L., Chonovtsy, M. 1974.
- 507 -
Kritsman, L., Geroicheskii period velikoi russkoi revolyutsii: 
opyt analiza t.n. "voennogo kommunizma", M/L. 1926.
Latsis, M., 'Tov. Dzerzhinskii i VChK' , Proletarskaya 
revolyutsiya, 9(56), 1926, pp.81-97.
Lenin, V.I., Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed. 
Lenin i Moskovskie bol'sheviki, M. 1977.
Levi, E., 'Moskovskaya bol'shevistskaya organizatsiya s fevralya 
do iyul'skikh dnei', in Ocherki po istorii oktyabr'skoi 
revolyutsii v Moskve, M. 1927, pp.33-86.
Lozovskii, A., Zadachi professional'nykh soyuzov, M. 1921.
Lyudvinskaya, T.F., Nas leninskaya partiya vela (vospominaniya), 
M. 1976.
Lyutsareva, L.V., 'O nekotorykh formakh rukovodstva Moskovskoi 
partiinoi organizatsii deyatel'nost'yu komsomola v gody 
grazhdanskoi voiny (1919-1920gg.), Uchennye zapiski MGPI im. 
Potemkina, 56, 1956.
Manievich, (ed), Ocherki po istorii revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya i 
bol'shevistskoi organizatsii v Baumanskom raione, M. 1928.
Maslov, S.S., Rossiya posle chetyrekh let revolyutsii, Paris 
1922.
Moskovskie bol'sheviki v bor'be s pravym i "levym" opportunizmom, 
1921-1929gg., M. 1969.
Moskovskii sovet za desyat' let raboty, 1917-1927gg., M. 1927. 
Moskva za 50 let Sovetskoi vlasti, 1917-1967., M. 1968. 
Myasnikov, A.F., Izbrannye proizvedeniya, Erevan, 1965. 
Nikolaev, N., Moskovskii rabochii i krest'yanin, M. 1921. 
Obichkin, O.G., Ustavy mestnykh organizatsii RSDRP, M. 1976. 
Ocherki istorii Moskovskoi organizatsii KPSS, 1883-1965, M. 1966. 
Ocherki istorii Moskovskoi organizatsii KPSS, vol.2, M. 1983. 
Ocherki istorii Moskovskoi organizatsii VLKSM, M. 1976.
Pankratova, A.M., Istoriya razvitiya fabzav pred-va i fabzav 
komitetov v Rossii, M. 1924.
Partiya i soyuzy (k diskussii o roll i zadachakh profsoyuzov) 
(G.Zinoviev,ed),Petersburg,1921.
Peters, Ya.Kh., 'Vospominaniya o rabote VChK v pervyi god 
revolyutsii 1 , Proletarskaya revolyutsiya, 10(33), 1924.
- 508 -
Petrov, Yu.P., KPSS - rukovoditel' i vospitatel' krasnoi armii 
(1918-1920gg.), M. 1961.
Petrov, Yu.P., Partiinoe stroitel'stvo v sovetskoi armii i flote 
(1918-1961gg.), M. 1964.
Piletskii, Ya.A., Rabochii klass i khozyaistvo Rossii v 1914-1919 
godakh, Kiev 1919.
Pokrovskii, M.N., Oktyab'skaya revolyutsiya, M. 1928.
Popov, I.A., 'Deyatel'nost' Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii po 
ukrepleniyu svoikh ryadov (okt.1917-yan.1919gg.)', Uchenye zapiski 
MOPI im.Krupskoi, Istoriya KPSS, 215, issue 13, 1968, pp.71-85.
Popov, N.N., Ocherk istorii rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii 
(bol'shevikov), M/L. 1926.
Profsoyuzy Moskvy, M. 1975.
Pyat' let raboty - yacheika RKP(b) i mestkom Glavkhozsklada RKKA 
1919-1924gg., M. 1925.
Pyat' let raboty yacheiki RKP(b) tipografii 'Krasnyi proletarii 1 
1919-1924gg., M. 1925.
Razgon, I.M., Moskva v period inostrannoi interventsii 
i grazhdanskoi voiny^ M~. 1947.
Rodionova, N., Gody napryazhennogo truda. Iz istorii Moskovskoi 
partiinoi organTzatsii 1921-1925gg. , M~! 1963.
Shest' let na revolyutsionnom puti. K yubileyu zavodskikh 
organizatsii 1917-1923gg. Gosudarstvennyi russko-kabel'nyi i 
metalloprokatnyi zavod 'Russkabel'', M. 1923.
Shiplin, L., et. al. , Bol'shevistskii put 1 bor'by i pobed (30 let 
yacheiki VKP(b) zavoda 'Dinamo'), M. 1933.
Spirin, L.M., Klassy i partii v grazhdanskoi voine v Rossii (1917 
-192Qgg.), M. 1968.
Strakhov, A.V., 'Natsionalizatsiya krupnoi promyshlennosti goroda 
Moskvy', Uchenye zapiski MGPI im.Lenina, 200, 1964.
Tarusov, V.N., 'Deyatel'nost' Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii 
po organizatsionnomy ukrepleniyu svoikh ryadov (1918 - 1920gg.)', 
Sbornik trudov iz istorii Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii, 
MOPI im.Krupskoi, 2, M. 1973.
Tel'nov, S.M., 'Boevye kommunisticheskie otryady osobogo 
naznacheniya v bor'be s kontrrevolyutsiei (1918g.), Uchenye 
zapiski MOPI im. Krupskoi, Istoriya KPSS, 215, issue 13,T968.
Tolstikh, D.A., Deyatel'nost' Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii 
po sozdaniyu organov Sovetskoi vlasti v Moskve (okt. 1917- iyun~i 
1918g.), M. 1958."———
- 509 -
Tri goda diktatury proletariata: itogi raboty sredi zhenshchin 
Moskovskoi organizatsii RKP, M. 1921.
Trotsky, L.D., Mirovoe ekonomicheskoe polozhenie i nashi zadachi, 
M. 1921.
Tseitlin, E., Pyat' let: iz istorii Moskovskoi organizatsii RKSM, 
M. 1922.
Varlamov, K.I., N.A., Slamikhin, Razoblachenie V.I. Leninym 
teorii i taktiki "levykh kommunistov" (noyabr* 1917-1918gg.), 
M. 1964.
Velikaya Oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya. 
Dokumenty materialy. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 
aprele 1917g. Aprel'skii krizis, M. 1958.
Yaroslavskii, E.M. (ed), Kak provodit' chistku partii, 
M/L. 1929.
Yarotskii, V.Ya., 'Trud v SSSR', Entsiklopedicheskii slovar', 
7e. pererabotan. izd. (Granat), vol.41, Part II.
Za chetyre goda (vospominaniya), RKSM, M. 1922.
Zaslavskii, P., Vospominaniya o V.I. Lenine, vol.3, M. 1960.
Zheleznodorozhniki i revolyutsiya: sbornik vospominanii i 
dokumentov o rabote zheleznodorozhnogo raiona Moskovskoi 
organizatsii RKP(b), M. 1923.
5. Works in English
Adams, Jan S., Citizen Inspectors in the Soviet Union, Praeger 
Publishers, New York 1977.
Adelman, J.R., 'The Development of the Soviet Party Apparat in 
the Civil War: Center, Localities and Nationality Areas', Russian 
History/Histoire Russe, 9, pt 1, 1982, pp.86-110.
Avrich, Paul, Kronstadt 1921, Princeton 1970. 
Avrich, Paul, The Russian Anarchists, New York 1978.
Avtorkhanov, A., Soviet Youth: Twelve Komsomol Histories, 
Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, series 1, 51, July 
1959.
Bahro, Rudolf, The Alternative in Eastern Europe, (trans David 
Fernbach), NLB 1978.
Bater, James H., 'Some Dimensions of Urbanisation and the 
Response of Municipal Government: Moscow and St Petersburg', 
Russian History/Histoire Russe, 5, pt 1, 1978.
- 510 -
Bellis, Paul, Marxism and the USSR: The Theory of Proletarian 
Dictatorhip and the Marxist Analysis of Soviet Society,Macmillan 
1979.
Berkman, Alexander, The Bolshevik Myth (Diary, 1920-1922), London 
1925.
Bettelheim, Charles, Class Struggles in the USSR: First Period, 
1917-1923, Harvester 1976.
Bradley, John. Civil War in Russia, 1917-1920, Batsford, London 
1975.
Brodersen, Arvid, The Soviet Worker: Labour and Government in 
Soviet Society, Random House, New York 1966.
Brzezinski, Z. The Permanent Purge, Harvard 1956.
Bukharin, N., E. Preobrazhenskii, The ABC of Communism, Penguin 
1969.
Carr, E.H., The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, (3 vols), 
Penguin 1966 .
Chamberlin, W.H., The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921, vol.2, 
Macmillan, London 1935.
Cohen, Stephen F., Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution,
A Political Biography, 1888 1938, Vintage Books, 1970.
Colton, T.J., Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: 
The Structure o"F Soviet Military Politics,Harvard UP,1979.
Corey, Esther, 'Passage to Russia', Survey, 53, October 1964.
Daniels, R.V., The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist 
Opposition in ScTviet Russia" OUP, London 1960.
Davies, Norman, 'The Missing Revolutionary War, (The Polish 
Campaigns and the Retreat from Revolution in Soviet Russia, 1919- 
1921), Soviet Studies, XXVII, 2, April 1975.
Davies, R.W., The Development of the Soviet Budgetary System, 
Cambridge 1958.
Day, Richard B., Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic 
Isolation, CUP, 1977.
Deutscher, Isaac, Soviet Trade Unions: Their Place in Soviet 
Labour Policy, London 1950.
Dewar, Margaret, Labour Policy in the USSR, 1917-1928, London 
1956.
Dobb, Maurice, Soviet Economic Development Since 1917, London 
1948.
- 511 -
Dukes, Paul, Red Dusk and the Morrow, London 1923.
Ellis, John, Armies in Revolution, Groom Helm, London 1973.
Erickson, John, 'Some Military and Political Aspects of the 
'Militia Army 1 Controversy 1919-1920', in Essays in Honour of 
E.H. Carr, Macmillan, 1974.
Erickson, John, The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political 
History, 1918-1941, London 1962.
Farbman, Michael S., Bolshevism in Retreat, London 1923.
^ »» 
Feher, Ferenc, Agnes Heller, Gyorgy Markus, Dictatorship Over
Needs, Blackwell, Oxford 1983.
Ferro, Marc, 'The Birth of the Soviet Bureaucratic System 1 in 
Reconsiderations on the Russian Revolution, Banff, 1976.
Fitzpatrick, Sheila, The Commissariat of the Enlightenment, CUP 
1970.
Fitzpatrick, Sheila, The Russian Revolution, OUP, 1982.
Getzler, Israel, Martov: A Political Biography of a Russian 
Social Democrat, CUP, 1967.
Goldman, Emma, My Disillusionment in Russia, London 1923.
Gorky, Maksim, History of the Civil War in the USSR, vol.2, 
London 1947.
Hamm, Michael F., 'The Breakdown of Urban Modernisation: A 
Prelude to the Revolution of 1917', in The City in Russian 
History, Kentucky 1976.
Hammond, T.T., Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution, 1893-1917, 
New York 1957.
Harding, Neil, Lenin's Political Thought, vol.2, Theory and 
Practice in the Socialist Revolution, Macmillan 1981.
Harrison, Marguerite E., Marooned in Moscow, New York 1921.
Kautsky, Karl, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Ann Arbor, 
1964.
Koenker, Diane, 'The Evolution of Party Consciousness in 1917: 
The Case of the Moscow Workers', Soviet Studies, XXX, 1, Januarp 
1978, pp.38-62.
Leggett, George, The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police, OUP, 1981. 
Leites, K., Recent Economic Developments in Russia, Oxford 1922.
Lewin, Moshe, Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates 
Pluto Press, London 1975.
- 512 -
Lewin, Moshe, 'The Social Background of Stalinism', in R.C. 
Tucker (ed), Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation, New York 1977. ————————————————————————————
Liebman, Marcel, Leninism Under Lenin, (trans Brian Pearce), 
Merlin Press, London 1980.
Lukacs, Georg, 'Towards a Methodology of the Problem of 
Organisation 1 , in History and Class Consciousness, Merlin Press, 
London 1971.
Mallet, Serge, Bureaucracy and Technocracy in the Socialist 
Countries, Spokesman Books, London 1974.
Maximoff, G.P., The Guillotine at Work, vol.1, The Leninist 
Counter-Revolution, Cienfuegos Press, Orkney 1979.
Medvedev, Roy, The October Revolution, Constable, London 1979.
Medvedev, Roy, On Socialist Democracy, Spokesman Books, London 
1975.
Nove, Alec, 'Socialism, Centralised Planning and the One-Party 
State', in Rigby, T.H., Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway (eds), 
Authority, Power and Politics in the USSR, Macmillan 1980.
Ransome, Arthur, Six Weeks in Russia in 1919, London 1919.
Rigby, T.H., Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967, 
Princeton 1968.
Roberts, P.C., '"War Communism": A Re-evaluation', Slavic Review, 
June 1970, pp.238-61.
Rosmer, Alfred, Lenin's Moscow, Pluto Press, London 1971.
Russell, Bertrand, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, London 
1920.
Schapiro, Leonard, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: 
Political Opposition in the Soviet State, 1917-1922,London 1955.
Party of the USSRSchlesinger, Rudolf, History of the Communist 
Past and Present, Orient Longman, 1977.
Serge, Victor, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 1901-1941 (trans Peter 
Sedgwick), OUP 1967.
Service, Robert, The Bolshevik Party in Revolution, 1917-1923: 
A Study in Organisational Change, Macmillan 1979.
Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions, CUP 1979.
Sorenson, J.B., The Life and Death of Soviet Trade Unionism, 
1917-1928, Atherton, New York, 1969.
- 513 -
Szamuely, Laszlo, First Models of the Socialist Economic Systems: 
Principles and Theories, Budapest 1974.
Trotsky, L.D., The New Course, London 1956.
Trotsky, L.D., The Revolution Betrayed, New park Publications, 
London 1973.
Wells, H.G., Russia in the Shadows, London 1920.
Ziegler, C.E., 'Worker Participation and Worker Discontent in the 
Soviet Union 1 , Political Science Quarterly, Summer 1983, pp.235-
c ~»53.
